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In light of rising numbers in the global refugee population, as well as new ideas for 
reforming the international refugee regime that emphasize refugee containment, there is reason to 
reaffirm refugee resettlement as a solid mechanism for burden-sharing, and perhaps the only 
obtainable durable solution for refugees in a protracted refugee situation. Canada has operated a 
robust refugee resettlement program for decades and is now presenting its private sponsorship of 
refugees program as a model to the rest of the world. Despite the significance of Canada’s 
resettlement program, both domestically and internationally, few studies have investigated how 
the program is deployed on the ground and how it is integrated within Canada’s legal system. 
This dissertation explores, through empirical methodologies, how Canada’s refugee resettlement 
framework operates as a legal process, with a focus on visa officer first instance decision-making 
and judicial review. The dissertation also investigates the role of refugee resettlement within 
Canada’s broader refugee policy and explores the evolving dynamics within the private 
sponsorship of refugees program. 
The analysis relies primarily on a dataset of 403 Federal Court judicial review court files 
submitted by rejected resettlement applicants between 2011 and 2015. The data on visa officer 
decision-making reveals concerning trends in various areas of decision-making, including 
documenting decisions, assessing credibility, assessing objective evidence, and dealing with 
language barriers and gender-based claims. The data also shows problematic interpretations of 
legislative criteria, including local integration, successful establishment, and inadmissibility. 
These shortcomings have serious consequences for refugee applicants, who are entitled to a fair 
and accurate decision, but also for sponsors in Canada, whose commitment for sponsorship may 
fade in the face of repeated problematic decisions. 
The analyses of judicial review outcomes show that leave grant rates are much higher in 
overseas refugee cases than in inland cases. The data also shows that some extra-legal factors, 
including lawyer experience and city of filing, are correlated to variations in outcomes. The wide 
variation in grant rates among individual Federal Court judges observed in the inland refugee 
context is also partly reflected in the dataset. In a more general sense, the data suggests that 
judicial review plays a limited role in the refugee resettlement program because of various legal 
and practical factors. Very few resettlement applicants have the financial or informational 
resources to pursue judicial review. As such, judicial review is an inaccessible avenue for the vast 
majority of resettlement applicants. Access to judicial review is further limited by the leave 
requirement, which deprives more than a third of applicants from having their case heard on the 
merits. In addition, the government settles out of court a surprisingly high proportion of cases. 
This practice raises concerns around IRCC’s potential use of case settlement as a method to 
insulate objectionable practices from judicial and public scrutiny, and avoid restrictive 
precedents.  
Considering the important practical difficulties refugee applicants face in accessing 
judicial review, this dissertation suggests that the most promising avenue for improving the legal 
infrastructure of refugee resettlement is to strengthen first instance decision-making through 
administrative changes. A few recommendations are offered in this regard, including increasing 
visa officer training, reverting to the automatic internal review of refusals, and instituting audio 
recording of interviews. I also argue that two regulatory changes are needed in order to bring 
Canada’s resettlement framework more in line with UNHCR guidelines and the principle of 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 2018, OpenCanada1  published the story of Yassin, a Syrian refugee. Yassin was a staff 
sergeant in the Syrian army who deserted in 2012 after receiving orders to fire on unarmed 
demonstrators. As he was travelling to his home Idlib province, he was ordered off a bus and 
arrested. In detention, he was tortured and forced to sit cross-legged continually for years. 
Eventually, he was released back to the army. Yassin, who had been rendered disabled as a 
result of extreme abuse in prison, was given a two-week leave to recover from his injuries. 
During his leave, he deserted once more. Eventually, he paid a smuggler to take him, his wife, 
and his son to Turkey. In Turkey, the Turkish Red Crescent visited his neighbourhood. Seeing 
that Yassin was disabled and with a family, he was referred to the International Organization 
for Migration for resettlement abroad. He, his wife and their son were eventually selected to be 
resettled to Canada through the Blended Visa Office Referred program and matched with the 
Beaches Presbyterian Church, a private sponsorship group in Toronto. Yassin and his family 
were interviewed, in person, in Adana in December 2015. The interview was conducted through 
an English-Arabic interpreter. During the interview, the visa officer asked Yassin what his 
duties were in the Syrian army. Yassin answered that he was a “fitness and marching coach” at 
the “department of missiles management.” Twenty months passed without Yassin hearing back 
from Canadian immigration officials. He was eventually interviewed again, this time on the 
phone, and was asked to provide more details about his duties in the army. Yassin responded as 
he did the first time, that he was a physical fitness trainer at the “department of missiles 
managements.” The visa officer took issue with this answer. As it turns out, the interpreter at 
the first interview misquoted Yassin as saying that he trained soldiers on how to use missiles. 
Ultimately, Yassin was denied resettlement for having provided contradictory testimony. The 
visa officer notes state that Yassin had not indicated “any difficulty in understanding the 
translator or in having the translator understand you.” As the journalist points out, even if 
Yassin could properly understand the interpreter, how could he possibly assess the accuracy of 
the translation? 
 
Emails to reconsider the case were sent to the Canadian mission in Turkey by Yassin’s sponsor 
to no avail. However, after the sponsor group hired a lawyer and commenced judicial review 
proceedings, the Canadian government opted to put an end to the litigation and consider the 
matter afresh. On redetermination by a different visa officer, Yassin was asked to clarify his 
involvement in the army, which he did in writing with the help of his legal team. Ultimately, the 
application was approved, and Yassin arrived in Canada in November 2020. 
 
Yassin was lucky he was selected for resettlement to Canada. Resettlement is offered to less than 
1% of the world’s refugee population. Yassin was also lucky that his sponsor had the resources 
to challenge the decision in Canadian courts. The vast majority of rejected refugees do not have 
sufficient means to challenge visa officer decisions. How many resettlement applicants are in 
Yassin’s position, but lack the resources to seek judicial review? 
                                                   
1 Gareth Chantler, “Canada’s Missing Syrians”, (May 14 2018), online: 
<https://www.opencanada.org/features/canadas-missing-syrians/#part-one-yassin>; Gareth Chantler, 







The global refugee crisis is one of the most critical challenges of our time. At the end of 2019, 
there were 79.5 million people forcibly displaced persons globally because of violence, 
persecution, or armed conflict - the highest number ever recorded. 2  Anti-immigrant and 
isolationist ideologies are on the rise worldwide, and states are increasingly withdrawing from 
their obligations under international refugee law. The 1951 Refugee Convention3 has proven 
insufficient to provide protection and durable solutions to the world’s refugees. As the 
Convention fails to enshrine the concept of burden-sharing into international law, the 
responsibility of protecting refugees is disproportionately falling on developing countries in the 
Global South who receive the vast majority of refugee flows as an accident of geography. At the 
same time, policies in the Global North further restrict the rights of asylum seekers and 
increasingly “push the border out.”4 
 
Refugee resettlement refers to the transfer of refugees from a state where they have sought 
protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them with permanent residence status.5 
Refugee resettlement exists outside the obligations established by the Refugee Convention. It is 
a voluntary act on the part of a state, distinct from a state’s international obligation to grant 
status to refugees who enter its territory. Resettlement is nonetheless a fundamental component 
of the international refugee regime. It is considered one of three ‘durable solutions’, along with 
local integration and voluntary repatriation. Few refugees are offered resettlement - only 0.449% 
                                                   
2 UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019” (Statistics and Demographics Section, 2020) at 2 
[“Global Trends 2019”]. 
3 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954). 
4 See Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, “Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of 
Refugee Exclusion” (Harvard Law School, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program, 2013). 
5 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011) at 2.  
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of the global refugee population in 2019. Despite this, refugee resettlement is a fundamental 
component of the international response to the global refugee crisis. Historically, the states that 
typically engage in refugee resettlement have primarily been those states of the Global North 
that receive relatively few spontaneous asylum seeker arrivals. As such, refugee resettlement is 
an important mechanism through which states offer not only protection but also contribute to 
global burden-sharing. The significance of refugee resettlement is highlighted, and challenged, 
by numerous ‘new’ initiatives that seek to formalize containment in the region of origin as the 
way forward. Such arrangements, critical refugee scholars have argued, are ethically dubious 
and unlikely to achieve meaningful results.6 Especially considering that over 77% of refugees 
are living in a protracted refugee situation with no solution in sight,7 I maintain throughout this 
dissertation that refugee resettlement should be reinvigorated and its role in the international 
refugee regime strengthened. 
 
Canada has operated a robust resettlement system for decades. Between 2004 and 2018, Canada 
was the country resettling the second-most refugees per year, only behind the United States.8 In 
recent years, resettlement admissions to Canada have increased, and admissions to the United 
States have fallen drastically, resulting in Canada becoming the top resettlement country since 
2018. The Canadian government and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are 
currently deploying an initiative to ‘export’ Canada’s unique private sponsorship of refugees 
                                                   
6 See Jennifer Hyndman, “Global Compacts or Containment? Geopolitics by Design”, in Howayda Al-
Harithy, ed, Urban Recovery: Intersecting Displacement with Post War Reconstruction, Abingdon: Routledge 
[forthcoming in 2021]. 
7 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 2 at 24. 




model to foreign jurisdictions.9 This initiative was formed in the aftermath of Canada’s much-
publicized private sponsorship of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees between 2015 and 2017. 
The Canadian contribution to the global resettlement program has been significant and has 
essentially enabled the global resettlement program to maintain steady admission levels, despite 
drastic decreases in resettlement admissions to the United States since 2016.  
 
Despite the significance of Canada’s resettlement program both domestically and 
internationally, surprisingly few studies have been conducted on how the program operates on 
the ground and how it is integrated within Canada’s legal system. Such an inquiry is important 
as Canada seeks to present its Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program as a model for 
the rest of the world to emulate. 
 
In Canada, research in refugee law has focused almost exclusively on inland refugee status 
determination, administered by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (IRB). These studies have focused, for example, on legal, cultural and 
psychological issues in the refugee determination process,10 the treatment of evidence by RPD 
members,11 RPD members’ perception of their role as decision-makers and the issue of “critical 
                                                   
9 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, News Release, “Canada, UNHCR & the Open Society 
Foundations Seek to Increase Refugee Resettlement through Private Sponsorship” (19 Sept 2016); Jennifer 
Bond, Ania Kwadrans, “Resettling Refugees through Community Sponsorship: A Revolutionary Operational 
Approach Built on Traditional Legal Infrastructure” (2019) 35:2 Refugee 86; Craig Damian Smith, “A Model 
for the World? Policy Transfer Theory and the Challenges to ‘Exporting’ Private Sponsorship to Europe” in 
Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron (eds), Strangers to Neighbours: Refugee Sponsorship in Context 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University, 2020. 
10 Cécile Rousseau et al, “The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 
Decision-making process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board” (2002) 15:1 J Refugee Stud 43. 
11 France Houle, “Le fonctionnement du régime de preuve libre dans un système non-expert : le traitement 
symptomatique des preuves par la Section de la protection des réfugiés” (2004) 38 RJT 263. 
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space” at the RPD, 12  the “managerialization” of the refugee determination process, 13 
inconsistencies in decision-making,14 the role of counsel in RPD hearings,15 the issue of trauma, 
memory, and disclosure capacity during RPD hearings, 16  the application of the concept of 
“subjective fear” by RPD members,17 the treatment of Hungarian Romani refugee claimants,18 
RPD member appointment,19 the use of guidelines by RPD members,20 access to legal aid and 
access to justice,21  and the consequences of the mandatory detention of designated foreign 
nationals,22  to name a few. This scholarly output has contributed to efforts to improve the 
reliability and fairness of the refugee status determination system.23  
                                                   
12 François Crépeau & Delphine Nakache, “Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee Determination System: 
1989-2002” (2008) 20:1 Intl J Refugee L 50. 
13 Dagmar Soennecken, “The Managerialization of Refugee Determinations in Canada” (2013) 84:2 Dr et soc 
291. 
14 Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39 Ottawa L Rev 335 
[“Troubling Patterns”]; Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” 
(2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 1 [“Luck of the Draw”]. 
15 Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical 
Assessment” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71. 
16 Jane Herlihy & Stuart W Turner, “Asylum claims and memory of trauma: sharing our knowledge” (2007) 
191 Brit J Psychiatry 3; Cécile Rousseau, & Patricia Foxen, “Look Me in the Eye: Empathy and the 
Transmission of Trauma in the Refugee Determination Process” (2010) 47:1 Transcultural Psychiatry 70; 
Diana Bögner, Jane Herlihy & Chris R Brewin, “Impact of sexual violence on disclosure during Home Office 
interviews” (2007) 191 Brit J Psychiatry 75. 
17 Michael Bossin & Laila Demirdache, “A Canadian Perspective on the Subjective Component of the 
Bipartite Test for ‘Persecution’: Time for Re-evaluation” (2004) 22 Refuge 108; Hilary Evans Cameron, 
“Risk Theory and ‘Subjective Fear’: The Role of Risk Perception, Assessment and Management in Refugee 
Status Determinations” (2008) 20:4 Intl J Refugee L 567. 
18 J Beaudoin, J Danch & S Rehaag, “No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in Canada” (2015) 
11:3 Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series no 12. 
19 Jacqueline Bonisteel, “Ministerial Influence at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board: The Case for 
Institutional Bias” (2010) 27:1 Refuge 103. 
20 France Houle & Lorne Sossin, “Tribunals and guidelines: Exploring the relationship between fairness and 
legitimacy in administrative decision-making” (2006) 49:3 Can Pub Admin 282. 
21  Jennifer Bond & David Wiseman, “Shortchanging Justice: The Arbitrary Relationship Between Refugee 
System Reform and Federal Legal Aid Funding” (2014) 91:3 Can Bar Rev 583; Emily Bates, Jennifer Bond & 
David Wiseman, “Troubling Signs: Mapping Access to Justice in Canada’s Refugee System Reform” (2016) 
47:1 Ottawa L Rev 5. 
22  Jennifer Bond, “Failure to Report: The Manifestly Unconstitutional Nature of the Human Smugglers Act” 
(2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377.  
23 For example, empirical evidence of wide grant rate disparities amongst IRB members in Rehaag, 
“Troubling Patterns”, supra note 14, has lent support to calls for the implementation of the refugee appeal 
division at the IRB and for the elimination of political appointments of IRB members. Both changes were 




In comparison, the literature on decision-making in Canada’s refugee resettlement program is 
remarkably thin. The bulk of recent resettlement studies have focused not on how the 
resettlement program unfolds on the ground, but on the historical and political context of 
resettlement policy in Canada, newcomer integration and evolving dynamics and challenges in 
the private sponsorship program. Yet, refugee decision-making in the resettlement program 
presents much of the same challenges, and refused refugee applicants face risks that are just as 
serious. Furthermore, the Canadian resettlement framework combines a number of unique 
characteristics that pose additional challenges in terms of decision-making, including the lack of 
administrative independence of decision-makers, the lack of appeal mechanisms and difficulties 
accessing judicial review, the lack of procedural protections for refugee applicants, the lack of 
legal representation, and the fact that decision-makers deal with a large caseload and receive 
only cursory training in refugee law. As new refugee policies are being developed and existing 
ones are being reconsidered or revised, there is a pressing need for studies examining how 
Canada’s resettlement policy is deployed as an administrative legal process. 
 
In particular, in light of reports highlighting serious problems in the quality of visa officer 
decision-making in the resettlement program, 24  there is a need for a detailed, empirical 
assessment of how refugee resettlement decisions are made. Important sources of information 
remain untapped by researchers. For instance, visa officers’ decisions and other documents 
produced by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) in the course of individual 
                                                   
24 See for example Canadian Council for Refugees, “Disturbing Upsurge in Rejections Rates of Eritrean 
Refugees in Cairo by Canada” (November 2009), online: <https://ccrweb.ca/en/bulletin/09/11/30>; Canadian 




resettlement applications have not been systematically examined. Similarly, very little attention 
has been paid to either judicial review decisions rendered by the Federal Court in the context of 
refugee resettlement decisions, or the role of judicial review in the resettlement program. It is 
also worth mentioning that no study has attempted to compare and contrast resettlement 
decision-making with inland refugee decision-making. Although both systems rely on different 
legal foundations and have at least partially distinct objectives, a comparison of both systems 
can serve to put both processes into perspective and identify avenues for improvement. 
  
The dearth of scholarship on refugee resettlement decision-making can be attributed to a number 
of factors. Resettlement decisions happen abroad and are rarely judicially reviewed by the 
Federal Court.25 Information on assessments made by visa officers is not easily accessible. As a 
discretionary program, refugee resettlement has traditionally been considered legally thin by 
legal scholars, and not amenable to substantive and procedural legal inquiries.26 In addition, 
refugee sponsor organizations, who normally submit sponsorship applications without the 
assistance of lawyers, have sometimes been reluctant to participate in legal research and legal 
advocacy, both enterprises being perceived as potentially leading to further legalization of the 
sponsorship system or antagonizing the government.27 
 
                                                   
25 From 2010 to 2015, a total of 403 judicial reviews of resettlement decisions were initiated before the 
Federal Court. By comparison, during the same period, 24,293 judicial review applications of inland refugee 
claims were initiated: Federal Court, Statistics, online: 
<http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Statistics>. It should be noted however that 
this figure, reported by the Federal Court, includes a number of judicial reviews of other proceedings, 
including Humanitarian and Compassionate applications and Pre-Removal Risk Assessments. See Rehaag, 
“Luck of the Draw”, supra note 14 at 21-22. 
26 See, for example, Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) at 8-10. 
27 Ibid. See also Ashley Chapman, “Private Sponsorship and Public Policy: Political Barriers to Church-




The objective of this dissertation is to engage in a detailed analysis of decision-making practices 
in the refugee resettlement program and to assess the role played by judicial review in the 
deployment of refugee resettlement policy. This dissertation further seeks to situate resettlement 
within refugee Canada’s refugee policy, and to engage in broader debates regarding the role of 
resettlement within the international refugee regime. My research thus engages with three 
distinct bodies of literature: the literature on the development and future of the international 
refugee regime, the literature on substantive refugee law and first instance refugee status 
decision-making, and the administrative law literature on the role of judicial review.  
 
My empirical analysis is based primarily on a quantitative and qualitative review of 403 case 
files of rejected refugee applicants who sought judicial review before the Federal Court between 
2011 and 2015 (393 PSR cases and 10 GAR cases). I analyze both how refugee applications 
were decided by IRCC visa officers and how judicial review applications were decided at the 
Federal Court. I also review a number of reports prepared by the UNHCR and various Canadian 
organizations, as well guidelines, evaluation reports, training material, and statistic reports 
prepared by the Government of Canada. 
  
The first two substantive chapters of this dissertation provide the historical, international, and 
legal context of this study, and seek to situate the role of third country resettlement within the 
broader international refugee framework. Chapter 2 focuses on the development of the 
international refugee regime. This chapter begins with a short review of the antecedents of 
international refugee law, including the emergence and collapse of the interwar refugee regime 
under the League of Nations. This is followed by a more in-depth discussion of the development 
of the current international framework, centring around the 1951 Convention relating to the 
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Status of Refugees and the UNHCR. Throughout the review of these international developments, 
particular attention is paid to how durable solutions and global burden-sharing are 
conceptualized in international refugee law. The role of resettlement today is further explored 
through a discussion of rising anti-immigrant sentiments, state retrenchment from international 
refugee law obligations, and the Global Compact on Refugees. I conclude Chapter 2 with a 
review of contemporary resettlement statistics. The numbers tell a sad story. Refugee 
resettlement is offered only to a small proportion of the millions of refugees in need of a durable 
solution. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the development of Canadian refugee policy, its relationship to the 
international refugee regime, and sets out the current Canadian legal framework of refugee 
resettlement. The chapter begins with a historical review of Canadian refugee policy that shows 
that, until the late 1970s, refugee resettlement initiatives were implemented through ad hoc 
government orders-in-council. Critics of Canada’s refugee policy during this period argue that 
admissions were guided not only by humanitarian concerns, but also economic and ideologic 
ones. In fact, Canada did not participate meaningfully in the interwar refugee regime under the 
League of Nations and did not engage in significant refugee resettlement until the 1950s. I then 
address the formalization of refugee policy in Canada for both overseas and inland claimants 
and the establishment of the private sponsorship of refugees program through the 1976 
Immigration Act. The remainder of Chapter 3 addresses the transition to the 2001 Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the current legal framework of refugee resettlement, 
with a focus on eligibility criteria and application procedures. I highlight in this section a few 
problematic features of the framework, such as the prior UNHCR documentation requirement 
and the successful establishment criteria, both of which appear to be inconsistent with the 
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objectives of refugee protection. I also present various statistics to situate the Canadian 
resettlement program within its broader international context. I then move on to a discussion of 
judicial review as the only recourse available to resettlement applicants whose application is 
rejected by a visa officer. The last section of Chapter 3 canvasses concerns expressed by refugee 
organizations and results of government evaluations regarding the implementation of the 
refugee resettlement program. This last section, which focuses on slow processing times, high 
refusal rates, and problems in decision-making, sets the table for the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the dissertation’s methodology, which centres around an analysis of a dataset 
of 403 rejected resettlement applications. Chapter 5 and 6 lay out my empirical findings, with 
Chapter 5 focusing on visa officer decision-making and Chapter 6 on judicial review. Chapter 5 
begins with an overview of the dataset, including countries of origin, countries of asylum, type 
of application, application grounds, and refusal grounds. This is followed by a detailed 
assessment of various substantive and procedural shortcomings in visa officer decision-making 
identified in the dataset. These sections form the bulk of the dissertation. My analysis identifies 
a number of shortcomings, including poorly-documented decisions, boilerplate decision-
making, failures in taking into account language barriers and vulnerability at the interview, 
flawed approaches to credibility determination, problematic evaluations of integration potential, 
and problematic approaches to gender-based claims. Visa officers were also found to be making 
frequent factual errors in their review of testimony, personal documentation, and objective 
country documentation. My analysis makes extensive reference to visa officer notes and 
decision letters, as well as IRCC and UNHCR guidelines. My findings are troubling, and 
confirm many of the concerns expressed by the refugee sponsorship community over the past 
three decades. I claim that these problems develop and persist in large part because the 
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resettlement program operates outside public and legal scrutiny. In light of the findings, I 
propose a number of administrative recommendations that would lead to improved decision-
making, including improvements in training and workload, as well as the establishment of an 
automatic internal review of all negative cases. I also invite IRCC to reconsider its policy 
position on local integration in light of UNHCR principles. Finally, I propose two regulatory 
changes, namely the elimination of the successful establishment criteria and the elimination of 
the UNHCR/state refugee documentation criteria for refugees sponsored by certain types of 
sponsor groups. 
 
Chapter 6 presents various quantitative and qualitative analyses on the operation of judicial 
review in the refugee resettlement context through an exploration of the outcome of the 403 
cases in my dataset. I assess variation in outcomes based on a number of factors, including 
country of origin, city of filing, experience of counsel, and various judge-centred characteristics. 
Throughout the analysis, I compare judicial review outcomes of overseas refugee applicants 
with that of inland refugee claimants. A central finding of my examination of judicial review 
applicants is that very few rejected resettlement applicants, and virtually no applicants from the 
Government-Assisted Refugee (GAR) stream, apply for judicial review at the Federal Court. I 
argue that this is because very few refugees abroad have the financial and informational 
resources required to initiate costly court proceedings. These practical hurdles in accessing 
Canada’s legal system are exacerbated by the fact that resettlement applicants must obtain leave 
before proceeding to a hearing on the merits. As such, refugee resettlement applicants face an 
important access-to-justice barrier. In the resettlement context, judicial review does not play its 
traditional role of correcting individual injustices and acting as an ongoing check on government 
decision-making. In fact, it is surprising how little impact courts have had on the resettlement 
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program as compared to Canada’s inland refugee system. This, I argue, is linked to the Federal 
Court’s position on the extraterritoriality of the Charter and its deferential approach to visa 
officer decision. In addition, and precisely because of the deferential approach of Federal Court 
judges in the refugee resettlement context, it is surprising to observe that both leave grant rates 
and ultimate grant rates are much higher for resettlement cases than they are for inland refugee 
cases. This is evidence, I maintain, of the comparatively poor quality of resettlement decisions. 
It is also surprising to observe that a very high proportion of cases - including the most 
meritorious cases - are settled out of court by the government, a practice that limits the court’s 
ability to provide meaningful oversight. I make two recommendations with regard to judicial 
review that would increase access to justice for rejected resettlement applicants. First, the 
former practice of exempting refugee resettlement applicants from the leave requirement should 
be reintroduced. Given the high success rate of resettlement judicial reviews, confirmed 
problems in decision-making, and the serious consequence of erroneous refusals, the argument 
that the leave requirement is necessary to prevent “unnecessary litigation” is an unconvincing 
one.28 In addition, I argue that steps should be undertaken at the administrative level to inform 
applicants of their options in terms of judicial review. 
 
The results of this dissertation suggest that the legal infrastructure of refugee resettlement needs 
to be strengthened. The various deficiencies identified in this research in terms of administrative 
decision-making and access to judicial review have various consequences. Certainly, erroneous 
refusals lead to catastrophic outcomes for refugees abroad who lack a durable solution. 
                                                   
28 See Canadian Bar Association, National Citizenship and Immigration Law Section, Response to Building 
on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: White Paper for Immigration and Refugee Policy and 




Furthermore, erroneous refusals increase program costs and risk stymying sponsor enthusiasm 
over the long term. 
 
Any discussion of refugee resettlement, especially one that aims at reforming or reinvigorating 
refugee resettlement, must grapple with the broader context of the international refugee regime. 
Advocates and humanitarians promoting refugee resettlement need to reckon with the potential 
pitfalls of national refugee resettlement initiatives. In Canada and elsewhere, governments have 
at times used resettlement initiatives as a ‘humanitarian alibi’ to justify restrictions to their 
inland asylum system. Legal scholars looking into refugee resettlement also need to recognize 
that increased juridification may be counter-productive, especially in the largely volunteer-run 
private sponsorship of refugees program. That being said, the proposals I forward in this 
dissertation are rather modest in scope. They should not lead to significantly increased costs or 
complexity. 
 
My approach to this research is informed by my practical legal experience in refugee 
resettlement. In 2015-2018, I have acted as a legal expert with the Refugee Sponsorship Support 
Program (RSSP) and was part of the Advisory Committee for the RSSP Toronto Chapter. I have 
also provided clinical supervision to law students at Osgoode Hall Law School participating in 
refugee resettlement casework with the International Refugee Assistance Project and have 
participated in the implementation at York University of a refugee sponsorship program in 
partnership with the Ryerson University Lifeline Syria Challenge. In addition, I have had the 




Much of what I write in this dissertation is critical of Canada’s refugee resettlement program. I 
want to state here that I undertake this research with a firm belief in the important contribution 
Canada provides through the refugee resettlement program to global refugee protection and 
burden-sharing. My primary motivation for pursuing this research stems from the conviction 
that increased scrutiny of decision-making in the resettlement system will lead to more accurate 
decision-making and an improved government-sponsors relationship, and help align the 
program with its humanitarian objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the international context in which the Canadian 
resettlement program operates. The international refugee regime is a complex structure that 
consists of international institutions, international treaties, regional treaties, declarations, 
guidelines, and discretionary state practices that emerged and evolved in the 20th century.1 At 
the centre of the international refugee regime is the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 2 (as modified by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees3) and the work 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This chapter shows that the 
international refugee regime suffers from two fundamental flaws: there exists no normative 
framework for global burden-sharing, and states routinely, with impunity, prevent asylum 
seekers from reaching their territory. As a result, the vast majority of refugees remain in the 
Global South, without a durable solution, while the population of refugees living in a protracted 
refugee situation grows. Throughout this chapter, I make the argument that, in the context of the 
seemingly intractable challenges of the international refugee regime, refugee resettlement has 
the potential to fill an important protection gap and accomplish meaningful and impactful 
burden-sharing.  
 
This chapter begins with a review of how the international refugee regime emerged, evolved, 
and collapsed in the first half of the 20th century. In the second part of this chapter, I review the 
                                                   
1 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005) at 70 [The Rights of Refugees]. 
2 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) 
[Refugee Convention]. 




development of international refugee institutions and legal instruments in the post-Second 
World War period, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1950 UNHCR Statute. This 
is followed by a third section where I discuss the modern conceptualization of the three durable 
solutions (repatriation, resettlement and local integration), and their relationship with norms of 
international refugee law. I also explore how changes in geopolitics have influenced policy on 
durable solutions. In a fourth section, I engage with three distinct but related developments in 
refugee protection that highlight the shortcomings of international refugee law and reveal the 
significance and fragility of refugee resettlement in the global refugee regime. This begins with 
the question of burden-sharing. I analyze the consequences of the lack of a normative 
framework for burden-sharing on refugee protection and explore the significance and 
shortcomings of the recent Global Compact on Refugees. I then address the question of the rise 
of anti-immigrant sentiment globally, and its impact on refugee resettlement. Particular attention 
is paid to drastic reductions in resettlement to the United States under the Trump administration. 
The question of the proliferation of non-entrée regimes, and their relationship to refugee 
resettlement, is discussed next. Following this discussion of some of the regime’s systemic 
flaws, I undertake to explain why studying decision-making, as I do in this dissertation, matters. 
In the last section of this chapter, I will present a snapshot of the current global refugee 
situation, and the role refugee resettlement currently plays in the international community’s 
response to the refugee crisis. 
 
2.2 The emergence and collapse of the interwar international refugee regime 
The law of asylum was only written in the 20th century.4 It would be a mistake however to 
describe forced migration movements as a 20th century phenomenon. Forced migration 
                                                   
4 Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol 1 (Leyden: AW Sijthoff, 1966) at 9. 
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movements are not new, nor have they ever been limited to a particular geopolitical context.5 
The first recorded use of term “refugee” dates back to the late 17th century, describing 
Huguenots, or French Protestants, who fled France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 
1685.6 It was also during this period that early writers of international law Hugo Grotius and 
Emer de Vattel first developed the doctrine of asylum.7 Both Grotius and Vattel recognized the 
right of individuals to expatriate themselves and the right of states to grant asylum.8 It is also 
worth noting that early legal developments at the national and international levels paved the way 
for the emergence of the international refugee regime and for international human rights law 
generally, including “friendship, commerce and navigation” in the 19th century and minority 
treaties in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.9 
 
In the early 20th century, a convergence of factors led to the idea that refugees were a special 
                                                   
5 See Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 32-33. See also Alexander Betts & Paul Collier, Refuge: 
Transforming a Broken Refugee System (London: Random House, 2017) at 4. 
6 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995) at 13-15. See also Alessandra Roversi, “The Evolution of the Refugee Regime and Institutional 
Responses: Legacies from the Nansen Period” (2003) 22 Refugee Surv Q 21 at 32. 
7 See Grahl-Madsen, supra note 4 at 9 
8 See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, “Asylum as a General Principle of International Law” (2015) 27:1 Intl J 
Refugee L 3. 
9 For instance, various domestic and international rules were adopted in attempts to reconcile the need for 
immigration, commerce and international investment, with existing rules of exclusion. In the 19th century, 
treaties of “friendship, commerce, and navigation” were common throughout Europe and were widely 
implemented in domestic law. These “alien law” treaties were normally instigated by states heavily involved 
in international commerce and guaranteed basic rights for alien traders such as the recognition of juridical 
personality, respect of life and physical integrity, personal liberty and freedom of movement. These treaties 
formed the first international system limiting the absolute discretion of states in the treatment of individuals 
on their territory. In the aftermath of the First World War, but before the adoption of refugee agreements, the 
League of Nations developed a system of protection of minorities. The goal of these minority treaties was to 
compel vanquished states to respect certain rights of ethnic and religious minorities, such as access to public 
employment, the right to distinct education and cultural institutions, and language rights. Minority treaties 
were a significant advancement in that they established, for the first time, a system of external scrutiny of a 
state’s treatment of its citizens. See Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 76-81. For a discussion 
of earlier legal developments in the law of asylum, see Grahl-Madsen, supra note 4 at 10-11; Cécile 
Mondonico-Torri, “Les réfugiés en France sous la Monarchie de Juillet: L'impossible Statut” (2000) 47:4 Rev 
hist mod & contemp 731 at 736; Guy S Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 
3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 37-38. 
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category of migrants deserving of special treatment and international protection. One of these 
factors is the appearance of restrictive migration controls.10 In the 20th century, international 
movement and residence throughout Europe became increasingly difficult without a valid travel 
document.11  Hathaway explains that, until the First World War, there were very few restrictions 
on international migration. Most European refugees were able to find a place of refuge, for 
example, in the Americas.12 This system of free movement, Hathaway explains, came to an 
abrupt end in the 1920s, when the rise in economic and political nationalism in Europe 
coincided with a sharp increase in the numbers of refugees.13 As nations established passport 
controls and restricted admission, refugees were no longer free to establish themselves in a place 
of safety.14 British dominions as well as the United States instituted restrictive immigration 
measures designed to limit immigration to people of British background.15 The United States, 
which was the world’s foremost country of migration in the 1910s with almost one million 
admissions per year, reduced annual entries to 165,000 by 1924.16 The emergence of restrictive 
immigration policies in the 20th century also coincides with the emergence of the welfare system 
in Europe. As states became more financially involved in the welfare of their population, they 
became increasingly concerned with the perceived additional burden of refugees.17 
                                                   
10 See Loescher, supra note 5 at 36. See also Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 83; Daniel 
Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018) at 28-31. 
11 Skran, supra note 6 at 14. 
12 James Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-1950” (1984) 33 Intl & 
Comp L Rev 348 at 348 [“The Evolution of Refugee Status”]. See also Jennifer Hyndman, Managing 
Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000) at 6-7 [Managing Displacement]. For an insightful history of the colonial roots of the emergence of 
immigration controls, see Radhika Mongia, Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the 
Modern State (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Loescher, supra note 5 at 36. 
15 Skran, supra note 6 at 22. 
16 Tommie Sjöberg, The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938-1947 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991) at 33-34. 




Refugee scholars agree that the most determining factor in the emergence of the international 
refugee regime in the 1920s is the unprecedented size of the refugee crisis. These were caused 
by revolutionary changes, the collapse of multi-ethnic empires and the creation of nation-states 
along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines.18 
 
The over one million Russian refugees who fled Russia following the Russian revolution of 
1917 impacted Europe enormously.19 European countries, depleted by the First World War, 
were reluctant to assist Russian refugees, viewed as destabilizing elements.20 The situation of 
Russian refugees was exacerbated by a 1921 Soviet decree that stripped Russian citizenship 
from Russian expatriates who had left after November 1917 and from those who had been 
abroad for more than 5 years.21  Stateless Russian refugees could not benefit from the few 
protections and entitlements that existed under alien law, which were only extended to a 
nation’s subjects.22  
 
The interwar international refugee regime was established in 1921 with the creation of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees under the auspices of the newly-created League 
                                                   
18 The early 20th century saw the collapse of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Ottoman empires. 
Ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in the newly created nation-states became persecuted “political 
misfits.” Many attempted to relocate to a country where their group was the majority. This proved impossible 
for groups without a home state such as Armenians, Jews, and Romanis (ibid at 18-20). See also Loescher, 
supra note 5 at 34-36. It is interesting to note that, while the First World War caused massive population 
movements in Europe, these displacements were not long-lasting. Most displaced populations and combatants 
were able to return home relatively quickly (Skran, supra note 6 at 15). 
19 Skran, supra note 6 at 32-40. 
20 Roversi, supra note 6 at 23. 
21 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 351. 
22 Ibid at 84. 
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of Nations.23 Fridtjof Nansen served as High Commissioner for Refugees until his death in 1930. 
The office of the High Commissioner was created to assist a specific population, Russian 
refugees, and the institution was conceived as a temporary one.24 The High Commissioner’s 
budget, too, was ad hoc and never became permanent.25 The High Commissioner was tasked 
with securing legal status for refugees, helping them find work in their country of refuge, 
assisting their resettlement to other countries, and assisting in repatriation efforts.26 The delivery 
and funding of humanitarian relief continued to be left to voluntary organizations.27  
 
A major achievement of the High Commissioner in the 1920s was the creation of a framework 
to issue identity documents to refugees, the so-called “Nansen Passport”, first established 
through the 1922 Arrangement with regard to the issue of certificates of identification to 
Russian refugees.28 The Nansen Passport was treated by states as the functional equivalent of a 
national passport. They allowed Russian refugees to cross borders and essentially provided them 
                                                   
23 Voluntary organizations played a major role in the establishment of the regime. Voluntary organizations 
had traditionally played the role of providing humanitarian relief to refugees. In the early 1920s, with the 
quick rise in the number of Russian refugees in Europe, voluntary organizations quickly exhausted their 
resources. In 1921, the International Committee for the Red Cross formally pressed the newly created League 
of Nations to appoint a High Commissioner for Refugees. See Skran, supra note 6 at 84-85; Roversi, supra 
note 6 at 23. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain any provision for the protection of 
refugees (Peace Treaty of Versailles, Covenant of the League of Nations). The office of the High 
Commissioner of the League of Nations for Russian Refugees was established in 1921 under a creative 
reading of articles 23 and 25 of the Covenant. Article 23 provided that member states would “maintain and 
establish the necessary international organization” to “secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of 
labour for men, women, and children”, while Article 25 provided that member states would “promote the 
establishment co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes 
the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.” 
See Roversi, supra note 6 at 23-24. 
24 Roversi, ibid at 24. 
25 Ibid at 37. 
26 Ibid at 24. 
27 Loescher, supra note 5 at 37-38. 
28 Arrangement with regard to the issue of certificates of identification to Russian refugees, 5 July 1922, 
LNTS vol XIII no 355. 
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with a minimum of legal status, although not citizenship.29  
 
Not long after the Russian refugee crisis emerged, another massive refugee movement occurred 
as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922.30  The rise of the Third Reich in 
Germany in the 1930s caused further refugee movement in Europe. Four hundred thousand 
refugees, mostly Jews, but also socialists, Romas, LGBT persons and other minorities, fled 
Germany in the 1930s.31  Emerging fascist regimes in European countries, including Italy and 
Spain, also produced significant refugee movements in the 1920s and 1930s.32  
 
The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees underwent numerous deep 
transformations and mandate expansions as a result of the changing nature of the refugee 
population. In 1926, the mandate of the High Commissioner was expanded to include Armenian 
refugees.33 Four years later, in 1928, the mandate of the High Commissioner was again extended 
to other national categories of refugees, including Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldaean, Syrian, Kurdish, 
and Turkish refugees.34 The first League of Nations refugee agreements did not impose specific 
obligations on host states beyond the recognition of documentation issued by the High 
Commissioner. It was generally assumed that the refugee problem was temporary and states 
                                                   
29 Skran, supra note 6 at 104-09; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 85; Otto Hieronymi, “The 
Nansen Passport: A Tool of Freedom of Movement and of Protection” (2003) 22:1 Refugee Surv Q 36. 
30 Religious minorities who had enjoyed some form of protection under Ottoman rule were persecuted in the 
newly-formed nations of the Balkans. Many fled to France or to Bulgaria, but the majority fled to Greece, 
where refugees accounted for 20% of the total population in the mid-1920s. See Skran, supra note 6 at 45. 
31 Ibid at 48-56. 
32 Ibid at 56-59. 
33 Arrangement relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May 1926, 
2004 LNTS 48. 
34 Arrangement concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugee of Certain Measures taken in favour 
of Russian and Armenian Refugees, 30 June 1928, 2006 LNTS 65. 
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voluntarily afforded refugees relatively generous benefits.35 By the late 1920s, European states 
began to recognize the enduring nature of the refugee problem and increasingly refused to 
integrate refugees. This led to a shift in international refugee law and the adoption of agreements 
that imposed substantial obligations on states.36 
 
After the death of Nansen in 1930, the High Commissioner for refugees was integrated within 
the Secretariat of the League of Nations, which allowed for more long-term planning.37 In 1933, 
after the rise to power of the Nazi regime, a separate High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish 
and others) Coming from Germany mandated with the protection of German refugees was 
established outside the League of Nations.38 In an effort to antagonize Germany as little as 
possible, the resolution establishing the High Commissioner for German refugees prevented any 
action or even discussion related to the political root causes of the German refugee flow.39 In 
1938, following Germany’s exit from the League of Nations, the two institutions were fused. 
 
In 1933, the League of Nations Intergovernmental Commission acknowledged the need to 
codify international refugee law into a binding convention, leading to the adoption of the 1933 
Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees.40 The 1933 Convention, however, 
                                                   
35 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 86. 
36 For example, the 1928 Arrangement explicitly dealt with a number of refugee rights, such as access to the 
courts, the right to work, protection against expulsion and equal taxation. The standards contained in the 1928 
Arrangement were, however, framed as non-binding recommendations, and states, facing a shortage of public 
funds as a result of the Great Depression, did not implement them in any meaningful way (ibid). 
37 Roversi, supra note 6 at 26. 
38 Ibid at 28. 
39 Sjöberg, supra note 16 at 34. 
40 Hathaway explains the significance of the 1933 Convention in the following terms: 
The [1933 Convention] is one of the earliest examples of states agreeing to codify human 
rights as matters of binding international law. Equally important, it opened the door to a new 
way of thinking about the human rights of aliens. Aliens’ rights had previously been 
conceived to respond to a fixed set of circumstances, namely those typically encountered by 
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was ratified by only eight states and had little impact on the ground. The poor reception of states 
prompted the League of Nations to work towards developing still binding but lighter obligations 
in the 1936 Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from 
Germany. 41  As Hathaway explains, although the 1936 Arrangement contained fewer legal 
obligations for host states, only seven states ratified the agreement.42 
 
The limited success of efforts aimed at imposing even light obligations on host states led to a 
major shift in the international refugee regime: a solution to the refugee problem was to be 
sought by resettling to other states those refugees incapable of integrating into their host country 
of refuge. The 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany43 was 
the first international instrument to explicitly endorse settlement abroad as a solution to the 
refugee problem.44 
 
In 1938 also took place the Evian Conference, which resulted in the creation of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR), outside the League of Nations, under the 
leadership of the United States. The IGCR was mandated with assisting refugees from the Third 
Reich, including Jewish refugees.45 The High Commissioner for Refugees was terminated, along 
                                                                                                                                                                   
traders. … Many risks faced by refugees in foreign states were, however, different from 
those which typically met business travelers. The Refugee Convention of 1933 met this 
challenge by setting a rights regime for a subset of the alien population, tailored to its 
specific vulnerabilities (Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 87). 
41 Provisional Arrangement concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany 4 July 1936, 3952 
LNTS 77 (1936-1937). 
42 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 89. 
43 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany, 10 Feb 1938, 4461 LNTS 61 (1938). 
44 The 1938 Convention provided that 
with a view of facilitating the emigration of refugees to overseas countries, every facility 
shall be granted to the refugees and to the organizations which deal with them for the 
establishment of schools for professional re-adaptation and technical training (see Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 90). 
45 Roversi, supra note 6 at 29. 
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with the League of Nations, in 1946. The IGCR remained operational until the following year.  
 
The interwar international refugee regime is generally considered to have been a limited 
success, if at all. The protection offered depended on the refugee group and projects could be 
vetoed if the Great Powers refused to fund them.46 Jews from Germany and Nazi-occupied 
territories faced a terrible fate and widespread antisemitism. At the Evian Conference in 1938, 
after Nazi Germany had “offered its Jews to the World”, state delegates declared their concern 
for the Jewish refugees, but only the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica agreed to increase 
their quotas. 47  Even in countries where Jews were able to find a safe haven, antisemitic 
discrimination and persecution were widespread. 48  The High Commissioner for Refugees 
(Jewish and other) Coming from Germany was only able to bring 4,000 German Jewish 
refugees to safety before the outbreak of the Second World War.49  
 
Generally speaking, root causes and conditions in source countries were not meaningfully 
addressed by the international refugee regime. 50  Very little was achieved in terms of 
guaranteeing a right for refugees to be granted admission to a country of asylum. 51  Few 
permanent settlement places were found. But as Skran points out, despite limited impact on the 
ground, the interwar refugee regime’s legacy is monumental. The institutions of the interwar 
period have disappeared, but the norms, rules, and procedures established during this period 
                                                   
46 Skran, supra note 6 at 272-77, 279-81. 
47 William I Brustein & Ryan D King, “Anti-Semitism in Europe Before the Holocaust” (2004) 25:1 Intl Pol 
Sci Rev 35 at 35. 
48 Skran, supra note 6 at 50-51 
49 See Roversi, supra note 6 at 29. 
50 Skran, supra note 6 at 226-58. 
51 Ibid at 277. 
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paved the way for the current refugee regime.52 Most importantly, the crucial legacy of the 
interwar refugee regime is the development of the notion that refugees are a special category of 
migrants, deserving of special protections.53 
 
2.3 The UNRRA and the IRO – a transition to a new regime 
Two years before the end of the Second World War, the Allied Powers created the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). 54  Initially, the UNRRA was 
created not to assist refugees, but to provide aid and relief to persons displaced by the Second 
World War (internally and externally), and to help with the repatriation of those outside their 
country of origin.55 UNRRA’s initial mandate included only nationals of the “United Nations”, 
i.e., allied nations. In response to pleas from Jewish organizations, the mandate of UNRRA was 
expanded in 1944 to include 
other persons who have been obliged to leave their country or place of origin or 
former residence or who have been deported therefrom by action of the enemy 
because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations.56 
 
 
In the first two years of its existence, “true refugees” (i.e. persons who were unable to repatriate 
to their country of origin) were referred to the IGCR. In 1945, the UNRRA became directly 
involved in refugee protection.57 In 1947, there remained over one million refugees in Europe,58 
and the UNRRA was facing criticism by the United States for its use of repatriation, including 
                                                   
52 Ibid at 293-296. 
53 Ibid at 261. See also Loescher, supra note 5 at 4-6. 
54 The United Nations organization itself was only created in 1945, but the term “United Nations” was used as 
early as 1942 to refer to the Allied Powers. The UNRRA became formally part of the United Nations in 1945. 
55 See Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status”, supra note 12 at 372. See also Loescher, supra note 5 at 
47-48.  
56 UNRRA Resolution 71, J 152 (1945). 
57 Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status”, supra note 12 at 373. 
58 Denis Gallagher, “The Evolution of the International Refugee System” (1989) 23 Intl Migr R 579 at 579.  
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forced repatriation to Soviet states.59 The United Nations General Assembly moved to create the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO) and transferred to the new organization the mandate 
of refugee protection and refugee aid.60  
 
In the following section, I will discuss in some detail the emergence and evolution of a new 
international refugee regime following the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Before 
moving on to that issue, I want to acknowledge that the preceding overview of the emergence of 
the international refugee regime rushes through decades of development in international refugee 
law without doing it justice. It is also heavily Eurocentric. It ignores many important refugee 
realities outside of Europe that occurred during the 19th century and early 20th century. There 
were many such displacements, including formerly-enslaved Black people who fled American 
slave states to free states and to Canada through the “Underground Railroad” in the 19th 
                                                   
59 Loescher, supra note 5 at 50. The political context surrounding shifts in preference for a particular durable 
solution will be addressed in some detail in section 2.5.2. 
60 The International Refugee Organization Constitution (15 December 1946) (annex I, s A, para 1) defined a 
refugee as: 
a person who has left, or who is outside of, his country of nationality or of former habitual 
residence, and who, whether or not he had retained his nationality, belongs to one of the 
following categories: 
(a) victims of the nazi or fascist regimes or of regimes which took part on their side in the 
second world war…; 
(b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether 
enjoying international status as refugees or not;  
(c) persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the second world war, for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion.  
Section B mandated the organization with the assistance and protection of “displaced persons”, defined as: 
a person who, as a result of the actions of the authorities of the [nazi or fascist regimes or of 
regimes which took part on their side in the second world war] has been deported from, or 
has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or of former habitual residence, such as 
persons who were compelled to undertake forced labour or who were deported for racial, 
religious or political reasons. 
The use of the term “displaced persons” as including not internally displaced persons but externally displaced 
persons in the IRO’s constitution is an anomaly in the language of the international refugee regime. See 
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, supra note 9 at 18. 
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century,61  displacement caused by slave raids in Africa,62  and displacements resulting from 
colonialism and colonial wars in Africa. Indeed, Chimni writes: 
… the limits of contemporary movement of forced migrants to the West cannot 
be discussed without talking about slave trade, the movement of indentured 
labour, and the occupation of territories declared terra nullius.63 
 
 
In my review of the interwar refugee regime, I have sought to rely on both authoritative and 
celebrated sources as well as works with a more critical perspective on the refugee regime. It 
was disappointing to find that very little scholarship on the development of the international 
refugee regime considered its non-European antecedents. In a sense, that focus reflects the 
Eurocentric character of the League of Nations refugee regime itself. 64  I was reminded of 
Chimni’s reflection that knowledge production in refugee law has tended to integrate and 
reproduce dominant ideologies of institutions and powerful states, and to promote their 
objectives.65 
 
2.4 The UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention66 
As the IRO’s mandate was set to expire in 1950, there remained a large number of refugees in 
                                                   
61 See Natasha L Henry, “Underground Railroad”, in The Canadian Encyclopedia, online: 
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/underground-railroad>. 
62 See Dennis D Cordell, “Des ‘réfugiés’ dans l'Afrique précoloniale? L’exemple de la Centrafrique, 1850-
1910” (2002) 85:1 Pol afr 16. 
63 BS Chimni, “The Global Refugee Crisis: Towards a Just Response” (Bonn: Development and Peace 
Foundation, 2018) at 3 [“The Global Refugee Crisis”]. 
64 As explained in this section, it was only in 1967 that the Refugee Convention was extended beyond Europe. 
65 BS Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies and the Practice of International Institutions: A View 
from the South” (1998) 11:4 J Refugee Stud at 365-70 [“The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies”]. 
66 This section focuses on the UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, it is important to note 
that a parallel UN agency - the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) - was created in 1949 to 
assist Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Very few refugees 
are resettled through the UNRWA. The vast majority of Palestinian refugees have not returned or been locally 
integrated. See Alex Joffe, “UNRAW Resists Resettlement” (Fall 2012) Middle E Q 11. 
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Europe, and it was clear that not all remaining refugees would be repatriated or resettled.67 As 
early as 1949, the United Nations General Assembly had begun the work of creating a successor 
organization to the IRO. This work culminated in the adoption of the Statute of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 195068 and the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees in 1951. The UNHCR Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention remain 
today the two pillars of the international refugee regime.69 
 
In order to understand how the international refugee regime operates today, it is informative to 
review the role played by the UNHCR and the Refugee Convention, and their evolution since 
the early 1950s. In particular, it is informative to consider the disjuncture between the mandate 
of the UNHCR and the Refugee Convention. Like its predecessor organizations, the UNHCR 
was designed as a temporary agency.70 When its initial three-year mandate was due to expire, 
the UN General Assembly extended the UNHCR’s mandate for a period of five years, and did 
so every five years until 2003, when a resolution of the General Assembly provided that the 
UNHCR would exist “until the refugee problem is solved.”71 
 
The UNHCR Statute tasks the UNHCR with providing international legal protection and durable 
                                                   
67 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 91. 
68 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGA A/RES/428(V), 14 
December 1950, art 13 [UNHCR Statute]. 
69 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 4 at 20. 
70 UNHCR Statute, supra note 68, art 13. 
71 Article 1 of the UNHCR Statute reads: 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees … shall assume the function of 
providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who 
fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the 
problem of refugees by assisting Governments and … private organizations to facilitate the 
voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national 
communities. 
See Loescher, supra note 5 at 55. 
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solutions for refugees.72 The UNHCR Statute also defines a “refugee” as (i) any person who has 
been considered a refugee under previous international instruments (“statutory refugees”)73 and 
Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had 
well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or 
political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, 
if he has no nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence.74 
 
 
Early on in UNHCR’s life, it was recognized that the restricted definition in UNHCR’s mandate 
was inadequate for several reasons. First, the definition excluded the majority of persons 
displaced in the context of civil war or political change. Second, conducting individual refugee 
assessments, which is what the Statute seems to require, was found to be impractical in the 
context of mass exodus. 75  Beginning in the late 1950s, the mandate of the UNHCR was 
extended through various measures in order to authorize the agency to provide assistance to 
refugees who did not meet the strict refugee definition.76 A 1957 resolution of the General 
Assembly authorized the UNHCR to assist Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, followed by 
another resolution in 1958 regarding Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, and another in 
1961 regarding Angolan refugees in Congo.77 In the late 1950s, the UN General Assembly 
began mandating the UNHCR with assisting displaced persons under its “good offices.” 78 
                                                   
72 UNHCR Statute, supra note 68, art 1. 
73 Ibid, art 6(A)(i). 
74 Ibid, art 6(B). 
75 See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 29-30. 
76 It should be noted that the UNHCR Statute itself provides that other organs of the UN may alter the 
mandate of the UNHCR, including the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. See 
Volker Türk, “The role of UNHCR in the Development of International Refugee Law” in Frances Nicholson 
& Patrick Twomey, eds, Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes 
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 153. 
77 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 24. 
78 Ibid. For a more critical assessment of how the notion of “good offices” allowed the UNHCR to underplay 
the consequences of colonialism, see Hyndman, Managing Displacement, supra note 12 at 10-11; Jennifer 
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Various terms and categories have since been used by the General Assembly and other UN 
organs to describe persons that fall under UNHCR’s competence, such as “refugees of concern”, 
“refugees and displaced persons of concern”, and “victims of man-made disasters.” 79 
Contemporary UNHCR publications describe the agency’s mandate as encompassing refugees, 
asylum seekers, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), returned refugees, returned IDPs, 
individuals under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate, and “other groups or persons of concern.”80 
Türk explains that all of these categories share a common element in that they include persons 
who “have been forced to flee, as a result of persecution, massive human rights violations, 
generalised violence, armed conflicts, civil strife or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order, threatening their lives, safety or freedom.”81 
 
The UNHCR Statute and UNHCR’s expanded responsibility through UN organs, however, do 
not create international legal obligations on states to protect refugees. International obligations 
regarding refugees follow from the 1951 Refugee Convention, which still today contains a very 
restrictive refugee definition. The refugee definition in the Refugee Convention (as amended by 
the 1967 Refugee Protocol) is almost identical to the above-quoted definition that appears in the 
UNHCR Statute: a refugee is a person who is outside their country of origin and cannot return 
because of a well-founded fear of persecution because of specified grounds. The only distinction 
that remains of relevance is that the Refugee Convention contains an additional ground: 
“membership in a particular social group.” The most well-known aspect of the Refugee 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Hyndman & Bo Viktor Nylund, “UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in Kenya” (1998) 10:1-2 
Intl J Refugee L 21. 
79 See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 26. 
80 UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019” (Statistics and Demographics Section, 2020) at 
64-66 [“Global Trends 2019”]. 
81 Türk, supra note 76 at 153. 
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Convention is its prohibition against refoulement, i.e., the forced return of refugees to a country 
where they fear persecution: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.82 
 
 
The focus on the refugee definition and the prohibition against refoulement has been said to 
overshadow other rights granted to refugees under Refugee Convention, which also include 
religious rights, property and intellectual property rights, the right of association, access to 
courts, employment rights, housing rights, education rights, the right to freedom of movement, 
the right to identity documents, the right to travel documents, the right to fair fiscal treatment, 
and the right to transfer one’s assets. 83 
 
The Refugee Convention as adopted in 1951 contained temporal and geographical limitations. 
Refugee status was limited to persons who have been displaced “[a]s a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951.”84 The Refugee Convention also provided that member states could 
declare at the moment of ratification that “events occurring before 1 January 1951” means 
                                                   
82 Refugee Convention, art 33. There is some debate on whether, and to what extent, the non-refoulement 
principle should be regarded as a principle of customary international law. See Hathaway, The Rights of 
Refugees, supra note 1 at 36, 363-76; Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, “The Scope and Content of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion” in Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson, eds, Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 87. The non-refoulement principle is also enshrined in other human rights 
instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85. See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 209. 
83 See Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 2-3, 13; Susan Kneebone, “Introduction: Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers in the International Context – Rights and Realities”, in Susan Kneebone, ed, Refugees, 
Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 1 at 6 [“Introduction”]. 
84 Art 1A(2). 
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“events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.”85  The inadequacy of the Convention 
refugee definition as adopted was recognized in the early 1960s, with the emergence of large 
refugee movements in Africa, none of which could be considered to have resulted from events 
occurring before 1951, or events occurring in Europe, for that matter. Efforts were undertaken 
within the UN to eliminate the limitations, culminating in the 1967 Refugee Protocol, which 
provides eliminated both the geographical and temporal limitation.86 
 
Still, from the 1960s on, the Convention definition became increasingly irrelevant for new flows 
of refugees who faced violence and were forced to flee for reasons not covered by the 
Convention, for example civil war or other armed conflicts.87 In the 1980s and 90s, signatory 
states to the Refugee Convention engaged in discussions on the potential expansion of the 
Convention refugee definition. It was generally acknowledged that those fleeing generalized 
violence were deserving of protection, but there was much resistance to the idea of a 
                                                   
85 Art 1B. For a discussion of the role of colonial states’ delegations in entrenching the European limitation in 
the Refugee Convention, see Ulrike Krause, “Colonial Roots of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Effects 
on the Global Refugee Regime” (2021) Intl Rel & Dev. 
86 Articles I(2) and I(3) of the 1967 Refugee Protocol read: 
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term “refugee” shall, except as 
regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the 
definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and ...” “and the words”... “a result of such events”, 
in article 1 A (2) were omitted. 
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any 
geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties 
to the Convention in accordance with article 1 B (1) (a) of the Convention, shall, 
unless extended under article 1 B (2) thereof, apply also under the present Protocol. 
Only a few states signatory states of the Convention had opted for the optional geographical limitation: 
Congo, Madagascar, Monaco, and Turkey. Madagascar remains the only signatory state to the Refugee 
Convention that has not ratified the Protocol. Turkey has maintained the geographical limitation upon 
acceding to the Protocol. See UNHCR, “States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol”, online (pdf): 
<https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf>. See Türk, supra note 76 at 161; Gallagher, 
supra note 58 at 583; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 110-12. 
87 Hyndman, Managing Displacement, supra note 12 at 12. See also Betts & Collier, supra note 5 at 40. 
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corresponding international obligation. The initiative was halted in 1994.88 
 
A few regional instruments better recognize the reality of “new” refugee flows.89 The most 
notable is the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
adopted by the Organization of African Unity.90 The OAU Refugee Convention incorporates the 
strict refugee definition found in the 1951 Convention and the Protocol,91  but provides an 
additional definition, which captures persons displaced because of “external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order.”92 Another regional 
instrument that seeks to remedy the insufficiency of the Convention refugee definition is the 
1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which grants protection to persons displaced by 
armed conflict and massive violations of human rights.93 While the Cartagena Declaration is 
not binding, it has been endorsed by Latin American states.94 
 
 
2.5 Refugee Resettlement and durable solutions 
The refugee regime under the 1951 Refugee Convention - and indeed frameworks established 
under other treaties and institutions - has a triple goal: providing protection for refugees, finding 
durable solutions for refugees, and ensuring global burden-sharing. Only the protection element 
                                                   
88 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 48-49. 
89 See Kneebone, “Introduction”, supra note 83 at 15. 
90 Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(10 September 1969) 1001 UNTS 45 [OAU Refugee Convention]. 
91 Art I(1). 
92 Art I(2). See Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, supra note 9 at 37-39; Hyndman, Managing Displacement, supra 
note 12 at 12-13. 
93 Organization of American States, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/Doc.10, rev 1 
(1984). See Hyndman, Managing Displacement, supra note 12 at 13-14. 
94 See Jose Alvin Gonzaga, “The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 
Refugee Definition” in Susan Kneebone, ed, The Refugees Convention 50 Years On: Globalisation and 
International Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) 233. 
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takes the form of an international obligation - the prohibition against refoulement. Frameworks 
to facilitate durable solutions and burden-sharing are developed through international voluntary-
based mechanisms, such as refugee resettlement. In this section, I examine how the international 
refuge regime’s approach to durable solutions and burden-sharing has shifted over the years, and 
investigate the role of refugee resettlement in trying to achieve these goals. 
 
2.5.1 Durable solutions: concepts and legal basis 
A “durable solution” is a solution that puts an end to, or resolves, the status of a person as a 
refugee. It is:  
…one that ends the cycle of displacement by resolving their plight so that they 
can lead normal lives. Seeking and providing durable solutions to the problems 
of refugees constitutes an essential element of international protection, and the 




UNHCR policies describe three durable solutions to refugeehood: voluntary repatriation, local 
integration and resettlement.96 The emphasis on durable solutions has been a central component 
of the international refugee law regimes of the 20th century.97 The durable solutions framework 
is developed not through international legal instruments, but as a matter of institutional 
policies.98 It will come as no surprise that the durable solutions framework does not integrate 
seamlessly into the legal framework of the Refugee Convention. The following section presents 
each traditional durable solution and discusses its relationship to the Refugee Convention. 
                                                   
95 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011) at para 1.3 [Resettlement Handbook]. 
96 Ibid. 
97 It is worth noting that Hathaway writes that refugee law’s growing emphasis on durable solutions has had 
the unintended consequence of minimizing the importance of the respect of full refugee rights under the 
Refugee Convention: Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 913. 
98 See Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2019) at 4. 
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i) Voluntary repatriation, voluntary reestablishment and cessation 
The UNHCR defines voluntary repatriation as a situation where “refugees return in safety and 
with dignity to their country of origin and re-avail themselves of national protection.”99 As 
Hathaway explains, an important terminology problem has arisen as a result of conflicts 
between the Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute.100 The UNHCR Statute mandates the 
UNHCR with “seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting 
Governments and… private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such 
refugees…”101 The difficulty with this mandate is that, under the Refugee Convention, there is 
no such concept as “voluntary repatriation.”102 Under the terms of the Refugee Convention, it is 
not voluntary repatriation that terminates refugee status, but voluntary reestablishment. 103 
Reestablishment entails something more than mere repatriation. Hathaway writes that 
contracting states should not automatically consider that refugee status was terminated by the 
mere fact that a refugee has, for example, temporarily visited her home country.104 
 
More importantly, the criteria utilized by the UNHCR to determine when to support voluntary 
repatriation is not well developed or even in line with the framework of the Refugee 
Convention. The Refugee Convention for the termination of refugee status following 
                                                   
99 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 95 at 28. As Weima observes, the terms “return” and 
“returnee” are now increasingly replacing the terms “repatriation” and “repatriate”: 
While repatriation refers to the legal process of regained citizenship, return is much more 
defined by physical location. “Returnees” can include both those who were previously 
recognized as refugees, as well as those whose migration was not officially recognized. 
“Returnee” can also be a misnomer – it can be applied to those who never themselves left, 
and who were born to forced-migrant parents (second generation), particularly as many 
refugees are spending increasingly extended periods in exile (Yolanda Weima, “Refugee 
Repatriation and Ongoing Transnationalisms” (2017) 7:1 Transnat’l Soc R 113 at 114).  
100 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 917-53. 
101 UNHCR Statute, supra note 68, art 1. 
102 If “repatriation” is to mean anything under the Refugee Convention, it refers to the concept of “cessation”, 
which is not voluntary: Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 916. 
103 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art 1(C)(4). 
104 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 918-19. 
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“cessation,” but cessation requires more than a mere voluntary desire to return or a finding that 
the well-founded fear of persecution no longer exists. Cessation requires the finding of a 
genuine, enduring change in circumstance that eliminates the well-founded fear of persecution 
and restores protection. 105  When a return occurs following cessation, the return is not 
“voluntary” but “mandatory.” Hathaway explains that when the UNHCR supports repatriation 
efforts under its mandate for a particular refugee population, host states tend to consider that 
refugee status has been automatically terminated under the cessation clause of the Refugee 
Convention. This blurring of the lines between cessation and voluntary repatriation leads to the 
premature withdrawal of refugee protection.106  
 
Notwithstanding the weak legal underpinning of repatriation and its conflation with cessation, 
established principles do guide the UNHCR’s repatriation efforts. The UNHCR’s handbook on 
voluntary repatriation acknowledges that voluntary repatriation is distinct from cessation and 
that voluntary repatriation can occur in situations that fall short of a “fundamental change of 
circumstances” in the country of origin. 107  The handbook provides that repatriation must 
nevertheless be truly voluntary, 108  and must be conducted in a “safe and dignified” way. 
Refugees should be not coerced, forced to move, be separated from their family, or be put in a 
situation where their safety is endangered. 109  The UNHCR also stresses the importance of 
                                                   
105 Ibid at 921-22. 
106 Ibid at 931-53. 
107 UNHCR, Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (Geneva: UNHCR, 1996) at para 2.1. 
108 The notion of voluntariness is defined broadly: 
Voluntariness means not only the absence of measures which push the refugee to repatriate, 
but also means that he or she should not be prevented from returning, for example by 
dissemination of wrong information or false promises of continued assistance. In certain 
situations economic interests in the country of asylum may lead to interest groups trying to 
prevent refugees from repatriating (ibid at para 2.3). 
109 Ibid at para 3.1. 
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engaging in the successful reintegration of returnees.110 Finally, voluntary repatriation is to be 
considered within a comprehensive framework that includes the other durable solutions. 111 In 
practice, this principle is not always followed.112 
 
In addition, in the context of growing pressures for repatriation, the UNHCR is reported to have 
engaged in organized repatriation in circumstances that violate the principles of voluntariness, 
safety, and dignity. Coercion is said to have been a factor in the repatriation of 200,000 
Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh in the early 1990s, the repatriation of 350,000 
Rwandan refugees in Tanzania in 1996, the repatriation of 40,000 Burundian refugees from 
Tanzania in 2012, and more recently, the repatriation of Afghan refugees from both Iran and 
Pakistan.113 
 
ii) Local integration and naturalization 
UNHCR policy documents describe local integration as a situation where “refugees legally, 
economically and socially integrate in the host country, availing themselves of the national 
protection of the host government.”114 Hathaway posits that this conception of local integration 
                                                   
110 Ibid at para 6.4. 
111 See Jeff Crisp, “Repatriation Principles Under Pressure” (2019) 62 Forced Migr R 20 at 20. 
112 Crisp writes: 
Host States in developing regions of the world do not want the indefinite presence of 
refugees on their territory, and in most cases are adamant that refugees should not be given 
the option of local integration. Donor countries are keen to bring an end to protracted refugee 
situations and expensive long-term assistance programmes, while countries of origin are 
often eager to bolster their legitimacy by demonstrating that their exiled citizens are prepared 
to vote with their feet by returning to their homeland.  
As for UNHCR – an agency funded and governed by States, and thus highly sensitive to 
their concerns – it became a prime objective to get as many refugees home as possible, 
thereby demonstrating the organisation’s usefulness to its primary stakeholder (ibid at 20-
21). 
113 Ibid at 21; Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 933-34. 
114 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 95 at 28. 
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is not an alternative to refugee status.115 Local integration, in this sense, is merely equivalent to 
the enjoyment of the full range of rights under the Refugee Convention. It will come as no 
surprise that the Refugee Convention does not contemplate the termination of refugee status 
upon “local integration.” Rather, Article 1(C)(3) of the Refugee Convention provides that 
refugee status is terminated upon naturalization, meaning a situation where a refugee 
“acquire(s) a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality.” 
The Refugee Convention recognizes that naturalization is a prerogative of sovereign states and 
imposes only very light obligations in this respect. Article 34 provides that contracting states 
shall “as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees”, which 
includes “mak[ing] every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and reduce as far as 
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.” 
 
iii) Third country resettlement 
The UNHCR defines resettlement as: 
The selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought 
protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with 
permanent residence status.116 
 
The term ‘resettlement’ appears in a few articles in the Refugee Convention. For example, 
article 30 stipulates that contracting states “shall permit refugees to transfer assets which they 
have brought into its territory to another country where they have been admitted for the 
purposes of resettlement.” However, “resettlement” is not listed as a circumstance that brings 
about the termination of refugee status. Hathaway explains that when the resettlement of a 
refugee occurs, refugee status in the country of asylum is de facto terminated because “the 
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continuing need for refugee protection is … at an end.”117 
 
The UNHCR operates a resettlement program which will be explored in some detail in later 
sections. It is important to note, however, that some resettlement activities operate outside the 
UNHCR, including resettlement through Canada’s private sponsorship of refugees program. It 
also bears mention that some state-operated resettlement activities have taken the form of non-
consensual resettlement. Non-consensual resettlement schemes existed under the IGCR and IRO 
regimes, and have resurfaced as state practices in the 1980s. Non-consensual resettlement occurs 
when asylum seekers are diverted by the intended asylum state to another state, and then given 
only one state-sanctioned resettlement opportunity (if any).118 The Refugee Convention imposes 
certain restrictions on such activities, including, at minimum, allowing “a reasonable period and 
all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country” to refugees who are being 
detained.119 Contracting states are also required, under the Refugee Convention, to allow for the 
transfer of assets to the country of resettlement.120 
 
iv) “New” durable solutions 
The concept of durable solutions has been expanded beyond the three traditional durable 
solutions in the past 10 years. The most significant of these is the concept of “complementary 
pathways for admission to third countries”, defined broadly as encompassing family 
reunification, private sponsorship, humanitarian programs, educational opportunities for 
                                                   
117 Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees, supra note 1 at 916. 
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refugees, and labour mobility opportunities for refugees.121 In April 2018, Canada launched a 
pilot program called the Economic Mobility Pathways Project, which aimed to identify and 
bring to Canada 10-15 skilled refugees who further met the requirements of Canada’s economic 
migration programs.122 The Global Compact on Refugees also adopts in its theory of durable 
solutions “other local solutions”, which include “interim legal stay, including… the appropriate 
economic, social and cultural inclusion of refugees… without prejudice to eventual durable 
solutions that may become available.”123 It is unclear how “other local solutions” (just as true 
local integration) might differ from the simple respect of full refugee rights. 
 
2.5.2 Shifting durable solutions 
The act of resettlement is a fundamentally discretionary one. The Refugee Convention does not 
require that signatory states grant status to refugees who are outside their borders. Resettlement 
is therefore considered an entirely “voluntary” act, one that does not flow from international 
obligations, but from states’ commitments to humanitarianism, global burden-sharing, and 
strategic foreign policy concerns.124 States’ interest in resettlement has waxed and waned along 
with changes in domestic and international politics. It is worth noting that the other two 
traditional durable solutions, in contrast, have some basis in international law. Local integration, 
understood as the enjoyment of full refugee rights, is a core state obligation resulting from the 
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Refugee Convention itself. The right of return is recognized under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,125 and various international human rights instruments oblige states 
to refrain from activity that would make repatriation impossible.126 However, the successful 
implementation of all durable solutions depends on their promotion by states and international 
agencies. In fact, the history of international refugee regimes is characterized by enormous shifts 
in the preference accorded to each durable solution by states and international institutions. These 
shifts can be attributed, for the most part, to changes in the international political climate and 
perceived changes in refugee flows. 
 
2.5.2.1 Durable solutions under League of Nations institutions and the IGCR 
The interwar international refugee regime was much more successful in securing legal 
protection than in finding durable solutions for refugees. While securing durable solutions was 
identified in the mandate of the High Commission, relatively meagre results were achieved in 
that respect.127 Organized resettlement occurred on a very small scale, and these operations were 
often part of broader settlement activities that were primarily focused on local integration. 
 
During the interwar period, repatriation was widely regarded as the most desirable outcome for 
both refugees and governments.128  Nansen himself was appointed High Commissioner after 
having played a major role in the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war following the First 
World War. 129  Two local integration schemes developed in the 1920s, both for Armenian 
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refugees, also included elements of resettlement.130 The first scheme provided for the settlement 
of Armenian refugees in Soviet Armenia. Some of the Armenian refugees to be settled there 
were displaced in Greece and Constantinople. The plan collapsed as tensions developed between 
the Soviet Union and Western states. This was followed by a second plan for the settlement of 
Armenian refugees in Syria, where some hundred thousand Armenian refugees were living in 
extremely difficult conditions in the mid-1920s. Almost 40,000 Armenian refugees were settled 
in coastal regions of Lebanon and Syria by 1938, territories then under French mandate. 
 
The IGCR, initially mandated in 1938 to help Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria and 
Jewish individuals who had not yet left those countries, operated with an explicit focus on 
resettlement, in contrast to League of Nations institutions. The task of the Chairman of the 
IGCR included negotiating “to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them by 
conditions of orderly emigration” and “approaching the Governments of the countries of refuge 
and settlement with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement.”131 The IGCR 
took the position that the answer to the Jewish refugee problem lay “in coordinating involuntary 
emigration with existing immigration laws and practices, in collaboration with the country of 
origin.”132 The explicit focus on resettlement by the IGCR reflected member states’ shared view 
that countries of first asylum would be unwilling to absorb large numbers of Jewish refugees.133 
In the months leading up to the Second World War, efforts by the IGCR to arrange the 
evacuation and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Jewish Germans and Austrians 
collapsed because of difficulties in finding resettlement spaces for Jewish refugees, and because 
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of German resistance in releasing Jewish assets to cover the cost of evacuation and settlement.134 
In fact, as the flight of Jewish refugees from the Third Reich increased, countries around the 
world moved to restrict their immigration policies.135 The IGCR never implemented the large-
scale resettlement program it had designed before and during the Second World War, but some 
European countries, including Holland and Belgium, as well as the United States, moved to 
unilaterally liberalize their immigration policies to accept Jewish refugees.136 The IGCR was 
essentially not operational between the outbreak of the Second World War and 1943, when its 
mandate was expanded to include all refugee groups displaced by the war in Europe at the 
Bermuda Conference.137 The revival of the dormant IGCR is attributed to the “massive pressure” 
on both the British and American governments to “do something” after Nazi atrocities against 
the European Jews were officially revealed by the Allied governments in December 1942.138 At 
that point, member states were eager to oppose the narrative pushed by Germany that the Allies’ 
war effort in the Middle East and North Africa was “on behalf of the Jews”139 and that “only 
Germany could liberate the Arabs from Allied-Jewish oppression.”140 Another motive for the 
expansion of the IGCR’s mandate to all refugees from Germany was that some non-Jewish 
refugees had become a hindrance to the Allied war effort, including some 40,000 Polish 
refugees who had fled to Iran in 1942. Ultimately, 35,000 were transferred to camps in East 
Africa, India, Mexico and the Middle East.141 Large-scale resettlement efforts under the IGCR 
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only began after the end of the Second World War.142  
 
2.5.2.2 Durable solutions after the Second World War 
At the conclusion of the war, there remained some 2 million “non-repatriable” displaced 
persons, mostly Eastern Europeans, located in Allied-occupied zones. 143  By then, major 
differences between states favouring repatriation and states favouring resettlement had begun to 
develop, a disagreement driven by Cold War political dynamics. During the UNHCR era, the 
international refugee regime’s approach to durable solutions continued to shift, and still today 
continues to be influenced by evolving international political tensions and alliances. 
 
The UNRRA, established two years before the end of the Second World War, is considered to 
have operated with a strong bias towards repatriation. 144  The UNRRA was supported by 
countries of the Soviet Bloc, who considered that their nationals should be repatriated by force if 
necessary.145 The UNRRA existed alongside the IGCR until both were dissolved in 1947. Both 
institutions promoted a diametrically opposed solution to the refugee problem: the IGCR was 
founded upon the principle that resettlement was the only possible solution for refugees from the 
Third Reich, while the UNRRA did not engage in any significant resettlement activities.  
 
The UNRRA’s criteria for defining refugees was rather narrow. As a result of pressures from the 
Soviet Union, UNRRA’s criteria for granting refugee status required that the refugee objectively 
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demonstrate that persecution would occur. 146  Under UNRRA auspices, it was generally 
presumed that displaced people and host countries both favoured repatriation. Loescher writes 
that little attention was given to actual individual wishes, and that massive repatriation 
operations unfolded where refugees were indiscriminately transported in boxcars. Many Soviet 
returnees were transported to labour camps immediately upon return.147  
 
The International Refugee Organization (IRO), created in 1947 under adamant opposition from 
the Soviet Union, operated with a bias towards resettlement. The IRO followed the groundwork 
laid by the IGCR, itself focused on resettlement. 148  Interestingly, the IRO’s preference for 
resettlement was not made explicit in the agency’s constitution.149  In reality, however, the 
organization was heavily geared towards resettlement. 150  In contrast with UNRRA’s 
indiscriminate repatriation, the IRO’s Constitution expressly recognized that refugees or 
displaced persons with a “valid objection” would not be repatriated to their country of 
nationality.151 The Soviet Union, viewing the IRO as a “tool of the West”, never joined the 
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organization and provided funding.152  From 1947 to 1951, over one million refugees were 
resettled through the IRO, mainly to the USA, Australia, Israel, and Canada.153 Only 54,000 
were repatriated to Eastern and Central Europe.154 
 
The conceptualization of durable solutions that existed under the IRO was essentially transferred 
to the UNHCR. No clear preference for resettlement emerges from UNHCR’s mandate or the 
Refugee Convention. Still, the work of the UNHCR was influenced, as Bessa writes, by a 
coalition of powerful Western states that sought to manipulate the international refugee regime 
as a political tool.155 As such, resettlement became an instrument through which Western states 
could assert their ideological superiority over Soviet states.156  As Hyndman points out, the 
Refugee Convention itself reflects a bias towards Western ideology: 
…its emphasis on persecution based on civil and political status as grounds for 
refugee status expresses the particular ideological debates of postwar European 
politics, particularly the perceived threats of communism and another Holocaust. 
By emphasizing civil and political rights, the convention had the effect of 
minimizing the importance of socio-economic human rights.157 
 
 
During the 1950s and early 1960s, resettlement was promoted by the UNHCR as the preferred 
durable solution. During the period, the vast majority of resettled refugees were European 
refugees fleeing communist regimes.158 As Bessa notes, the first massive UNHCR resettlement 
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operation occurred in 1956 after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which led to the displacement 
of around 200,000 Hungarians. Of these, 180,000 were resettled to third countries.159 A few 
years later, a large proportion of the 3.5 million East Germans who fled to West Germany before 
1961 were resettled to third countries.160 Chimni argues that domestic economic interests were 
also a driving factor in defining durable solutions in the 1950s and 1960s: Northern states, 
experiencing unprecedented economic expansion, depended on refugee flows to fill the labour 
shortages caused by the Second World War.161 
 
Major resettlement activities continued in the late 1960s and 1970s. During this period, new, 
non-European refugee flows began to emerge. The first of these were refugee movements in 
Africa caused by armed conflicts following decolonization, including the Algerian war of 
independence and various armed conflicts in newly independent states in sub-Saharan Africa.162 
In the 1970s, massive refugee flows also developed in both Asia and Central America. During 
this period, resettlement remained shaped by Cold War dynamics. The largest resettlement 
operation in UNHCR’s history was the resettlement of 1,311,183 Vietnamese, Laotian, and 
Cambodian refugees (“Indochinese” refugees) who fled their country after the fall of Saigon in 
1975 and the establishment of communist regimes in the region.163 
 
In the 1980s, Western states’ interest in resettlement began decreasing. Bessa writes that in 
1979, one out of every 24 refugees were resettled. By 1996, that number had decreased to one 
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out of every 400 refugees. 164  This shift coincided with the end of massive opposition to 
communism in Western states, and an increase in non-European refugee flows, particularly in 
Africa. Western resettlement states proved unwilling to resettle African refugees, especially 
those that were not fleeing communist regimes. According to Chimni, 
an image of a ‘normal’ refugee was constructed—white, male and anti-
communist—which clashed sharply with individuals fleeing the Third World.165 
 
 
This racist and xenophobic approach by states to refugee protection is also at the source of the 
various non-entrée regimes that began appearing around the same time.166 In order to maintain 
resettlement as a relevant solution, the UNHCR led efforts to depoliticize the program. The 
refugee regime’s “exilic bias” formally ended in the 1990s with the establishment of a clear 
preference for repatriation.167 The shift was formally institutionalized in the 1990s, with the 
UNHCR declaring the 1990s the “decade of repatriation” and adopting a “hierarchy of durable 
solutions.” Under this new paradigm, resettlement became the “least preferred solution”, one 
that is framed as a protection tool with precisely defined criteria.168 The view that resettlement is 
the least desirable durable solution was challenged by many critics of the international refugee 
regime, including Fredrikson, who recommended abandoning the hierarchy of durable solutions 
approach, suggesting that repatriation is the “happiest solution” not in the eyes of the refugees 
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themselves, but in the eyes of the UNHCR and individual states.169 
 
The emphasis on resettlement in the Cold War era was replaced by a focus on source control 
and, ultimately, repatriation. The shift was accompanied by a management review at the 
UNHCR that emphasized care and maintenance over protection.170 Aleinikoff explains that this 
shift was supported by three shared principles.171 First, states adopted after the Cold War a 
liberal, human rights argument, following which the solution to the refugee problem lies not in 
resettlement but in preventing situations that cause people to flee. Second, states came to rely on 
a communitarian argument according to which membership in a community is not a question of 
legal status, but a question of identity that cannot easily be changed. Third, resettlement became 
perceived as unjustifiably relieving refugee-producing states from their responsibility. This 
justification is criticized by Chimni, who highlights the false assumptions that guided the shift 
away from resettlement.172 Chimni also challenges the “internalist” understanding of the root 
causes of refugee flows. He points to the cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, whose respective 
refugee crises are generally considered to have been caused by internal armed conflicts. These 
types of explanations, Chimni writes, ignore the fact that in both cases the international 
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community created the conditions for the conflicts to take place.173 
 
Between 1996 and 1998, UNHCR-assisted resettlement departures hovered around 20,000, a 
historical low.174 Beginning in the late 1990s, a renewed interest in refugee resettlement arose as 
a result of migration management concerns and perceived abuses of asylum systems.175 The 
UNHCR began pushing back against the notion of resettlement as the least preferable durable 
solution, 176  and developed the “strategic use of resettlement” (SUR) in the context of the 
Convention Plus Initiative, which ran from 2002 to 2005. The UNHCR defines the SUR as 
the planned use of resettlement in a manner that maximizes the benefits, directly 
or indirectly, other than those received by the refugee being resettled. Those 
benefits may accrue to other refugees, the hosting state, other states or the 
international protection regime in general.177 
 
 
The concept of the SUR had purchase among receiving states in the security environment that 
followed the attacks of 9/11. Without going into detail into the SUR, it is worth noting two 
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major criticisms that have been voiced towards the initiative. The first relates to the assumption 
that increased resettlement will result in lower numbers of irregular arrivals. When the initiative 
was being developed, researchers insisted that there was no evidence supporting the claim that 
resettlement numbers impact irregular arrivals.178 In a more recent empirical study, van Selm 
found that “strategic” resettlement initiatives had created various expectations among 
stakeholder that had not been met, in part because of poor management and the absence of 
benchmarks.179 More importantly, some fear that the promotion of the SUR will results in states 
viewing resettlement primarily as a strategic tool rather than a humanitarian program, and 
turning to resettlement as a “humanitarian alibi” in order to justify restrictions on domestic 
asylum systems. 180  Such a rhetorical approach, van Selm writes, has been deployed in 
Australia,181 and, as we will see in chapter 3, in the Canadian context as well. 
 
Efforts at implementing the SUR have been largely unsuccessful.182 It worth considering that 
outside the deployment of the SUR, refugee resettlement is often part of broader geopolitical 
strategies designed to curb or discourage the movement of asylum seekers. Consider for 
example the EU-Turkey deal, where Turkey readmits asylum seekers that moved on to Greece, 
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in exchange for Syrian refugees in Turkey being resettled to Europe.183 The Australia-Malaysia 
agreement to exchange asylum seekers and refugees,184 and various US-Australia initiatives 
provide further examples.185 
 
2.6 Refugee resettlement and current debates in the international refugee regime 
2.6.1 The challenge of burden-sharing and new directions in refugee protection 
The development of the concept of the strategic use of resettlement in the early 2000s, discussed 
above, occurred within a broader multilateral process designed to produce norms around global 
burden-sharing.186 Betts & Durieux explain that the refugee regime can be conceptualized as 
comprising of two sub-regimes: asylum and burden-sharing. 187  Asylum concerns a state’s 
responsibility for refugees within its territory, while burden-sharing concerns a state’s support 
for refugees outside its territory. The importance of burden-sharing has in fact been recognized 
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Turkey?” (2017) 54 Forced Migr Rev 9. 
184 See Jaffa Mckenzie & Reza Hasmath, “Deterring The ‘Boat People’: Explaining the Australian 
Government’s People Swap Response to Asylum Seekers” (2013) 48:4 Austl J Pol Sci 417. 
185 See Ghezelbash, supra note 10 at 127-29. Such “trading” arrangements are not contemplated under the 
SUR initiative: van Selm, “Great Expectations”, supra note 179 at 1. 
186 The use of the term “burden-sharing” has been criticized as conveying the view that refugees are 
“negotiable and transferable commodities” without agency: Volker Türk & Madeline Garlick, “From Burdens 
and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global 
Compact on Refugees” (2016) 28:4 Intl J Refugee L 656 at 664, citing Ann Vibeke-Eggli, Mass Refugee 
Influx and the Limits of Public International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002). The term 
“responsibility-sharing” has been suggested as having a less negative connotation and as implying that 
refugees can make a positive contribution to host countries. I would add that the term “responsibility-sharing” 
reflects the reality that countries other than source countries (including developed countries far away from 
refugee flows) often share primary responsibility for causing refugee flows through international armed 
intervention (see BS Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back” (2018) 
30:4 Intl J Refugee L 630 [“Global Compact on Refugees”]; BS Chimni, “The Geopolitics of Refugee 
Studies”, supra note 65). Contemporary international documents, such as the New York Declaration and the 
Global Compact on Refugees, use both terms. Scholarship, however, seems for the most part to have retained 
the “burden-sharing” terminology, and I have therefore chosen to use that terminology as well. See also 
Tristan Harley, “Regional Cooperation and Refugee Protection in Latin America: A ‘South-South’ Approach” 
(2014) 26:1 Intl J Refugee L 22 at 44-45; Rebecca Dowd & Jane McAdam, “International Cooperation and 
Responsibility-Sharing to Protect Refugees: What, Why and How?” (2017) 66:4 ICLQ 863 at 869-70. 
187 Alexander Betts & Jean-François Durieux, “Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise” (2007) 20:3 J 
Refugee Stud at 510. 
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since the inception of the international refugee regime. The Nansen Passport system itself was 
presented as achieving a “more equitable distribution of Russian refugees.”188 Burden-sharing is 
also explicitly acknowledged in the preamble of the Refugee Convention: 
CONSIDERING that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on 
certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the 
United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot 
therefore be achieved without international co-operation. 
 
 
UNHCR’s Executive Committee has also repeatedly stated that burden-sharing is necessary for 
the effective functioning of the international refugee system.189 It is noteworthy that the broader 
notion of “international cooperation” is not unknown in international law.190 In addition, many 
international treaties, declarations and resolutions call for “international solidarity.”191 Despite 
this, no burden-sharing norms (enforceable or not) have been developed at the international 
level, beyond situation-specific initiatives, such as the plan that followed the 1988 International 
Conference on Central American Refugees, the 1989 Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, and the 1999 Humanitarian Evacuation Programme (HEP) for Kosovar evacuees.192 The 
                                                   
188 Fridtjof Nansen, “Russian Refugees: Report to the Council of July 20th, 1922”, quoted in Labman, 
Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 98 at 20. 
189 See Türk & Garlick, supra note 186 at 660. 
190 Ibid at 658-61. For example, art 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 
7 provides that one of the UN’s purpose is “to achiev(e) international cooperation to solve international 
problems.” Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter contain similar provisions. In addition, the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to UNGA res 2625(XXV), 24 Oct 1970 provides: 
States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the differences in their 
political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in 
order to maintain international peace and security and to promote international economic 
stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and international co-operation free from 
discrimination based on such differences. 
Türk & Garlick point out that the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions endorsing the UN Friendly 
Relations Declaration as an important interpretive tool. 
191 Türk & Garlick, supra note 186 at 661-63. See also Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The Future of International 
Solidarity in Global Refugee Protection” (2021) 22 HR Rev 1. 
192 Alexander Betts, “The Global Compact on Refugees: Towards a Theory of Change?” (2018) 30:4 
Intl J Refugee L at 624 [The Global Compact of Refugees]. See also Alexander Betts, Protection by 
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international refugee regime has thus been described as a “half-complete regime.”193 Betts & 
Durieux write that the consequences resulting from the absence of a normative framework for 
burden-sharing are momentous: 
ad hoc and ab initio bargaining has been required on a case-by-case basis in 
order to address specific protracted or mass influx situations. This has made 
northern commitments to provide durable solutions for protracted and mass 
influx situations in the South unpredictable, selective and contingent upon the 
perceived interests of the states involved. … In the absence of a guiding 
normative framework, contributions to such initiatives have been highly 
discretionary acts that have been subject to the interests of states.194 
 
 
Today, 85% of the world’s refugee population is in the Global South.195 The Global North, home 
to only 15% of refugees, spends around 20 billion USD for their refugee determination 
infrastructure. That is four times the budget made available to agencies that are responsible for 
the care of 85% of the refugee population in the Global South.196 The consequences of the lack 
of norms around burden-sharing go far beyond global financial inequities. Hathaway writes that 
the unpredictability of burden-sharing is the main reason why host states withdraw from their 
legal responsibility to protect refugees. 
… neither the actual duty to admit refugees nor the real costs associated with 
their arrival are fairly apportioned among governments. There is a keen 
awareness that the states in which refugees arrive presently bear sole legal 
responsibility for what often amounts to indefinite protection.197 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2009); Michael Baruticiski & Astri Suhrke, “Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in 
Protection and Burden-sharing” (2001) 14:2 J Refugee Stud 95; Betts & Collier, supra note 5 at 47-
52. 
193 Betts & Durieux, supra note 187 at 510, 515. See also Betts, Protection by Persuasion, ibid. 
194 Betts & Durieux, ibid at 517. 
195 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 2. 
196 See James Hathaway, “The Global Cop-Out on Refugees” (2018) 30:4 Intl J Refugee L 591 at 593 
[“Global Cop-Out”]. 
197 James Hathaway & Alexander Neve, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for 
Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 115 at 117. Hathaway & Neve 
write that another fundamental reason why states withdraw from refugee obligation is that  
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There is deep skepticism among scholars of the international refugee regime about whether 
meaningful change can be achieved within the existing framework. Betts & Collier write that: 
The world of the twenty-first century must meet the needs of refugees. And this 
will be achieved not by pious adherence to the dictums of a bygone era, but by 
rising to the current challenge, just as our grandparents rose to the very different 
challenge that they faced. Left to lawyers alone, the limited global energy 
available for the reform of the refugee system will be dissipated, and so will the 
limited budgets. The way forward is not to reinterpret past wording, but to build a 
new system that works. We need an international agency that can guide this task 
of building anew. UNHCR is not currently equipped to be that agency, but it 
must become so.198 
 
 
In the past two decades, two important initiatives were launched to move away from the current 
discretionary and ad hoc approach to burden-sharing. The Convention Plus initiative, in place 
during the 2000s, was intended to bring into international refugee law a normative framework 
for global burden-sharing, but failed to produce any such norms.199 More recently, in the wake 
of the unprecedented Syrian refugee crisis and the drowning of thousands of refugees in the 
Mediterranean, the international community came together to adopt in 2016 the New York 
Declaration on Refugees, which called for “a more equitable sharing of the burden and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
governments increasingly believe that a concerted commitment to refugee protection is 
tantamount to an abdication of their migration control responsibilities. They see refugee 
protection as little more than an uncontrolled "back door" route to permanent immigration, in 
conflict with official efforts to tailor admissions on the basis of economic or other criteria. 
The uneven distribution of the refugee burden also exists within the Global South. Okafor writes: 
… despite the fact that they tend to be more open to refugees than most countries in other 
regions of the world, most African countries do not do as much as Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Kenya, and others, in terms of absorbing refugees. … 
Richer Global South countries such as Saudi Arabia need to contribute much more to 
responsibility-sharing, both at the level of the admission of refugees and the making of 
financial contributions. So far, there is little indication that many more of these richer Global 
South states will begin to expand and deepen their expression of international solidarity in 
global refugee protection [sources omitted] (Okafor, supra note 191 at 9, 16). 
198 Betts & Collier, supra note 5 at 6. 
199 See Betts & Durieux, supra note 187 at 510. 
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responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees.”200 The long-anticipated Global 
Compact on Refugees (GCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 
2018, takes the form of a non-binding agreement that “seeks to operationalize the principles of 
burden- and responsibility-sharing to better protect and assist refugees and support host 
countries and communities.”201 More particularly, the GCR seeks to (i) ease pressures on host 
countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third country solutions; and 
(iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.202 The goals of the 
GCR are to be further developed in periodic ministerial-level “Global Forums” and through the 
development of “Support Platforms” made available to host countries. 
 
It would be outside the scope of this dissertation to address in great detail the GCR, but some 
remarks are in order. Despite its shortcomings, the GCR is an important step forward, triggered 
by some measure of consensus that more equitable and predictable burden-sharing is in the 
interests of both resettlement states and countries of first asylum. That states came together 
around this principle is, in itself, to be celebrated.203 
 
There is cause for pessimism, however. The compact is more aspirational than normative. Just 
like the Convention Plus initiative, the GCR is non-binding and fails to develop actual norms to 
allocate the cost of refugee protection. We have yet to see the adoption of meaningful 
                                                   
200 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, GA Res A/RES/71/1, UNGAOR, 71st Sess, (2016) at 
para 68. Aleinikoff writes that the principal factors that brought the international community - and in 
particular Northern States - to initiate discussion around burden-sharing are the mass displacement of Syrian 
refugees and the increase in the number of asylum seekers in Europe coming from Northern Africa 
(Alexander Aleinikoff, “The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees” (2018) 30:4 Intl J 
Refugee L 611 at 611). 
201 Art 5. 
202 Art 7. 
203 See Okafor, supra note XX at 8, 13. 
	 57	
	
operational measures. Hathaway writes that the GCR sets out a series of measures that may be 
implemented in certain, rather undefined circumstances. He likens the measures of the compact 
to items on a menu that may or may not be available on a given day.204 Academics have also 
claimed that the Global Compact, by prioritizing the easing of pressures on host states and by 
not condemning non-entrée regimes, in fact risks weakening international refugee law.205 There 
seems to be very little appetite, on the part of signatory states to the Refugee Convention, to 
expand international refugee law. Furthermore, the GCR results in cementing existing 
containment policies. Hyndnam writes that the GCR’s approach is one of “business-as-solution 
and business-as-usual”: 
[The Global Compacts] serve to instantiate the status quo: money from the 
wealthiest states fund major host countries in the global South and Middle East to 
support refugees, reproducing the containment of displaced people in their 
regions of origin. … 
 
… At the end of the day, the solutions proffered are in the interests of the 




Under the compact, repatriation is to be the favoured solution. The compact does include a brief 
call for increases in refugee resettlement, but that reference seems like a mere afterthought.207 
                                                   
204 Hathaway, “Global Cop-Out”, supra note 230 at 592. 
205 See Chimni, “Global Compact on Refugees”, supra note 196; Betts, “Global Compact on Refugees”, supra 
note 192. 
206 Jennifer Hyndman, “Global Compacts or Containment? Geopolitics by Design”, in Howayda Al-Harithy, 
ed, Urban Recovery: Intersecting Displacement with Post War Reconstruction, Abingdon: Routledge 
[forthcoming in 2021] [“Global Compacts”]. Hyndman notes that bilateral containment partnerships - such as 
the EU-Lebanon and the EU-Jordan partnerships - have been emerging in recent years in parallel to the Global 
Compact initiative. 
207 The Global Compact on Refugees, supra note 121, provides at paragraphs 90-91: 
Apart from being a tool for protection of and solutions for refugees, resettlement is also a 
tangible mechanism for burden- and responsibility-sharing and a demonstration of solidarity, 
allowing States to help share each other’s burdens and reduce the impact of large refugee 
situations on host countries. At the same time, resettlement has traditionally been offered 
only by a limited number of countries. The need to foster a positive atmosphere for 
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The significance of the compact lies not in its loose pledge for resettlement, but in the 
infrastructure it sets out for helping host states care for refugees. This is to be achieved through 
concerted humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, maximizing private sector 
contributions, and the deployment of “support platforms” in host countries.208 
 
I note that the inclination to reform the international refugee regime in a way that would see the 
organized hosting of refugees in regions of origin is not new. Hathaway and Neve recommended 
in the 1990s doing away with the cumbersome and costly legal mechanisms of the current 
system in favour of a system that would guarantee temporary protection to all refugees in their 
region of origin through a global shared responsibility framework.209 Their proposal was to 
reorient refugee law towards human rights and away from migration. This view of refugee 
protection, according to the authors, is more consistent with the principles of the Refugee 
Convention. Under their plan, refugees would lose the right to reach a country of asylum of their 
choosing, but both protection and a durable solution would be extended to the entire refugee 
population. A similar reform proposal was more recently presented by Betts and Collier.210 Their 
proposal, too, would see refugees granted asylum in their region of origin, with the effort funded 
by countries of the Global North. Their proposal would promote integration in the country of 
asylum through private sector investment. 
 
In my view, initiatives such as the GCR have purchase among wealthy nations precisely because 
                                                                                                                                                                   
resettlement, and to enhance capacity for doing so, as well as to expand its base, cannot be 
overstated. … 
Contributions will be sought from States, with the assistance of relevant stakeholders, to 
establish, or enlarge the scope, size, and quality of, resettlement programmes. 
208 S 2.2 and para 32.  
209 Hathaway & Neve, supra note 197. 
210 Betts & Collier, supra note 5. 
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they result in keeping refugees far away from their borders. However, formalizing the unequal 
human distribution of refugees worldwide does not sit well with a more critical view of refugee 
flows as caused in part by colonialism and Western military intervention. There, is I believe 
reason to push back against these approaches. Part of the solution to more equitable burden-
sharing, I would submit, lies in increasing third country resettlement. 
 
 
2.6.2 Anti-immigrant populism and the unpredictability of refugee resettlement 
Populist movements, and in particular anti-immigrant and racist movements, have been on the 
rise throughout the world since the 2008 economic crisis,211 with devastating consequences for 
the protection of refugees. Right-wing populist movements have gained support in many 
Western countries, including France, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Brazil. Opposition to immigration is considered a unifying feature of right-
wing populist movements.212 
                                                   
211 See Jörg Matthes & Desirée Schmuch, “The Effects of Anti-Immigrant Right-Wing Populist Ads on 
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: A Moderated Mediation Model” (2017) 44:4 Comm Research 556; Fareed 
Zakaria, “Populism on the March: Why the West is in Trouble” (2016) 95:6 Foreign Aff 9; Paul Lewis et al, 
“Revealed: The Rise of Populist Rhetoric”, The Guardian (6 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-
rhetoric>. See also Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology” 
(2017) 22:1 J Pol Ideologies 1 for a critique of the use of term populism as an ideology in contemporary 
politics. 
212 Zakaria writes: 
On many other social issues, such as gay rights, even rightwing populists are divided and 
recognize that the tide is against them. Few conservative politicians today argue for the 
recriminalization of homosexuality, for instance. But immigration is an explosive issue on 
which populists are united among themselves and opposed to their elite antagonists (Zakaria, 
ibid at 14).  
See also J Eric Oliver & Wendy M Rahn, “Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election” (2016) 667:1 The 
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 189; Magdalena Nowicka, “Cultural 
Precarity: Migrants’ Positionalities in the Light of Current Anti-immigrant Populism in Europe” (2018) 39:5 J 
Intercult Stud 527. Okafor predicts that the “re-rise” of anti-refugee populism is likely to remain prevalent in 
the foreseeable future, with devastating consequences for refugee protection: 
It is difficult to see this trend disappearing any time soon. It may stabilize and/or weaken, but 
if history is our guide, it will likely not disappear altogether. This is important for the ability 
of many States to express as much international solidarity as they can, and ought, to refugees 




The recent implementation of anti-immigration policies in the United States, historically the 
leading resettlement country, has had a devastating impact on the global resettlement system.213 
Shortly after coming into office in January 2017, President Trump suspended refugee arrivals 
for 120 days and suspended arrivals of Syrian refugees indefinitely, through Executive Order 
13769. The same executive order implemented the notorious ‘travel ban’ targeting individuals 
from seven Muslim-majority countries (Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Lybia, Somalia and Yemen).214 
Legal challenges were brought against the order, which was replaced in March 2017 by 
Executive Order 13780. Refugee arrivals resumed in October 2017, but at drastically reduced 
levels. 215  During the 2017 fiscal year (ending September 30, 2017), 53,716 refugees were 
resettled to the United States, down from 110,000 projected under the Obama administration.216 
Resettlement numbers dropped to 22,491 for the 2018 fiscal year, the lowest number since 
1980. 217  In September 2019, the Trump administration announced that refugee admissions 
would be lowered further to 18,000 for the 2020 fiscal year. 218  Because of the covid-19 
                                                                                                                                                                   
countries often make their immigration and refugee policies in ways designed to manage the 
electoral risk often posed to them by these anti-refugee/migrant parties… (Okafor, supra note 
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213 As Kazin explains, the type of racist populist policies implemented during the Trump presidency are by no 
means new in the United States (Michael Kazin, “Trump and American Populism: Old Whine, New Bottles” 
(2016) 95:6 Foreign Aff 17). 
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Guardian (25 October 2017), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/24/trump-refugee-ban-
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216 International Rescue Committee, “Refugee Admissions Update” (2019), online (pdf): 
<https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/3873/wrdrefugeeadmissionsupdate18june19final.pdf> 
[“Refugee Admissions Update”]. 
217 Ibid. See also Migration Policy Institute, “U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of 
Refugees Admitted, 1980-Present” (2020), online: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-
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pandemic, only 11,000 were resettled that year.219 The target decreased further still to 15,000 for 
the 2021 fiscal year.220 
 
It is also significant that racialized groups were disproportionately affected by the cuts in US 
resettlement admissions. The International Rescue Committee reports that admissions of 
Christian refugees dropped by 36% in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, while admissions of Muslim 
refugees dropped by 85%.221 Despite the drastic reductions, the number of European refugees 
resettled to the United States actually increased in fiscal year 2017 compared to 2016.222 These 
changes in American refugee policy contributed to a global decreased of more than 50% in 
UNHCR-led resettlement departures in 2017.223 
 
The drastic change in refugee admissions to the US serves to highlight how national refugee 
resettlement programs, as discretionary programs, are highly vulnerable to changes in national 
politics. It also shows the importance of expanding refugee resettlement beyond a few receiving 
states. 
 
2.6.3 Asylum restrictions and retrenchment from international refugee law 
Throughout this dissertation, the discretionary nature of refugee resettlement is contrasted with 
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the legally-binding prohibition against refoulement under international law. I would like here to 
nuance that distinction and posit that the protection against refoulement is characterized by 
similar discretionary state policies. As Kneebone writes:  
The rights of refugees are defined in international law, but are subject to state 
discretion as to their implementation in national legal systems. … 
[I]mplementation is being done in such a way as to deny refugees the rights 
which are due to them under the international regime of refugee protection.224 
 
 
Beyond failures in national refugee determination systems, and national restrictions to the 
refugee definition, states have adopted mechanisms designed to prevent potential asylum 
seekers from entering their territory.225 New generation of non-entrée regime include financial 
incentives, the provision of equipment or training, shared enforcement, establishing agencies 
tasked with interception, and deploying staff abroad. 226  The development of artificial 
intelligence in the area of migration could further extend the reach of non-entrée measures.227 
Hathaway writes that non-entrée policies allow Northern states to insist on the respect of the 
                                                   
224 Kneebone, “Introduction”, supra note 83 at 1-2. 
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The current response of Western nations, shorn of all rhetoric, is to use a range of 
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non-refoulement principle by countries of the Global South, while simultaneously avoiding its 
burden: 
It enables a pattern of minimalist engagement under which the formal 
commitment to refugee law can be proclaimed as a matter of principle without 
risk that the wealthier world will actually be compelled to live up to that regime’s 
burdens and responsibilities to any serious extent.228 
 
 
There is some debate around whether particular restrictions to asylum violate the principle of 
non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention. Thus far, national courts have consistently 
found the non-refoulement principle in domestic legislation to have no extra-territorial 
application.229 However, commentators consider that international law does provide a basis to 
challenge non-entrée regimes, 230  especially in light of recent developments in jurisdiction, 
shared responsibility and assistance.231 
 
It is not my goal here to provide a detailed account of restrictive measures to asylum adopted by 
states. The first point I want to make is that the very existence of such measures shows that 
                                                   
228 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative 
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breaching the rules of refugee law they seek to avoid (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra 




‘hard’ norms of international refugee law are by no means immune from discretionary state 
practices. As such, the sharp distinction between the foundation of asylum and resettlement 
should be nuanced. Second, refugee resettlement is essential to refugee protection precisely 
because of the proliferation of non-entrée and containment mechanisms. Paradoxically, refugee 
resettlement appears as both a solution and a justification for non-entrées regimes. As discussed 
in section 2.5.2.2, states have presented increases in resettlement commitments as a justification 
for tightening restrictions on asylum. Arguably, as the “race to the bottom” intensifies, and as 
new technologies of immigration control emerge, it will become increasingly difficult for 
refugees to access asylum. Resettlement, meanwhile, remains the only durable solution for 
many refugees who are barred from entering a safe country of asylum. 
 
2.7 Refugees and resettlement today – a glance at the numbers 
In its most recent Global Trends report, the UNHCR reported that 20.4M refugees were under 
its mandate at the end of 2019. 232 In addition, the UNHCR reported that there were 5.6M 
Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the UNRWA, 45.7M internally-displaced persons 
(IDPs), 4.2M asylum seekers, and 4.5M “Venezuelans displaced abroad.” This amounts to a 
total of 79.5M “forcibly displaced” persons worldwide, the highest number of refugees ever 
recorded. The top countries of origin in 2019 were Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, 
Myanmar, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, and the Central African 
Republic.233 The UNHCR also reports that, as of the end of 2019, 15.7M refugees (77% of the 
refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate) were living in a “protracted refugee situation”, 
defined as a situation where 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality are seeking 
                                                   
232 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 2. 
233 Ibid at 8. 
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refuge in a given country of asylum. Nearly six million refugees have been in exile for more 
than 20 years.234 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the vast majority of refugees (85%) are currently located in 
countries of the Global South.235 Countries considered “least developed” by the United Nations, 
including Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen, host about 27% of the world’s refugee 
population, while they account for a combined 1.2% of the world’s gross domestic product.236  
 
In 2020, UNHCR projected that there would be around 1.45M persons “in need of resettlement” 
in 2021.237 Forty-tree percent (616,958) of refugees identified to be in need of resettlement are 
located in Africa (excluding North Africa), 29% in Europe (423,600), 19% in the Middle East 
and North Africa (275,981), 7% in Asia & the Pacific (99,470), and 2% in the Americas 
(29,374). 238  In 2019, only 107,800 refugees were resettled globally 239  (63,726 through the 
UNHCR),240 accounting for 7.5% of the total refugee populations identified as being “in need of 
                                                   
234 Ibid at 24. The metric used by the UNHCR to assess protraction has been criticized. Labman writes that the 
accepted definition of protraction 
fails to encompass the chronic, irresolvable, and recurring character of protracted refugee 
situation or articulate the long-term political consequences of protraction. … Protracted 
situations represent the failure of local integration, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement. 
Protraction is the antithesis to solution” (Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 98 at 
28).  
See also Kneebone, “Introduction”, supra note 83 at 3-4. 
235 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 22 
236 Ibid. 
237 UNHCR, “Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021” (Division of International Protection, 2020) at 11 
[Global Resettlement Needs 2021]. Resettlement needs are assessed by the UNHCR “based on considerations 
related to the protection environment/framework in the country and the effective availability of other durable 
solutions” (95). 
238 Ibid at 96. 
239 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 2. 
240 UNHCR, “Global Resettlement Needs 2021”, supra note 237 at 119. 
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resettlement” by the UNHCR in 2019 (1.4M).241 That figure is not quite accurate, as it cannot be 
determined if the 36,720 refugees resettled outside the UNHCR’s auspices in 2019 (including 
the vast majority of refugees admitted to Canada through the PSR stream) were in fact 
considered “in need of resettlement” by the UNHCR for the purpose of its global resettlement 
needs calculations.242 
 
Since 2001, global resettlement numbers have averaged 94,958 persons per year. The 
resettlement numbers for 2016 were the highest in over two decades (189,300), with 37 states 
taking part in refugee resettlement.243 Global arrivals for 2018 were 50% lower than in 2016 
(92,400). As explained in section 2.6.2, this drop is mainly due to drastic reductions in 
resettlement to the United States.244 Nevertheless, as the below graph shows, global resettlement 






                                                   
241 Ibid at 55. 
242 I do not want to suggest that these refugees were not, objectively speaking, “in need of resettlement.” The 
Canadian PSR program, for instance, operates outside UNHCR’s referral-based resettlement system, but the 
Canadian criteria provides that resettlement will only be offered if no durable solution is available to the 
refugee in a reasonable period of time, a criteria that mirrors UNHCR policy. It is also worth considering that 
UNHCR’s position on the need for resettlement for particular populations and the availability of other durable 
solutions, such as local integration, is influenced by pressures from host, source and donor states. As 
discussed in section 2.5.1, the UNHCR has in the past promoted repatriation in situations where returning 
refugees were put at risk.  The political nature of the international refugee regime is apparent not only at the 
macro-level of defining the global role durable solutions, but also at the micro-level of identifying refugee 
protection strategies for specific refugee populations. 
243 UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016” (2017), at 27 [Global Trends 2016]. 
244 The overall reduction in resettlement would have been far greater had other states, and especially Canada, 
not increased their resettlement admissions. 
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TABLE 2.1 - GLOBAL REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT DEPARTURES (2001-2019)245 
 
The above graph is somewhat misleading, however, because the global refugee population under 
UNHCR’s mandate has also been steadily increasing since 2010, and is now at a historic high. 
In stark contrast, the graph below shows that, as a proportion of the global refugee population, 
refugee resettlement numbers in 2019 were at their lowest since 2001 (0.449%). 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 - RESETTLEMENT AS A % OF THE POPULATION  
UNDER UNHCR MANDATE 
 
In 2019, repatriation was by far the top durable solution in terms of numbers. This comports 
with the international refuge regime’s shift away from the “exilic bias” in the 1980s. In 2019, 
                                                   
245 Data compiled relying on UNHCR’s Global Trends reports, UNHCR’s Statistical Yearbook reports, and  
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317,200 refugees are reported to have returned to their country of origin.246 Local integration is a 
process more difficult to assess. As reviewed in section 2.5.1, the UNHCR defines local 
integration as a situation where “refugees legally, economically and socially integrate in the host 
country, availing themselves of the national protection of the host government.” Hathaway 
posits that such a conception of local integration merely amounts to refugee status, and that only 
naturalization can put an end to refugee status. 247  Interestingly, the UNHCR uses full 
naturalization as a proxy for local integration in its Global Trends statistic, since legal, 
economic, and social integration is practically impossible to assess. It estimates that 55,000 
refugees were naturalized in 2019.248 
 
In their proposal to fundamentally reform the international refugee regime, Betts and Collier 
stress that the access to a durable solution has become an “elusive fiction.”249 The numbers 
speak for themselves. It is evident that, almost seventy years after the adoption of the Refugee 
Convention, international refugee law has failed to provide a solution to the global refugee 
problem. In 2019, using naturalization as a metric for local integration, a total of 480,000 
refugees found a durable solution. 
 
 
                                                   
246 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 50. 
247 See section 2.5.1. 
248 UNHCR, “Global Trends 2019”, supra note 80 at 54. The UNHCR specifies that, due to reporting 
limitations, naturalization data “are only indicative at best and provide an underestimate of the extent to which 
refugees are naturalized.” 
249 They add that 
… the international community is not managing to end conflicts to allow people to go home; 
it is not persuading host countries to integrate locally; and resettlement places are a drop in 
the ocean. Instead people are left in limbo, with generations of refugees being born in camps, 
growing up in camps, and becoming adults in camps. Around them, they struggle to find role 
refuge models because their parents have usually been denied hope and opportunity (Betts & 
Collier, supra note 5 at 137-38). 
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2.8 Tinkering at the margins? Why adjudication matters 
This chapter has highlighted several broad and systemic problems that contribute to making the 
international refugee system relatively ineffective, unpredictable, and geopolitically unequal. It 
has also highlighted the importance of refugee resettlement as a mechanism to achieve 
protection and ethical burden-sharing. In a certain sense, the international refugee regime is one 
that is perpetually deficient and perpetually searching for a new strategy, yet the initiatives that 
have the most purchase among states and international institutions seem to only put “old wines 
in new bottles.” The political forces at play in keeping the status quo are strong. At the same 
time, the rationale for a different kind of response is more compelling than ever. 
 
The critiques that can be directed at the regime are numerous, and many have advocated for 
deep reforms. Despite persistent calls for reform by researchers and practitioners, and periodic 
international initiatives, very little has been achieved since the 1960s in terms of reforming the 
structure of the international refugee regime.250 The pillar of the international refugee regime 
remains an outdated legal instrument, one that largely leaves the challenge of refugee protection 
to expressions of international solidarity. I want to make it clear that I acknowledge the deep 
critiques of the refugee regime and calls for reform. That being said, while I argue that refugee 
resettlement remains a key mechanism for refugee protection and burden-sharing and should be 
increased, I do not examine in this dissertation avenues to fundamentally alter the international 
refugee regime. My goal is more modest in scope. It is to take a component of the international 
refugee regime - the Canadian resettlement system - and assess it on its own terms. 
 
                                                   
250 See ibid at 5. 
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In the following chapters, I explore how Canada’s refugee resettlement system interacts with 
principles of international refugee law, soft law principles of refugee protection, and Canadian 
administrative law. I also explore how decision-making in the resettlement system impacts 
refugee protection. I acknowledge that Canada is under no international legal obligation to 
resettle refugees. However, that should not preclude further legal analysis. I take the position 
that, should Canada operate a refugee resettlement program, the program should not only be 
consistent with principles of refugee protection and humanitarianism, it should also be fairly and 
accurately implemented, and consistent with principles of Canadian administrative law. 
 
This dissertation assesses the implementation of Canada’s resettlement program primarily 
through the lens of visa officer decision-making and judicial review. As reviewed earlier in this 
chapter, refugee status decision-making has been the subject of many studies in legal 
scholarship, in Canada and in other jurisdictions. These studies are important because they show 
that asylum states, despite being governed by the same international obligations and 
commitments, implement their obligations very differently. As Betts and Collier comment: 
[the wording of the Convention has been] tortured into reinterpretations stretched 
to fit new circumstances. With wide variation in legal interpretation, policy 
coherence has been lost. Court rulings have become eccentric: refugees in 
identical circumstances will be granted asylum in the courts of some nations but 
refused it in others; even within the same country, they will be granted asylum in 
some years but not others. … What began as coherent common rules for 
responding to persecution have evolved into chaotic and indefensible responses 
to the problem of mass flight from disorder.251 
 
 
In a similar vein, Evans Cameron writes that the Refugee Convention provides only the “barest 
legal guidance”, leaving it to states to craft a system in conformity to their constitutional and 
                                                   
251 Ibid at 5. 
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administrative structure.252  As a result, refugee status decision-making varies tremendously 
between states.253 
 
In other words, refugee status decision-making is where ‘the rubber meets the road’, at least in 
states with formalized, state-led refugee status determination systems. Consider for example the 
varying national approaches with regard to gender-based claims,254  claims based on sexual 
orientation,255 and claims based on gender identity.256 Consider also the widely varying refugee 
recognition rates between states. Japan has a refugee recognition rate of 0.3%,257 and Israel’s is 
less than 1%,258 while the Canadian refugee recognition rate for 2018 was 59.9%.259 Betts and 
Collier report that even within Europe, where relatively harmonized asylum standards have been 
adopted, there is important variation. 260  In her comparative study of inland refugee status 
determination systems in the United States, Canada, and Australia, Rebecca Hamlin explains 
that the striking differences in recognition rates in each country can be explained by several 
                                                   
252 Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Law's Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018) at 28. 
253 Ibid. 
254 See Bethany Lobo, “Women as a Particular Social Group: A Comparative Assessment of Gender Asylum 
Claims in the United States and the United Kingdom” (2012) 26 Geo Immigr LJ 361; Tal Kopan, “Trump 
Admin Drops Asylum Protections for Domestic Violence Victims”, CNN (11 June 2018), online: 
<https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/politics/jeff-sessions-asylum-decision/index.html>. 
255 See Jana Weßels, “Sexual orientation in Refugee Status Determination” (2011) Refugee Studies Centre 
Working Paper no 73, online (pdf): <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ebb93182.pdf>. 
256 See Senthorun Raj, “Evolving Bodies: Mapping (Trans)Gender Identities in Refugee Law” in Gavin 
Brown & Kath Browne, eds, The Routledge Research Companion to Geographies of Sex and Sexualities 
(London: Routledge, 2016) 221. 




258 Alona Ferber, “By the Numbers: Israel Recognizes Less Than 1% of Asylum Seekers”, Haaretz (23 June 
2014), online: <https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-seeking-asylum-israel-oks-under-1-1.5252984>. 
259 This data includes both “legacy” (pre-reform cases) and new cases (Sean Rehaag, “2018 Refugee Claim 
Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” (19 June 2019), online: <https://ccrweb.ca/en/2018-refugee-claim-
data>. 
260 For example, Betts & Collier report that refugee recognition was 14% in Greece, compared to 94% in 
France. For Eritreans, the recognition rate was 26% in France, compared to 100% in Sweden (Betts & Collier, 
supra note 5 at 46-47). 
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factors, perhaps the most important of which is institutional independence and its impact on 
fact-finding and training: 
An RSD regime with high administrative insulation puts a great deal of pressure 
on the one hearing, requiring the tribunal to invest resources into fact finding and 
training, to ensure decision makers have as much information at their disposal as 
possible. It also results in questions about the refugee definition being more 




I reiterate that I am not suggesting that improved decision-making in Northern states is the only 
way, or even the best way, to ensure that international protection is provided to those who need 
it. But decision-making does matter, for numerous reasons. It is important to scrutinize national 
refugee institutions because they reveal how the international refugee regime is implemented at 
the national level. Decision-making obviously matters for refugees in need of protection who are 
entitled to fair, accurate, and legally-sound decisions. In the Canadian resettlement context, it 
also matters for refugee sponsors, whose enthusiasm for sponsorship may fade in the face of 
repeated problematic decisions and lack of appeal mechanisms.262 Furthermore, in terms of 
program administration, every erroneous refusal leads to additional processing costs and 
increased delays in reaching admission targets. In this sense, quality decision-making is required 
for the sustainability of the program. More fundamentally, shortcomings in decision-making 
undermine the program as a whole in terms of attaining its humanitarian objective. 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
In this overview, we have seen that the international refugee regime emerged as a temporary 
                                                   
261 Rebecca Hamlin, “International Law and Administrative Insulation: A Comparison of Refugee Status 
Determination Regimes in the United States, Canada, and Australia” (2012) 37:4 L & Soc Inquiry 933 at 963. 
262 See Shauna Labman, “Private Sponsorship: Complementary or Conflicting Interests?” (2016) 32:2 Refuge 
67 at 76. 
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response to a specific refugee situation in the 1920s, with a primary emphasis on legal 
protection and a wholly Eurocentric focus. The first generation of international refugee 
institutions collapsed with the onset of the Second World War and the dissolution of the League 
of Nations. Building on the League of Nations experience, the international refugee regime was 
rebuilt around the UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Eurocentric focus of the 
interwar refugee regime carried through to the new regime, until 1967, when the geographical 
limitation of the Refugee Convention was eliminated. The 1951 Refugee Convention remains 
today the pillar of the international refugee regime, despite its restricted focus on “persecution.” 
 
The place of resettlement in the international refuge regime has shifted widely in the past 70 
years. Driven by Cold War politics, resettlement was utilized as a political tool by Western 
countries and was considered the “preferred durable solution” in the three decades that followed 
the Second World War. The “exilic bias” of the refugee regime began to fade in the 1980s, with 
the end of the Cold War and the emergence of so-called “new refugee flows.” Repatriation 
firmly became the preferred durable solution in the 1990s, as resettlement numbers fell to 
historic lows. In the early 2000s, international efforts to reinvigorate resettlement were relatively 
successful, with the emergence of the concept of the “strategic use of resettlement.” In recent 
years, resettlement admissions have increased in absolute numbers, but have not kept up with 
the global increase in the global refugee population. 
 
Shifts in state perspectives on durable solutions highlight two important deficiencies of 
international refugee law. First, while international refugee law explicitly protects against 
refoulement, the right to seek asylum - arguably provided for in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights263 - is routinely ignored by states. 264 In this context, this chapter has explored 
how states have increasingly developed policies and technologies designed to prevent asylum 
seekers from entering their territory. Second, the international refugee regime lacks a normative 
framework around burden-sharing. Third-country resettlement and the provision of financial aid 
to states of asylum remains an entirely discretionary act on the part of states, subject to changes 
in domestic politics. International law provides no solution to the reality that the vast majority of 
the global refugee population resides in low- to very-low income countries. The unpredictability 
of burden-sharing has caused host states to withdraw from their legal responsibility to protect 
refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees seeks to address this problem by formalizing 
burden-sharing principles. Just like previous initiatives, however, the Global Compact remains 
non-binding and experts doubt that it will deliver on its promises. The Global Compact also 
exposes a problematic inclination to view burden-sharing in primarily economic terms, and to 
promote refugee containment in the Global South. Without a solid grounding in international 
law, the search for durable solutions has proven an immensely difficult task, wholly dependent 
                                                   
263 Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, 
Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) provides that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution.” The right to seek asylum is also recognized under the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948 and the American Convention on Human Rights, 22 
November 1969. See Andrew Brouwer, “Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human 
Rights Collide” (2003) 21:4 Refuge 6. 
264 Janet Dench writes: 
The subsequent half-century has made this right to seek asylum an orphan right, since, 
despite its appearance in the foundational human rights document, it was never adopted by 
any human rights conventions and covenants that followed. The millions who face 
persecution have discovered that their right to seek asylum is one that states are not 
necessarily prepared to protect. 
Instead of addressing how people fleeing persecution might seek asylum in other countries, 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees focused on the obligation of states 
not to refoule a refugee to persecution. The challenge of getting out of the country in which 
one fears persecution and into (or to the door of) a country of potential asylum is left up to 
the refugee. States, meanwhile, have emphasized their right to protect their borders and 
decide who enters their territory (Janet Dench, “Controlling the Borders: C-31 and 
Interdiction” (2001) 19:4 Refugee 34 at 34).  
See also Kneebone, “Introduction”, supra note 83. 
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on international and domestic political interests, and expressions of international solidarity. 
 
In this context of increasing state retrenchment from refugee law and pervasive uncertainties 
concerning burden-sharing commitments, national refugee resettlement programs, such as 
Canada’s program, have the potential to fill an important protection gap. Refugee resettlement 
has the additional benefit of generally favourable public opinion towards the ‘orderly’ arrivals 
of refugees. Positive public attitudes towards resettlement, including public interest in refugee 
sponsorship, should be leveraged further. The challenge in such efforts will always be to avoid 
causing prejudice to established asylum systems. Resettlement alone - at least resettlement as 
currently practiced - cannot solve the refugee problem. Many argue that it should remain the 
“smallest piece of the puzzle”, given that relocation away from one’s language and culture is not 
ideal, and that it may even act as a pull-factor driving refugee flows.265 Nevertheless, refugee 
resettlement remains a solid mechanism of burden-sharing, and perhaps the only durable 
solution for refugees in a protracted refugee situation. 
                                                   
265 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 98 at 29. 
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CHAPTER 3 CANADA’S RESPONSE TO REFUGEES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Refugee resettlement in Canada, although discretionary from the perspective of international 
law, is governed by detailed regulatory and legislative instruments. Decision-making in the 
resettlement program is also constrained by principles of administrative law and, perhaps, rights 
guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The purpose of this chapter is to present the 
Canadian legal framework of refugee resettlement and to discuss the place of refugee 
resettlement within Canadian refugee policy. This chapter also explores the Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees (PSR) program and discusses concerns regarding the administration of the program 
expressed by both refugee organizations and government as a way to set the stage for chapters 5 
and 6.  
 
This chapter is not intended to be a detailed account of Canadian immigration law more 
generally. However, to provide a rich context, the first two sections focus on basic principles of 
Canadian immigration law, briefly reviewing exclusionary and discriminatory immigration 
policies in Canada. The third section provides an overview of developments in Canadian refugee 
policy in the 20th century which led to the formalization of refugee resettlement and the birth of 
the PSR program in the 1976 Immigration Act. The transition to the 2001 Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the evolution of the resettlement program within Canadian 
refugee policy are then discussed in detail. Some attention will be paid in this section to policy 
developments that articulate a conflicting relationship between refugee resettlement and inland 
asylum. Important changes to the resettlement system introduced in the 2010s are addressed 
next, including the introduction of annual caps, the imposition of a UNHCR documentation 
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requirement for PSRs, and the creation of the Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) program. 
This section also further explores the dynamics within the PSR program through a discussion of 
the principles of naming and additionality. The following section addresses restrictions placed 
on inland refugee claimants in Canada. This discussion further demonstrates the importance of 
refugee resettlement within Canadian refugee policy. The subsequent two sections present, in 
some detail, the current legislative and regulatory criteria governing refugee resettlement under 
the 2001 IRPA, and avenues for redress available to rejected resettlement applicants. This 
section includes an analysis of the approach taken by courts in judicial review of resettlement 
cases. The penultimate section canvasses concerns, including long processing delays, low 
approval rates, and low-quality decision-making, that have been reported by actors involved in 
the refugee resettlement system. In the final section, I present and discuss statistics on refugee 
resettlement arrivals to Canada between 1979 and 2019. 
 
3.2 Admission and territorial sovereignty in Canada – a positivist assessment 
There is a rich academic debate on the nature of border and sovereignty in liberal democracies. 
Rawls and Dworkin never focused on migration directly, but both of their accounts of the liberal 
system rely on an assumption of closed borders. The classical liberal theory of Rawls assumes a 
relatively closed political community as a precondition to the liberal state.1 Dworkin considers 
community to be “prior to justice and fairness.”2 Michael Walzer, on the other hand, explicitly 
endorses closed borders as necessary for his conception of justice to emerge.3 Other liberal 
                                                   
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971) at 12. See also Michael Walzer, Spheres 
of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983) at 61. 
2 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001) at 208. See also Walzer, ibid, at 61. 
3 Walzer, ibid. See also Catherine Dauvergne, “Amorality and Humanitarianism in Immigration Law” (1999) 
37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ at 601 [“Amorality and Humanitarianism”]. That said, Walzer does recognize the 




theorists have argued that the concept of closed borders, including a more relaxed closed 
borders principle that respects the principle of mutual aid, does not sit well with the principle of 
the equal moral worth of all individuals, also central to the liberal theory.4  Joseph Carens 
maintains that various strands of liberal theory support the concept of open borders and that 
therefore such a position should be considered inherent to liberalism.5 Galloway and Chai Yun 
Liew explain:  
[d]espite the intellectual excitement generated by the concept of citizenship and 
the wide variety of critical views, the dominant framework has endured, a 
framework in which the nation-state is presented as having sovereignty to 




It is not my objective in this chapter to go any further into the theoretical debate around 
sovereignty, liberalism and borders. My point here is merely to state, before presenting an 
account of how immigration law currently operates in Canada, that the question of closed 
borders is very much a contested one, at least in theoretical debates. 
 
The Supreme Court in Chiarelli described the principles governing immigration law in these 
terms:  
The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non‑citizens do not 
have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country.  At common law an 
alien has no right to enter or remain in the country. … 
 
The distinction between citizens and non‑citizens is recognized in the Charter. 
While permanent residents are given the right to move to, take up residence in, 
and pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province in s. 6(2) (of the Charter), 
                                                   
4 Dauvergne, ibid; Catherine Dauvergne, “Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration 
Law” (1997) 10 Can JL & Jur 323. 
5 See Joseph H Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49 Rev of Pol 251; 
Dauvergne, “Amorality and Humanitarianism”, supra note 3 at 607; Susan Kneebone, “The Rule of Law and 
the Role of Law: Refugees and Asylum Seekers”, in Susan Kneebone, ed, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the 
Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 32 at 66. 
6 Donald Galloway & Jamie Chai Yun Liew, Immigration Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 82. 
	 79	
	
only citizens are accorded the right “to enter, remain in and leave Canada” in s. 
6(1).  
 
Thus Parliament has the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact 
legislation prescribing the conditions under which non‑citizens will be permitted 
to enter and remain in Canada.7 
 
 
Immigration legislation - just like the Charter - recognizes an absolute right to enter and remain 
in Canada only to those who hold citizenship and to persons “registered as an Indian under the 
Indian Act.”8 All other individuals can only enter or remain in Canada if they obtain permission 
- a visa - from the Canadian government. Generally speaking, a visa must be obtained prior to 
the individual’s entry into Canada.9 There exist two broad categories of non-citizen status in 
Canadian immigration law: temporary status (including the visitor class, the worker class, and 
the student class), and permanent status. Temporary status, as the name implies, includes an end 
date and severely limits the entitlements of the visa holder. For the purposes of the IRPA, 
temporary residents and persons without status are considered “foreign nationals.”10 Only in 
limited circumstances can a person transition from temporary to permanent status from within 
                                                   
7 Canada (MEI) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711 at 733-34. See Sharry Aiken, “From Slavery to Expulsion: 
Racism, Canadian Immigration Law and the Unfulfilled Promise of Modern Constitutionalism” in Vijay 
Agnew, ed, Interrogating Race and Racism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 55 at 57 [“From 
Slavery to Expulsion”]; Galloway & Liew, supra note 6 at 6-11. 
8 IRPA, s 19(1). A quasi-absolute right to enter, remain and leave one’s country of citizenship is recognized 
under international law: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 art 12(4) (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976). See James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 954-56 
[The Rights of Refugees]. It is also a right expressly recognized under section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982 c 11. Both international and Canadian law, however, allow for the revocation of citizenship of foreign-
born citizens in certain circumstances. See Christopher G Anderson, “A Long-Standing Canadian Tradition: 
Citizenship Revocation and Second-Class Citizenship under the Liberals, 1993–2006” (2008) 42:3 J Can Stud 
80; Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien” 
(2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ 1. 
9 IRPA, s 11(1). 
10 IRPA, s 2(1), “foreign national”. 
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Canada. 11  In addition, few temporary migrants can qualify under the stricter permanent 
residence rules.12 
 
Permanent residency provides extensive social and legal entitlements and allows a person to 
stay indefinitely in Canada as well as sponsor their dependents. Permanent residency is also a 
pathway to citizenship. It includes three broad categories: the economic class, the family class 
and the humanitarian class. Resettled refugees obtain permanent residency status under the 
humanitarian class upon their arrival in Canada.13 In contrast, inland refugee claimants whose 
claim is accepted by the IRB immediately receive protected person status, and thereafter become 
eligible to apply for permanent status.14 
 
3.3 Exclusion and discrimination in Canadian immigration law 
Aiken writes that Canadian pre-Confederation immigration policy was designed to “divest the 
indigenous population of their sparsely populated ‘wild lands’ and render them productive as 
quickly as possible.”15 The colonial effort was guided by an ideology that sought to populate the 
land by British settlers (and French settlers under the French regime). Slavery remained legal in 
Canada until the early 19th century. In fact, Canada’s first non-white immigrants were enslaved 
                                                   
11 For example, a current pilot program allows for the transition to permanent status of temporary foreign 
workers in the “home child care” and the “home support” categories. See Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada, “Home Child Care Provider Pilot and Home Support Worker Pilot”, online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/caregivers/child-
care-home-support-worker.html>. A separate program for “Live-In-Caregivers” existed until 2014. See 
Galloway & Liew, supra note 6 at 88, 123.  
12 Galloway & Liew, ibid at 130. 
13 IRPA, s 139(1). 
14 Sasha Baglay & Martin Jones, Refugee Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) at 120-21. Inland protected 
persons must wait 180 days after the conferral of protected person status before submitting a permanent 
residence application (IRPR, s 175(1)). The delay is five years in the case of “designated foreign nationals” 
(IRPA, s 11(1.1)). Protected persons found to be inadmissible on the grounds of security, violation of human 
or international rights, serious criminality, organized criminality, or danger to public health or safety are 
ineligible for permanent status in Canada (IRPA, s 21(2)). 
15 Aiken, “From Slavery to Expulsion”, supra note 7 at 63. 
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Black people, brought as early as 1628.16 The term ‘White Canada’ has been used to describe 
Canadian migration policy from Confederation up to the 1960s. Jakubowski explains that 
[i]nitially, immigration policies were ethnically selective: racist in orientation, 
assimilationist in objective. Striving to preserve the British character of Canada, 
authorities directed their efforts towards excluding certain people from entry, 




The term “race” first appeared as a tool of immigration exclusion in section 38(c) of the 1910 
Immigration Act, 18  which allowed the Governor-in-Council to “prohibit … the landing in 
Canada … of immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements 
of Canada.”19 Black American immigrants were routinely excluded as being “unsuited to the 
climate” of Canada.20 In 1919, “nationality” was added to the section. The amended section 
38(c) allowed the government to exclude any race or nationality  
by reasons of any economic, industrial or other condition temporarily existing in 
Canada or because such immigrants are deemed unsuitable having regard to the 
climatic, industrial, social, educational, labour or other condition or requirements 
of Canada or because such immigrants are deemed undesirable owing to their 
peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of holding property, and 
because of their probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the 
duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable period of 
time after their entry.21 
 
 
                                                   
16 Ibid. Slavery was outlawed in the British Empire in 1833. See Gerald E Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy: 
Indifference or Opportunism? (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977) at 22 [Canada’s Refugee 
Policy]. 
17 Lisa Marie Jakubowski & Elizabeth Comack, “‘Managing’ Canada’s Immigration: Racism, Racialization, 
and the Law” in Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender/Sexuality Connections, 3rd ed 
(Halifax & Winnipeg: Fernwood Publication, 2014) 88 at 90, citing JE Elliot & A Fleras, Unequal Relations: 
An Introduction to Race and Ethnic and Aboriginal Dynamics in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1996). 
18 Immigration Act, SC 1910, c 27 [1910 Immigration Act]. 
19 Section 38(c) of the 1910 Immigration Act was essentially carried over to section 61 of the Immigration Act, 
SC 1952 c 42. See Anna Pratt, Securing Canada’s Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada 
(Vancouver, UBC Press, 2005) at 76. 
20 See Esmeralda MA Thornhill, “So Seldom for Us, So Often Against Us: Blacks and Law in Canada” (2008) 
38:3 J Black Stud 321 at 329. 
21 See Lisa Marie Jakubowski, Immigration and the Legalization of Racism (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997) at 16. 
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An Order-in-Council passed under section 38(c) in 1919 prohibited the immigration of persons 
from the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian or Turkish “races”, without the permission of 
the Minister.22 The “Asian race” was prohibited from entry in 1923. The restriction remained in 
place until 1956 when the government entered into an agreement with Asian countries limiting 
the numbers of nationals allowed to immigrate to Canada.23 
 
In addition, in the first decades following Confederation, specific policies were enacted to 
prevent immigration from the Asian continent, more specifically from China, Japan and India. 
In the mid-1880s, following a decrease in labour needed by the Canadian Pacific Railway, the 
Federal Government adopted the infamous “Chinese Head Tax” with the passing of the 1885 
Chinese immigration Act.24 Fees under the Chinese Head Tax regime reached $500 in 1903.25 
The exclusion of Japanese migration was achieved through a “Gentleman’s Agreement”, where 
Canada agreed not to impose discriminatory laws against Japanese immigrants, while the 
Japanese government agreed to restrict the number of people permitted to emigrate to Canada.26 
The case of Indian migrants proved more complicated as India was part of the British Empire. 
Following the arrival of around two thousand north-Indians in the early 1900s, the Governor 
General of Canada sent a note to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London stating that 
the immigrants 
                                                   
22 David Matas, “Racism in Canadian Immigration Policy – Part One: The History” (1985) 5:2 Refuge 8 at 8. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Chinese immigration Act, SC 1885, c 71. See Galloway & Liew, supra note 6 at 17. See also Jakubowski, 
supra note 21 at 14. 
25 Interestingly, the passing of the 1885 Chinese Immigration Act came after the Federal Government had 
spent years opposing anti-Chinese measures by the Legislature of British Columbia. These British Columbia 
statutes described Chinese immigrants as “governed by pestilential habits”, “useless in instances of 
emergency”, and “inclined to habits subversive of the comfort and well-being of the community.” See 
Galloway & Liew, supra note 6 at 15. 
26 Jakubowski, supra note 21 at 14. 
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doubtless come under misrepresentation as they are not suited to climate, and 
there is not sufficient field for their employment. Many in danger of becoming 
public charge and thus subject to deportation under law of Canada.27 
 
 
Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier requested that the Indian colonial government institute a 
passport system over which Canada would have control. The Indian colonial government, facing 
a rise in nationalist and anticolonial movements, insisted that migration by British subjects to 
other British colonies should remain untrammelled by passport restriction.28 Ultimately, the goal 
of the Canadian government was achieved through the so-called “Continuous Journey 
Stipulation”, an amendment to the 1906 Immigration Act that made it impossible for immigrants 
to come to Canada other than by a continuous journey. 29  The only company offering a 
continuous journey from India to Canada – the Canadian Pacific Railway – was instructed not to 
issue through tickets to Canada from India.30 The continuous journey rule had a drastic impact 
on the number of Indian immigrants coming to Canada. In 1907 and 1908, over four thousand 
Indians came to Canada. That number fell to single and double digits in the following years.31 
 
Canadian immigration law established, until the 1960s, a tiered system of “preferred 
nationalities” corresponding to varying admission restrictions. At the top of the list were white 
                                                   
27 See Radhika Viyas Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport” (1999) 11:3 Pub Cult 
527 at 533. This obsession with climate incompatibility, Mongia writes, is a clear example of “cultural 
racism”, a racist framework “whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of 
cultural differences” (534). 
28 Ibid at 536-38. 
29 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act, 7-8 Edward VII, c 33 (assented to 10 April 1908). See Jakubowski, 
supra note 21 at 14. The continuous journey rule is what led to the infamous Komagata Maru incident, where 
376 Indians were stranded on a boat off of Vancouver for two months before being forcibly returned to India. 
Upon return, Indian officials are reported to have killed 23 passengers during a riot. See Ninette Kelley & 
Michael J Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy, 2nd ed 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 152-54. 
30 Jakubowski, supra note 21 at 14. 
31 Ibid at 15. 
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citizens of the United States and the United Kingdom, who could immigrate with very few 
restrictions. Secondary preferred nationalities varied according to labour needs. In the 1920s, the 
second tier of preferred countries consisted of Northern European countries and Scandinavia, 
who could enter Canada if they were sponsored by a Canadian relative or could fill labour 
needs. Citizens from “non-preferred” countries of Eastern and Southern Europe could only 
immigrate to Canada with a special permit, while Asian immigrants faced almost 
insurmountable restrictions.32 
 
During World War II, regulations under the War Measures Act33 restricted entry by Japanese 
immigrants, and even provided for the deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese descent.34 In 
a speech in 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King described Canada’s immigration policy in the 
following terms: 
I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting 
persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. … The people of Canada do 
not wish, as result of mass immigration, to make any fundamental alteration in 
the character of our population. … Any considerable Oriental immigration would 
… be certain to give rise to social and economic problems.35 
 
 
Restrictions by country of origin continued after World War II, with citizens from listed 
countries being prohibited from immigrating to Canada unless they had sufficient means. 
Citizens from Africa and Asia were allowed to enter Canada only if they had immediate family 
already in the country.36 Canadian immigration law never explicitly discriminated against Jews. 
                                                   
32 Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 192. 
33 War Measures Act, 1914, SC 1914, c 2. 
34 Matas, supra note 22 at 9. Regulations passed under the War Measures Act also allowed for the internment 
without trial of immigrants from enemy countries, as well as citizens naturalized after 1922. See Kelley & 
Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 279. 
35 Kelley & Trebilcock, ibid at 312. See also Pratt, supra note 19 at 74. 
36 Matas, supra note 22 at 9. 
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However, as Matas writes, Jews effectively faced discrimination through widespread abuse of 
discretionary power: 
Whatever the immigration requirements were, Jews could not meet them. The 
law allowed for entry of families with sufficient capital to establish farms. But 
Jewish families with capital were not allowed entry. Immigration was headed by 
an avowed antisemite, Fred Blair. He transferred the responsibility for processing 
Jewish applicants from other government offices to his own where he personally 
scrutinized each application, deciding its eligibility. But in virtually every case 
the answer was “no”.37 
 
 
Explicit racial restrictions against non-Europeans remained until 1962, when race was removed 
as an immigration criterion in favour of general criteria applied to all immigrants regardless of 
nationality. Five years later, in 1967, the more objective “points system” - still used today - was 
introduced. While “white Canada” policies were officially dismantled in the 1960s, a number of 
scholars and advocacy groups have argued that racism and discrimination still lurk in Canadian 
immigration law. In particular, it has been claimed that visa officer decision-making is informed 
by racial biases. 38  
 
For instance, current security inadmissibility proceedings have been shown to be almost entirely 
directed at individuals from the Global South.39 Temporary visa applications are denied for an 
                                                   
37 Ibid. See also, regarding the treatment of Jews under Canadian immigration and refugee law: Irving Abella 
& Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe (1933-1948), 3rd ed (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012); Irving Abella, “Canadian Refugee Policy to 1980: Historical Overview” 
in Vaughan Robinson, ed, The International Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses (London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 1992) 77 [“Canadian Refugee Policy to 1980”]. 
38 See Alan Simmons, “Racism and Immigration Policy” in Vic Satzewich, ed, Racism and Social Inequality 
in Canada: Concepts, Controversies and Strategies of Resistance (Toronto: Thomson Educational, 1998) 87; 
Augie Fleras, Immigration Canada: Evolving Realities and Emerging Challenges in a Postnational World 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015); Sherene Razack, “Making Canada White: Law and the Policing of Bodies of 
Colour in the 1990s” (1999) 14:1 CJLS 159; Nandita Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making 
of ‘Migrant Workers’ in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
39 See Angus Grant, Confronting (In)Security: Forging Legitimate Approaches to Security and Exclusion in 
Migration Law (PhD thesis, York University Osgoode Hall Law School, 2016). 
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increasingly large proportion of African applicants, while temporary visa are available upon 
entry for citizens of virtually every country of the Global North.40 Scholars have also pointed out 
that Canadian visa offices are not evenly distributed across the globe, and are especially rare in 
sub-Saharan Africa.41 
 
Lastly, it is worth reflecting on whether the points system has truly eradicated discrimination in 
immigration legislation. First, points systems are designed as a solution to combat one kind of 
discrimination, that based on race, nationality, ethnicity, and religion. However, as Dauvergne 
explains, points systems cement discrimination based on socio-economic class: 
Points systems were invented by settler states seeking to break with their 
racialized immigration histories. The systems, however, do not removed 
discrimination, they simply deploy it differently. People who come out at the top 
of points systems are well educated, multi-lingual, economically successful, and 
young. Accordingly, they are very likely to be wealthy, and to come from 
wealthy families. A preference for the rich is hardly non-discriminatory, but 
Western legal systems have struggled to recognized and remedy discrimination 
against either the rich or the poor. These groups do not fit liberal analysis of 
discrimination well because of the embedded assumption that wealth or poverty 




                                                   
40 Idil Mussa, “African visitors least likely to obtain Canadian visas”, CBC News (26 November 2019), online: 
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/canada-s-temporary-visa-approval-rate-lowest-for-african-
travellers-1.5369830>. 
41 Jakubowski & Comack, supra note 17 at 103. See also Vic Satzewich, Points of Entry: How Canada’s 
Immigration Officers Decide Who Gets In (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 87-88. 
42 Catherine Dauvergne, The New Politics of Immigration and the End of Settler Societies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 175. See also Aiken, “From Slavery to Expulsion”, supra note 7 at 71; 
Stuart Tannock, “Points of Prejudice: Education‐Based Discrimination in Canada's Immigration System” 
(2001) 43:4 Antipode 1330. Anna Pratt writes that the shift away from racial exclusion in Canadian 
immigration law was also followed by a preoccupation with security and criminality:  
At the same time that humanitarian and legal challenges both to the racism of immigration 
policies and to the scope and uses of discretion gained momentum, the logic of security, 
supplemented by criminality discourses, emerges as the guiding rationale for immigration 
enforcement and exclusion.  … There was then during the period a shift away from explicit, 
racially based exclusions justified by national purity discourses toward exclusions based 
increasingly on the risks posted to a reconfigured conception of national security (Pratt, 
supra note 19 at 74). 
	 87	
	
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the modern Canadian immigration system developed 
into a two-tier migration and employment framework that relies on racialized temporary foreign 
workers in low-paying and precarious occupations.43 
 
Refugee policies do not operate in isolation from immigration policies. Although refugee law 
and immigration law have distinct foundations in political and legal theory, and in international 
law, they are deeply integrated, and largely stem from an undistinguishable core of social and 
economic concerns. In fact, the first legislation to governing refugees was adopted only in 1976. 
For a long period of Canada’s history, the Canadian government was not interested in 
newcomers’ motivations for migration.44 
 
3.4 The emergence of the refugee in Canadian immigration law 
Early Canadian law and policy did not distinguish between immigrants and refugees. However, 
many migration movements in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries involved refugees as 
understood today in international law.45 The first of these groups is generally considered to be 
the American Loyalists who came to British North America following the American Revolution 
in the late 18th century.46 This population movement was facilitated by what is considered the 
                                                   
43 See Judy Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox of International 
Rights for Migrant Workers” (2012-2013) 34 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 95; Sarah Marsden, “Assessing the 
Regulation of Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada” (2011) 49:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 39; Delphine Nakache, 
“Temporary Workers: Permanent Rights?” (2010) Canadian Issues: Temporary Foreign Workers 45; J Adam 
Perry, “Barely Legal: Racism and Migrant Farm Labour in the Context of Canadian Multiculturalism” (2012) 
16:2 Citizenship Stud 189. 
44 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 25. 
45 See Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) at 
34. 
46 Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 12. See also Tradafilos Tradafilopoulos, Becoming Multicultural: 
Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 24; 
Christopher G Anderson, Canadian Liberalism and the Politics of Border Control, 1867-1967 (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2012) at 33. Whether American Loyalists were “refugees” as understood today is subject to some 
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first example of immigration legislation in what is now Canada.47 A number of other “non-
conformist minorities”, themselves persecuted under the new American regime migrated to 
British North America in the 19th century, including Quakers, Tunkers, Amish, and 
Mennonites.48 
 
Over 50,000 formerly enslaved Black people migrated to Canada from the United States 
between 1810 and 1860. While slavery was legal through the British Empire until 1833, the 
institution of slavery was not widespread in British North America. 49  This movement was 
assisted by Canadian organizations, including the Anti-Slavery Society of Canada and the 
Fugitive’s Union, which helped formerly enslaved people escape the United States and find 
employment in the colonies.50 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
debate. Dirks is of the view that Loyalist migrants were not refugees, but rather came to Canada by choice, 
because of a desire to remain in British territories (Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 16). 
Irving Abella expresses a similar view (Irving Abella, “Canadian Refugee Policy to 1980”, supra note 37 at 
80). 
47 An Act for the ready admission of His Majesty’s Subjects in the Colonies on the Continent, who may be 
induced to take refuge in this Province, from the Anarchy and Confusion there, and for securing the Peace, 
and preserving the Loyalty and Obedience of the Inhabitants of this Province, SNS 1775, c 6. See Galloway 
& Liew, supra note 6 at 11. 
48 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 17. 
49 The possibility of extradition of enslaved people to the United States ended in 1833 (ibid at 22-23). 
Barrington Walker writes that the commonly held idea of British North America and Canada as a haven for 
enslaved Black people is only partially true. In 1790, the British Parliament enacted legislation to allow the 
importation of “Negroes, household furniture, utensils of husbandry or cloathing.” He adds that during much 
of the British colonial period, “Blacks were neither subjects nor citizens; rather, they were commodities, 
goods, machines for producing wealth, sexual pleasure, and social status” (Barrington Walker, “Introduction: 
From a Property Right to Citizenship Rights – The African Canadian Legal Odyssey” in Barrington Walker, 
ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey: Historical Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) 3 at 
4). See also Harvey Amani Whitfield, Blacks on the Border: The Black Refugees in British North America, 
1815–1860 (Burlington: University of Vermont Press, 2006). In addition, Abella writes that British North 
America was not a very hospitable refuge for former enslaved Black Americans: 
That these areas were not much of a haven might be inferred from the fact that as soon as 
they could - that is, after the Emancipation Proclamation and the end of the Civil War - the 
vast majority of these ex-slaves chose the vagaries of a post-war America over life in their 
new home. Very few of these refugees chose to settle in Canada (Abella, “Canadian Refugee 
Policy to 1980”, supra note 37 at 80). 
50 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 22-23. 
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In the years following Confederation, Mennonites and Doukhobors facing persecution in Russia 
settled in Canada in considerable numbers through organized programs that included land 
grants. 51 The motivations behind these land grants, Dirks explains, was driven not by 
humanitarianism but by economic factors: 
Canada accepted these thousands primarily because the land had to be settled and 
made productive. Humanitarianism must be thought of as playing a secondary 
role. Certainly, any sympathy there may have been, particularly for the 
Doukhobors, diminished quickly after their arrival in 1899. With the appointment 
of Frank Oliver as minister of the interior in 1906, the government’s policy of 
granting concessions to unorthodox sects was terminated.52 
 
In the late 19th century, other minority groups were resettled to Canada, including American 
Mormons and Russian Jews, but without land grants.53 
 
It is worth noting that Canada did not participate in any meaningful way in the international 
refugee regime under the League of Nations during the interwar period. It is somewhat ironic 
that Canada was awarded the Nansen Medal in 1986, given the fact that Canada never 
recognized the Nansen Passport and failed to act in good faith in its dealings with refugee 
institutions during the 1920s and 1930s. Canada did not sign the 1922 or 1924 arrangements 
regarding the issuance of the Nansen Passport to Russian and Armenian refugees.54 The reason 
for this refusal was that the Canadian government was reluctant to relinquish the absolute right 
to return refugees should they become a charge to the state or become otherwise unfit for 
residence in Canada. 55  At the 1926 League of Nations Intergovernmental Conference, 
participating states agreed to include in the Nansen Passport a return visa. Canada signed the 
                                                   
51 Ibid at 32-34. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid at 34-35. 
54 Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill, “Rejecting Misfits: Canada and the Nansen Passport” (1994) 28:2 Intl Migr 




1926 arrangement, but never ratified nor implemented it in any meaningful way.56 The Canadian 
government insisted that its condition had always been that it would only agree to the passport 
system if returnability was possible within five years, instead of the one-year period provided by 
the 1926 arrangement. When signatory states agreed to extend the returnability provision to five 
years, Canada once again increased its criteria. Canada did not attend the 1929 and 1933 
intergovernmental conferences, and did not accede to the resulting arrangements. By 1938, the 
Canadian government’s position on the 1926 Arrangement was that “We have done nothing to 
ratify it and, therefore, we are probably not bound by it in any way.”57 
 
Throughout the interwar period, the Canadian government took the position that refugees should 
be bound by the same criteria and requirements as regular migrants.58 This proved impossible 
for the vast majority of refugees. Armenian refugees, for example, were categorized as Asian, 
and therefore were required to comply with the continuous journey rule and were required to 
have $250 in cash on hand. The continuous journey rule required that tickets be purchased in the 
country of birth or in Canada, an impossible requirement for refugees.59 Refugees other than 
those from the United Kingdom and Northern and Northwestern Europe fell under “undesirable” 
or “least preferred” immigration categories and were required to comply with strict criteria.60 
 
The majority of the around 20,000 refugees who were admitted to Canada during the interwar 
period were brought through ad hoc programs adopted following strong pressure and support 
                                                   
56 In fact, a Canadian immigration official declared that the Canadian delegate signed the 1926 Arrangement 
“merely as he would have signed a Final Act, to show that he was present at the Conference” and that “he did 
not intend in any way to bind the Government to ratify” (ibid at 286-87). 
57 Ibid at 292. 
58 Ibid at 294. 
59 Ibid at 294-95. 
60 Ibid at 295. 
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from charitable organizations in Canada. Some refugees were allowed to come through family 
sponsorship. Canadians of European descent were allowed to sponsor parents, children and 
siblings, while Canadians of Asian descent could only sponsor spouses and children under the 
age of 18.61 A few hundred refugees were admitted under labour sponsorships, many of which 
were supported by organizations such as the Armenian Relief Association of Canada and the 
United Church of Canada.62 Some 150 Jewish orphans were brought to Canada with the help of 
the Canadian Jewish Congress, and thousands of Russian Mennonite refugees were resettled 
with the support of the Canadian Mennonite Board, which had entered into an agreement with 
the Canadian Pacific Railway.63 
 
During the Second World War, fewer than 5,000 refugees were resettled to Canada, a record 
reported to be the worst record of any democracy.64 Kelley and Trebilcock note that, while the 
still-fragile economy was the government’s stated motive, the real motive behind not opening up 
immigration was to ensure that Canada did not become a haven for Jewish refugees.65 The 
Canadian government’s reluctance to engage in the mass resettlement of Jewish refugees was 
most apparent in the period leading up to the 1938 Evian Conference, which Canada initially 
opposed.66 That same year, a government report acknowledged the global refugee problem, but 
recommended against the admission of more Jewish refugees out of a concern for preserving 
                                                   
61 Ibid at 299. 
62 Ibid at 300. 
63 Ibid at 301-03. These various organizational sponsorship efforts paved the way for the private sponsorship 
of refugees program, formalized in the 1976 Immigration Act. See Geoffrey Cameron, “Reluctant Partnership: 
A Political History of Private Sponsorship in Canada (1947–1980)” in Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, 
eds, Strangers to Neighbours: Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2020) 19. 
64 Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 259-60. 
65 Ibid at 257. See also Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 50-54. 
66 Dirks, ibid at 56. 
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Canada’s ethnic makeup.67 
 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, Canada became more involved in the international 
refugee regime. Canada was a key player in the efforts that led to the creation of the IRO, and 
made significant contributions to the organization’s resettlement efforts. As Dirks notes, 
however, Canada’s policy was to select predominantly single young men for resettlement. As 
the Canadian economy continued to show signs of improvement in the late 1940s, and the need 
for workers increased, Canadian immigration policies were liberalized and refugee movements 
to Canada increased. Still, the focus remained on single men with funds who were able to work. 
Ethnic and religious organizations again played a pivotal role in pressuring the government to 
do more for refugees. This resulted in the establishment of the Close Relative Program, which 
allowed Canadians to sponsor entire families. 68  Other special initiatives allowed for the 
resettlement of Estonian families from Sweden in 1948-49 and of Jewish orphans in 1947.69 
During the period of the existence of the IRO, however, Canada admitted very few “hard core” 
refugees, including those refugees suffering from tuberculosis.70 
 
Canada’s ambivalent commitment to international refugee protection persisted continued in the 
1950s. The 1952 Immigration Act contained no provision referring to refugees.71 While Canada 
chaired the UN committee responsible for drafting the Refugee Convention, Canada did not 
immediately ratify the Convention in 1951, citing concerns that the Convention would prohibit 
                                                   
67 Ibid at 57-58. 
68 Ibid at 157-164. 
69 Ibid at 164-167. 
70 Ibid at 172-175. The term “hard core refugee” was used to describe refugees that were either old or 
disabled, a group that resettlement states were largely unwilling to resettle. 
71 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 34. 
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Canada from removing refugees who posed a security risk.72 Canada also deployed efforts to 
limit UNHCR’s refugee protection activities.73 Canada abstained from voting for the expansion 
of the UNHCR’s mandate to carry out aid programs for refugees, and only contributed minimal 
funds for the maintenance of refugees.74 In 1952, the Canadian government eliminated the 
UNHCR’s Canadian office. 75  While Canada did participate to some extent in UNHCR’s 
resettlement activities during the early 1950s, Canada’s resettlement program was not geared 
towards protection first and foremost. Rather, it was integrated within a broader immigration 
rationale. Corbett writes that the 11,000 refugees admitted between 1952 and 1954 were 
“carefully selected, and most of them would have satisfied our standard if they had been 
applying as immigrants.”76 Of the ten thousand “difficult cases” resettled to third countries, 
“Canada accepted so few that she was not even listed among the countries which receive two 
hundred cases or more.”77 
 
Resettlement initiatives in Canada increased in the mid-1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Still, however, 
there existed no permanent legal framework for refugee resettlement, and these operations were 
implemented through various ad hoc orders-in-council.78 As reviewed in Chapter 2, Cold War 
dynamics played a defining role in the international refugee regime in the decades following the 
Second World War. In 1956, the Canadian government faced intense pressure from civil society 
and from within Parliament to respond to the refugee crisis caused by the 1956 Hungarian 
                                                   
72 Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 345; Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 179-82. 
73 Dirks, ibid at 182. 
74 Ibid at 183. 
75 Ibid at 185. 
76 David Corbett, Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Critique (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957) at 
198-99. See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 34-35. 
77 Corbett, ibid. 
78 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 35. 
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uprising against Soviet occupation.79  The Canadian public, and the business community in 
particular, were favourable to the admission of anti-communist Hungarian refugees.80  Over 
37,000 Hungarian refugees were resettled between 1956 and 1958.81 The Hungarian refugee 
movements also served to highlight with the Canadian public that there still remained refugees 
from the Second World War in reception centres across Europe, including a large population of 
“hard-core” refugees. 82  In the late 1950s, Canada participated - albeit reluctantly - in 
international efforts to resettle the remaining hard-core Second World War refugees.83 Twelve 
thousand Czech refugees were admitted in 1968-69.84 In 1969 Canada finally ratified the 1951 
Refugee Convention.85 A further 200 Tibetan refugees were admitted in 1970-71, followed by 
7,000 Asian Ugandan refugees in 1972.86 These Ugandan refugees were the first “Third World 
refugees” to be admitted to Canada, and the initiative was undertaken only following pressures 
from the United Kingdom.87 A further 7,000 Chilean refugees were admitted in 1973-74.88 
 
Dirks writes that Canada’s refugee policy in the first 50 years following Confederation was 
governed by a desire to settle the land. He adds that during the following 60 years, refugee 
                                                   
79 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 193-99. See Valerie Knowles, Strangers at our Gates: 
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Jan Raska, Czech Refugees in Cold War Canada, 1945-1989 (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2018). 
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Robinson, ed, The International Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 1992) 132 at 135-36. 
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policy remained driven by economic factors rather than a humanitarian imperative.89 Indeed, 
refugee admissions in that period were primarily the result of labour needs, and during 
economic downturns, very few refugees were admitted.90 Political factors played an important 
role in refugee policy. While Hungarian, Czech, and Ugandan refugees were admitted in 
relatively large numbers, other less politically desirable groups received a much less generous 
response, including Chilean refugees (perceived as left-leaning), Jewish refugees, and Tibetan 
refugees.91 
 
3.4.1 Refugee policy under the 1976 Immigration Act  
3.4.1.1 Formalization of refugee law 
In 1974, the Canadian government released the Green Paper on Immigration. 92  The Paper 
recommended that Canada “continue in its humanitarian tradition” and that a formal refugee 
category be incorporated in immigration legislation. 93  With the adoption of the 1976 
Immigration Act, Canada for the first time recognized in legislation its obligation under the 
Refugee Convention. Under the legislation, refugees were designated as a class, alongside the 
family class, the assisted relative class and the independent class. The protection of refugees and 
humanitarianism also figured for the first time as legislative objectives of immigration 
legislation.94  
 
                                                   
89 Ibid at 254-58. See also James C Hathaway, “Selective Concern: A Review of Refugee Law in Canada” 
(1987) 33 McGill LJ 676 at 678-80 [“Selective Concern”]. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. See also Basok & Simmons, supra note 87 at 135-36; Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 
at 35; Sharryn J Aiken, “Of Gods and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee Policy” (2001) 14 
RQDI 1. 
92 Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canadian Immigration and Population Study (Ottawa: 
Information Canada, 1974). 
93 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, supra note 16 at 250-251. 
94 See Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 388-98. 
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At the time, Canada had not yet become a significant country of first asylum, and it was 
assumed that the centrepiece of Canada’s refugee policy would continue to be the selection and 
admission of refugees from abroad.95 The Act allowed for the resettlement of refugees who met 
the Refugee Convention definition, but also refugees who met the definition of a “designated 
class”, to be defined in regulations.96 Three designated classes were created under the Act: the 
Indochinese class,97 the Eastern European Self-Exiled Persons class,98 and the Latin American 
Political Prisoners and Oppressed Persons class. 99  Hathaway writes that the criteria of the 
designated classes evidence Canada’s economic and ideological bias in refugee policy.100 The 
Self-Exiled Persons Class, which applied to Eastern Europeans, did not require that the 
applicant be the subject of past or prospective harm. The Indochinese Designated Class similarly 
concerned refugees fleeing communist regimes and did not require that the applicant show 
evidence of harm.101 The Political Prisoners and Oppressed Persons Class applied to citizens of 
South American countries (some of them Western-backed right-wing regimes) who had not 
been able to leave their country. Unlike the other designated classes, applicants in this category 
had to either meet the Refugee Convention definition or establish that they would be subject to 
some form of punishment for the legitimate exercise of their freedom of expression. Hathaway 
writes that Canada’s resettlement policy in the early 1980s was by no means driven by a 
humanitarian imperative alone. It was instead driven by a mix of economic interests, a will to 
maintain strategic and ideological alliances, and, thirdly, a commitment to humanitarianism: 
                                                   
95 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 40. 
96 Immigration Act, 1976, SC 1976-77, c 52, s 6(3). See Kelley & Trebilcock, supra note 29 at 396-98. 
97 Indochinese Designated Class Regulations, SOR/78-931, s 6. 
98 Self-Exiled Persons Designated Class Regulations, SOR/78-933, s 6. 
99 Political Prisoners and Oppressed Persons Designated Class Regulations, SOR/82-977, s 6. 
100 Hathaway, “Selective Concern”, supra note 89 at 692-98. 
101 See Michael Casasola, “The Indochinese Refugee Movement and the Subsequent Evolution of UNHCR 




The Canadian policy of “Compassion with Realism” accepts the promotion of the 
Canadian national interest as the primary determinant of its refugee policy, and 
strives to accommodate other concerns to the extent that they are not 
incompatible with that dominant focus.102 
 
 
That view has been challenged by some. Howard Adelman challenges the somewhat widespread 
conception that Canada selects the “best and brightest” refugees and ignores the more difficult 
cases. He acknowledges that during the Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian refugee 
movement, various church groups had criticized the government for selecting only those 
refugees with the best establishment prospects. Humanitarianism, it was said, had yielded to 
economic self-interest.103  In Adelman’s view, however, while it may be true that European 
countries admit a proportionally greater number of “hard-core” refugees, the global number of 
refugees resettled in European countries is relatively low compared to the number resettled in 
Canada. Canada’s contribution, according to Adelman, is in quantity as opposed to quality.104 
That being said, the 1976 Immigration Act did formalize the existing practice of selecting only 
healthy refugees and those who have economic potential. Under the Act, this took the form of 
the so-called “successful establishment” 105  criteria and the full application of medical 
                                                   
102 Hathaway, “Selective Concern”, supra note 89 at 683. 
103 Howard Adelman, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees (Regina: LA Weigl Educational Associates, 
1982) at 56. 
104 R A Girard, then Director of Refugee Affairs, Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission, 
makes a similar argument:  
Some critics have charged that the Canadian policy is an expression of self-interest with a 
selection apparatus designed to pick and choose those refugees who fit Canadian ideas of 
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involvement in all aspects of refugee relief - involvement on a scale that far exceeds what 
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“Canadian Refugee Policy: Government Perspectives” in Howard Adelman & Michael 
Lanphier, eds, Refuge or Asylum: A Choice for Canada (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1990) 
113 at 114-115).  
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19:4 Refuge 76 at 79 [“Current Trends”]. 
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inadmissibility common to all immigration categories.106 Even beyond the formal requirements 
of the act, it has been argued that the incorporation of refugee assessments within the larger 
immigration bureaucracy resulted in refugees being informally assessed against regular 
immigration criteria.107 
 
3.4.1.2 The birth of the Private Sponsorship of Refugees program  
The Act’s regulations, adopted in 1978, established the private sponsorship of refugees (PSR) 
program. The PSR program formally established in law a refugee admission framework that had 
been developing through ad hoc programs since the 1940s.108 The PSR program has become 
emblematic of Canada’s response to refugees, and surprisingly little has changed in the PSR 
framework since its inception. The PSR program will be explored in greater detail later in this 
chapter, but it is worth here noting particularly salient developments and debates.  
 
The coming into force of the act in 1978 coincided with the exodus of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (“Indochinese” refugees) and an unprecedented 
rise in public support for mass resettlement. The PSR program was hugely successful in 
bringing to Canada over 60,000 “boat people” between 1979 and 1980.109 Canada’s response to 
                                                   
106 Immigration Act, 1976-77, c 52, s 19(1)(ii). Facing critiques that it was selecting the best and brightest 
refugees, Canada began to shift its policies in the late 1990s, eventually exempting resettlement applicants 
from medical inadmissibility for “causing excessive demand on health or social services” and loosening the 
successful establishment criteria: See Debra Pressé & Jessie Thomson, “The Resettlement Challenge: 
Integration of Refugees from Protracted Refugee Situations” (2008) 25:1 Refuge 94 at 96. 
107 Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 40; Gerald E Dirks, “A Policy within a Policy: The 
Identification and Admission of Refugees to Canada” (1984) 17 Can J Pol Sci 279 at 306. 
108 G Cameron, supra note 63 at 19; Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 83-84. 
109 See Michael J Molloy et al, Running on Empty: Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 1975-1980 
(Montreal & London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017); Michael J Molloy & James C Simeon, 
“Introduction: The Indochinese Refugee Movement and the Launch of Canada’s Private Sponsorship 
Program” (2016) 32:2 Refuge 3; Michael Casasola, “The Indochinese Refugee Movement”, supra note 101; 
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the Indochinese refugee crisis earned it the Nansen Medal in 1986, the first time the Medal was 
ever awarded to an entire nation. Treviranus and Casasola discuss the significance of that 
refugee movement in these terms: 
The Indochinese resettlement movement defined resettlement internationally and 
was pivotal for private sponsorship in Canada. Thousands of Canadians became 
involved, many of whom 25 years later remain active in refugees issues. The 
success of the Indochinese in resettling across Canada and the welcome they 
received demonstrated to Canadians their country's capacity to provide refuge to 
those in need, as well as the meaningful role that average Canadians could play. 
Intensively researched, and followed very closely by the media, the resettlement 
of the “Indochinese boat people” remained for 20 years the public face of the 




Public support for refugee resettlement decreased after the Indochinese crisis. This shift 
coincided with a rise in asylum claims in Canada and also with the broader international refugee 
politics of the 1980s, including the move away from the Cold War conception of durable 
solutions. Interestingly, the number of admissions through the resettlement program rose again 
in the late 1980s. Labman suggests that this could be a result of the international recognition 
Canada received in 1986 for its response to refugees.111 
 
Later in the 1990s, the sponsorship community, concerned by the strict application of the 
Convention refugee definition, was actively involved in consultations that led to the creation of 
the Humanitarian Designated classes, which broaden the eligibility criteria for refugee 
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protection.112 Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s, the number of resettlement admissions to 
Canada was relatively low. In Canadian refugee policy, resettlement eventually became to be 
perceived as secondary to asylum.113 As Labman notes, the Department of Employment and 
Immigration’s annual report included in 1991 for the first time a section on the refugee 
determination system, noting that 
… Canada’s program is moving away from resettling mass movements of 
persons … towards emphasis on protection cases. At the same time, the UNHCR 
is focussing its efforts on voluntary repatriation and local resettlement of 
refugees. Third country resettlement is considered only in exceptional cases.114 
 
 
3.4.1.3 Formalization and evolution of the inland asylum system 
It bears noting that the 1976 Immigration Act also formalized procedures to grant status to 
inland asylum seekers found to be Convention refugees.115 Under the established procedure, 
asylum seekers would attend an interview with an immigration officer, the transcript of which 
was sent to the Refugee Status Advisory Committee. The committee then made a 
recommendation to the minister. Unsuccessful applicants could make an application on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds to the Special Review Committee.116 The new inland 
refugee system became strained as a result of increases in the number of asylum seekers in the 
1980s. In the 1970s, there were approximately 200-400 refugee claims lodged each year. By the 
early 1980s, that number jumped to 3,000-5,000 claims per year.117 This prompted the Canadian 
                                                   
112 Ibid at 190. The Humanitarian Designated classes included the Source Country class and the Country of 
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government to begin deploying measures designed to restrict the arrival of asylum seekers.118 
Canada’s inland refugee status determination procedure was fundamentally altered by the 1985 
Supreme Court’s Singh decision.119  
 
Justice Wilson in Singh determined that section 7 of the recently adopted Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, did apply to refugee claimants in Canada: 
(Counsel for the applicant) concludes that “Everyone” in s. 7 is intended to 
encompass a broader class of persons than citizens and permanent residents. 
Counsel for the Minister concedes that “everyone” is sufficiently broad to 
include the appellants in its compass and I am prepared to accept that the term 
includes every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of 
such presence amenable to Canadian law.120 
 
Justice Wilson further held that the right to life, liberty and security of the person, as 
contemplated by section 7 was at play in inland refugee status determinations, and that refugee 
claimants are therefore entitled to fundamental justice, which requires that they be provided the 
opportunity to present their case orally when credibility is at stake. In 1989, in response to the 
Singh decision, the government of Canada established the Immigration and Refugee Board, an 
                                                   
118 See Knowles, supra note 79 at 225; James C Hathaway and R Alexander Neve, “Fundamental Justice and 
the Deflection of Refugees from Canada” (1996) 34:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 214. Audrey Macklin writes that non-
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Canada. Most recently, Canada charged a US humanitarian worker with smuggling (an 
offence under IRPA that carries a maximum life sentence) for transporting twelve Haitian 
asylum seekers to the USA– Canada border (Audrey Macklin, “Asylum and the Rule of Law 
in Canada: Hearing the Other (Side)”, in Susan Kneebone, ed, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and 
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independent administrative tribunal tasked with hearing inland refugee claims.121 
 
3.5 The 2001 IRPA and the resettlement-asylum dynamic 
In the late 1990s, the Canadian government moved to craft the successor to the 1976 
Immigration Act. Major changes were recommended in the 1998 Legislative Review Advisory 
Group (LRAG) report Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future Immigration.122 
Notably, the LRAG report recommended that refugee and immigration matters be separated into 
two different acts, in order “to emphasize the different goals of Canada’s humanitarian 
commitment and its immigration program.” 123  It also recommended that the overseas 
resettlement system and the inland asylum system be administered by a single protection 
agency, whose decision-makers would be  
civil servants selected by the protection agency for their abilities. They would be 
trained in human rights law and in procedures for making fair and consistent 
decisions. These Protection Officers would be assigned to work in Canada and at 
Canadian points of service abroad.124 
 
 
The LRAG report also recommended that selection criteria be broadened and that overseas 
resettlement be steered towards the protection of the most vulnerable.125 As such, the report 
recommended abolishing the successful establishment criteria, exempting resettlement 
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applicants from inadmissibility for excessive cost to medical services, and prioritizing the most 
vulnerable and most needy refugees. 126  The recommendation to shift operations towards 
protection rather than the ability to settle was also recommended in CIC’s own 1999 ‘White 
Paper’ Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration 
and Refugee Policy and Legislation.127 
 
In 2000, the Federal government introduced Bill C-31, An Act respecting immigration to 
Canada and the granting of refugee protection to persons who are displaced, persecuted or in 
danger.128 The bill died on the order paper and was reintroduced and adopted as Bill C-11 in 
2001.129  The two most fundamental recommendations of the LRAG report with respect to 
refugee policy – to create two distinct acts dealing with immigration and refugee matter and to 
merge overseas and inland refugee decision-making – were not adopted. The new legislation did 
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need than asylum-seekers who arrive directly to Canada. If so, UNHCR would respectfully 
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however include separate sets of objectives for immigration and refugee matters. The new act 
also implemented some of the more specific recommendations of the LRAG designed to steer 
the resettlement program towards protection, including exempting refugee applicants from 
medical inadmissibility and relaxing the successful establishment requirement.130  
 
However, observers criticized the government for using improvements to the resettlement 
program in Bill C-31 to justify restrictions on asylum seekers in the same bill. Casasola writes 
that 
[t]he urgent protection pilot and the policy commitment to ensure the immediate 
entry of urgent protection cases were presented in response to questions about 
limitations that C-31 would present for refugees seeking asylum in Canada. 
Resettled refugees were presented as part of the refugees using the “front door.” 
And by providing such refugees greater access, Canada suggested it had the 




In the political climate that followed the 9/11 attacks, Canada and the US resumed negotiations 
over a bilateral safe third country framework. In December 2002, the countries adopted the 
Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), which excluded from refugee protection 
most asylum seekers who arrived in Canada at a land crossing or airport.132 
 
Throughout the 2000s, increasing concerns - including security concerns - over the uncontrolled 
arrival of asylum seekers led to resettlement being portrayed by the government as the preferred 
                                                   
130 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 43. Casasola notes that the Canadian government 
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manner of offering refugee protection in Canada.133 Labman writes that following the arrival of 
a boat of Sri Lankan asylum seekers off the coast of British Columbia in 2009, immigration 
minister Jason Kenny declared that those migrants were entering Canada through the “back 
door” and that such arrivals should be restricted in favour of regular migration - despite the fact 
that the Convention provides that no state shall punish refugees for entering a country of asylum 
illegally.134 
 
The oppositional positioning of resettlement and asylum was also evident in the debates that led 
to the 2010-2012 refugee reforms implemented through the Balanced Refugee Reform Act 
(BRRA) 135  and the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (PCISA). 136  Both acts 
implemented important procedural and substantive changes designed to “accelerate the 
processing of refugee claims and deter abuse of the system.” 137  The refugee reforms 
implemented the long-awaited Refugee Appeal Division (RAD),138 but restricted its access to 
                                                   
133 Despite this framing, resettlement arrivals in Canada throughout the 2000s were comparable to the 
admission levels of the 1990s. 
134 See Shauna Labman, “Queue the Rhetoric: Refugees, Resettlement and Reform” (2011) 62 UNBLJ 55 at 
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Convention: 
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87. Section 133 of the IRPA incorporates this principle of international law into Canadian domestic law. 
135 Balanced Refugee Reform Act, SC 2010, c 8 [BRRA]. 
136 Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC 2012 c 17 [PCISA]. 
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some categories of refugee claimants.139 The legislative package also implemented restrictions 
on alternative recourses for failed refugee claimants, 140  implemented severely shortened 
timelines for all claimants throughout the claim process,141 provided for the designation of safe 
countries associated with further restrictions, 142  created the “designated foreign nationals” 
regime, associated with mandatory detention and other restrictions,143 and modified the selection 
process for Refugee Protection Division (RPD) members.144 These legislative changes were 
                                                   
139 Access to the RAD was denied for refugee claimants whose claim was deemed to be “manifestly 
unfounded” or to have “no credible basis”, and refugee claimants who came through the United States and 
whose claim was referred to the IRB as an exception to the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement. The 
RAD is also precluded from hearing appeals of refugee claims determined to be withdrawn or abandoned, and 
determinations that refugee protection has ceased (IRPA, s 110(2)). 
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months (IRPA, s 112(2)(b.1), eliminated the availability of an automatic stay of removal upon filing a judicial 
review application for DCO claimants (IRPR s 231(2)), and subjected DCO claimants to shortened hearing 
scheduling timelines (IRPR, s 159.9). The most important features of the DCO regime were ruled 
unconstitutional by the Federal Court (see YZ v Canada (MCI), 2015 FC 892; Feher v Canada (MPSEP), 
2019 FC 335). In May 2019, the federal government of Justin Trudeau announced that it would remove all 
countries from the DCO list, and that the DCO regime would eventually be repealed through legislative 
amendment. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, News Release, “Canada Ends the 
Designated Country of Origin Practice” (17 May 2019), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-
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143 Section 20.1 of the IRPA allows the minister to designate any group of two or more persons who arrive 
irregularly to Canada if he or she “is of the opinion that examinations of the persons in the group… cannot be 
conducted in a timely manner” or if he or she suspects that members of the group have engaged in human 
smuggling or human trafficking. Designated foreign nationals are subject to mandatory detention to be 
reviewed within 14 days and then every six months (IRPA, s 57.1). They are also barred from accessing the 
RAD (IRPA, s 110(2)(a)), are barred from making an H&C application for 5 years (IRPA, s 25(1.01)), and are 
barred from applying for permanent residence for 5 years following a favourable RPD decision (IRPA, s 
20.2). 
144 Prior to the reform, RPD members and members of the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), were 
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Service Employment Act, SC 2003, c 22 (IRPA, s 169.1). It was widely felt within the academic and refugee 
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implemented in parallel with several other important changes in immigration and refugee policy, 
including new visa requirements for certain countries145 and cuts to health-care coverage for all 
refugee claimants. 146  Throughout those reforms, refugee claimants were portrayed as 
“undeserving”, “bogus”, and “queue jumpers”, whereas refugees abroad awaiting resettlement 
were portrayed as “legitimate” or “deserving” refugees. 147 The day before the introduction of 
the BRRA, which included important restrictions on asylum seekers, the government announced 
an increase of 2,500 resettlement places as evidence that Canada remained committed to refugee 
protection. The Canadian government praised resettled refugees for “their respect of our 
laws.”148 Such juxtaposition, Labman writes, 
…completely obscures the reality that, on another legal plane, resettlement 
refugees have no legal right to resettlement, whereas asylum refugees do possess 
the right not to be sent back through the legal obligation of non-refoulement, set 
out in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and confirmed in the IRPA.  
…  
Essentially, one layer of legality is being asserted to evade another layer of legal 
obligation.149 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Bonisteel, “Ministerial Influence at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board: The Case for Institutional 
Bias” (2010) 27:1 Refuge. Members of the newly created RAD are Governor in Council appointments. 
145 These countries include St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland. The Canadian 
government did however lift in November 2013 the visa requirement for Czech nationals, which had been 
imposed in 2009. 
146 The Interim Federal Health Program cuts, which did not require legislative amendment, were implemented 
two days following the adoption of the PCISA (Order Respecting the Interim Federal Health Program, 
SI/2012-26, (2012) C Gaz I, 1135). Before June 2012, all refugee claimants had access to “expanded health 
coverage”, which covered medical services, non-medical services (dental, vision, psychotherapy, etc.) and 
prescription medication. As a result of the 2012 cuts, refugee claimants were covered only for basic medical 
services, and DCO claimants and rejected claimants were covered only for diseases or conditions “posing a 
risk to public health or public safety.” In Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (AG), 2014 FC 651, 
Justice Mactavish of the Federal Court ruled that the IFHP cuts violate both section 12 and section 15 of the 
Charter. Shortly after forming government in 2015, the government of Justin Trudeau dropped the appeal of 
Justice Mactavish’s decision (See Janice Dickson, “Liberals Drop Harper Government’s Court Battle Over 
Refugee Health Benefits”, iPolitics (16 December 2015), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2015/12/16/liberals-
drop-harper-governments-court-battle-over-refugee-health-benefits/>. 
147 See Labman, “Queue the Rhetoric”, supra note 134 See also Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 
45 at 32. 
148 Public Safety Canada, Media Release, “Canada’s Generous Program for Refugee Resettlement is 
Undermined by Human Smugglers Who Abuse Canada’s Immigration System (21 October 2010), online: 
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/nws/nws-rlss/2011/20110616-3-en.aspx>. 
149 Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 79. See also Megan Bradley & Cate Duin, “A Port in 
the Storm: Resettlement and Private Sponsorship in the Broader Context of the Refugee Regime”, in Shauna 
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The oppositional juxtaposition of resettlement and asylum has continued in recent years. While 
the current Canadian government has thus far refrained from the inflammatory rhetoric of its 
predecessor, its unprecedented response to the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 was 
immediately followed by a much different response to refugee claimants crossing the border. 
Amid calls to suspend or repeal the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA),150 the 
government instead toyed with the idea of closing the “loophole” that exempt from the 
application of the STCA refugee claimants who enter Canada at an unofficial land crossing.151 
Throughout policy debates around the so-called “crisis”, border crossers were labelled as 
“illegals” and “queue jumpers.”  For instance, Conservative immigration critic Michelle Rempel 
suggested that border crossers take the place of more legitimate refugees waiting to be resettled: 
Of course, there are real, human consequences of this. The people entering 
Canada illegally from the safety and security of the United States jump ahead of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 74. 
150 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for 
Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, 5 December 
2002 [STCA]. The agreement is implemented through section 159.3 of the IRPR: 
159.3 The United States is designated under paragraph 102(1)(a) of the Act as a country that 
complies with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the Convention Against 
Torture, and is a designated country for the purpose of the application of paragraph 101(1)(e) 
of the Act. 
Irregular border crossings by refugee claimants into Canada began to increase in 2017 after US president 
Donald Trump enacted several restrictive measures designed to deter refugee claimants from entering the US, 
including detention and family separation, and the rejection of asylum claims resulting from gender-based 
violence or gang violence. As a result of the STCA, refugee claimants arriving from the United States are 
removed to the United States, unless specified exceptions apply (IRPA, s 101(1)e); IRPR, s 159.3). The STCA 
does not apply to refugee claimants who enter Canada at “a location that is not a port of entry” (IRPR, s 
159.4(1)(a)). See Letter from Canadian Law Professors to the Hon Admed D Hussen, “Suspending Safe Third 
Country Agreement” (31 January 2017), online (pdf): <https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Lettre-Letter.pdf>. 
151 Teresa Wright, “Border security minister mulling ways to close loophole in Safe Third Country 
Agreement”, Toronto Star, (15 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2019/03/15/border-security-minister-mulling-ways-to-close-loophole-
in-safe-third-country-agreement.html>. See Sean Rehaag, “Closing the Canada-U.S. Asylum Border 
Agreement Loophole? Not So Fast” The Conversation (25 March 2019), online: 
<https://theconversation.com/closing-the-canada-u-s-asylum-border-agreement-loophole-not-so-fast-
114116>. See also Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 54.  
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This view reflects at best a misunderstanding of the Canadian refugee system, at worse a poorly 
veiled attempt to demonize refugee claimants. There is no such “queue.” The processing of 
refugees abroad by IRCC operates independently of the system set up to process refugee claims. 
 
This brings us back to the notion of refugee resettlement being used as a humanitarian alibi in 
the context of government efforts to limit their responsibilities towards asylum seekers, briefly 
discussed in section 2.5.2.2. Bradley & Duin write that Canada’s support for the resettlement of 
Syrian refugees has provided “cover for more restrictive responses to asylum-seekers, 
particularly those who have entered Canada by land from the United States.”153 They also note 
that, while Canada has not decreased its financial commitment to international refugee 
organizations as a result of increased resettlement admissions, such reduction remains a 
“palpable concern.”154 
 
3.6 The PSR program: reforms and conflicting interests 
Major changes to the PSR program took place around the same time as the inland refugee 
reform. These changes highlight many of the tensions and conflicting interests that lie at the 
core of the program. In 2011, the government repealed the Source Country class, which had 
existed since 1997.155 In many respects, the Source Country class borrowed from the Political 
                                                   
152 Wright, ibid. 
153 Bradley & Duin, supra note 149 at 75. 
154 Ibid at 82. 
155 Section 148 of the IRPR (repealed by SOR/2011-222, s 6), read: 
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Prisoners and Oppressed Persons Designated Class under the 1976 Immigration Act. The Source 
Country class allowed for the resettlement of persons from certain designated countries of origin 
who remained in their country of origin but would otherwise qualify under one of the other two 
categories. Applicants under the Source Country class could be Government-Assisted, Privately 
Sponsored, or admitted as “self-supported refugees.” Countries designated under the class 
included Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Liberia, 
Sudan, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.156 The administration of the Source 
Country posed particular challenges due to the fact that internally displaced persons (IDPs) do 
not come under the protection of the UNHCR. As a result, CIC could not rely on UNHCR for 
                                                                                                                                                                   
148. (1) A foreign national is a member of the source country class if they have been 
determined by an officer to be in need of resettlement because 
(a) they are residing in their country of nationality or habitual residence and that 
country is a source country within the meaning of subsection (2) at the time their 
permanent resident visa application is made as well as at the time a visa is issued; 
and 
(b) they 
(i) are being seriously and personally affected by civil war or armed conflict 
in that country, 
(ii) have been or are being detained or imprisoned with or without charges, 
or subjected to some other form of penal control, as a direct result of an act 
committed outside Canada that would, in Canada, be a legitimate 
expression of freedom of thought or a legitimate exercise of civil rights 
pertaining to dissent or trade union activity, or 
(iii) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social 
group, are unable or, by reason of such fear, unwilling to avail themselves 
of 
(2) A source country is a country 
(a) where persons are in refugee-like situations as a result of civil war or armed 
conflict or because their fundamental human rights are not respected; 
(b) where an officer works or makes routine working visits and is able to process 
visa applications without endangering their own safety, the safety of applicants or 
the safety of Canadian embassy staff; 
(c) where circumstances warrant humanitarian intervention by the Department in 
order to implement the overall humanitarian strategies of the Government of 
Canada, that intervention being in keeping with the work of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; and 
(d) that is set out in Schedule 2. 
See Treviranus & Casasola, supra note 110 at 190; Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 59-60, 
126-40. 
156 See Canada, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement - Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations [Source Country Class], (2011) C Gaz I, 1001. 
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pre-screening and referrals of applicants under the Source Country class, and visa offices in the 
designated countries found themselves receiving a large number of ineligible applications.157 In 
moving to repeal the class, the Canadian government noted that application processing in those 
countries required substantially more resources than in countries that were not designated under 
the program.158 In addition, the government noted that it was quite difficult to operate visa 
offices in countries experiencing wared conflict. 159  The Canadian government repealed the 
Source Country class in 2011, explaining that “the class was inefficient, unresponsive to 
evolving protection needs and that the problems were structural in nature.” 160  An equally 
important consideration is the fact that submissions under the Source Country class could 
potentially surpass the targets set by the government.161 The Canadian Council for Refugees 
criticized the repeal of the class, stating that the problems underlined by the government did not 
apply to those applying as privately sponsored refugees: 
The government argues in the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that the 
challenge of giving applicants direct access in Source Countries undermines the 
effectiveness of the resettlement program. However, this argument does not 
apply to applicants who are privately sponsored, since they do not require direct 




In 2012, the Harper government also introduced two important measures designed primarily to 
limit the number of applications submitted by private sponsors. First, Groups of Five and 
                                                   
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Evaluation of Government Assisted Refugees (GAR) and 
Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP)” (March 2011) at 52. 
159 Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 129. 
160 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Repeal of the Source Country Class of Humanitarian-Protected 
Persons Abroad”, Operational Bulletin 346 (7 October 2011), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operational-
bulletins-manuals/bulletins-2011/347-october-7-2011.html>. 
161 Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 130. 
162 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Comments on Proposed Elimination of Source Country Class” (18 April 
2011), online: <https://ccrweb.ca/en/comments-proposed-elimination-source-country-class>. 
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Community Sponsors became limited to the sponsorship refugees who have previously obtained 
a formal refugee status recognition by the UNHCR or by a state.163 This requirement, which has 
a disproportionate impact on certain nationalities, will be further examined in section 3.8.1.2. 
Second, a cap was placed on the number of applications each SAH can submit in a given year.164 
Additionally, between 2012 and 2017 - which overlaps with most of this dissertation’s study 
period - SAH applications were further restricted by visa office “sub-caps.”165  The capped 
missions included Nairobi, Pretoria, Cairo, Islamabad, Rome, Tel Aviv and Dar es Salaam. 
Hyndman writes that the sub-caps affected primarily sub-Saharan refugees, and created a system 
of “racialized preference.”166 The Trudeau government eliminated the sub-caps in December 
2016.167 
 
In 2012, the Canadian government also announced a mixed stream, termed “Blended Visa 
Office-Referred” (BVOR) program, whereby sponsors select refugees from a list provided by 
IRCC and share the settlement cost with the government.168 The BVOR program was in fact the 
culmination of various blended pilot programs that had existed since the 1990s.169 The idea of a 
                                                   
163 IRPR, s 153(1)(b). See Canada, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement - Regulations Amending the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, (2012) C Gaz I, 1534. See also Shauna Labman, “Private 
Sponsorship: Complimentary or Conflicting Interests?” (2016) 32:2 Refuge 67 at 69 [“Private Sponsorship”]. 
164 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation Division, “Evaluation of the Resettlement 
Programs (GAR, BVOR, PSR and RAP)” (July 2016) at para 4.1.1 [“Evaluation of the Resettlement 
Programs”]. 
165 See Ashley Chapman, “Private Sponsorship and Public Policy: Political Barriers to Church-Connected 
Refugee Resettlement in Canada” (Citizens for Public Justice, 2014) at 8, online <https://www.cpj.ca/private-
sponsorship-and-public-policy>. 
166 Jennifer Hyndman, “Unsettling Feminist Geopolitics: Forging Feminist Political Geographies of Violence 
and Displacement” (2019) 26:1 Gender Place & Cult 3 at 21. See also Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra 
note 45 at 108. 
167 Ibid. 
168 IRPR, s 157. See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 86, 111-14. 
169 The first such ad hoc program, FOCUS Afghanistan, brought Afghanistan Ismaili refugees to Canada in 
1994-1998. This program was slightly different than subsequent blended programs in that the refugees were 
selected by sponsor organizations. Five other pilot blended initiatives were implemented in subsequent years. 
See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 98-102. See also Rachel McNally, “The Blended Visa 
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blended program is to be understood in the context of declining visa office-referred (VOR) 
sponsorships under the regular PSR program and the government’s concern over the prevalence 
of family-linked sponsorships. The BVOR program offers clear incentives to sponsors: the 
government covers half of the settlement cost, BVOR sponsorships are not counted towards 
allocated caps, and candidates on the BVOR list are, at least in theory, travel-ready.170 Despite 
these incentives, participation in the BVOR program has been low. In the first years of the 
program, participation failed to reach the modest targets set by the government.171 Admission 
numbers grew during the Syrian refugee movement, as newly-formed sponsor groups with no 
links to refugee families were attracted by the relatively brief processing times of the program. 
However, BVOR numbers have since decreased, with the annual target sitting at 1,000 for 2021, 
a far cry from the 4,334 refugees resettled through the program in 2016. The BVOR program 
has been criticized by sponsors as a means to privatize the government’s resettlement 
commitments. Indeed, in the first year of the program, BVOR admissions were carved out of 
existing GAR targets, which led to a statement from the Canadian Council for Refugees that 
sponsors taking part in the BVOR program were not providing additional resettlement, but 
merely “saving the government money.”172 Today, BVOR targets are set out in a third, separate 
category, which better respects the principle of additionality. The BVOR program creates a new 
way for citizens and organizations to collaborate with government to achieve refugee protection. 
It also provides important incentives to sponsor groups looking to sponsor refugees with higher 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Office-Referred Program: Perspectives and Experiences from Rural Nova Scotia”, in Shauna Labman & 
Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 134 at 135-37. 
170 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 113-14 for a discussion of delays that developed in 
2016 in the BVOR program, which resulted in the government offering “replacement cases” to sponsors. 
171 Ibid at 111. 
172 Ibid at 111-12; Canadian Council for Refugees, “Important changes in Canada’s Private Sponsorship of 




needs. The sustainability of the BVOR program is uncertain, however, given that a core feature 
of the PSR program since its inception is the possibility of naming the refugees to be sponsored. 
One possible scenario is that participation in the BVOR program will remain low, with 
temporary spikes only when global events inspire an upsurge in new, one-time sponsors groups. 
 
It is useful here to explore in further detail the evolving dynamic between sponsors and 
government over the issue of “naming” and “additionality”, considered to be the two pillars of 
private sponsorship. Howard Adelman writes that tensions between the government and the 
sponsorship community began developing in the 1990s: 
Instead of a program characterized by an almost loving trust between the 
government and the private sector, it became a program, as the research report 
prepared by the Strategic Planning and Research Branch of Immigration Policy 
stated… characterized by “a lot of mistrust”.173 
 
 
The Canadian government engaged in a review of the PSR program in 1990 which revealed that 
the sponsorship community had major concerns over the PSR program. More than 20 years 
before the introduction of the BVOR program, sponsors expressed concern over the apparent 
shift in responsibility for refugee protection from the government to sponsors and the erosion of 
the principle of “additionality.”174  At the height of the Indochinese refugee movement, the 
                                                   
173 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Discussion Paper: Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program” 
(1992) 12:3 Refuge 2 at 3 [“Discussion Paper”]. 
174 See also Treviranus & Casasola, supra note 110 at 186-87. The CCR defines the principle of additionality 
in the following terms: 
Additionality – private sponsorship is additional to government assisted refugees. Each year 
the government makes its commitment, on behalf of Canadians, to resettle a certain number 
of refugees. Anything that Canadians do through private sponsorship is on top of that 
commitment. This means that it allows Canadians to offer protection and a permanent home 
to extra refugees, who would not otherwise have the opportunity (Canadian Council for 
Refugees, “Important Changes”, supra note 172 at 1).  
See also, on the principle of additionality during the Indochinese refugee movement: Casasola, “The 
Indochinese Refugee Movement”, supra note 101 at 48. While IRCC acknowledges the PSR 
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number of privately sponsored refugees was over and above the government’s GAR 
commitments. Privately sponsored refugees were not included in annual targets. What is more, 
the government had in the early days of the program committed to “matching” each privately 
sponsored refugee with a government-assisted refugee.175 The matching formula was dropped in 
1980, but the new admission commitments informally reflected the former formula.176 In any 
case, during this period, private sponsorship was considered to be truly “additional.” The 
success of the PSR program, in a way, had a perverse effect on the government’s refugee policy. 
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, PSR admission numbers surpassed GAR admission 
numbers, leading many in the sponsorship community to question whether the principle of 
additionality had been abandoned and whether the government had come to rely on private 
sponsors to deliver its humanitarian policy. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the 
concept of additionality remains a controversial aspect of the PSR program to this day. 
 
The government’s 1990 report also revealed that the issue of “naming” had become an 
important concern from the government’s perspective.177  In the first few years of the PSR 
program - and with regard to Indochinese refugees in particular - private sponsors engaged 
overwhelmingly in “nameless” sponsorships, that is, a sponsorship where the refugee is selected 
                                                                                                                                                                   
community’s understanding of the notion of additionality, it considers that “the principle of 
additionality is not part of the PSR program theory” (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 
“Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 164 at 14). 
175 Labman, Crossing Law’s Broder, supra note 45 at 89. 
176 Ibid at 92. 
177 Even today, the naming principle remains rather unique to the Canadian PSR program. Governments 
around the world have recently adopted refugee sponsorship programs, but very few have adopted the naming 
principle. See Sabine Lehr & Brian Dyck, “‘Naming’ Refugees in the Canadian Private Sponsorship of 
Refugees Program: Diverse Intentions and Consequences”, in Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, 
Strangers to Neighbours: Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2020) 42 at 42. 
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by the government. 178  As the program evolved, sponsors increasingly resorted to “named” 
sponsorships. Many of these refugees were family members of other refugees brought through 
the program (“echo” sponsorships). The government’s concern at this point was that the PSR 
program had become more of a parallel family reunification program than a humanitarian 
program.179 The BVOR program and previous “blended initiatives” were designed to allow it to 
regain control of the naming of sponsored refugees. 180  Interestingly, in 2000, the blended 
initiative for Sierra Leonean refugees blended initiative included an appeal to the Sierra 
Leonean ethnic community to sponsor their family members. 181  In more recent years, the 
Canadian government has come to consider the naming practice in a much more favourable 
light. CIC’s 2007 Summative Evaluation expressly recognized that family-linked refugee 
sponsorship is aligned with UNHCR priorities and IRPA’s objective of family reunification.182 
 
Lehr and Dyck write that many states have adopted a sponsoring program following Canada-led 
consultations, but note that few have adopted the naming principle.183 This speaks to the fact that 
both states and the UNHCR are reluctant to relinquish refugee selection to sponsors. However, 
the ability to name refugees has significant benefits. Many attribute Canada’s sustained sponsor 
participation over the decades to the ability to name refugees. As mentioned above, reuniting 
separated families is a recognized principle of both the international refugee regime and an 
objective of Canadian immigration legislation. However, there remains a concern that refugees 
                                                   
178 Ibid at 44. 
179 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Discussion Paper”, supra note 173 at 4. See also Treviranus & 
Casasola, supra note 110 at 186-87.  
180 See Labman, “Private Sponsorship”, supra note 163; Shauna Labman & Madison Perlman, “Blending, 
Bargaining, and Burden-Sharing: Canada’s Resettlement Programs” J Int Migr & Integration 339. See also 
Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 111-14 
181 Treviranus & Casasola, supra note 110 at 194-95.  
182 See Lehr & Dyck, supra note 177 at 54. 
183 Ibid at 42.  
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selected by private sponsors may not be the most vulnerable, and that consequently the program 
may be having a lesser impact than it otherwise could.184 In her examination of the ethical 
considerations around refugee selection in the PSR program, Lenard recognizes the value of 
selecting family members of Canadians for resettlement, but maintains that refugees with non-
familial connections to Canada should not be favoured over more vulnerable candidates: 
Canadians should otherwise be encouraged to select refugees for sponsorship 
from those who are listed on the UNHCR priority list, and they should be 
discouraged from selecting on the basis of discriminatory connections.185 
 
 
3.7 Access to asylum and resettlement 
In section 2.6.3, I discussed the importance of refugee resettlement for international refugee 
protection in light of the methods and technologies countries of asylum deploy to restrict access 
to their asylum system. In this section, I want to canvass interdiction measures enacted by 
Canada in recent decades. Various mechanisms are currently used to prevent persons from 
accessing Canada’s asylum system. The IRPA as adopted in 2002 barred access to the asylum 
system to persons who have previously applied for refugee status in Canada (whether or not the 
application was withdrawn),186 persons who were granted refugee status by another state and can 
be returned there,187 and persons who are inadmissible because of security, violating human or 
international rights, serious criminality, or organized criminality.188 The IRPA also provides for 
the designation of safe third countries. 189  The contentious Canada-US Safe Third Country 
Agreement, adopted in 2001, discussed in section 3.5, came into force in 2004. Under the 
                                                   
184 See Bradley & Duin, supra note 149 at 74. 
185 Ibid at 66. 
186 IRPA, ss 101(1)(b)-(c). 
187 IRPA, s 101(1)(d). 
188 IRPA, s 101(1)(f).  
189 Section 101(1)(e) of the IRPA provides that a claim is ineligible if the claimant “came directly or indirectly 
to Canada from a country designated by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their 
former habitual residence.” 
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regulations, barring certain exceptions,190 anyone who enters Canada through a land or air port 
of entry is ineligible to claim refugee status. Arbel reports that the impact of the STCA on 
asylum seekers has been momentous: 
In the first year of the STCA’s operation, the number of claims lodged at the 
border declined by over 50 per cent, from 8,904 in 2004 to 4,041 in 2005. Recent 
statistics suggest a continuation of this trend. In 2010, for example, 4,642 claims 
were lodged at the border. In 2011, the numbers dropped significantly, with only 
2,563 claims. In 2012, 3,790 claims were lodged at the border.191 
 
 
The STCA became especially contentious following changes in the US asylum system under the 
Trump administration, leading to a second constitutional challenge of the STCA framework. In 
July 2020, Justice McDonald of the Federal Court determined that the section 7 Charter rights 
of persons returned to the United States under the terms of the STCA were breached because 
such persons face automatic detention: 
The narrow focus here is the consequences that flow when a refugee claimant is 
returned to the US by operation of the STCA. The evidence establishes that the 
conduct of Canadian officials in applying the provisions of the STCA will 
provoke certain, and known, reactions by US officials. In my view, the risk of 
detention for the sake of “administrative” compliance with the provisions of the 
STCA cannot be justified. Canada cannot turn a blind eye to the consequences 
that befell Ms. Mustefa in its efforts to adhere to the STCA. The evidence clearly 
demonstrates that those returned to the US by Canadian officials are detained as a 
penalty. 192 
 
The federal government is appealing the decision to the Federal Court of Appeal and 
successfully obtained a stay of justice McDonald’s order.193 
                                                   
190 The exceptions include persons who have close family members in Canada, unaccompanied minors, 
temporary residents, and persons facing the death penalty in the United States (IRPR, ss 159.5, 159.6). 
191 Efrat Arbel, “Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights: Examining the Safe Third Country 
Agreement between Canada and the United States” (2013) 25:1 Intl J Refugee L 65 at 71-72. 
192 Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 770 at para 
138. 
193 Canada (MCI) v Canadian Council for Refugees, 2020 FCA 181. See Public Safety Canada, Media 
Release, “Government of Canada to appeal the Federal Court decision on the Safe Third Country Agreement” 
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Recently, in the wake of an increase in irregular arrivals of asylum seekers through the Canada-
US land border, the Canadian government amended the IRPA to render ineligible any person 
who has previously made a refugee claim in a “Five Eye Alliance” country (the USA, the UK, 
Australia or New Zealand).194  
 
However, the most effective restriction to asylum is not achieved through ineligibility, but 
through visa requirements and overseas interception activities. Morrison and Crosland explain 
that 
[t]he imposition of visa restrictions on all countries that generate refugees is the 
most explicit blocking mechanism for asylum flows and it denies most refugees 




Throughout the past decades, Canada has frequently amended its visa policy to impose a visa 
requirement on particular countries in response to changes in refugee flows (Hungary in 2001, 
Mexico and the Czech Republic in 2009).196 The government’s rationale for such change in visa 
policy is rather perverse. Refugee arrivals are deemed “illegal” if they lack the proper visa. They 
are deemed “abusive” if they come when no visa is required, which justifies the imposition of a 
                                                                                                                                                                   
(21 August 2020), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2020/08/government-of-
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March 19, 2019 and Other Measures, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2015, cl 306. See Grace Wu, Johanna Reynolds & 
Julie Young, “Refugee Stories Reveal Anxieties About the Canada-U.S. Border”, The Conversation (20 
January 20), online: <https://theconversation.com/refugee-stories-reveal-anxieties-about-the-canada-u-s-
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195 John Morrison & Beth Crosland, “The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The End Game in 
European Asylum Policy?” (2001) UNHCR Working Paper No 39 at 28, online: 
<https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3af66c9b4/trafficking-smuggling-refugees-end-game-european-
asylum-policy-john-morrison.html>. See Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, “Interception and Asylum: When 
Migration Control and Human Rights Collide” (2003) 21:4 Refuge 6. 
196 See Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, “Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the Politics of 




visa requirement for that particular country.197 Today, a visa is required to enter Canada as a 
visitor for citizens of 148 countries, which together account for 99.74% of the refugee 
population under UNHCR’s mandate.198 Visas are systematically refused if it is suspected that 
the applicant will seek asylum in Canada.199 It is worth mentioning that merely applying for a 
visa can prove extremely difficult for persecuted persons. Visa applicants need to present a valid 
passport from their country of origin. Asylum seekers take a risk in obtaining a passport from 
their government. In the case of collapsed governments, there may be no authority issuing 
passports.200 In addition, a visa application can result in coordination and information sharing 
between Canada and the country of origin, which may expose the applicant.201 As a result, 
travelling without proper documentation and employing smuggling is the only option for many 
fleeing danger.202 
 
Canada engages in interception activities designed to intercept travellers who do not have valid 
                                                   
197 See Gerald Kernerman, “Refugee Interdiction Before Heaven’s Gate” (2008) 43:2 Government & 
Opposition 230 at 244. 
198 Data obtained through UNHCR, “Refugee Data Finder”, online: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-
statistics/>. The list of visa-exempt countries is provided in Schedule 1.1 of the IRPR. 
199 Section 179(b) of the IRPR reads: 
An officer shall issue a temporary resident visa to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is 
established that the foreign national 
… 
(b) will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay under Division 2. 
200 Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 195 at 8-9. 
201 Arbel & Brenner, supra note 196 at 39. 
202 Human Rights Watch reports: 
In many cases, it is impossible for people fearing persecution from their government to 
obtain a passport from that government or to approach embassies in search of a visa. Even 
when people do approach embassies, persons from a growing number of countries will never 
be able to obtain a visa for the purpose of fleeing persecution. Desperate people will resort to 
desperate measures. With all other options closed, migrants and asylum seekers have been 
forced to make use of illegal and dangerous means of entry via sophisticated trafficking and 
smuggling rings. Numerous studies, including a recent UNHCR report, have concluded that 
restrictive entry policies have themselves contributed to the rise in trafficking and smuggling 
of persons (Human Rights Watch, International Catholic Migration Committee & World 
Council of Churches, “NGO Background paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface” 




visas without regard to protection needs.203 These activities are deployed as part of the Multiple 
Borders Strategy developed in 2003. The Multiple Borders Strategy’s goal is to “push the border 
out” of the Canadian territory to facilitate the interception of undocumented migrants.204 Canada 
places immigration liaison officers at various overseas locations. Liaison officers - formerly 
known as “Migration Integrity Officers” - are tasked with “identifying and intercepting people 
in offshore locations, and also, training and working with airlines, local immigration authorities, 
and local law enforcement agencies to do the same.”205 Arbel and Brenner report that, as of 
2013, Canada has deployed 63 officers in 48 strategic overseas locations, leading to the 
interception of 73,000 persons since 2001.206 The Canadian government states that its practice is 
to direct to the UNHCR any person found to be in need to asylum. However, liaison officers are 
not mandated to assess protection needs and there is no available data on this practice. In 
addition, interception activities can occur in transit states that are not signatories to the Refugee 
Convention, where refugee claimants are at risk of refoulement.207 
 
It is also worth mentioning that Canada incentivizes airlines to be extremely vigilant in their 
scrutiny of travellers coming to Canada through the use of carrier sanctions, whereby an airline 
is charged a hefty penalty for each traveller coming to Canada without valid documentation.208 
                                                   
203 See Michael Bossin, “Bill C-31: Limited Access to Refugee Determination and Protection” (2001) 19:4 
Refuge 55 at 56. 
204 Arbel & Brenner, supra note 196 at 2. 
205 Ibid at 30. 
206 Ibid at 34. 
207 See Janet Dench, “Controlling the Borders: C-31 and Interdiction (2001) 19:4 Refuge 34 at 37; Brouwer & 
Kumin, supra note 195. 
208 See François Crépeau & Stephen H Legomsky, “North American Responses: A Comparative Study of US  
and Canadian Refugee Policy” in Susan Kneebone & Felicity Rawlings-Sanaei, eds, New Regionalism and 
Asylum Seekers - Challenges Ahead (New York: Berghan Books, 2007) 137. 
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Irregular travel is also curbed through the penalization of “people smuggling.”209 
 
Canada’s asylum system - and that of Western liberal states more generally - is full of 
contradictions. Canada has established a relatively robust system to assess asylum claims, but 
every possible step is taken to prevent refugee claimants from accessing it. Matthew Gibney 
describes interdiction measures as a “liberal schizophrenia.”210 The proliferation of interdiction 
measures seriously erodes the relevance of the Refugee Convention and the non-refoulement 
principle. It is precisely because refugee claimants face growing obstacles on their way to 
protection that refugee resettlement can play an important role in responding to global refugee 
needs. Paradoxically, as discussed earlier in this chapter, successive governments have justified 
restrictions to Canada’s inland system by announcing new resettlement initiatives. Framing 
refugee resettlement as a “humanitarian alibi” for restrictive asylum policies co-opts 
resettlement in an effort to erode the non-refoulement principle. 
 
3.8 The legal framework of refugee resettlement in Canada 
This section will provide an overview of current eligibility and admissibility criteria for refugee 
resettlement applicants and highlight the differences between the eligibility for resettlement and 
eligibility for seeking inland asylum. While I will not focus on sponsor eligibility and 
restrictions, it is useful to quickly review the different categories of resettled refugees and how 
                                                   
209 See Dench, supra note 207; David Moffette & Nevena Aksin, “Fighting Human Smuggling or 
Criminalizing Refugees? Regimes of Justification in and around R v Appulonappa” (2010) 33:1 CJLS 21; Idil 
Atak, Graham Hudson & Delphine Nakache, “Making Canada’s Refugee System Faster and Fairer: 
Reviewing the Stated Goals and Unintended Consequences of the 2012 Reform” (2017) CARFAMS Working 
Paper no 2017/3, online (pdf): <https://carfms.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CARFMS-WPS-No11-Idil-
Atak.pdf>. 
210 Matthew J Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, 





Under current Canadian law, refugee applicants cannot independently submit an application to 
IRCC.212  They must be selected either by the Canadian government under the Government 
Assisted Refugees (GAR) program, or by Canadian sponsors as Privately Sponsored Refugees 
(PSRs). GARs receive settlement and financial assistance from the federal government through 
the Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) for a period of 12 months. 213  Privately sponsored 
refugees receive financial and social support from their sponsor, and also have access to 
government-funded settlement services.214 In some exceptional circumstances, financial support 
can be extended in both the PSR and GAR programs to up to 36 months.215 
 
Financial assistance provided to both GARs under the RAP and to PSRs are roughly equivalent 
to prevailing social assistance rates.216 In theory, private sponsors can either select the sponsored 
refugee independently (“named sponsorship”) or from a pre-approved list provided by IRCC 
(“visa office-referred refugee” - VOR), but the vast majority are sponsor-referred. 217  As 
                                                   
211 The Government of Quebec has established different rules for the private sponsorship of refugees within 
the province. This section focuses only on the rules governing private sponsorship outside Quebec. 
212 Section 150 of the IRPR, which was repealed in 2012, allowed for independent applications without a 
referral or undertaking in certain countries or geographical areas designated by the Minister. Direct access 
was also allowed under the former Source Country Class, abolished in October 2011. See Labman, Crossing 
Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 60. 
213 The eligibility period under the RAP program can be extended for another 12 months in cases with special 
needs. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, IP 3 - In Canada Processing of Convention Refugees Abroad 
and Members of the Humanitarian Protected Persons Abroad Classes ‒ Part 2 [Resettlement Assistance 
Program (RAP)] at para 14.7, online (pdf): 
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip03-part2-eng.pdf>. 
214 Financial support guidelines stipulate that financial support should be equivalent to social assistance rates. 
In exceptional cases, the sponsorship period can be extended for up to three years: IRPR, s 154(2)- (3). 
215 IRPR, s 154(4). See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “OP5 - Overseas Selection and Processing of 
Convention Refugees Abroad Class and Members of the Humanitarian-protected Persons Abroad Classes” (8 
August 2009) at para 13.14 [“Overseas Selection and Processing”]. 
216 Many sponsors, however, voluntarily provide additional financial assistance. 
217 See Casasola, “The Indochinese Refugee Movement”, supra note 101; Canada, “Resettlement Handbook 
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mentioned earlier in this chapter, private sponsors can now sponsor through the BVOR program 
and share the cost of sponsorship with the government. Another program, the Joint Assistance 
Program, matches GARs with private sponsors, who provide non-financial settlement support to 
the refugees.218 
 
Three types of private sponsors exist under the federal framework.219 Sponsorship Agreement 
Holders (SAHs), who are responsible for the majority of sponsorships, are incorporated entities 
that have an ongoing agreement with the Canadian government to make several sponsorships 
each year.220 SAHs can sponsor on their own, with a partner organization (constituent group) or 
with an individual (co-sponsor). The second most common sponsorship structure is the Group of 
Five, defined as a group of five Canadian citizens or permanent residents who come together to 
make a single sponsorship. Both the SAH category and the Groupe of Five category existed 
under the 1976 Immigration Act. A third category, the Community Sponsor, was created after 
the adoption of the 2001 IRPA. A Community Sponsor can be an organization, corporation or 
association. Like Groups of Five, Community Sponsors are assessed for each sponsorship they 
make.221 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Groups of Five and Community Sponsors can only 
sponsor refugees who have received a previous refugee determination by a state or by the 
UNHCR. SAHs are exempted from the UNHCR documentation requirement, but are limited by 
annual caps. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Country Chapter: Canada” (July 2011, revised February 2018), online: 
<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/3c5e55594/unhcr-resettlement-handbook-country-chapter-
canada.html> [“Country Chapter: Canada”]. 
218 IRPR, s 157. See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 85. 
219 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program” 
(2019), at paras 2.3-2.5, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/guide-private-sponsorship-refugees-program.html>. 
220 The Sponsorship Agreement Holder category is essentially equivalent to the “Master Agreement Holder” 
category that existed under the 1976 Immigration Act framework. 




Since 1997, the province of Quebec has operated a separate but integrated private sponsorship 
program with similar categories of private sponsor.222 The sponsor categories in Quebec are 
defined slightly differently. Instead of the Group of Five, the Quebec criteria allow for 
sponsorships to be conducted by Groups of Two to Five, and all sponsor organizations must be 
incorporated. The Quebec framework is also distinct in that the ministère de l'Immigration, de la 
Diversité et de l'Inclusion has in the past issued blanket suspensions on all sponsorship 
applications.223 
 
3.8.1 Refugee eligibility 
3.8.1.1 The refugee classes 
Eligibility requirements for resettled refugees borrow from both the inland refugee framework 
and regular immigration programs. Refugee resettlement applicants must be members of one of 
two classes: the Convention Refugee Abroad class or the Humanitarian-Protected class, both 
defined in the IRPR. The Convention Refugee Abroad Class224 refers to Convention Refugee 
definition found in the Geneva Convention and incorporated in section 96 of the IRPA: 
                                                   
222 See Québec, Ministère de l’Immigration, de la Diversité et de l’Inclusion, “Le parrainage collectif des 
personnes en situation particulière de détresse” (2010), online: 
<https://numerique.banq.qc.ca/patrimoine/details/52327/2062473>. 
223 Such a suspension was implemented in January 2017 following the submission of a large number of 
sponsorship applications for Syrian refugees: Québec, Ministère de l'Immigration, de la Diversité et de 
l'Inclusion, Press Release, “Accueil de réfugiés parrainés - Suspension temporaire de la réception de nouvelles 
demandes de parrainage” (9 January 2017), online: 
<http://www.mifi.gouv.qc.ca/fr/presse/communiques/com20170109.html>. Another temporary suspension, 
this one resulting from “préoccupations sérieuses concernant l’intégrité de certaines pratiques de personnes 
morales” was announced on October 28, 2020: Québec, AM 2020-004, (2020) GOQ II, 4526. Under this 
suspension, sponsorship applications from organizations are suspended until November 1st, 2021, while 
Groups of 2-5 are limited to 750 applications until a new policy is announced. See Adèle Garnier & Shauna 
Labman, “Why Québec’s Refugee Sponsorship Suspension is so Misguided”, The Conversation (22 
November 2020), online: <https://theconversation.com/why-quebecs-refugee-sponsorship-suspension-is-so-
misguided-149250>. 




96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group or political opinion, 
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by 
reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of 
those countries; or 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their 
former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, 
unwilling to return to that country. 
 
The Convention refugee definition operates in Canada’s overseas and inland systems. Both the 
inland and the overseas programs establish a secondary ground of protection. In the inland 
context, the IRPA establishes the “Persons in need of protection” category, defined as persons 
who face a risk of torture, a risk to their life, or cruel and unusual punishment.225 That category 
does not apply in the overseas context. The refugee resettlement framework contains a rather 
wide additional category. Section 147 of the IRPR establishes the Country of Asylum class, 
whose members are defined as foreign nationals who are seriously and personally affected by 
civil war, armed conflict, or massive violations of human rights in each of those countries. Since 
the Source Country class was repealed in 2011, the Country of Asylum class is currently the 
only sub-class included in the broader Humanitarian-Protected class: 
Member of the country of asylum class 
147 A foreign national is a member of the country of asylum class if they have 
been determined by an officer to be in need of resettlement because 
(a) they are outside all of their countries of nationality and habitual 
residence; and 
(b) they have been, and continue to be, seriously and personally affected 
by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of human rights in each 
of those countries. 
 
There is no dearth of Federal Court case law, UNHCR guidelines, or legal treatises addressing 
                                                   
225 IRPA, s 97. Persons will not qualify under the “person in need of protection” category if the risk is “faced 
generally by other individuals in or from that country.” 
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the Convention refugee definition. Refugee lawyers and scholars are familiar with the 
Convention refugee definition, which has governed international and domestic refugee systems 
since 1951. The Country of Asylum class definition, being unique to Canada’s resettlement 
system, has received much less attention from courts and commentators. It is worth reviewing 
here IRCC’s own interpretation of the definition found in its operating manual. CIC’s 2009 
manual on overseas processing of refugees includes the following statement about the meaning 
of “human rights” under the Country of Asylum refugee class: 
Human rights are defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as rights 
from which no derogation is permitted under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), even in times of war. The ICCPR lists the 
following as core human rights: 
 
•  right to life; 
•  freedom from torture; 
•  freedom from enslavement or servitude; 
•  protection from imprisonment for debt; 
•  freedom from retroactive penal laws; 
•  the right to recognition as a person before the law; and 
•  freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
 
ICCPR incorporates the core human rights from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and further outlines a broader range of rights. For example, it 
states that freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is a human right as is 
freedom from arbitrary interference in private, home and 
family life. 
 
What constitutes a basic human right is determined by the international 
community, not by any one country. However, when making a determination as 
to whether a fundamental violation of a human right has taken place, it is 
acceptable to consider Canadian law.226 
 
The same manual explains in the following terms the meaning of a “massive” violation of 
                                                   
226 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Overseas Selection and Processing, supra note 215 at para 6.8. As 
part of department-wide modernization efforts, IRCC and CBSA are currently transitioning to online program 
delivery instructions. The content of the former manual is now published online:  Immigration, Refugees and 






A “massive” violation of human rights means that the violation is not an isolated 
occurrence. “Isolated” can be interpreted two ways. In one sense, a violation is 
isolated (i.e., not massive), if it happens to an individual (or a few individuals) as 
opposed to a specific group or an entire population. In another sense, a violation 
is isolated if it is a one-time occurrence, as in the case of an eruption of violence 
over a particular incident. There may not be a history of violence prior to the 
incident in question, nor is there a reasonable expectation of a recurrence. In this 
sense, the violence may have been horrific, but it would not be considered 
“massive” in the context of these Regulations.227 
 
 
The Country of Asylum Class definition is partly analogous to the “broader refugee definition” 
developed and applied by the UNHCR, which defines refugees as persons who are 
outside their country of origin or habitual residence and unable to return there 
owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom 
resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.228 
 
 
The UNHCR’s Resettlement Handbook further explains that this category includes “persons 
who are affected by the indiscriminate effects of armed conflict or other ‘man-made disasters’, 
including, for example, foreign domination, intervention, occupation or colonialism.”229 The 
Country of Asylum class, just like the UNHCR’s broader refugee definition (and unlike the 
Convention refugee definition) does not require that the person be specifically targeted. The 
harm feared may be the result of indiscriminate acts. 
 
                                                   
227 Ibid at 6.28. 
228 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011) at para 3.2.2 [Resettlement Handbook]. See 
also UNHCR, “Note on The Mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his Office” (October 2013) 
at 3, online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5268c9474.html>. 
229 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, ibid at para 3.4. 
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3.8.1.2 Other criteria 
i) No alternative durable solution 
As mentioned in the second chapter of this dissertation, the Canadian resettlement system 
follows the international refugee regime’s preference for repatriation, firmly entrenched since 
the early 1990s. In the Canadian resettlement program, resettlement will only be offered if the 
applicant has “no reasonable prospect, within a reasonable period, of a durable solution in a 
country other than Canada.”230 
 
ii) Successful establishment  
The IRPR require that resettlement applicants satisfy the visa officer that they will become 
“successfully established” in Canada. Establishment potential is to be assessed taking into 
consideration the following factors: 
(i) their resourcefulness and other similar qualities that assist in integration in a 
new society, 
(ii) the presence of their relatives, including the relatives of a spouse or a 
common-law partner, or their sponsor in the expected community of resettlement, 
(iii) their potential for employment in Canada, given their education, work 
experience and skills, and 




As, mentioned earlier in this chapter, the successful establishment requirement, as initially 
formalized under the 1976 Immigration Act, imposed stricter criteria. For example, the former 
regulations required that establishment potential be assessed taking into consideration the ability 
of the applicants to communicate in French or English, rather than their “ability to learn” those 
languages. The rationale behind the successful establishment criteria was criticized in the 1999 
                                                   
230 IRPR, s 139(1)(d). 
231 IRPR, s 139(1)(g). 
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LRAG report. 232  In the 2001 IRPA, the successful establishment requirement relaxed and 
completely eliminated for applicants determined to be “vulnerable or in urgent need of 
protection.” 233  Current policy documents relied on by visa officers state that eligibility 
assessments are to focus not on successful establishment, but on protection needs.234 
 
CIC’s manual on refugee overseas processing describes the successful establishment assessment 
as involving the determination of the likelihood that the applicant will “be able to provide for 
themselves and their dependants; and not rely on social assistance for food and shelter after a 3 
to 5-year time period.” 235 While it appears that relatively few applicants are refused for lack of 
establishment potential,236 the current successful establishment criteria remain at odds with the 
principle of humanitarianism and refugee protection. Aiken offers the following assessment: 
While the criteria are to be applied with an emphasis on social factors rather than 
strictly economic, subjective and highly discretionary considerations with regard 
to the refugee’s “personal suitability” continue to supplant the assessment of the 
refugee’s need for protection. Canadian visa officers frequently overrule the 
advice of legal officers from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees with regard to deserving cases. Despite widespread criticism of the 
government’s refugee resettlement model, officials have refused to eliminate the 
establishment criteria from overseas selection.237 
                                                   
232 See section 3.5. 
233 IRPR, s 139(2). Section 138 of the IRPR defines a person in “urgent need of protection” as someone who is 
likely to be killed, subjected to violence, torture, sexual assault or arbitrary imprisonment, or returned to their 
country of nationality. A “vulnerable” refugee is defined as a person who “has a greater need of protection 
than other applicants for protection abroad because of the person’s particular circumstances that give rise to a 
heightened risk to their physical safety.” 
234 IRCC’s processing manual states that the “shift toward protection rather than ability to establish” is one of 
the four core principles of Canada’s resettlement program. The other three core principles are rapid family 
reunion, accelerated processing of urgent and vulnerable protection cases, and balancing inclusiveness with 
effective management through closer relationships with partners (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
“Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at para 5.2). 
235 Ibid at para 13.9. 
236 In the 105 cases reviewed for the purpose of CIC’s 2011 PSR quality assurance evaluation, “(s)ettlement 
potential was cited in less than 5 percent of refused cases, showing that visa officers are well aware of the 
humanitarian basis for the program (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The PSR QA Project: Managing 
Quality Counts” (2011) at 2.2 [“PSR QA Project”]). See also Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 
at 63; Pressé & Thomson, supra note 106 at 96. 
237 Sharry Aiken, “From Slavery to Expulsion”, supra note 7 at 76. In the same vein, Labman writes: 
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The UNHCR handbook itself states that the integration potential of refugees should not be a 
relevant factor in assessing the need for resettlement: 
The notion of integration potential should not negatively influence the selection 
and promotion of resettlement cases. For example, educational level or other 
factors considered to be enhancing the prospects for integration are not 




Under Canadian immigration law, some categories of non-citizens are barred from entering or 
remaining in Canada. The grounds of inadmissibility under the IRPA include security, human or 
international rights violation, criminality, health, financial situation, misrepresentation, failure to 
comply with the act, and having an inadmissible family member.239 Naturally, resettlement 
applicants are exempt from financial inadmissibility, as most will immediately require 
government or private sponsor financial support.240 Resettlement applicants are also exempt 
from health inadmissibility for placing excessive demands on health or social services.241 This 
latter exemption did not exist under the 1976 Immigration Act framework. In addition, through 
section 22 of the IRPR, both inland refugee claimants and overseas resettlement applicants are 
                                                                                                                                                                   
The fact that [the successful establishment criteria] remain in the regulation, however, means 
that they can be used as a basis of refusal in as many cases as desired. This despite some 
reworking of the criteria, the successful establishment criteria in the regulations continue to 
reflect the desired qualities of economic immigrants (Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra 
note 45 at 63). 
Before the adoption of the IRPA, Michael Casasola observed that the successful establishment 
assessment leads to inconsistent decision-making: 
This seemingly objective assessment essentially measures the ability to become financially 
independent within one year of her arrival. In reality this is a highly subjective assessment 
which has led to inconsistent decision-making among visa posts This criterion can prevent 
Canada form resettling refugees believed to be in greatest need of protection or a durable 
solution (Casasola, “Legislative Review”, supra note 124 at 19). 
238 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 228 at para 6.1. See also Labman, supra note 45 at 27. 
239 IRPA, ss 33-42. 
240 IRPR, s 139(3); IRPA, s 39. 
241 IRPA, s 139(4). 
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exempt from inadmissibility under the ground of misrepresentation.242 Resettlement applicants 
remain however subject to all of the other grounds of inadmissibility. 
 
iv) UNHCR or state refugee status documentation 
Since 2012, Groups of Five and Community Sponsors can only sponsor refugees that have 
obtained a positive refugee determination from the UNHCR or a foreign state.243 This change 
was part of a broader set of reforms implemented in 2011-2012, designed to reduce the number 
of applications submitted in the PSR program and to increase the acceptance rate in the PSR 
stream.244 As a result of the change, sponsorships submitted by Groups of Five fell drastically in 
comparison to SAH sponsorships. In 2010, Groups of Five sponsored 42% of all privately 
sponsored refugees, while SAHs sponsored 54%. In 2014, Groups of Five sponsored only 17% 
of PSRs, SAHs 79%.245  It bears mention that, while only Groups of Five and Community 
Sponsors are bound by the requirement of s 153(1)(b), many other resettlement applicants have 
received a refugee determination by the UNHCR. In fact, all GARs have previously been 
identified as refugees by the UNHCR.246 It must be emphasized that a positive refugee status 
determination by the UNHCR or a foreign state is not a guarantee that the applicant will be 
determined to belong to one of the refugee classes by a Canadian visa officer. In every case, visa 
officers make their own independent determination as to whether an applicant is eligible and 
admissible, and they often come to different conclusions than the UNHCR. In fact, it was only 
recently that the Federal Court ruled that visa officers cannot in their assessments simply ignore 
                                                   
242 IRPA, s 40(1)(a) refers to “directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a 
relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act.” 
243 IRPR, s 153(1)(b). 
244 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 75-76.  
245 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 
164 at para 5.7. 
246 See UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 228 at para 7.2. 
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a UNHCR designation altogether. 247 
 
That being said, the requirement under section 153(1)(b) is problematic for several reasons. Not 
all refugees have access to a state or UNHCR refugee status determination. The UNHCR does 
not conduct refugee determinations in every state nor for every refugee population. In situations 
of mass influx of refugees, UNHCR refugee determination procedures can be halted. At the 
height of the Syrian refugee movement, for example, it was practically impossible for Syrian 
refugees to obtain a UNHCR status determination in neighbouring states, including Turkey, 
Lebanon, and Jordan. That the government temporarily lifted the requirement for Syrian 
refugees illustrates that refugees in need of resettlement may be unable to obtain refugee status 
documentation. Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Burmese refugees in Thailand face similar barriers 
in accessing UNHCR’s refugee determination system, as do refugees in an urban setting.248 
Relying on state-run refugee determination systems is equally problematic, as many states 
signatory to the Refugee Convention do not recognize gender, sexual orientation, or sexual 
identity as persecution grounds.249 In addition, the 4.3 million Palestinian refugees coming under 
the mandate of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) do not have access to 
UNHCR refugee determination procedures. 250  Another problem with the requirement arises 
from the fact that the Country of Asylum class under the IRPR is broader than the Convention 
                                                   
247 See Ghirmatsion v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 519 at para 58. See also Kidane v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 
520; Weldesilassie v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 521; Woldesellasie v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 522. 
248 See Canadian Council for Refugees, “Comments on notice of intent – changes to the Private Sponsorship 
of Refugees Program” (9 January 2012), online (pdf): 
<https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/g5_comments_jan2012.pdf>. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides: 
This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or 
agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees protection or assistance. 




refugee definition. Requiring that refugees meet the Convention refugee definition effectively 
disqualifies refugees who would qualify under the Country of Asylum class from being 
sponsored by Groups of Five or Community Sponsors.251 
 
3.8.2 The Syrian refugee movement and exceptional measures in 2015-16  
Without a doubt, the Syrian refugee movement has redefined the role of refugee resettlement in 
Canada. In the lead-up to the November 2015 federal election, the heart-wrenching photo of the 
body of young Alan Kurdi, a Syrian refugee who drowned in Greek waters, captured public 
attention.252 Canadians soon learned that Kurdi’s family was seeking resettlement to Canada, 
and that their aunt’s sponsorship application had been rejected.253 During the election campaign, 
the Liberal Party promised to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees within two months of forming 
government.254 In the end, just over 40,000 Syrian refugees were resettled to Canada between 
November 2015 and January 2017, specifically 21,876 GARs, 14,274 PSRs, and 3,931 
BVORs.255 
                                                   
Paradoxically, Canada has not incorporated Article 1D into domestic law, meaning that Palestinian refugees 
falling into the care of the UNRWA are not excluded from claiming asylum in Canada. See Baglay & Jones, 
supra note 14 at 201-02; 206-07. 
251 Ibid. Ironically, in some situations, the fact that an applicant has refugee status granted by a state who is a 
party to the Refugee Convention is the very reason why visa officers deem the applicant to have a durable 
solution in that country. 
252 Nahlah Ayed, “Little Alan Kurdi, washed ashore, suddenly refocuses Syrian tragedy”, CBC News (3 
September 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/little-alan-kurdi-washed-ashore-suddenly-
refocuses-syrian-tragedy-nahlah-ayed-1.3213893>; Nicholas Keung, “How Alan Kurdi’s tragic death changed 
thousands of lives”, Toronto Star (1 September 2016), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2016/09/01/how-alan-kurdis-tragic-death-changed-thousands-of-
lives.html>. 
253 Nil Köskal & Lisa Mayor, “The family of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian ‘boy on the beach,’ is coming to Canada, 
CBC News (27 November 2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/alan-kurdi-family-canada-refugees-
1.3338703>. 
254 “Justin Trudeau’s promise to take 25,000 Syrian refugees this year ‘problematic’”, CBC News (28 October 
2015), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-syria-refugees-settlement-groups-1.3291959>. 





Between 2015 and 2017, a number of temporary exemptions were adopted through ministerial 
instructions to facilitate the resettlement of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees in just a few 
months. These exceptions included allowing SAHs to sponsor Syrian refugees outside their 
annual allocation,256 allowing G5s and CSs to sponsor Syrian (and Iraqi) refugees without a 
UNHCR or state refugee designation,257 allowing G5s and CSs to sponsor Syrian (and Iraqi) 
refugees through the BVOR program,258 waiving of travel loans,259 and assessing all Syrians on a 
loosely defined prima facie basis.260 In addition, IRCC massively increased human resources in 
visa offices near Syria (Ankara, Beirut, and Amman), and fast-tracked Syrian cases. During this 
period, Syrian refugee cases were processed in as little as 2 months, whereas the general 
processing time was 3 to 5 years. 261  While the Syrian resettlement movement involved 
individualized selection, it does share some similarities with earlier “group resettlement” 
initiatives.262 
 
                                                   
256 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Report 7 - After the Warm 
Welcome: Ensuring that Syrian Refugees Succeed (8 March 2016) at 26, online (pdf): 
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/CIMM/Reports/RP8555094/cimmrp07/cimmrp07-
e.pdf>. 
257 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Temporary public policy to facilitate the sponsorship 
of Syrian and Iraqi refugees by Groups of Five and Community Sponsors” (19 December 2016), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-
instructions-agreements/sponsorship-syrian-iraqi-refugees-groups-five-community-sponsors-2017.html>. The 
exemption from the refugee status document requirement was achieved through the use of the Humanitarian 
and Compassionate exemption under section 25.1(1) of the IRPA. 
258 See Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, “Sponsoring Syrian Refugees through the Blended Visa 
Office-Referred (VOR) Program”, online (pdf): <http://www.rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Syrian-
BVOR-Info-Sheet-Jan-2016-1.pdf>. The standard criteria of the BVOR program has since changed and all 
sponsor types can now sponsor the BVOR program. 
259 See House of Commons, supra note 256 at 34. 
260 See Canada, “Internal Audit of Operation Syrian Refugees Identification and Processing” (1 June 2017) at 
para 8, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/reports-
statistics/audits/operation-syrian-refugees-identification-processing.html>. 
261 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative – Looking to 
the Future”, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-
syrian-refugees/looking-future.html> [Looking to the Future]. See also House of Commons, supra note 256. 
262 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 140-48; Robert Batarseh, Searching for a “Clean 
Population”: A Study of Canada’s Group Processing Program (PhD Thesis, York University, Department of 
Political Science, 2017) at 208-16. 
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3.8.3 Interviews and application procedure 
Contrary to inland refugee claimants, resettlement applicants cannot access state-funded legal 
assistance.263 The overwhelming majority of resettlement applicants navigate the system without 
the assistance of legal counsel or an immigration consultant. 264  The initial steps in the 
application procedure differ for GARs and PSRs. PSR applications involve two separate 
applications: a sponsorship application and a permanent residence (refugee) application. In 
many cases, often because of language barriers, someone other than the refugee applicant 
completes the refugee’s application.265 The sponsor side of the application is processed at IRCC 
offices in Canada.266 If the sponsorship application is approved, the case is forwarded to a visa 
office abroad and the applicant interviewed in person by a visa officer.267 
 
                                                   
263 It should be noted, however, that access to legal aid for inland asylum seekers varies from province to 
province and is not recognized as a constitutional right. Legal aid is not universally available and some 
asylum seekers go unrepresented. See Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee 
Determination System: An Empirical Assessment” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 79, 94-103. Existing 
legal aid programs for asylum seekers are vulnerable to budgetary cuts, as evidenced by the Government of 
Ontario’s 2019 decision to cease all legal aid funding for asylum seekers. See Sharry Aiken and Sean Rehaag, 
“Ontario’s Cuts to Legal Aid for Refugees: Racist, Xenophobic and Possibly Unconstitutional”, The 
Conversation (16 April 2019), online: <https://theconversation.com/ontarios-cuts-to-legal-aid-for-refugees-
racist-xenophobic-and-possibly-unconstitutional-115615>. See also Emily Bates, Jennifer Bond, & David 
Wiseman, “Troubling Signs: Mapping Access to Justice in Canada’s Refugee System Reform” (2016) 47:1 
Ottawa L Rev 1. 
264 In the past, some visa officers refused that applicants have their lawyer attend the interview. In Ha v 
Canada (MCI), 2004 FCA 49, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that such a practice was a violation of 
procedural fairness. The court also held that a blanket directive issued by CIC prohibiting lawyers and 
representatives from attending interviews was invalid because it fettered visa officers’ discretion to consider 
each case on their facts and determine whether to allow lawyers to attend the interview. It is also worth noting 
that the Refugee Sponsorship Support Program, established in 2015, provides some measure of pro bono legal 
services to sponsors in every Canadian province except Quebec. See Kelsey Lange, “Mobilization of the 
Legal Community to Support PSR Applications through the Refugee Sponsorship Support Program” in 
Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: Refugee Sponsorship in Context 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 212. 
265 In the present dataset, many cases were refused on the basis that the written application was inadequate or 
conflicted with the in-person interview, even though the applicants stated at the interview that someone else 
had completed the form and that they were not aware of the contents because they do not speak English. 
266 During the time of this study, and until April 2017, sponsorship applications were screened at the 
Resettlement Operations Centre in Ottawa (ROC-O). Applications are now processed at the Centralized 
Processing Office in Winnipeg (CPO-W). 
267 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at 10.4. 
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GAR cases generally begin with the UNHCR. Cases that are evaluated by the UNHCR for 
resettlement purposes come by way of internal, external or unsolicited pre-referrals.268 Refugees 
considered for resettlement by the UNHCR must have had a prior positive individual refugee 
determination. It is however possible for the UNHCR to submit referrals on behalf of refugees 
who have been recognized on a prima facie basis, and non-refugee stateless persons. 269 
Candidates are then interviewed by the UNHCR for the purpose of determining whether they are 
in need of resettlement considering their specific needs and the prospect of alternative durable 
solutions.270 UNHCR submissions fall into one of seven categories: refugees with legal and 
physical protection needs, survivors of torture or violence, refugees with medical needs, women 
and girls at risk, refugees in need of family reunification, children and adolescents at risk, and 
refugees who lack a foreseeable alternative durable solution.271 
 
If the refugee is found to be in need of resettlement, the UNHCR determines the most 
appropriate country of submission, taking into account family links in resettlement states, the 
urgency of the case considering the resettlement country’s processing time, the particular 
selection criteria of resettlement states, the annual quota of resettlement states, the refugee’s 
language(s), and the refugee’s expressed preference.272 
 
Most applicants (GARs and PSRs) are interviewed, but IRCC operational guidelines allow, in 
some cases, for positive and negative decisions to be made solely on the basis of the written 
                                                   
268 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 228 at para 5.6. In a few visa offices, referrals have been 
obtained from other agencies, including the Hebrew Immigrant Society and Refuge Point (see Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs – Extended Report” (Spring 
2016) at para 6.3 [“Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs – Extended Report”]). 
269 Ibid at para 7.2. 
270 Ibid, c 5. 
271 Ibid, c 6. See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 27. 
272 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 228 at para 7.6. 
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application. 273  Interpreters are provided by IRCC at the interview. 274  Interviews are not 
transcribed or recorded. Visa officers take notes themselves and enter them into IRCC’s internal 
database.275 During the interview, which generally lasts 40 minutes to 1 hour, applicants and 
their family members are asked to provide details, in their own words, on why they fled their 
country of origin, why they cannot return, why they cannot stay in their current country of 
asylum, their ability to establish, family composition, potential inadmissibility such as criminal 
history and involvement in inadmissible groups, and any other detail deemed relevant by the 
visa officer.276 The assessment of GAR applicants is streamlined as compared to PSR applicants, 
given that their narrative has already been scrutinized by the UNHCR.277  IRCC guidelines 
specify that family members can be interviewed separately if deemed appropriate by the visa 
officer.278 In some cases, a second interview is arranged.  If a visa officer has concerns about the 
application that have not been properly addressed during the interview, they may prepare a 
“procedural fairness letter” outlining their concerns and inviting the applicant to make written 
submissions within a certain timeframe. The guidelines provide that procedural fairness letters 
are required when third-party information has come to light after the interview.279 
 
Under the 1976 Immigration Act, all negative refugee decisions (both PSR and GAR) were 
reviewed by a senior immigration officer. That is no longer the case since the implementation of 
                                                   
273 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at paras 10.4, 
10.5. In the inland refugee system, by contrast, no refugee claimant (whose application is properly submitted) 
is denied asylum without the benefit of an in-person hearing. 
274 Ibid at paras 11.3, 11.4, 12.1. 
275 Ibid at para 16.3. The transfer of notes does not always happen immediately and sometimes can take 
months, which has led to allegations that the process was not properly documented. 
276 Ibid, c 13 & 14. The duration of a typical interview was explained in a visa officer affidavit in file IMM-
3934-13. 
277 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 
164 at para 5.5.2. 
278 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at para 11.1. 
279 Ibid at para 10.5. 
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the IRPA. 280  Rejected applicants receive a written refusal letter by regular mail or email. 
Program guidelines state that refusal letters “should refer to evidence provided by the applicant, 
and how and why this evidence does not meet the requirements” of the refugee classes.281 
However, as will become clear in the following analysis, the decision letter often discloses little, 
if any, information as to why the case was rejected. To get a sense of why the application was 
rejected, applicants must request the notes taken by the officer by way of a formal Access to 
Information request under the Access to Information Act.282 
 
3.8.4 Avenues for review, judicial deference, and the Charter 
The avenues for review for failed resettlement applicants are slim to none. Generally speaking, 
decisions denying permanent residence applications are not appealable internally.283 A failed 
refugee resettlement applicant can request a reconsideration of the decision by submitting 
written representations and supporting documents to the visa office.284  Reconsiderations are 
highly discretionary. In a case included in this study’s dataset, Justice Strickland explained: 
The authorities are also clear that there is no general duty to reconsider an 
application for permanent residence upon receipt of new information or to 
provide detailed reasons for deciding not to do so. … Further, an officer is not 
obliged to reconsider a decision… The obligation of an officer is to take into 
account all relevant circumstances in deciding whether to exercise the discretion 
to reconsider…285 
 
                                                   
280 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 236 at 57. 
281 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at para 27.2. In 
the case of refusals based on successful establishment, the same manual states that “[t]he refusal letter must 
give clear and detailed reasons why the applicant does not have the potential to resettle successfully in 
Canada” (ibid). 
282 Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, C A-1. 
283 The only exceptions are decisions not to approve Family Class sponsorships, which can be appealed by the 
sponsor to the Immigration Appeal Division of the IRB (IRPA, s 63(1)). 
284 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 215 at 27.3. In 
the case of GARs, the UNHCR can seek an informal review. See Canada, “Country Chapter: Canada”, supra 
note 217 at para at 6.5. 
285 Zakia Balkhi et al v Canada (MCI) (13 MAY 2014), IMM-6740-13 (FC) at 6. 
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The only recourse for failed resettlement applicants provided by law is to seek judicial review 
before the Federal Court in Canada.286 Access to judicial review is limited by several practical 
and legal factors. 287  The financial and logistical task of hiring a lawyer and coordinating 
litigation in Canadian courts is excessively difficult for the vast majority of displaced persons 
abroad. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
Unlike an appeal, the result of a positive judicial review is not a reversal of the decision. It 
results in the decision being quashed and remitted for redetermination by a different visa 
officer.288 Also, overseas refugee applicants must obtain permission, or “leave”, before they can 
proceed with their application.289  
 
Interestingly, under the 1976 Immigration Act, all visa officer decisions were exempt from the 
leave requirement.290 The leave requirement for visa officer decisions, introduced with the IRPA, 
was officially justified by the need to avoid unnecessary litigation and also to ensure consistency 
in treatment between overseas visa applicants and inland refugee claimants (to whom the leave 
requirement already applied).291 As explained by the Canadian Bar Association, the consistency 
argument is a flawed one - the absence of a leave requirement for visa officer decisions existed 
precisely because persons being evaluated by visa officers do not benefit from the same 
                                                   
286 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 66-76. In contrast with judicial review in the inland 
system, where the Minister can seek a judicial review of a positive decision made by the IRB, positive refugee 
resettlement decisions are not subject to review. 
287 See Macklin, supra note 118 at 103-05. 
288 Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(3).  
289 IRPA, s 72(1). See Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” 
(2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 1 at 7-9 [Luck of the Draw]. 
290 Immigration Act, SC 1976-77, c 52, s 82.1(1). 
291 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: New 




procedural protections as inland refugee claimants: 
It should go without saying that the principle of consistency has to be applied 
consistently. One reason for the present inconsistency in access to the Federal 
Court is to compensate for another inconsistency in access to a fundamentally 
just determination system. 
 
The refugee determination system abroad is far different from the refugee 
determination system in Canada. Abroad, instead of oral hearings in front of an 
expert, independent tribunal, with right to counsel, there are discretionary 
interviews with public servants whose main tasks have nothing to do with 
applying the refugee definition. Policy is not to permit counsel to attend, in those 
cases when interviews are granted, although exceptions are sometimes made.292 
 
The authors of the report also note that, given the high success rate of judicial reviews of visa 
officer decision, there is no need to curtail “unnecessary litigation:” 
Federal Court statistics show that approximately 45% of judicial reviews of 
overseas decisions are resolved in favour of the applicant. By comparison, 
applications for leave for judicial review of inland decisions are denied without 
reasons in the vast majority of cases, approximately 80%. These figures indicate 
that imposition of a leave requirement for overseas decisions will simply serve to 
insulate CIC from its own poor decisions.293 
 
 
Under the current framework, Federal Court judges normally do not issue reasons in leave 
decisions and leave decisions are not appealable.294 The test for when leave should be granted is 
not defined in the legislation and is rarely addressed in the jurisprudence of the Federal Court. It 
is clear, however, that the test is, at least in theory, a very permissive one.295 In his study on 
leave applications in the inland refugee context, Rehaag writes: 
The test for leave has therefore been variably described in the following terms: a 
reasonably arguable case; a fairly arguable case; a serious question to be tried; 
                                                   
292 Canadian Bar Association, National Citizenship and Immigration Law Section, Response to Building on a 
Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: White Paper for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation at 
46. See also Canadian Council for Refugees, “Comments on Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st 
Century” (March 1999), online: <https://ccrweb.ca/en/white-paper-comments>. 
293 Canadian Bar Association, ibid at 93. 
294 IRPA, s 72(2)(e). 
295 See Bains v Canada (MEI) (1990), 47 Admin LR 317 (FCA); Virk v Canada (MEI) (1991), 13 Imm LR 
(2d) 119 (FCTD). 
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and whether it is plain and obvious that the applicant has no reasonable prospect 
of success. However formulated, the test is highly permissive: leave should be 
granted unless it is clear that the judicial review application has no reasonable 
chance of success, namely, where it is so obvious that the application must fail 
that a determination on the merits is unnecessary.296 
 
 
For cases that are granted leave, the Federal Courts Act provides that the Federal Court may 
quash a decision in certain circumstances, including if it determines that the decision-maker 
acted without jurisdiction, failed to observe a principle of procedural fairness, erred in law, 
made an erroneous finding of fact, acted by reason of fraud or perjured evidence, or acted in 
another way that is contrary to law. 297  Judicial review is also subject to the evolving 
administrative law jurisprudence on the standard of review, which is based on the principle that 
reviewing courts should show deference to administrative decision-makers. In the 2011-2015 
period, the standard of review analysis was governed by the Dunsmuir decision, where the 
Supreme Court established that the reasonableness standard applies to questions of fact, mixed 
fact and law, and most questions of law.298 Reasonableness is described in Dunsmuir as being 
concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and 
intelligibility within the decision-making process.  But it is also concerned with 
whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which 
are defensible in respect of the facts and law.299 
 
 
Questions of procedural fairness, however, always attract the standard of correctness.300  That 
being said, while the jurisprudence is not entirely consistent, the Federal Court has often applied 
                                                   
296 See Sean Rehaag, “The Luck of the Draw”, supra note 289 at 9. 
297 Section 18.1(4). 
298 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 52-61. Legal questions that attract the correctness 
standard include questions of law that are of “central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside 
the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise”, constitutional questions and “true questions of jurisdiction 
or vires.” See also Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 
SCC 61 at paras 30-55. 
299 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47. 
300 Sketchley v Canada (AG), 2005 FCA 404 at paras 52-54. 
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the correctness standard in the immigration context for many questions of law, particularly 
where the courts have established a “clear legal test.”301  In the recent Vavilov trilogy, the 
Supreme Court reworked the standard of review framework in favour of a strong presumption of 
reasonableness, but reaffirmed the requirement of justification.302 The potential impact of the 
Vavilov framework will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
 
In the landmark Baker case, the Supreme Court determined that the level of procedural fairness 
owed in administrative proceedings varies according to a list of factors, including: the nature of 
the decision being reviewed, the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute, the 
importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected, the legitimate expectations 
of the person challenging the decision, and the choices of procedure made by the agency 
itself.303 The Federal Court has drawn a sharp distinction between the inland context and the 
overseas context in terms of how it assesses decisions and how it considers its reviewing role. 
The approach adopted in the resettlement context is a very deferential one. Because resettlement 
decisions are considered “purely administrative”, and because visa officers are considered to 
exercise “extensive discretion” in their decision-making, the Federal Court accords them 
“considerable latitude.”304 The fact that resettlement refugee applicants are outside Canada and 
do not face potential removal from Canada is also considered a factor limiting the duty of 
fairness of visa officers.305 There is however case law suggesting that the level of procedural 
fairness owed to refugee resettlement applicants is not at the lowest end of the spectrum. In the 
                                                   
301 Sakthivel v Canada (MCI), 2015 FC 292 at paras 25-30. See also Sean Rehaag, “The Luck of the Draw”, 
supra note 289 at 10. 
302 Canada (MCI) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. 
303 Baker v Canada (MCI), [1999] 2 SCR 817, [1999] SCJ No 39. 
304 Jallow v Canada MCI), [1996] FCJ No 1452 at 18. See also Qarizada v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 1310 at 
para 27. 
305 Oraha v Canada (MCI), [1997] FCJ No 788, 72 ACWS (3d) 140 at 9. 
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2004 Ha decision, the Federal Court of Appeal reasoned: 
In Baker, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly recognized that a person 
does not necessarily have to have a legal entitlement to enter or remain in Canada 
in order to be entitled to increased procedural protections. Rather, the Court 
simply stated [at paragraph 25]: “[T]he more important the decision is to the lives 
of those affected and the greater its impact on that person or those persons, the 
more stringent the procedural protections that will be mandated.” The fact that 
the appellants are applying for permanent resident status as Convention refugees 
suggests that this decision is potentially of great importance in their lives.306 
 
 
It remains the fact that the doctrinal environment surrounding judicial review in resettlement is 
deeply deferential. The root of this approach to overseas refugee decisions lies in Canadian 
courts’ approach to the extraterritorial application of the Charter. In the precedent-setting Singh 
decision, Justice Wilson stated that “the Charter applied to every human being who is physically 
in Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law.”307 This interpretation did 
not preclude, however, the application of the Charter to someone outside Canada but still 
“amenable to Canadian law.” Macklin writes that the Singh decision leaves open the issue of 
whether the conduct of Canadian officials acting under Canadian authority is subject to Charter 
scrutiny. She adds that 
[e]xamples where these issues might arise include the processing of immigration 
applications in offices abroad, the participation of Canadian officials in the 
interrogation of Canadian citizens detained in foreign prisons, and the conduct of 
Canadian troops in Afghanistan.308 
 
 
In the subsequent Khadr309 and Hape310 cases, the Supreme Court determined that the Charter 
                                                   
306 Ha v Canada (MCI), 2004 FCA 49 at para 61. See also Krikor v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 458 at paras 12-
13. 
307 Singh v Canada (MEI), [1985] 1 SCR 177 at para 35. 
308 Macklin, supra note 118 at 85, note 32. 
309 Canada (Prime Minister) v Kadr, 2010 1 SCR 44. 
310 R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26. 
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can also apply to a Canadian citizen outside Canada. The issue of whether the Charter can apply 
to non-citizens outside Canada who are also “amenable to Canadian law”, and in particular visa 
applicants, has yet to be determined by the Supreme Court, and lower courts decisions are not 
entirely consistent. In Slahi,311 the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that the Charter did not 
apply in circumstances similar to those in Kadr, but where the applicant was a non-citizen. In 
Crease, however, the Federal Court found that the Charter did apply to a non-citizen outside 
Canada who sought a declaration that he was eligible for Canadian citizenship.312 The reasoning 
in Crease has had little impact on subsequent Federal Court case law. In the case of Jallow, 
cited above, a refugee resettlement applicant sought to have the decision rejecting their 
application quashed on the ground that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Singh, the 
decision-making process in place was in breach of section 7 of the Charter. Justice Rouleau held 
that the Singh decision - and we should understand, the Charter itself - does not apply to foreign 
nationals outside Canada: 
In reviewing Singh, supra, it is clear to me that the process which was eventually 
put in place in Canada is not applicable to claimants outside the country. Wilson 
J. makes numerous references in her reasons wherein she emphasizes the duty of 
fairness on decision makers but it is very clear to me that other consequences 




3.9 Slow processing times, low approval rates, and concerns over decision-making 
Over the years, a variety of challenges have developed in the administration of the refugee 
resettlement program. This section will focus on three interrelated issues that have been central 
concerns of advocacy and sponsor groups: high refusal rates, slow processing times, and 
                                                   
311 Slahi v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2009 FCA 259. 
312 Crease v Canada, [1994] 3 FC 380. 
313 Jallow, supra note 304 at 17. The reasoning in Jallow was followed in Oraha, supra note 305. 
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inconsistent and poor-quality decision-making. 
 
i) Slow processing times 
Slow processing times - especially in the PSR program - have been a major concern of both the 
government and the sponsorship community for some time. Already in 1992, the problem of 
ballooning processing times was acknowledged by Employment and Immigration Canada.314 At 
the time, PSR cases were taking between 18 to 24 months to process. The government set a 
processing target of 6 to 9 months for PSRs.315 Processing times have since steadily increased. 
In 2001, it was taking up to 17 months to process 80% of PSR cases. That number grew to 35 
months by 2005 and 54 months by 2015.316 This is a far cry from the 6 to 9 months target the 
government set in the early 1990s. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, calls to reduce processing 
times in the PSR program intensified.317 During the Syrian refugee movement, Syrian cases 
were fast-tracked, but refugees of other nationalities continued to face long processing times. A 
Canadian Council for Refugees 2016 report deplored the nationality-dependent variable 
processing times, arguing that slow processing times have a severe negative impact on both 
refugees and sponsors: 
                                                   
314 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Discussion Paper”, supra note 173 at 3. See also Treviranus & 
Casasola, supra note 172 at 187. 
315 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Discussion Paper”, ibid at 4. 
316 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Summative Evaluation of the Private Sponsorship of Refugees 
Program” (2007) at para 3.2.3 [“Summative Evaluation”]. 
317 See Canadian Council for Refugees & Elected Sponsorship Agreement Holder Representatives, 
“Comments on Private Sponsorship of Refugees evaluation” (2007), online (pdf): 
<https://ccrweb.ca/files/psrevalcomments.pdf>; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation 
of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 164 at para 5.5.2; Canadian Council for Refugees, “The Private 
Sponsorship of Refugees Program: Current Challenges and Opportunities” (2006), online (pdf): 
<https://ccrweb.ca/files/psrpbriefing.pdf> [“Current Challenges”]; Casasola, “Legislative Review”, supra note 
124 at 19; Thomas R Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship in Manitoba” (2003) 4:2 J Intl 
Migr & Integration 257 at 267; Chapman, supra note 165 at 5. See also Treviranus & Casasola, supra note 
110 at 187. 
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The Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program has been plagued by extremely 
long processing delays overseas. Some refugees arrive quite quickly: some 
Syrian refugees have arrived after only a month or two. Other refugees, notably 
those from Africa, have waited four or five years before they are finally able to 
travel to Canada. 
 
The excruciatingly slow processing times are completely unacceptable for a 
program that is supposed to protect refugees in danger. The long delays also 
discourage potential sponsors from getting involved.318 
 
The reason for the overall ballooning of processing times is simple: the number of annual 
applications has vastly exceeded the admission targets set by the government. Processing times 
have however begun to decrease in recent years. The introduction, in 2012, of annual caps for 
SAHs and the UNHCR documentation requirement for G5s and Community Sponsors, were 
designed as measures to decrease the number of applications.319 These measures did lead to a 
moderate decrease in case backlog, but proved insufficient to bring processing times to 
acceptable levels.320 More importantly, these measures led to backlogs accumulating on the SAH 
side rather than on the government side. Processing times only began to decrease following 
                                                   
318 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Renewing Canada’s Sponsorship Program” (2016) at 2-3, online (pdf): 
<https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/renewing-psr-jan-2016.pdf>. See also Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 164 at para 5.5.2: 
PSR processing times were perceived as very long by the sponsor community and refugees. 
In addition, the sponsor community stressed that long processing times made it difficult for 
them to keep the sponsorship group, and the larger supporting community, engaged in the 
process. Some of these difficulties included the upfront work to build interest in sponsoring a 
refugee, and the level of effort needed to complete an application. On top of these 
difficulties, since applications took years to process, changing refugee family compositions 
would alter the resettlement needs of a particular case. In some cases, this may result in one-
year window sponsorship issues in Canada if refugees do not alert the department of these 
family composition changes before they depart. Moreover, members of a sponsor group 
often needed to be replaced and resources needed to be sought elsewhere as the length of 
processing time increases. PSR also noted that in addition to the stress associated with the 
lengthy processing times, there was the lack of available updates on the application. Some 
key informants, SAH representatives, and sponsor focus group participants, therefore, cited 
the need for a better online method for them to monitor PSR application status. 
See also Canadian Council for Refugees, “Current Challenges”, supra note 317. 
319 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs – Extended 
Report”, supra note 268 at para 5.5.2. 
320 Ibid. In 2013, the year-end inventory was reduced by 20%, and by a further 8% in 2014. 
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significant increases in annual admission levels as of 2015. In 2016, the Canadian government 
pledged to eliminate the PSR backlog and reduce processing times to 12 months by 2019.321 As 
of July 23, 2020, 25 visa offices were posting processing times for PSR applications. Processing 
times ranged from 14 months in Egypt and in Kenya to 46 months in Djibouti, for an average 
processing time of 25 months.322 
 
ii) Low and varying approval rates 
Low approval rates have been cited as a concern by both the government and private 
sponsors.323  Between 1998 and 2005, approval rates averaged 51% for PSRs and 69% for 
GARs.324 In 2007, a CIC evaluation reported that the low approval rates were affecting program 
efficiency and were responsible for the growing backlog of cases. The same report attributed the 
high refusal rates to failures in screening by sponsors, a finding that was challenged by sponsor 
groups.325 The report also indicated that the majority of Constituent Groups had in fact high 
approval rates - close to that of GARs - but that the overall rates were driven down by a 
minority of Constituent Groups that submit a large number of cases with low approval rates.326 It 
was reported that for sponsors, the problem of high refusal rates is compounded by the fact that 
no clear reasons are received for refusals.327 The sponsorship community reacted to the report by 
pointing out that it incorrectly assumed that all refusals are correctly rejected, and that it further 
                                                   
321 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Private sponsorship of refugees in 2017” (January 2017), online: 
<https://ccrweb.ca/en/private-sponsorship-refugees-2017>. 
322 Processing times listed at https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/services/application/check-processing-times.html. 
323 See Canadian Council for Refugees, “Current Challenges”, supra note 317; Canadian Council for 
Refugees, “Survey of Refusals of Privately Sponsored Refugees - Summary of Results” (2015); Treviranus & 
Casasola, supra note 110 at 187; Casasola, “Legislative Review”, supra note 124 at 19. 






failed to assess how many refusals are linked to issues outside the control of sponsors, such as 
changes in country conditions. In other words, the sponsorship community was arguing that the 
long processing delays contribute to inflated refusals based on changes in country conditions: 
… [the report] implies that refusals necessarily represent cases that are correctly 
rejected, an assumption strenuously and repeatedly disputed by NGOs and never 
analyzed in the evaluation. Again the case of Iraqi refugees is illustrative – there 
has been a high refusal rate of Iraqi privately sponsored refugees. This is 
changing now, as the international interpretation of the needs of the refugees has 
developed. In at least one case, a family initially refused by the visa post was 
recently recognized as refugees and resettled to Canada. Were the private 
sponsors submitting the “wrong” cases, or was the visa office slow in 
recognizing the realities that Iraqi refugees are fleeing? 
 
The evaluation does not address the possibility that a significant proportion of 
refusals might be for reasons that the sponsor could not know or anticipate when 
the application was submitted, such as a change in country conditions, the 
international political and protection context, a change in conditions for the 
applicants as a result of long delays, and many other possible factors that 
ultimately are recorded as refusals…328 
 
 
Between 2011 and 2014, the average grant rate for PSR applications lay just below 70%, while 
GAR cases averaged between 88% and 93%, with the exception of 2013.329 A 2016 IRCC 
evaluation attributed this increase in approval rates to various changes implemented as a result 
of the 2007 PSR Evaluation and the 2011 GAR/RAP Evaluation, including the elimination of 
the Source Country class and increased training opportunities for both sponsors and visa 
officers.330 It should however be noted that the GAR refusal rate does not reflect the actual 
refusal rate of UNHCR submissions: 
                                                   
328 Canadian Council for Refugees & Elected Sponsorship Agreement Holder Representatives, supra note 317 
at 4. See also Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 104-05. 
329 In 2013, a large number of cases were rejected in visa offices that had accepted applications under the 
cancelled Source Country class, abolished in 2012. 
330 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs – Extended 
Report”, supra note 268 at para 5.5.2. The implementation of the refugee status requirement in 2012 to 
refugees sponsored by Groups of Five and Community Sponsors is also likely to have had an impact on 
approval rates in the PSR program. 
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…where a UNHCR referral is likely to be refused (e.g., due to polygamous 
marriages, massive health needs, etc.), IRCC may recommend to the UNHCR 
that the referral be withdrawn in order to prevent a refusal and allow for timely 
referral to another resettlement country. These withdrawn applications are not 
officially counted in the data.331 
 
 
The Syrian refugee movement has had a major impact on approval rates in the PSR program. In 
2015, 2016, and 2017, approval rates increased to 85%-90%, in large part because of the 
number of Syrian refugees being assessed on a prima facie basis. It appears that grant rates have 
since decreased to pre-2015 levels. Approval rates in the GAR program - which were already 
relatively high - have increased only slightly during the Syrian refugee movement. In the GAR 
program as well, approval rates have since decreased to pre-2015 levels. Approval rates in both 
programs remain significantly higher than they have been historically. 
TABLE 3.1 - RESETTLEMENT APPLICATION APPROVAL RATES332 
PSR approval rate 
(principal applicants) 
GAR+BVOR approval rate 
(principal applicants) 
 
2011 68.78% (2,577/3,747) 
 
88.91% (2,758/3,102) 
2012 67.12% (2,378/3,543) 
 
87.78% (2,183/2,487) 
2013 68.54% (2,958/4,316) 
 
68.94% (2,572/3,731) 
2014 67.38% (2,018/2,995) 
 
93.11% (7,876/8,459) 
2015 84.74% (5,146/6,073) 
 
93.86% (12,436/13,249) 
2016 89.94% (7,723/8,587) 
 
94.30% (6,930/7,349) 
2017 88.23% (7,251/8,218) 
 
86.30% (3,375/3,911) 




It is worth noting that approval rates vary widely between visa offices. From 2011 to 2015, PSR 
                                                   
331 Ibid at para 5.5.2. 
332 Data compiled from customized statistical reports produced by IRCC and ordered by the author. The 
approval rates do not include PSR applications rejected at the in-Canada screening stage. 
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approval rates among offices processing 40 or more cases varied between 95.92% (Damascus) 
and 29.36% (New Delhi). The variation across visa offices was much less pronounced in GAR 
and BVOR cases. Excluding Bogota, 333  GAR grant rates varied from 91.62% (Ankara) to 
65.34% (Moscow). In both streams, there was a general alignment of visa offices along the 
approval rate scale. However, a few visa offices had a relatively high approval rate in one 
stream and a relatively low approval rate in the other. Both Paris and Colombo had a relatively 
high PSR approval rate and a relatively low GAR approval rate. Conversely, both Dakar and 
Accra had a relatively low PSR approval rate, and a relatively high GAR approval rate. 
 






                                                   
333 Bogota was one of the few countries that accepted applications under the former Source Country class, 
abolished in 2011. It appears that some applications under the Source Country that had been submitted but not 
yet processed when the class was abolished were rejected in 2013. That year, 864 GAR cases were rejected 
out of 883 cases processed at the Bogota office, for an approval rate just below one percent. 
334 Grant rate by principal applicant among visa offices that processed 40 or more PSR cases in 2011-2015. 





































































































































































































































































































































iii) Concerns over visa officer decision-making 
The sponsorship community has voiced concerns over the quality and consistency of decision-
making by visa officers since the 1980s. Many reports released by the Canadian government 
have acknowledged these concerns, and the federal government has released a few studies that 
assess the decision-making process from an empirical perspective. The substance of these 
various reports will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 5. However, I will present here 
some of the major issues that have been flagged by both the government and the refugee 
advocacy community. 
 
Inconsistent decision-making was noted in EIC’s 1990 evaluation of the PSR program.336 In 
1992, the problem was again noted, with EIC recognizing that visa officers have an “extremely 
                                                   
335 Visa offices that processed 40 or more GAR cases during that period. 















































































































































































































































































































































heavy workload.”337 Closer scrutiny of visa officer decision-making occurred in the late 1990s 
when the government was fashioning the successor legislation to the 1976 Immigration Act. 
CIC’s 1997 policy orientation report, entitled Refugee Resettlement Model acknowledged the 
existence of consistency problems in decision-making and recommended that visa officer 
training be increased.338 Consistency in decision-making was also a chief concern that led the 
Legislative Review Advisory Group (LRAG) to recommend in 1997 that both inland and 
overseas refugee determination be conducted by a single independent administrative tribunal.339 
In 2006, the Canadian Council for Refugees conducted a review of 11 rejected applications from 
Iraqi refugees. The authors of the review noted several problems with the decisions, including 
excessively brief decisions devoid of substance, overzealous credibility findings based on 
peripheral considerations, misinterpretation of the Refugee Convention with regard to military 
service evasion, failures in applying the correct legal test for persecution, and failures to 
consider the Country of Asylum class.340 The Canadian Council for Refugees followed up this 
report with a larger assessment of refusals at the Cairo visa office in 2010. That report outlined 
widespread failures by one particular visa officer, including lack of knowledge of country 
conditions, lack of understanding of the refugee definition, faulty credibility assessments, bias 
against members of the Pentecostal faith, failure to take into account documentary evidence, 
poor interview techniques, and poor note-taking.341 The report highlighted the program’s lack of 
                                                   
337 Employment and Immigration Canada, “Discussion Paper”, supra note 173 at 4. 
338 See Casasola, “Legislative Review”, supra note 124 at 21. 
339 Canada, LRAG Report, supra note 122. See also Casasola, ibid, at 19-20. 
340 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Analysis of a Small Number of Iraqi Private Sponsorship Applications 
Refused at Damascus” (2006), online (pdf): <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/static-
files/IraqiPSRrefusals.pdf>. See also Canadian Council for Refugees & Elected Sponsorship Agreement 
Holder Representatives, supra note 317. 
341 These cases were filed at the Federal Court in November 2009. See Canadian Council for Refugees, 
“Disturbing Upsurge in Rejections Rates of Eritrean Refugees in Cairo by Canada” (2009), online: 
<https://ccrweb.ca/en/bulletin/09/11/30>; Canadian Council for Refugees, “Concerns with Refugee Decision-




The problems in these cases highlight the systemic shortcomings in refugee 
decision-making at Canadian visa offices. Visa officers are often inadequately 
trained, decisions are rarely reviewed by the courts or monitored internally, and 
there are few witnesses to interviews, which are not recorded. The system thus 
lacks accountability. 
 
It is possible that there are similar patterns of flawed decision-making occurring 




The report recommended that guidelines and training be strengthened, and that regular 
monitoring of compliance be instituted. The report also recommended the introduction of video 
recording of interviews. In 2011, a group of around 40 refugee applicants, all rejected by the 
same visa officer at the Cairo office, commenced judicial review proceedings at the Federal 
Court.343 The four lead cases were granted by Justice Snider and the others were settled.344 The 
terms of the settlement included the removal of the deciding visa officer from refugee decision-
making. 
 
In 2011, CIC published an extensive study of decision-making in the PSR program that looked 
at a random sample of 209 accepted and refused files decided in 2007 in the Middle East-Africa 
region.345 Consultations with the Canadian Council for Refugees and SAHs organizations were 
also conducted. The study focused on credibility assessments, gender-based decision-making, 
the application of the legal criteria, documenting decisions, and communication with sponsors. 
Various shortcomings were identified, including the failure to confront applicants with 
                                                                                                                                                                   
[“Decision-Making at Cairo”]. 
342 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Decision-Making at Cairo”, ibid at 3. 
343 See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 45 at 73. 
344 Ghirmatsion v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 519; Kidane v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 520; Weldesilassie v 
Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 521; Woldesellasie v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 522. 
345 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 236. 
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credibility concerns, the scant use of objective country documentation, inadequate reasons, the 
failure to interview all family members, the failure to refer to the IRB Guidelines on Gender-
Based Violence, and the failure to consider the Country of Asylum class. The report increased 
training for visa officers, the development of decision-making tools, and reverting to the former 
practice of having a senior immigration officer review all negative decisions. This study 
represents the most extensive refugee resettlement decision-making assessment conducted to 
date. Its findings and recommendations will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
 
In 2016, IRCC released an empirical study on the resettlement programs that covered the 2010-
2015 period.346 The study relied on a large dataset of key informant interviews, focus groups, 
and surveys, with both government and non-government actors. While this study did not focus 
on quality of decision-making, visa officer training was reported to be lacking in many respects. 
Notably, it was reported that training was inconsistent between visa offices and that not all 
officers had access to training because it was oversubscribed. 
 
3.10 Resettlement in Canada – A glance at the Numbers 
Between 1979 and 2018, a total of 707,421 refugees were resettled to Canada. A total of 
313,401 refugees (43.30%) came through the PSR program, 385,014 through the GAR program 
(54.43%), and 9,006 (1.27%) through the BVOR program. Over this 41-year period, the yearly 
admission average was 17,254, but the numbers have varied widely. As the graph below shows, 
there have been three peaks of admissions. The initial peak in 1979-1980 corresponds to the 
Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian movement and the birth of the PSR program. Admissions 
increased again in 1988-1991, mostly as a result of a large number of refugees selected under 
                                                   
346 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs, supra note 164. 
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the self-exiled category. The peak in 2016 corresponds to the Syrian refugee movement. Under 
the current government’s immigration level plans, total resettlement numbers for 2020-2023 are 
to remain well above program averages, climbing to 36,000 in 2021.347 It is worth noting that 
the COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on admissions through the resettlement stream 
as well as other immigration streams. At the time of finalizing this dissertation, partial data 
shows that, in the first 10 months of 2020, only 18.78% of the admission target was reached 
(15.55% of the PSR target; 22.28% of the GAR target; 2.5% of the BVOR target). Inevitably, 
total admissions for the year 2020 will fall well short of projected targets. Restrictions related to 
COVID-19 are likely to continue into 2021. 
 
TABLE 3.4 - RESETTLEMENT TO CANADA (1979-2019) & 2020-2023 TARGETS348 
 
                                                   
347 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Notice – Supplementary Information for the 2021-
2023 Immigration Levels Plan” (30 October 2020), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2021-2023.html>. 
348 Data collated from Canadian Council for Refugees reports, the Government of Canada OpenData Platform, 
and IRCC reports to Parliament.  
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The overall rise in resettlement numbers that followed the Syrian movement has been welcomed 
by refugee organizations, including the Canadian Council for Refugees. The Canadian Council 
for Refugees has deplored, however, the fact that the historical balance in the resettlement 
program is now compromised:  
Canada’s commitment to refugees must not be privatized: the government needs 
to take the lead by resettling more refugees than private citizens do. We are very 
concerned to see that the government is intending to resettle only half the number 
of Privately Sponsored refugees, especially as Government-Assisted Refugees 




This chapter began with a review of Canada’s patchwork refugee policy in the 20th century. The 
analysis reveals that Canada was essentially absent from the international response to refugees 
until the 1950s. Today, Canada operates a robust refugee resettlement program that receives 
international recognition, although some elements of Canada’s economically-driven refugee 
policy endure to this day. 
 
The framework of refugee resettlement in Canada emerged through ad hoc, highly selective 
initiatives that were driven by humanitarian, but also by economic and ideological concerns. 
Refugee resettlement was formalized through the 1976 Immigration Act, and has remained 
largely unchanged since then. Admission levels under the program, however, have varied 
dramatically as a function of public and political support. These shifts attest to the 
                                                   
349 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Multi-year immigration levels welcomed, but government commitment 
to refugees falls short” (2 Nov 2017), online: <http://ccrweb.ca/en/release/multiyear-levels-welcomed-
commitment-falls-short?platform=hootsuite>. The government’s initial decision to consider BVOR arrivals as 
part of the government’s commitment overall GAR commitment was also criticized by the refugee 
community as infringing on the principle of additionality: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 
“Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs”, supra note 164 at 4.2.2; Canadian Council for Refugees, 
“Important changes”, supra note 172. 
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fundamentally discretionary nature of the resettlement program. The 1976 Immigration Act also 
introduced the innovative PSR program. While elements of the PSR program have proven quite 
contentious, the program has been hugely successful over the years in harnessing 
humanitarianism in civil society, well beyond what the drafters of the 1976 Immigration Act had 
envisioned.  
 
Important changes in refugee movements have occurred in the past 40 years. When the 
Canadian government moved to legislate refugee policy, refugee resettlement was the main 
element of Canada’s refugee response. Since the increase in asylum seeker arrivals in the 1990s, 
this is no longer the case. Paradoxically, the refugee resettlement program has provided an 
opportunity for successive governments to legitimize rights-restrictive policies for asylum 
seekers, portrayed as ‘bogus’ or even ‘illegal’. Refugee resettlement nevertheless remains a 
fundamental component of Canada’s participation in the international refugee regime. 
Following the 2015-2017 Syrian refugee movement, the program has been receiving increasing 
attention from the international community. As many states are now looking at Canada’s private 
sponsorship of refugees program as a model, it is imperative to critically assess the impacts of 
sponsorship and increased resettlement on other aspects of refugee protection. 
 
Given the significance of refugee resettlement for Canada’s humanitarian immigration policy, it 
is surprising that decision-making in refugee resettlement has thus far received little attention 
from scholars, and especially legal scholars. This is all the more surprising considering that 
refugee organizations have, for decades, expressed concerns over the quality of decision-making 
in visa offices. Similarly, the integration of the resettlement program into Canadian 
administrative law, and the role played by courts in the development and implementation of the 
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resettlement program, are issues seldom discussed in academic research and as international 




CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Studying decision-making 
The most common methodology used by legal scholars in refugee status decision-making 
studies, at least in the Canadian context, is to assess judicial review decisions as a window into 
first instance administrative decision-making. This focus on court decisions perhaps reflects a 
general methodological bias in administrative law, where the emphasis has traditionally been on 
“judicial review” more than “government action.”1 Also, because court decisions are publicly 
available and most of them are accessible online, the study of judicial review presents clear 
advantages in terms of data gathering. However, the study of judicial review alone presents 
several limitations. In the context of overseas refugee determinations, judicial review decisions 
represent only the tip of the iceberg, as the vast majority of refugee determinations are not 
reviewed by the Federal Court. Perhaps more importantly, what judges write in judicial review 
decisions provides only a small window into how the decision-maker arrived at their decision. 
Administrative law’s focus on judicial review often results in a framework of analysis that looks 
exclusively at how the standard of review is applied by judges. In this dissertation, I am not - or 
at least not primarily - interested in whether visa officer decisions pass the test of judicial 
review. Principles of administrative law do play a major role in my analysis, but I am equally 
interested in examining how visa officers make refugee decisions. Questions such as how visa 
officers conduct interviews, how visa officers draft reasons, how they use country documents, 
are not matters that are necessarily relevant on judicial review. Even the overall role of judicial 
review in the resettlement program cannot be assessed relying on judicial review decisions 
                                                   
1 See Harry Arthurs, “The Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries ‘Wee, Wee, Wee’ All the Way 
Home)” (2005) 55:3 UTLJ 797; Harry Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business” 
(1979) 17:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Jennifer Raso, “Unity in the eye of the beholder? Reasons for decision in 





In order to assess these kinds of issues, I determined that it was necessary to access detail 
information on the administration decision-making process itself. I initially sought to access a 
randomly selected sample of positive and negative visa officer decisions. Through access to 
information requests to IRCC, I requested anonymized copies of the first 10 decisions issued 
each year between 2011 and 2015. These were refused. Ironically, as a second-best strategy, I 
opted to access the decision-making process through judicial review. I was ultimately able to 
access a comprehensive pool of publicly available court files of judicial review applications in 
the refugee resettlement context. The added advantage of this method is that it allows for a 
double analysis, of both the first instance decision-making and judicial review for each case. 
 
This component of my methodology yielded the entire court file in 403 judicial review 
applications of refugee resettlement decisions, representing the entirety of applications 
submitted to the Federal Court between 2011 and 2015. As described below, the court files were 
comprised of different elements depending on when the application was resolved. At a 
minimum, the files included the visa officer’s decision.2 Other files included the visa officer’s 
notes, pleadings submitted by the parties, and the judge’s decision.  
 
The second component of my methodology includes the review of publicly available reports 
prepared by government institutions, international agencies, and civil society organizations 
involved in refugee resettlement. These are predominantly documents prepared by 
EIC/CIC/IRCC, the UNHCR, and the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR). Thirdly, I have 
                                                   
2 Applications for mandamus, naturally, did not include a decision. 
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reviewed customized statistical reports obtained through IRCC. These reports were ordered 
because the statistical data disclosed by IRCC was found to be insufficient for my purposes. 
Fourth, I have reviewed training documents obtained through access to information requests. 
 
4.2 Identifying cases and study period 
In order to develop a rich dataset that would lend itself to valid quantitative analyses, I strived to 
include the largest number of cases possible. Considering my capacities in terms of data 
collection and data analysis, I determined that a caseload of 300 to 500 cases was ideal. Based 
on an initial estimation of the number of judicial review applications filed each year, I 
determined that the study would cover a 5-year period (2011-2015). The 2015 cut-off point was 
also chosen in order to exclude from the dataset cases stemming from the Syrian refugee 
resettlement initiative, which was initiated in November 2015. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, Syrian cases during a brief period following the election of the Liberal government in 
late 2015 were assessed on a prima facie basis, meaning that Syrian applicants were presumed 
to be eligible for resettlement unless there was evidence to the contrary. Visa officers focused 
only on security screening.3 As the goal of my analysis is to investigate the operation of the 
refugee resettlement system under ordinary circumstances, I determined that cases decided as 
part of the Syrian initiative should be excluded, hence the 2015 cut-off. Finally, considering that 
                                                   
3 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Syrian Refugee Resettlement Initiative – Looking to 
the Future”, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/welcome-
syrian-refugees/looking-future.html>. Other exemptions were temporarily applied as part of the initiative: 
SAHs were allowed to sponsor an unlimited number of Syrian refugees outside of their annual cap allocation, 
Groups of 5 and Community Sponsors were allowed to sponsor Syrian (and Iraqi) refugees with no UNHCR 
status recognition, and immigration loans were waived for all Syrian refugees. See House of Commons, 
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Report 7 - After the Warm Welcome: Ensuring that 





CIC’s PSR Quality Assurance Report was published in 2011, the chosen study period has the 
added benefit of lending itself to an impact analysis of the report.4 
 
The dataset for this dissertation encompasses all judicial review applications of negative refugee 
resettlement decisions filed in the Federal Court between 2011 and 2015 inclusively. The cases 
were identified using two separate methods. First, two access to information requests were 
submitted to CIC/IRCC seeking the disclosure of the Federal Court docket number (IMM-201#-
##) for every judicial review file involving permanent residence applications under the refugee 
classes between 2011 and 2015.5 These requests produced a total of 283 applications. In the 
course of gathering data, it became apparent that the list provided was incomplete, as some 
cases for which a reported decision had been issued were not included in the disclosure. In fact, 
I learned that neither IRCC, the Department of Justice, nor the Federal Court keep a reliable 
record of judicial review applications based on the precise nature of the underlying decision. In 
order to capture the remaining cases, I designed a strategy to review the entire caseload of the 
Federal Court during the study period. I first conducted an automated search of the Federal 
Court docket for potential overseas refugee cases. The automated search was coded in Python 
programming language. The search identified all docket entries categorized as “Imm – Appl. for 
leave & jud. review – Arising outside Canada” which contained as a keyword the location of a 
visa office that had decided a refugee resettlement case during the same calendar year or the 
previous two years.6 That search produced a total of 4,864 cases. All 4,864 cases were manually 
                                                   
4 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The PSR QA Project: Managing Quality Counts” (2011). 
5 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Access to Information Request #A-2015-01715 (23 October 2015) (for 
years 2011-2014); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Access to Information Request #A-2016-
46785 (29 March 2017) (for year 2015). 
6 The first entry in the online docket of judicial review application in respect of a refugee resettlement case 
typically had this format: 
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reviewed at a Federal Court location. A further 120 refugee resettlement cases were identified 
through the manual review, for a total of 403 cases.7 I have a high level of confidence that all 
judicial review applications were captured using this method. The reliability of this method was 
confirmed by cross-referencing the results of the search with the list of cases disclosed by IRCC 
through the ATI request.  
 
4.3 Gathering the cases and analytical framework 
In each of the 403 cases, the entire physical file was ordered and was manually reviewed. The 
bulk of relevant documents was scanned and remains on file. The content of the physical file 
varied depending on when in the judicial review process the application was resolved. Judicial 
review applications that were not perfected or discontinued before being perfected contained the 
least information. Some of these cases contained only a notice of application, but most 
contained also the visa officer’s decision letter and the visa officer’s notes.8 Cases that were 
perfected typically contained, in addition to the decision letter and the reasons, an affidavit from 
the applicant, and memoranda of argument from both parties. Some cases also contained an 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Application for leave and judicial review against a decision CIC, JORDAN, AMMAN, 23-APR-
2015, FILE #G0000***** filed on 21-SEP-2015. Written reasons not received by the Applicant 
Tariff fee of $50.00 received 
The relevant visa offices were identified using customized statistical reports obtained from IRCC, on file with 
author.  In overseas matters, applicants are allowed to file a judicial review application within 60 days after 
they receive a decision (IRPA, s 72(2)b)), which would suggest that in the year 2011, only decision made in 
2011 and 2010 would have been judicially reviewed. However, in the refugee resettlement context, it is 
frequent for applicants not to immediately receive a decision and file a judicial application more than 60 days 
after the decision was issued. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution, visa offices having decided cases in 
2010 and 2009 were included in the search for the 2011 year, and the same method was used for subsequent 
years. As it turned out, not a single case was judicially reviewed more than one year after the decision was 
issued. 
7 See Appendix A for the full list of cases. 
8 If an applicant states in the application for leave that reasons were not received, the Federal Court will 
request reasons from the visa office pursuant to rule 9 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22. The “reasons” in immigration matters include the decision letter and 
the notes taken by the officer. Some cases were discontinued before the rule 9 disclosure was placed in the 
record. In a few cases in the dataset, reasons were not requested by the applicant despite the fact that the 
reasons had clearly not been received, as none were included in the application. 
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affidavit from the visa officer, and, in a few cases, cross-examination of the visa officer. The 
most complete cases were those that were granted leave. These cases generally contained the 
full “tribunal record”, which includes, in addition to the above, all forms and supporting 
documents submitted during the application process.9 Cases that proceeded to a hearing naturally 
also included the Federal Court’s decision. During the study period, CIC transitioned from the 
Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAIPS) to the Global Case Management 
System (GCMS). Notes entered in the GCMS system typically contain less biographical and 
application data than notes entered in the CAIPS system.10 
 
For each case, qualitative and quantitative information was gathered from both the Federal 
Court docket and the physical file and collated in Excel. The information gathered pertained to 
both the administrative process (the immigration application) and the judicial review process. A 
coding handbook was prepared to ensure consistency in coding. 
 
i) Administrative process 
The quantitative variables pertaining to the administrative process include the following: 
a) Application date 
b) Decision date 
c) Principal applicant gender 
d) Principal applicant date of birth 
e) Dependents 
f) Location of visa office 
g) Name/code of visa officer 
h) Whether reconsideration was requested 
i) Whether a lawyer or consultant was on file 
j) Type of application (GAR or PSR) 
k) Type of sponsor (in the case of PSR applications) 
                                                   
9 Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, ibid, r 15, 17. The full tribunal 
record was not routinely scanned. 
10 Notes in the CAIPS system usually contained an information sheet that indicated the principal applicant’s 
date of birth, family composition, type of sponsorship, name of sponsor and city of destination. 
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l) Country of origin 
m) Country of asylum 
n) Basis of application (religion, political opinion, violation of human rights, etc.) 
o) Basis of rejection (credibility, durable solution, nexus, inadmissibility, etc.) 
p) City/province of destination 
q) Whether case law was cited by the visa officer  
r) Whether country documents were cited by the visa officer 
s) Number of lines relevant to the applicant in the visa officer’s decision 
t) Whether the applicant had UNHCR/state refugee status 
u) Whether a procedural fairness letter was sent to the applicant 
 
 
In addition to these quantitative data points, a summary of the refugee narrative and the refusal 
rationale was created for each case, where possible. Based on the foregoing, a second analytical 
framework was created based on apparent problematic aspects in visa officer decision-making. 
The categories in this framework include: 
a) Cases where language issues/translation issues may have led to the negative 
decision 
b) Cases where the visa officer approached gender claims in a problematic fashion 
c) Cases where the visa officer failed to take into account the mental health or 
physical limitation of the applicant 
d) Cases that present a problematic assessment of testimony 
e) Cases that present a problematic assessment of personal documents 
f) Cases that present a problematic assessment of objective documents 
g) Cases where the visa officer failed to consider the central element of the claim 
h) Cases where the visa officer confused the concepts of generalized risk and local 
integration 
i) Cases where the visa officer appeared to have an unreasonable expectation in 
terms of memory 
j) Cases where the visa officer appeared to make a microscopic examination of the 
evidence 
k) Cases where the visa officer appears to have breached procedural fairness 
l) Cases where the visa officer appears to have made a problematic credibility 
determination 
 
ii) Judicial review process 
With regard to the judicial review process, each case was coded for the following data points: 
a) Date of JR application 
b) Federal Court office 
c) Name of lawyer 
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d) Whether the application was perfected, discontinued before being perfected, or 
not perfected 
e) Whether leave was opposed 
f) Name of leave judge, leave outcome, and leave date 
g) Whether the case was discontinued following a positive leave 
h) Whether there is evidence of case settlement 
i) Name of hearing judge, date of decision, and hearing outcome 
j) For positive judicial review decision – a classification of the grounds for 
quashing the visa officer’s decision (unreasonable credibility finding, breach of 
procedural fairness, etc.) 
k) Whether the decision was published (reasons) or unpublished (order) 
l) Whether a question for certification was submitted, by which party, and whether 
it was certified 
m) Whether the Federal Court decision was appealed 
n) Whether the respondent submitted a substantive affidavit from the visa officer 
and whether the visa officer was cross-examined by the applicant 
 
A plain-language summary of the applicant’s arguments on judicial review, and a summary of 
all Federal Court decisions on the merits was also created. 
 
4.4 Publicly accessible reports 
Many publicly reports and guidelines were accessed and reviewed. Specifically, I reviewed 
several reports and guides issued by the UNHCR, including the influential Resettlement 
Handbook, as well as annual Global Trends and Projected Resettlement Needs reports. I have 
also reviewed various operating manuals, program evaluations, and statistical reports issued by 
EIC/CIC/IRCC and other government agencies. The statistical platform Open Data proved to be 
a valuable source of statistical information. Reports prepared by various non-governmental 
organizations, such as the Canadian Council for Refugees, were also reviewed 
 
4.5 Customized statistical reports 
While the Open Data platform contained precious statistics on overseas refugee applications, it 
proved insufficient for two reasons. First, the data on overseas refugee processing available on 
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Open Data is currently not broken down by visa office. Only global numbers are provided. 
Second, the datasets for the relevant years were presented in terms of persons, as opposed to 
applications. Because my own dataset relies on principal applicants as the primary measure, 
and because the number of dependents included in each application is not always apparent on 
the record, I sought additional data through IRCC’s customized statistical service, including the 
number of refugee resettlement applications received, processed, and rejected by each visa 
officer, broken down by the type of application (GAR, PSR, BVOR). 
 
4.6 Training material 
Two packages of visa officer training material were obtained through access to information 
requests. The first is dated July 2015 (102 pages - handout documents) and the second April 
2020 (90 pages - PowerPoint presentation).11 Both disclosures include documents prepared by 
International Region Training (RIRT) trainers. As both disclosures differ in form and content, it 
remains unclear whether there exists other training material. 
 
4.7 Limitations 
This study’s methodology has three significant, inherent limitations. First, the body of overseas 
refugee cases in respect of which a judicial review is launched is not a representative sample of 
overseas refugee decisions. Presumably, before a decision is made to launch a judicial review 
application by a refugee applicant or their sponsor (if there is one), a problem has already been 
identified. Problematic decisions are therefore overrepresented in the dataset. That being said, 
considering the difficulty in accessing judicial review for overseas refugee applicants, it is likely 
                                                   
11 Access to Information Request #2A-2020-01732 (8 October 2020); Access to Information Request #A-
2015-09399 (29 June 2015). 
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that problematic decisions routinely go unchallenged. Second, the dataset includes very few 
GAR applicants - which is in itself a telling substantive finding. Decision-making in the GAR 
stream remains a blind-spot. To be clear, the dataset is not presented as a representative sample 
of visa officer decisions, and no inferential statistical analysis is conducted. Caution must be 
exercised when drawing conclusions as to the prevalence of the identified trends in the wider 
body of cases. Third, the dataset is only comprised of negative visa officer decisions. As 
reported in CIC’s PSR Quality Assurance report, important variations in decision-making 
practices exist depending on the outcome of a particular case.12 
 
In closing this chapter, I want to emphasize three broader points. This study makes no attempt to 
document the subjective experience of refugee applicants themselves. The irony is that the 
experience of refugees in the Canadian immigration system is ultimately what really matters 
here. In fact, too many refugee studies fail to account for the agency of refugees in navigating 
and shaping the global refugee regime. However, in my opinion, doing justice to refugees’ 
perspectives and experiences would require a dedicated research focus. Ultimately, I had to limit 
the scope of this already broad research and leave the matter for another day. I also want to 
acknowledge that the voices of women refugees are minimized in the dataset because of the 
resettlement system’s focus on the “principal applicant”, which in the family context is 
overwhelmingly the male head of the household. Finally, it should be noted that the overall 
group of cases processed in visa offices is not necessarily representative of the body of refugees 
awaiting resettlement. As observed in section 3.6, between 2012 and 2017, SAH-sponsored 
refugee cases processing in certain visa offices was restricted by sub-caps. The visa offices 
                                                   
12 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The PSR QA Project: Managing Quality Counts” (2011). 
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affected by the measure included Islamabad, Nairobi, Cairo, and Pretoria.13 As pointed out 
previously, the sub-caps disproportionately affected refugees from sub-Saharan Africa. It was 
nonetheless interesting to note that, despite the sub-caps, those four visa offices remained the 
top four visa offices in terms of both cases refused and cases judicially reviewed during the 
study period. 
                                                   
13 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation Division, “Evaluation of the Resettlement 
Programs (GAR, BVOR, PSR and RAP)” (July 2016). 
	171	
	
CHAPTER 5 ASSESSING VISA OFFICER DECISION-MAKING 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Determining refugee status is considered one of the most difficult and complex adjudication 
tasks facing administrative decision-makers. Writing on Canada’s inland refugee determination 
system, Cécile Rousseau et al explain that this complexity 
stems from the need of the decision-maker to have sufficient knowledge of the 
cultural, social, and political environment of the country of origin, a capacity to 
bear the psychological weight of hearings where victims recount horror stories, 
and of consequent decisions which may prove fatal, and an ability to deal with 
legal issues such as the subtle international definition of the refugee or the 
procedures of quasi-judicial hearings involving various pieces of evidence.1 
 
 
In the overseas program, the task facing decision-makers is arguably more difficult. Visa 
officers arrive at their decision without detailed arguments from counsel, and process a larger 
caseload. Visa officers also lack the in-depth training and resources provided to IRB members. 
As compared with the inland refugee system, few overseas refugee cases are reviewed by the 
Federal Court, and the program receives very little outside scrutiny. Under such circumstances, 
shortcomings in decision-making can easily develop and persist. In section 3.9, I have provided 
an overview of concerns expressed by civil society organizations and government over the 
quality of decision-making in the overseas refugee program. In this chapter, I present the results 
of a detailed analysis of visa officer decision-making in the 403 cases comprising the dataset. I 
begin this analysis with an overview of the core characteristics of the dataset, including the type 
of application, processing times, country of origin and country of asylum, visa officer and visa 
offices, gender and family composition, as well as grounds for application and refusal. This is 
                                                   
1 Cécile Rousseau et al, “The Complexity of Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the 




followed by an analysis of procedural shortcomings I have identified in the cases, including 
language matters, the treatment of vulnerable applicants, problematic interview conduct and visa 
officer bias, the issue of documenting decisions, and delays in assessing cases. The next section 
addresses trends in more substantive areas of decision-making: the treatment of gender-based 
claims, the assessment of personal evidence and country documents, the assessment of local 
integration, the assessment of successful establishment, the assessment of inadmissibility, and, 
finally, credibility and plausibility determinations. In the last section of this chapter, I will 
present a few recommendations that would in my view contribute to increasing the quality of 
decision-making in the overseas refugee system. 
 
5.2 Overview of refugee applications 
i) Type of application 
The dataset includes 403 discrete applications. However, many of the 403 judicial review 
applications involved multiple linked “principal applicants” who were grouped together for the 
purpose of judicial review. In total, 492 separate principal applicants are represented in the 
dataset. The 403 judicial review applications cases also include four mandamus applications i.e., 
applications for an order compelling the government to make a decision in a particular case 
where no decision had yet been made. Three hundred and ninety-three (393) applications were 
identified as PSR applications (475 principal applicants). One of these applications was 
identified as a mandamus application. During the same period, 10 judicial review applications 
(17 principal applicants) in the GAR stream were initiated. Two of those cases were mandamus 























393 97.52% 475 1 10 2.48% 17 9 
† Principal applicant equivalent 
 
Amongst the 393 privately sponsored cases, 224 were sponsored by a SAH (57.00%);2 138 were 
sponsored by a Group of Five (35.11%);3 and one (1) was sponsored by a Community Sponsor 
(0.25%). In 30 of the privately-sponsored cases (7.63%), it was impossible to determine the type 
of sponsor. In most of these cases, the application had not been perfected and there was no 
decision in the court record. In the case of the SAH-sponsored applications, it was often 
impossible to determine whether the sponsorship involved a co-sponsor or a constituent group, 
and, as a result, that data point was not coded. 
TABLE 5.2 - TYPE OF SPONSOR 
Type of Sponsor # of 
cases 
% of dataset 
SAH (with or without 
constituent group / co-sponsor 
224 57.00% 
Group of Five 138 35.11% 
Community Sponsor 1 0.25% 
Unknown 30 7.63% 
Total 393 100% 
 
ii) Cases per year and processing times 
The table below shows that the number of cases filed in the Federal Court each year ranged 
from a low of 59 cases in 2013 to a high of 106 cases in 2015. Taking into consideration the 




                                                   
2 This includes sponsorships conducted through a “personne morale” or a “persone morale + individu” in 
Quebec. 




TABLE 5.3 - JR APPLICATIONS PER YEAR 






All years 403 
 
It is noteworthy that processing times during this period were quite lengthy. It was possible to 
determine the delay between the date of reception of the application at the visa office and the 
date the final decision was issued in 189 cases (185 PSR cases & 4 GAR cases - 46.90% of all 
applications). The delays do not include any time required for in-Canada processing of PSR 
applications, which can add a number of months to the process.4 The average processing time 
for PSR cases was 1,092 days (3 days shy of 3 years) and the median PSR processing times was 
1,016 days (2 years, 9 months and 16 days). The processing times for PSR cases ranged from 74 
days to 3,353 days (9 years, two months, and 17 days). Eighteen PSR cases (9.73% of the PSR 
cases surveyed) took over 5 years to process. Interestingly, the 4 GAR cases had a higher 
average processing time than PSR cases (1,711 days).5 Within PSR cases, there was a steady 
increase in average processing times over the study period, from a low of 678 days in 2010 to a 
high of days in 1,353 in 2015. These processing times for PSR cases in this dataset closely 





                                                   
4 In-Canada processing is especially lengthy for Groups of Five. IRCC notes that only 5% of Groups of Five 
sponsorship applications are accepted upon initial submission, and that Groups of Five applications are 
returned to the sponsor on average three times before it is accepted (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship 
Canada, Evaluation Division, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs (GAR, BVOR, PSR and RAP)” (July 
2016) at para 6.2.5 [Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs]). 
5 This is interesting because GAR cases are normally processed faster than PSR cases (ibid at 5.5.2). 
6 IRCC’s evaluation reported that 80% of PSR cases were processed within 36 months in 2010 and 54 months 




TABLE 5.4 - AVERAGE PROCESSING TIME (PSR CASES) 











iii) Country of origin and country of asylum 
There were 18 countries of origin represented in the dataset. Four countries accounted for more 
than 75% of the cases: Afghanistan (137 cases - 34%), Somalia (74 cases - 18%), Eritrea (57 
cases - 14%), and Sri Lanka (47 cases - 12%). It was impossible to determine the country of 
origin in 11 cases. The diversity in terms of third country was greater, with 37 countries in total. 
Pakistan was by far the most frequent third country with 106 cases – 26%. It was impossible to 






















                                                   
7 Weighted average. 
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TABLE 5.5 - COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN 
 














































A clear trend in terms of flight path was apparent in two notable cases: 102 of the 137 Afghan 
applicants in the dataset sought refuge in Pakistan (74.45%) and 35 of the 47 Sri Lankan 
applicants sought refuge in India (74.47%).8 
 
iv) Visa offices and visa officers 
The location of the processing visa office does not map perfectly over the countries of asylum, 
as many visa offices are responsible for processing applications from multiple countries. There 
were 24 separate visa offices represented in the dataset, with 6 visa offices being responsible for 
more than 75% of all applications (Islamabad, Nairobi, Cairo, Pretoria, New Delhi, and 
Moscow). 
TABLE 5.7 - PROCESSING VISA OFFICES 
 
It was interesting to note that some visa offices were much more likely than others to have their 
refusals challenged in court. Among visa offices with 40 or more PSR refusals in 2011-2015, 
                                                   



























the likelihood of a refugee refusal being challenged in judicial review varied from 17,07% 
(Ankara) to 0% (London, England).9 










Ankara 41 7 17.07% 
Amman 58 9 15.52% 
Accra 72 11 15.28% 
New Delhi 243 35 14.40% 
Moscow 268 34 12.69% 
Islamabad 943 108 11.45% 
Abu Dhabi 100 11 11.00% 
Singapore 121 13 10.74% 
Cairo 503 41 8.15% 
Damascus 54 4 7.41% 
Rome 69 5 7.25% 
Pretoria 603 39 6.47% 
Nairobi 1,975 68 3.44% 
Beirut 175 4 2.29% 
London England 45 0 0 
All included offices 5270 389 7.38% 
 
It was not always possible to determine the identity of the visa officer. The signature of the 
deciding visa officer was almost always illegible in decision letters, and the typed “name” under 
the signature almost invariably read “Immigration Officer”, or a similar anonymous title. In the 
visa officer notes also, the identity of the visa officer was not clearly indicated. Identifying the 
visa officer was especially difficult in cases processed under the GCMS system. In some cases, 
a code was used to identify the visa officer. In other cases, no visa officer is identified by code. 
In addition, Federal Court decisions only mention the visa officer by name in exceptional cases. 
As a result, I have only conducted one analysis that relies on the identity of the visa officer.10 
 
                                                   
9 The disparity between visa offices remains even when taking into consideration the proportion of cases 
decided in 2015 that may have been judicially reviewed in 2016. 
10 See section 5.4.7. 
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v) Gender and family composition 
The gender of the principal applicant was apparent on the record in the vast majority of cases. 
Three hundred seventeen (317) principal applicants were identified as male (66.74%), while 158 
were identified as female (33.26%). In the majority of cases involving a married couple, the 
husband was designated as the principal applicant. The presence or absence of dependents was 
apparent on the record in 378 cases. One hundred and thirty-six cases (35.98%) proceeded with 
a single applicant, while 242 included dependents (64.02%). Female principal applicants were 
slightly more likely to proceed without dependents than male principal applicants (40.54% 
compared to 35.68%). Almost invariably, female principal applicants with dependants were 
single mothers. 
 
5.3 Overview of application and refusal grounds 
i) Application grounds 
I was able to determine the type of risk being alleged in 366 cases. Identifying risk grounds was 
not always straightforward. Applicants proceed without a lawyer and do not typically frame 
their narrative in terms of regulatory eligibility criteria. It also seems that visa officers - at least 
in the case of rejected applications - do not always categorize the type of risk they are assessing 
in terms of eligibility criteria. In addition, most applications in the dataset involved more than 
one ground of persecution or risk described in the Country of Asylum Class. For example, in the 
vast majority of claims from Sri Lankan nationals, the risk feared was linked to both civil war 
and race. Similarly, the majority of claims from Afghan nationals involved a variety of grounds 
including civil war, and persecution based on religion, race and gender. The Country of Asylum 
ground “seriously and personally massive violations of human rights” was quite difficult to 
code, as it was essentially ignored as a standalone ground by visa officers, or blended into 
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Convention persecution grounds. 
TABLE 5.9 - APPLICATIONS GROUNDS 
Ground # of cases % of cases11 
Affected by civil war 196 53.55% 
Political opinion 114 31.15% 
Religion 96 26.23% 
Race 94 25.38% 
PSG - woman 58 15.85% 
PSG - clan or tribe 34 9.29% 
PSG - family member 20 5.46% 
Nationality 12 3.29% 




ii) Grounds for refusal 
The grounds for refusal were identifiable in 393 cases.12 In the vast majority of cases, multiple 
grounds for refusal were invoked by the visa officer. Credibility was by far the most common 
ground for refusal, cited in over half of the decided cases. 
TABLE 5.10 - GROUNDS OF REFUSAL 
Ground # of cases % of cases13 
Credibility 198 50.38% 
Durable solution - repatriation 86 21.88% 
Durable solution - integration 63 16.03% 
No nexus to a Convention ground 63 16.03% 
“Does not reside in country of application” 46 11.70% 
No objective basis for fear 45 11.15% 
Identity not established 36 9.16% 
No subjective fear 27 6.87% 
Inadmissibility 15 3.82% 
Failed to attend interview/submit forms 9 2.29% 
Internal flight alternative (IFA) 7 1.78% 
Successful establishment 7 1.78% 
Settlement in third country 3 0.76% 
 
It was interesting to note that some grounds for refusal correlated strongly to particular refugee 
populations and particular countries of asylum. For example, the vast majority of Sri Lankan 
and Afghan applicants were found to be able to repatriate to their country of origin, whereas the 
                                                   
11 Among the 366 cases where an application ground was apparent. 
12 The refusal ground was unclear in 6 cases, in addition to the 4 cases where judicial review was launched 
before the case was decided (mandamus cases). 
13 Among the 393 cases where a refusal ground was apparent. 
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vast majority of applicants in South Africa were found to have locally integrated in their country 
of asylum. 
 
5.4 Trends in decision-making 
This section presents a detailed qualitative assessment of problematic trends identified in visa 
officer decisions, divided between “procedural matters” and “substantive matters.” In order to 
provide a rich context, the analyses make extensive reference to case file notes. The analyses 
also engage with both IRCC and UNHCR guidelines. While the overall role of judicial review is 
addressed in greater detail in chapter 6, Federal Court pronouncements on cases that have been 
decided on the merits will be examined. Throughout this section, I also present some 
quantitative data related to the frequency of certain elements in the dataset. I reiterate here that 
my dataset is not a representative sample of the body of refugee cases decided during the study 
period, and that therefore this study makes no claim as to the prevalence of certain elements 
within the wider body of cases. 
 
 
5.4.1 Procedural matters 
5.4.1.1 Language 
Difficulties around language contribute to making refugee status determination an extremely 
challenging adjudicative task.14 The quasi-totality of interviews were conducted through an in-
person interpreter. Interpreters do much more than simply transfer meaning from one language 
to another, they are mediators of culture. Much “cultural content” can get lost in the 
                                                   
14 See Audrey Macklin, “Asylum and the Rule of Law in Canada: Hearing the Other (Side)” in Susan 
Kneebone, ed, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 78 at 85; Laura Smith-Khan, “Different in the Same Way? Language, 




Because of the close links between language and culture, however, even 
excellent translators fulfill this task only when they attempt to communicate in 
their translations the cultural context of words and concepts. Interpreters used in 
the asylum procedure often not only lack this sophistication; sometimes they are 
also not qualified or they make mistakes because of fatigue resulting from a 
lengthy hearing. All this may distort the communication between asylum-seeker 
and refugee. Of special importance is a structural problem created by the 
necessity of using interpreters.15 
 
 
It appears that practices around the use of interpreters may vary depending on the visa office. 
CIC’s processing manual states that visa officers should preferably use visa office employees as 
interpreters, although UNHCR staff, or friends and family members of an applicant can be used 
if necessary.16 The manual also provides that visa officers should be sensitive to the importance 
of using female interpreters with female applicants,17 and includes the following directions for 
assessing the fluency and impartiality of the interpreter: 
The officer must be completely satisfied that every interpreter is fully fluent in 
the languages of both the interviewer and the applicant, and that the translation is 
correct and free of bias. 
 
If at any time the officer is not satisfied that an interpreter is translating 
accurately, the officer should verify their suspicion by rephrasing the answers 
that have raised doubts, and ask the applicant to confirm that the officer has 
understood correctly. If necessary, identify another interpreter or reschedule the 
interview. 
 
The officer should also advise applicants to tell them at any point during the 
interview if there is anything that they do not understand or if there are any other 
difficulties.18 
 
                                                   
15 Walter Kalin, “Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-Hearing” 
(1986) 20:2 Intl Migr Rev 230 at 233. See also Smith-Khan, ibid, at 394. 
16 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “OP 5: Overseas Selection and Processing of Convention Refugees 
Abroad Class and Members of the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad Classes” Manual (2009) at para 
11.4 [“Overseas Selection and Processing”].  




The manual also cautions against being overly zealous in looking for inconsistencies in an 
applicant’s testimony, especially where the applicant is speaking through an interpreter.19 The 
manual clearly states that visa officers should “not trust an interpreter who may come from a 
rival ethnic or tribal group.”20 
 
It is important to note that, while an interpreter is provided at interviews, applicants receive no 
assistance in completing application forms, which must be completed in English or French. 
Applicants not fluent in these languages, and those who are illiterate, often rely on family 
members, friends or neighbors to translate and transcribe their refugee narrative. Some rely on 
third-party translation services. Errors can easily arise in the process.  
 
Language was identified as having played a problematic role in 29 cases. In 15 cases, 
interpretation issues at the interview appears to have hindered the communication between the 
visa officer and the applicant. In a further 17 cases, the applicant, being either illiterate or not 
fluent in English, had relied on someone else to complete the forms, and for that reason may not 
have been fully aware of what was stated in the written application.21 In the pages that follow, I 
summarize 13 such cases and discuss both the impact of language barriers on the administration 
of the resettlement program and potential avenues to minimize language barriers.  
 
i) Interpretation 
IMM-4531-11 involves, ironically, a young Afghan man who had worked as an interpreter with 
Canadian and American forces in Afghanistan. After an Islamic group began suspecting his 
                                                   
19 Ibid at para 13.1. 
20 Ibid at para 11.1. 
21 Some cases presented a problem with regard to both forms and interpretation. 
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involvement, he fled with his family to Tajikistan. The visa officer found both that they lacked 
credibility, and that they could locally integrate in Tajikistan. With regard to credibility, the visa 
officer took issue with the fact that the applicant had not informed his superiors about his 
problems with the Islamic group. The decision letter reads: 
You were interviewed with the assistance of an interpreter fluent in English and 
Dari. You did not indicate that you had any difficulty in understanding the 
translator or in having the translator understand you. 
 
The applicants’ affidavit submitted on judicial review, however, tells an entirely different story. 
They explain that the interpreter did not speak Dari but a “Tajik Persian slang” that was partly 
unrecognizable to them. They stated that they raised their concerns with the visa officer, who 
told them to simply ask the interpreter to repeat the questions if there was a problem. The visa 
officer also refused the applicants’ request for their son - who had worked as a Dari-English 
interpreter - to act as the interpreter during the interview. Leave in this judicial review 
application was granted unopposed, and the case was eventually settled. 
 
IMM-5037-15 is the case of a Hazara Afghan man who fled to Pakistan with his four children 
after his wife was killed in a rocket attack. The visa officer rejected the application on the basis 
that the applicants had repatriated to Afghanistan, and were not residing in Pakistan. As with the 
previous case, the visa officer stated: “You did not indicate that you had any difficulty in 
understanding the interpreter or in having the interpreter understand you.” In their affidavit 
submitted in judicial review, however, the applicants explain that the interpreters (there were 
two interpreters) were ethnic Pashtuns or Tajiks and had limited abilities in the Dari language. 
The applicant stated that he has an intermediate level of English, and he was aware at the 
interview that certain terms were not being correctly translated. The applicant further stated in 
his affidavit that he made this known to the visa officer and even attempted to communicate 
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directly with her in English. The applicants also noted in their affidavit that the interpreter was 
Pashtun, and that Pashtuns are long-time enemies of the Hazara. They argued that the 
inadequate interpretation may have resulted from the interpreter’s bias against them. In this 
case, too, leave was granted unopposed, and the application was settled. 
 
IMM-4927-11 is the case of an Afghan family that fled to Tajikistan during the Taliban regime. 
In this case, the visa officer concluded that the applicants did not fear persecution in 
Afghanistan, but rather did not want to return due to general instability. Shortly after the refusal, 
the applicant’s sponsor wrote to the visa office requesting reconsideration for the following 
reasons: 
… it seems that the family did have problems with the interpreter. They thought 
something was not being translated correctly, and questioned the person 
translating for them. The interpreter told them to “be quiet… quit complaining… 
and not to say anything negative about their situation”. 
 
This case was denied leave at the Federal Court. 
 
In IMM-3863-13, an Eritrean man of Pentecostal faith claimed that he had escaped Eritrea after 
having been detained and beaten by state authorities because of his religion. The application was 
rejected on credibility grounds. The visa officer states in his reasons: 
Unwilling to provide more detail. Subject is reticent and did not provide any 
details even when asked. It was very difficult to extract information. ... Because 
the applicant is unwilling or unable to provide any details concerning his refugee 
claim, I have questions as to his credibility. I would expect him to be able to 
provide details to substantiate his story. 
 
The judicial review application suggests that inadequate interpretation is what caused the 
applicant to be unable to provide the full details of his claim. The applicant indicated in his 
application that he required interpretation in Tigrinya. However, the interview notes show that 
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the visa officer began the interview with the wrong file, that of an Ethiopian applicant. The 
interpreter present at the interview was not a Tigrinya interpreter, but an Amharic interpreter, an 
official language of Ethiopia. After the mistake was discovered, the officer proceeded with the 
correct file, but never asked the applicant if he needed an interpreter in another language. As the 
applicant did not speak Amharic, he answered the visa officer’s question in English, a language 
he barely spoke. This case was granted leave and judicial review was granted on consent. 
 
IMM-2716-13 is the case of a Somalian woman who fled to Saudi Arabia with her children after 
her husband was killed by members of Al-Shabab. The case was refused because the visa officer 
found that they would not be at risk in Somalia and instead left for economic reasons. The 
interview took place using “3-way interpretation.” An interpreter provided translation from 
English to Arabic, while the principal applicant’s son translated from Arabic to Somali. The 
applicants stated in their affidavit that this method of interpretation led to various 
misunderstandings. The Federal Court found that this did not amount to a breach of procedural 
fairness because the applicants had not requested that the interpreter be replaced.22 
 
In IMM-4782-15, an Afghan, Shia Ismaili family claimed that they would suffer persecution in 
Afghanistan because of their religion and ethnicity. The visa officer believed that they were not 
residing in Pakistan but had returned to Afghanistan. In addition, the visa officer made a number 
of negative credibility findings. One of these was based on the fact that the principal applicant’s 
employment card contained a “POR number.” This was found to be inconsistent with the 
applicant’s statement that he was never issued a POR card:  
                                                   
22 Mohamed v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 192. 
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Your employment card has a POR number EC-311-0063922? Can you explain? 
It is a mistake. Why would the employer put a POR number on your card? Do 
not know maybe someone put it there. … 
His employment card has a POR number on it. PA cannot explain. 
 
As with some of the above cases, the visa officer wrote in the decision letter that the applicants 
had not indicated that they had problems with the interpretation. However, the principal 
applicant’s son, who has a basic understanding of English, stated in his affidavit to the Federal 
court that he objected to the interpretation on numerous occasions during the interview. He 
stated that his father’s answer with regard to the POR card was not properly translated: 
Another incident occurred when my father was asked about why a POR card 
number was recorded on my father’s employment Card even though he testified 
that he had no POR card. My father explained to the Officer that he did not have 
a POR card or POR card number. One of his supervisors was a fellow Afghan 
and in order to help my father get the job he recorded his own POR card number 
on my father’s employment card. The interpreter summarized the explanation in 
one sentence stating “It is not my card number.” Again I objected to the 
translation and told the Officer in English that the interpreter was not giving the 
full explanation. Again she did not confront the interpreter on the issue, and told 
me not to interrupt. 
 
This case was granted leave by the Federal Court (unopposed) and ultimately settled. 
 
The above cases confirm that the interview process is fertile ground for linguistic 
misunderstandings. The interpreters provided are not necessarily professionals, and it can be 
difficult to find interpreters in certain dialects in certain regions. What is troubling is that it 
appears that visa officers consistently use boilerplate text in their decision indicating that the 
applicant did not complain about the quality of the interpretation, regardless of whether such 
observation was actually made during the interview. 
 
ii) The challenge of completing forms 
Literacy poses significant problems in refugee and immigration proceedings. The Council of 
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Canadian Administrative Tribunal reports: 
Citizenship and immigration is an area of administrative law where literacy and 
the understanding of law presents a daily challenge. Matters coming before 
immigration boards and tribunals involving the issue of literacy are often in the 
context of citizenship requirements - namely, the applicant’s knowledge of the 
official language, as well as knowledge of Canada and the responsibilities and 
privileges of citizenship. Similarly, low literacy presents an obstacle for 
individuals required to complete potentially complex and confusing 
documentation in a clear and accurate manner.23 
 
The data shows that many applicants had difficulty completing the forms, and that omissions in 
the written forms and inconsistencies between the forms and the interview testimony are a 
frequent basis of refusal in refugee claims. Illiterate applicants, and those speaking neither 
English nor French, must rely on third parties to translate and transcribe their refugee narratives. 
Translation can be of poor quality, inaccurate or incomplete. Applicants who rely on third-party 
translation are also exposing themselves to potentially fraudulent services. Even for applicants 
who have the language abilities to complete forms themselves, it can be difficult to determine 
the level of detail required. 
 
In IMM-1481-15, a Tamil family from Sri Lanka stated at the interview that they fled their 
country because their sons were being targeted to join the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE). They stated that LTTE members had come to the family home on numerous occasions. 
The visa officer faulted the principal applicant for not mentioning these visits in the forms. The 
applicant replied that he had provided the information to his son in Canada, who omitted to 
include them in the written translation. The visa officer notes include the following exchange: 
Who wrote this narrative? I told my son in Canada and he wrote it. … 
                                                   
23 Council of Canadian Administrative Tribunals, “Literacy and Access to Administrative Justice in Canada: 




Why is there no mention that the LTTE came to your house so frequently and, as 
you state, forcing your sons to join? I did mention. … I told them that but I don’t 
know what happened in the translation. 
Your son in Canada wrote this? I sent my Tamil script to my son and I don’t 
know if he translated himself or gave to someone else. … 
So why is it not in the narrative? I wrote everything, don’t know what went 
wrong with translation. 
 
The judicial review application was not perfected. 
 
IMM-6857-11 concerns a family that fled Somalia. The principal applicant stated at the 
interview that his father, his mother, and his two brothers were killed because of armed fighting. 
He also stated that he was detained by a militia for a month and freed after his aunt paid off his 
captors. While testimony provided by the other applicants confirmed these events, the visa 
officer took issue with the fact that the written forms indicated that the principal applicant had 
been detained one year (not one month), and the forms did not mention the role played by his 
aunt in his escape.24 On judicial review, the applicant argued that the discrepancies were due to 
poor translation made by a man who spoke hardly any Somali. Indeed, the visa officer notes 
indicate the following: 
… who helped you fill out your application form? A Somali man who lived here 
for so long who also knows a little Somali and that time I didn’t speak good 
English. 
 
This case was granted leave but refused on the merits. The court rejected the above argument 
because the applicant had not voiced this concern at the interview. 
 
In IMM-6677-14, an Afghan family told the visa officer that they fled to Russia after a 
commander demanded to marry their daughter and threatened to kill the principal applicant. The 
                                                   




family also stated that they were beaten and faced persecution because of their Hazara ethnicity. 
The case notes indicate that the visa officer questioned at length the principal applicant about his 
military service and his political involvement. The visa officer initially made a positive 
determination in the case, but three weeks later sent a procedural fairness letter to the applicant 
requesting updated Schedule A forms. The visa officer wrote: 
Please note that for the “Personal History” and “Addresses” sections, you must 
provide details from the age of 18 (disregard the part about the 10 year limit). 
There must be no gaps (even a month long). 
 
The applicant sent updated forms, but these were also considered inadequate by the visa officer 
because a few months were missing from the personal history. A second procedural fairness 
letter was sent to the applicant. The second set of updated forms were also deemed inadequate, 
and the case was rejected. The rejection letter states that because of the missing months, the visa 
officer is “not satisfied that you and your dependents are not inadmissible under the Act.”25 On 
judicial review, the principal applicant outlined in his affidavit that he had difficulty 
understanding what was requested of him because he does speak English. He indicated that after 
attempting to translate the email in Dari using Google, he contacted a friend who had helped the 
family complete the original application. This friend prepared a new Schedule A form by hand, 
relying on information the applicant was providing. The applicant stated that the friend never 
mentioned that months were missing from his personal history. The case was denied leave. 
 
IMM-3505-12 concerns an Afghan family that fled to Pakistan. At the interview, the principal 
applicant stated that he had been beaten, jailed, and tortured by the Taliban, and that the Taliban 
had killed his son. The visa officer noted during the interview that in the written forms the 
principal applicant had not mentioned the death of his son or the abuse he endured at the hands 
                                                   
25 This problematic type of conclusion on inadmissibility will be reviewed later in section 5.4.6. 
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of the Taliban. In response, the principal applicant’s daughter told the visa officer that her father 
is illiterate and that he did not complete the forms himself. She said that her father had signed a 
blank form, which was then completed by family friends in Canada who asked questions to the 
applicants by telephone. Ultimately, the visa officer rejected the application, partly because of 
the credibility issues resulting from this inconsistency. This case was granted leave and judicial 
review was granted by Justice Manson, who found that the credibility finding was unreasonable: 
The Officer’s negative credibility finding is, at first blush, reasonable, given the 
fact that the PA first raised the allegations of having been jailed, beaten, tortured 
and extorted by the Taliban and that the Taliban had killed his son at the 
interview and had not mentioned these serious claims on his application form for 
permanent residence. While it seemed reasonable for the Officer to reject the 
PA’s and dependents’ explanation that the PA had signed a blank form and that 
the form was completed over the telephone by friends in Canada who were co-
sponsoring the family. (SIC) … However, and most importantly, given the fact 
that the Officer did not mention the interviewees’ explanation that the PA is 
illiterate, and that the PA’s son in Canada is illiterate, it was unreasonable for the 
Officer to ignore that part of the explanation. The Officer erred in this regard.26 
 
 
In IMM-1852-12 and IMM-1854-12, two Eritrean cousins had fled to Sudan. Both had been 
detained after attempting to evade national service. They were detained at the same camp and 
escaped around the same time. The visa officer took issue with the fact that their written forms 
contained identical wording. In response, one applicant state that they had a nearly identical 
experience, and that the similarities in wording were due to the fact that they had relied on the 
same person to complete the forms: 
The person who wrote the testimony was one person, we gave him our story and 
in his own way he wrote. We each have our own experience, the person writing 
our story was the same person. Because we can’t write, everybody tells him their 
story, even my cousin told him, and the person wrote the story you read now. 
 
Neither case was perfected on judicial review. 
                                                   




In IMM-8334-14, a young Ethiopian woman applied for resettlement in Kenya. In her 
application, it was written that her father had been abducted for perceived sympathy toward the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and that her mother was killed by members of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front. The forms also indicated that she was detained by 
state authorities on suspicions of hiding OLF documents, and that during detention, she was 
raped and forced to cook and clean. The visa officer rejected the case on credibility grounds for 
the sole reason that the dates of detention indicated in the forms (March 5, 2010 to April 20, 
2010) did not match the dates mentioned at the interview (April 20, 2010 to May 4, 2010). When 
confronted with the discrepancy, she explained that the person who she hired to write the forms 
must have made a mistake: 
Why the discrepancy? Maybe the person who wrote it made a mistake. But who 
gave them the information? I did. Who wrote the information? I don’t know. I 
couldn’t write it so somebody who could English wrote it. … 
PA responded that she didn’t know why the dates were different. She stated that 
she didn’t understand why he would have written that, that maybe she didn’t pay 
him enough. 
 
At the Federal Court, Justice Fothergill considered that the visa officer’s credibility assessment 
was reasonable and rejected the judicial review.27 
 
There is ample evidence in the dataset indicating that completing the forms can be exceptionally 
challenging for refugee applicants. They are often unable to complete the forms themselves, and 
are unable to verify the accuracy of the statements made in their name. Inconsistencies and 
omissions are often fatal to an application. I am not suggesting here that it is improper for visa 
officers to draw negative conclusions from inconsistencies or omissions. As I explain further 
                                                   
27 Hamdiya Kasim Abdella v Canada (MCI) (14 October 2015), IMM-8334-14 (FC). 
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below, I do believe however that visa officers should exercise caution in this regard.  
 
iii) Bridging the language gap 
The above cases show that language barriers can seriously impair an applicant’s ability to 
present her case to the deciding visa officer. Language difficulties can develop at two critical 
stages of the application process - the in-person interview and the drafting of the forms. It 
appears that visa officers are not always sensitive to the language barriers facing applicants. In 
this section, I want to discuss steps that could be undertaken to minimize such barriers, 
beginning with interpretation. 
 
I want to acknowledge here that, because visa officer interviews are not recorded, it can be 
difficult to assess the validity of claims made by applicants on judicial review regarding the 
accuracy of interpretation. It is also worth noting that, on judicial review, the bar for quashing 
decisions based on inadequate interpretation is quite high. The court will only intervene on 
matters of inadequate interpretation if the applicant voiced his or her concern to the decision-
maker. For example, in IMM-2716-13, described above, the Federal Court refused the 
applicant’s argument about interpretation because he had not mentioned it to the visa officer. 
This raises an obvious question: how can an applicant who does not speak English or French be 
expected to notice inaccuracies in interpretation during the interview? Normally, inaccuracies 
will only be noticed if the visa officer notes are scrutinized after the fact. Nevertheless, it is 
telling that in the vast majority of the cases cited above, the judicial review was either settled or 
granted on consent, which suggests that government lawyers gave credence to the statements 




At minimum, IRCC should take further steps to ensure that interpretation is provided by a 
competent interpreter who speaks not only the language of the applicant, but her particular 
dialect. IRCC directs visa officers to avoid using an interpreter from a rival group. This policy 
should be applied with more consistency. I acknowledge that finding interpreters can be 
challenging, especially if the language spoken by the applicant is infrequently spoken in that 
particular area. Nevertheless, guidelines to assess the competency of interpreters should be 
strengthened and applied consistently. Three-way interpretation should never occur, and family 
members should be allowed to provide interpretation if the applicants so request. Applicants are 
the best judges of whether an interpreter is fluent in their language. If there is any doubt as to 
whether the interpretation is adequate, the interview should be postponed until an appropriate 
interpreter can be found. Finally, IRCC should implement systematic audio recording of 
interviews. This would not only allow for accurate post facto assessments of whether the 
applicant’s testimony was accurately translated, it would also provide visa officers with a useful 
tool to review interviews. 
 
With regard to the written forms, the cases reviewed indicate that many applicants do not have 
first-hand knowledge of what is written. Applicants typically rely on friends, family members, 
neighbours, or their sponsor in Canada to complete the forms with information they provide 
orally. It can be difficult for applicants to determine the level of detail to include in the written 
forms. Question 3a) in IMM0008 Schedule 2 requests the following information: 
Set out in chronological order all the significant incidents that caused you to 
seek protection outside your home country. You should include any action taken 
against you, your family members or any other individuals in a similar situation. 
 
The answer box for question 3a) includes only 5 lines. The Refugee Sponsorship Training 
Program stresses that this is the most important section of the application, and that applications 
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should include a separate narrative detailing the applicant’s flight in as much detail as possible.28 
It is doubtful that applicants who do not benefit from pro bono legal help from Canadian 
lawyers know to provide additional information on a separate sheet. In any case, most applicants 
have no means to verify that the information is complete and accurate, yet they are often faulted 
for omissions and inconsistencies. Visa officers should exercise caution in drawing negative 
inferences from omissions or inconsistencies in the written forms where there is evidence that 
the applicant did not complete the forms herself. 
 
5.4.1.2 Vulnerable applicants 
Research in the medical sciences indicates that refugees and asylum seekers experience a high 
prevalence of mental disorders, especially posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and 
anxiety.29 Mental health disorders and cognitive deficits can pose challenges in refugee status 
assessments, where testimony, memory, and credibility play central roles. Janet Cleveland 
explains that mental health issues can affect a claimant’s ability to coherently present their case 
before a decision-maker: 
For example, a person who has experienced torture or rape may well have 
difficulty telling her story to the Board despite procedural adjustments. Her 
                                                   
28 Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, “Handbook for Sponsoring Groups - Chapter 5: The Refugee 
Forms” at 52 (November 2017), online (pdf): <rstp.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Chapter-5-The-Refugee-
Forms-NOV-2017-FIN.pdf>. 
29 Debbie C Hocking, Gerard A Kennedy & Suresh Sundram, “Mental Disorders in Asylum Seekers: The 
Role of the Refugee Determination Process and Employment” (2015) 203:1 J Nervous and Mental Disease 28 
at 28. See also Cécile Rousseau, Abdelwahed Mekki-Berrada & Sylvie Moreau, “Trauma and Extended 
Separation from Family among Latin American and African Refugees in Montreal” (2001) 64:1 Psychiatry 
40; Cécile Rousseau et al, “Appendix 11 - Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Evidence Review for Newly 
Arriving Immigrants and Refugees” (2011) 183:12 CMAJ 290; Rachel Kronick, “Mental Health of Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers: Assessment and Intervention” (2018) 63:5 Can J Psychiatry 290; Mina Fazel, Jeremy 
Wheeler & John Danesh, “Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees Resettled in Western 
Countries: A Systematic Review” (2005) 365:9467 Lancet 1309; Zachary Steel, Naomi Frommerb & Derrick 
Silove, “The Law and its Effects Failing to Understand: Refugee Determination and the Traumatized 
Applicant” (2004) 27 Intl J L & Psychiatry 511; Zachary Steel et al, “Association of Torture and Other 
Potentially Traumatic Events With Mental Health Outcomes Among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict 
and Displacement: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis” (2009) 32 J Am Med Association 537. 
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account may still be marred by inconsistencies, vagueness, omissions, late 
disclosure, apparent lack of emotion, or other characteristics that can easily be 
mistaken for signs of untruthfulness.30 
 
 
Trauma, in particular, can affect a person’s ability to recall life events.31 Masinda explains that 
victims of trauma can develop dissociative disorders that renders them unable of remembering, 
verbally at least, a traumatic event. They may at some point recover their memory of the event, 
but the memory may include false elements.32 Various theories have been put forward to explain 
the impact of trauma on memory, including information surcharge, coping mechanisms, and the 
lack of “detached sensitivity” required to form metaphorical thoughts.33 The UNHCR recognizes 
that decision-makers assessing refugee status must be sensitive to the mental health of asylum 
seekers and be prepared to adjust their decision-making strategy: 
207. It frequently happens that an examiner is confronted with an applicant 
having mental or emotional disturbances that impede a normal examination of his 
case. A mentally disturbed person may, however, be a refugee, and while his 
claim cannot therefore be disregarded, it will call for different techniques of 
examination.  
 
208. The examiner should, in such cases, whenever possible, obtain expert 
medical advice. … 
… 
                                                   
30 Janet Cleveland, “The Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: A Critical Overview” (2008) 25:2 Refuge 119 at 119. 
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210. It will, in any event, be necessary to lighten the burden of proof normally 
incumbent upon the applicant, and information that cannot easily be obtained 
from the applicant may have to be sought elsewhere… 
211. In examining his application, therefore, it may not be possible to attach the 
same importance as is normally attached to the subjective element of “fear”, 
which may be less reliable, and it may be necessary to place greater emphasis on 
the objective situation.34 
 
 
In various cases in the dataset, an applicant presented at the interview with apparent mental or 
physical disabilities. In my assessment, these impairments were not always adequately taken 
into account by the visa officer. In IMM-1792-13, for example, an Iraqi man who had fled to 
Syria was interviewed over video conference by a visa officer located in Beirut. He told the visa 
officer that a militia group had killed his two brothers, and that he himself had been shot by the 
militia because his brothers would not support the group. The notes of the visa officer indicate 
that he noticed immediately at the beginning of the interview that the applicant was mentally 
disabled: 
From outset of interview, it appeared that the PA was mentally disabled. He was 
having difficulties understanding the question: asked by the interpreter. PA 
would repeat the questions asked by interpreter and then respond in every case. 
 
Nevertheless, the visa officer rejected the case because of the applicant’s inability to recall 
relatively minor details, including details of his military service. For example, the visa officer 
faulted the applicant for not being able to recall the names of his superiors in the military. This 
case went unopposed by the respondent and was granted on consent before leave was decided. 
Sadly, the record indicates that the applicant disappeared in Syria two weeks after his interview 
in October 2013. 
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In the case above, the visa officer observed that the applicant suffered from a mental disability, 
but seems to not have adapted his expectation in terms of memory recall. There are other cases 
where visa officers failed to notice (or at least, fail to note in the file) even severe mental 
disability. In IMM-4049-14, a young Tamil woman from Sri Lanka fled to India. In her written 
application, she stated that Sri Lankan soldiers suspected her of being a supporter of the LTTE, 
and that they had detained her and sexually assaulted her. Her interview proceeded through 
video conference. During the interview, she gave a more general explanation of why she left, 
referring to current conditions in Sri Lanka. The visa officer (who was female) never referred to 
the written narrative and never asked the applicant about the experiences of sexual assault. She 
rejected the case stating that the applicant had not established “specific or personalized reasons 
for fearing return to Sri Lanka.” The applicant had also mentioned at the interview that her 
parents had disappeared during the war, but she was unable to explain to the visa officer what 
had happened to them or who exactly told her that they had died: 
She could not provide the year her parents disappeared, explain the 
circumstances of the disappearance, or provide the names of the persons who told 
her about the disappearance. It is reasonable to expect that a person would recall 
certain details of a significant life event, such as the disappearance of their 
parents. 
 
On judicial review, the applicant submitted a report by a mental health practitioner diagnosing 
her with a deficit in intellectual and social functioning. The report states that she has the mental 
capacity of a young child. It could be the case that the fact that the interview was held by video 
conference hindered the visa officer’s ability to assess the applicant. Nevertheless, it is troubling 
to imagine that a decision-maker would not notice such a significant impairment, and would 
fault the applicant for not being forthcoming about past sexual violence. At the Federal Court, 




Another notable case is IMM-3409-15. In that case, the visa officer asked the principal applicant 
if he had any “serious disease of mental disorder”, to which he replied “no.” However, the 
principal applicant’s son told the visa officer “My father has mental problems. He does not 
remember … It is not serious but because of shocks, he forgets things.” The son’s statement was 
dismissed and no accommodation was made. Ultimately, the visa officer rejected the application 
on credibility grounds because of the applicant’s inability to recall the name of the Mogadishu 
neighbourhood he lives in, and inconsistencies between the father’s recollection of certain 
details and his sons’. On judicial review, this case was granted leave and then discontinued. As 
will be further discussed in section 5.4.3, the visa officer’s conclusions in this case were, in 
addition, not supported by the evidence. 
 
In another case, IMM-7959-11, the notes indicate that the applicant repeatedly told the visa 
officer that “his head was no good.” The applicant in this case had witnessed his sister and 
father dying in a bombing. He also testified that his sister had been raped before the bombing. 
The visa officer found the applicant not credible because he did not know that another sister of 
his had also been raped (she was a separate applicant). The visa officer also faulted the applicant 
because it was indicated in the written forms that the applicant’s sister had died from the rape 
and not from the bombing: 
You said earlier head not good. What did you mean? Asked what happened about 
his father, he gets headaches; suffered from seeing his father die. I can’t find him 
credible as he is getting more dramatic and gesturing in a superficial way, and 
telling me he is not lying, he is telling me the truth. 
 
The judicial review application in this case was discontinued after a declaration by the 




In IMM-122-13, it was clear at the interview that the applicant suffered from hearing and/or 
anxiety problems and that he had trouble understanding the questions posed to him: 
PA had to have question clarified three times. … Clarifying with PA. … Repeat 
question. … PA doesn't seem to understand. …  wants me to repeat the question. 
… PA wants question repeated again. (Repeated question 3X). PA is agitated. … 
Repeat question pls. Repeated. … Interpreter must clarify. … PA’s behaviour is 
odd. … Have reviewed interview and appear that there were difficulties. 
 
During the interview, the visa officer made no attempt to inquire into the cause of the 
communication problems or clarify whether the applicant understood the interpreter. The visa 
officer refused the application on the grounds that the applicant had left not because of the civil 
war in Somalia, but because he was offered a sponsorship to come to Canada. The applicant’s 
sponsor requested that the case be reconsidered and confirmed that the applicant was hard of 
hearing and had difficulty hearing the interpreter. At the Federal Court, this case was denied 
leave. 
 
The five cases reviewed above tell us that resettlement applicants can present with a variety of 
physical and mental impairments, including intellectual deficits, memory problems, and hearing 
issues. In each of the reviewed cases, it appears that the applicants’ mental or physical state 
hindered their ability to present their case to the visa officer. An important finding is that visa 
officers in these cases made no effort to better understand the vulnerability of the applicants. 
Visa officers were not sensitive to these vulnerabilities and did not attempt to adapt the 
interview in light of the recognized impairments. Neither did they adapt their expectations of 
memory and consistency. That is perhaps unsurprising. Beyond general statements in IRCC 
material that visa officers should be sensitive to “medical condition, age, or mental or 
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psychological incapacity”,35 my research has identified no guideline or directive to visa officers 
for the processing of vulnerable applicants other than fast-tracked processing,36 resorting to the 
Joint Assistance Program, 37  and exempting the applicant from the successful establishment 
criteria.38 The training materials reviewed do not cover vulnerable applicants either. It is worth 
noting that in 2006 the IRB issued a guideline with respect to vulnerable persons appearing 
before the IRB. The guideline recognizes that a person’s vulnerability may affect memory and 
behaviour, and therefore may cause them to provide inconsistent and incoherent testimony, and 
may also cause them to be reluctant or unable to talk about their experiences.39 The guideline 
states that the identification of vulnerability should be made early in the process so as to allow 
for procedural accommodations to be made.40  Possible procedural accommodations include 
proceeding by videoconference, allowing the participation of a support person, creating a more 
informal setting, varying the order of questioning, excluding non-parties from the hearing room, 
and “allowing any other procedural accommodations that may be reasonable in the 
circumstances.”41  It should be noted that empirical studies conducted in the inland context 
suggest that IRB members have a poor understanding of the impact of trauma on refugee 
claimants.42 In addition, Janet Cleveland writes that the IRB guideline fails to address the more 
substantive challenges faced by vulnerable claimants: 
The Guideline on Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing 
Before the IRB (Guideline 8) addresses only one of these issues, that of 
procedural adjustments designed to attenuate some of the difficulties faced by 
                                                   
35 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 11.5. 
36 Ibid at para 24. 
37 Ibid at paras 6.31, 15.4. 
38 Ibid at para 22.5. 
39 Immigration and Refugee Board, “Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons 
Appearing Before the IRB” (amended 15 December 2012) at para 4.1, online: <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-
policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir08.aspx> [“Vulnerable Persons”]. 
40 Ibid at para 5.1, 7. 
41 Ibid at para 4.2. 
42 Rousseau et al, supra note 1; Masinda, supra note 31. 
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vulnerable persons during IRB procedures. Although a praiseworthy initiative, 
the Guideline therefore falls far short of responding to all the needs of vulnerable 
persons appearing before the IRB.43 
 
It is also worth pointing out that most inland claimants benefit from the advocacy of lawyers to 
identify and inform their vulnerable state in the context of their refugee claim. Overseas 
applicants do not. Ensuring that the vulnerability of overseas refugee applicants is properly 
taken into account would require the development and implementation of a policy that places 
some of the responsibility of identifying vulnerability on visa officers and more clearly 
articulates the substantive consequences of various types of impairment. 
 
5.4.1.3 Interview conduct and bias 
There were very few cases in the dataset where bias was apparent on the record or argued on 
judicial review. Allegations of bias are notoriously difficult to make out before a court. The 
legal test to be met a high one. In Committee for Justice and Liberty, the Supreme Court 
described the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias as: 
…what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and 
practically - and having thought the matter through - conclude. Would he think 
that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or 
unconsciously, would not decide fairly.44 
 
 
In the visa officer context, the Federal Court has sometimes adopted an even more stringent 
standard than that set out in Committee for Justice and Liberty. For example, in Au, Justice 
Nadon observed: 
Since visa officers do not act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, a test of bias 
similar to the test applied to judges or decision-makers acting judicially is not, in 
my view, appropriate. In my opinion, a less stringent test should be applied to 
                                                   
43 Cleveland, supra note 30 at 120. 
44 Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394. 
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visa officers, one which requires an absence of conflict of interest and a mind 
that is open to persuasion. … The visa officer represents the Minister, and 
therefore cannot be expected to be as impartial as a judge should be.45 
 
 
In addition, in the case of visa officer decision, because visa officer case notes are cursory and 
almost entirely produced by the deciding visa officer himself or herself, it can be extremely 
difficult for an applicant to produce evidence of objectionable conduct. In one case in the 
dataset, however, the biased behaviour of the visa officer was clear. It is worth here going into 
some of the details of the case because it provides a rare window into the interaction between 
visa officers on the ground and their superiors in Ottawa. The case also illustrates how easily 
decision-makers can err in their risk assessment, and how removal practices can place failed 
refugee claimants at a higher risk. 
 
IMM-610-12 concerns a Libyan family that had previously come to Canada in 2000 and made a 
refugee claim on arrival. Before the RPD, the principal applicant had claimed that he was at risk 
in Libya because of his brother’s activities as an opponent of the Gaddafi regime. The RPD 
accepted that the brother was an opponent of the regime, but determined that the principal 
applicant himself was not credible and would not be at risk in Libya. In 2008, removal 
proceedings were initiated, and the applicant submitted a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment 
application (PRRA). In support of his application, the applicant submitted new evidence that the 
Libyan police had issued an arrest warrant for him, as well as a report on his brother’s detention. 
The PRRA officer rejected the application, stating that the arrest warrant did not indicate 
specifically why the applicant was sought by Libyan authorities. The applicants were concerned 
                                                   
45 Au v Canada (MCI), [2001] FCJ No 435 at para 22. See also Horvat v Canada (MCI), [2003] FCJ No 354 
at paras 8-11. 
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that they would face an increased risk in Libya if they were to be identified as failed asylum 
seekers. They insisted on renewing their passport themselves and hoped that they would be able 
to travel as ordinary passengers. However, at the airport, CBSA officers delivered their 
passports directly to the flight crew, who then handed them over to Libyan authorities. As a 
result, the principal applicant was questioned immediately upon arrival, and sent to prison for 
several months. During his detention, he was tortured and questioned about his links to 
opponents of the Gaddafi regime. Subsequent to his release, the applicant learned that 
authorities were again looking for him. Through a bribe, the family obtained a European visa, 
and took a flight to Sweden, where they submitted a refugee claim. Their claim was not heard, 
however, and they were deported to Malta, the visa-issuing country, following the terms of the 
Dublin Regulations II. 46  In Malta, the family was able to secure counsel in Canada, who 
informed immigration officials of their situation and asked that they be brought to Canada, 
either as GARs or under humanitarian and compassionate considerations. What transpired 
afterwards is reminiscent of the facts in the landmark Baker case.47 The record shows that there 
was extensive communication between management officials, who were keen on accepting the 
case, and visa officer Beaulieu,48 who was adamant that the applicants not return to Canada. It is 
worth here quoting at length officer Beaulieu’s notes: 
I do not see what is Canada’s obligation this case, they were heard and the 
applicant[s] received the attention they deserved. A decision was made, they 
returned to L[iby]a and then decided after some time, on their own, to leave 
L[iby]a again for Sweden and are now in Malta. 
 
The other issue has to do with the four children, or at least one of them who 
appears to have a medical problem that may render him inadmissible. The two 
youngest children who are born in Canada are 10 and 8 years old. I note that the 
                                                   
46 Dublin II Regulation, EU Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003.  
47 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 [Baker]. 
48 The name of the visa officer was mentioned in the Federal Court decision, a rather unusual step, which 
perhaps reflects the court’s view of the conduct of the visa officer. 
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initial grouping of this family is 6 persons but the UNHCR has added the rest of 
the family (all other relatives living in Tripoli) 16 other individuals. … 
 
Both Adel Ben-Hmuda and his spouse Aisha Ben-Matug who was already in 
advance state of pregnancy, traveled to Canada as tourists on 4 July 2000 with 
two children Mohamed and Muawiya. … 
 
The family was removed from Canada on 12 August 2008. The applicant and his 
family spent 8 years in Canada at public expense. … 
 
The family hopes to gain entry to Canada by using the Canadian Citizenship of 
these two minor children, who because of their citizenship could not be 
considered refugee claimants. … 
 
I also note that Adel Ben-Hmuda declares suffering from diabetes and one son 
suffers from muscular dystrophy. It is likely that this family will be in need of 
social assistance and other social services. 
 
 
Before formally deciding the case, visa officer Beaulieu was transferred to another visa office 
and lost carriage over the file. The case was reassigned to a second visa officer, who travelled to 
Malta to interview the applicants. She rejected the case on the basis that the applicants had had 
full access to Canada’s refugee determination system, and that they were now asylum shopping 
because they would prefer to live in Malta rather than Canada. She also determined that the 
applicants would face no risk in Libya since, by then, the Gaddafi regime had been overthrown. 
 
Visa officer Beaulieu’s analysis, and that of the second visa officer, is riddled with factual 
errors, the most important of which is that the family’s reason for leaving Libya for a second 
time was not assessed by the RPD or the PRRA officer. Their claim for resettlement was 
founded on events that transpired after their return to Libya. In addition, as the Federal Court 
pointed out, there was no evidence that the applicants had stayed in Canada “at the public 
expense”, or that they would become a public charge if they returned to Canada. In any case, 
this was not a relevant consideration, as all resettlement applicants are exempted from 
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inadmissibility on the ground of causing excessive demand on health or social services. More 
importantly, the analysis of officer Beaulieu shows a troublesome attitude towards the 
applicants, a disposition toward gratuitous comments, and a lack of objectivity. The Federal 
Court found that the allegation of apprehension of bias had been made out and granted the 
judicial review. In her reasons, Justice Gleason highlighted the striking resemblance with the 
fact in the Baker case: 
In my view, this case is on all fours with Baker and, indeed, bears a striking 
similarity to many of the facts in that case. There, an officer, who was someone 
other than the officer who had decided Ms. Baker’s H&C application, compiled 
notes that the decision-maker reviewed before rendering the decision. These 
notes concluded that Ms. Baker would be a “tremendous strain” on the Canadian 
social welfare system for the rest of her life and mentioned her psychiatric 
condition, limited skills and training and number of children she had, using 
capital letters at several points for emphasis. … Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
concluded that a well-informed member of the community would perceive bias 
when reading the notes in Baker, which seemed to link Ms. Baker’s mental 
illness, her training as a domestic worker and the fact she had a number of 
children with the conclusion that she was likely to be a strain on the social 
welfare system. … 
 
An identical conclusion must be drawn in this case. … Officer Beaulieu’s emails 
reflect a similarly troubling tone and lack of objectivity, evidenced, for example, 
by his needless comments regarding Ms. Benmatug’s pregnancy and the 
comments regarding the number of members of the applicants’ extended family 
in Libya. … As in Baker, it is my view that a reasonable, well-informed member 
of the community would perceive bias in reading Officer Beaulieu's emails and 
therefore have a reasonable apprehension that the First Secretary did not have a 
mind that is open to persuasion.49 
 
 
Justice Gleason took the extraordinary step of ordering that the offending emails from officer 
Beaulieu be expunged from the applicant’s file, and that the file be reassigned to a different visa 
office for redetermination, because officer Beaulieu had copied his emails to various individuals 
employed at the Rome visa office. Justice Gleason also took the extraordinary step of awarding 
                                                   
49 Benhmuda v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 1222 at paras 35-36. 
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costs to the applicant. News reports indicate that the family was eventually accepted for 
resettlement and arrived in Canada in December 2013.50 
 
This case is probably rather exceptional, at least in that the visa officer put his objectionable 
views in writing and that senior officials advocated for the case to be granted.51 It illustrates 
nonetheless the potential perverse effect of the principle of non-interference in decision-making, 
and begs the question: what mechanisms are in place to prevent this type of conduct? I suggest 
that a policy of systematic review of negative decisions by senior visa officers would guard well 
against this type of attitude.  
 
It is worth mentioning that there were a handful of cases in the dataset where applicants 
claimed, on judicial review, that the visa officer laughed at them,52 or was confrontational.53 In 
these cases, the evidentiary basis to support the claims of bias on judicial review rested solely on 
the applicant’s affidavit. I explained in previous sections that instituting the audio recording of 
interviews would allow for a more accurate review of interpretation matters. The recording 




Reason-giving has been described as the “staple of the exercise of administrative function in 
                                                   
50 Maureen Brosnahan, “Benhmuda Family Finally Returns After Facing Torture in Libya”, CBC News (10 
December 2013), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/benhmuda-family-finally-returns-after-facing-
torture-in-libya-1.2457839>. 
51 See section 5.4.1.5, below for a discussion of the impact of the Baker decision on the level of candour in 
administrative reasons. 
52 IMM-4740-11, IMM-5557-15. 
53 Files IMM-4531-11, IMM-2274-11, IMM-5765-14. 
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modern bureaucratic states.” 54  Paul Philip Graig explains that reason-giving has both 
instrumental and non-instrumental benefits.55  From the instrumentalist perspective, a causal 
relationship is implied between the provision of reasons and the accuracy of the outcome. The 
act of providing reasons helps ensure that a matter was properly considered by the decision-
maker, and reasons assist the courts in performing their supervisory review. From a non-
instrumentalist perspective, the provision of reasons serves to increase public confidence in the 
administrative process.56  
 
IRCC’s processing manual states that visa officers are expected to take careful notes when 
interviewing an applicant: 
The officer must enter notes in CAIPS, or in a paper file if CAIPS is not 
available. The notes must include a conclusion with a summary of the decision 
and a clear statement of how the applicant does not meet the relevant criteria. 
Officers should keep detailed notes to support their decisions; these will be 
needed should the case be brought to the Federal Court…57 
 
Visa officer training material stresses the importance to include the following elements in the 
record: 
- Document sequence and content of the interview 
- Cite open source searches (Claim, IFA and Credibility), to ground your 
approval or concerns 
- Document your reasoning58 
 
 
In the case of refusals, visa officers are expected to prepare a substantive refusal letter that 
                                                   
54 Mathilde Cohen, “When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach” 
(2015) 72:2 Wash & Lee L Rev 483 at 528. 
55 PP Craig, “The Common Law, Reasons and Administrative Justice” (1994) 53:2 Cambridge LJ 282. 
56 Ibid at 283-285. 
57 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 27.1. 
58 Access to Information Request #2A-2020-01732 (8 October 2020) at 88. 
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provides information on why the case was rejected.59  Documenting decisions was a major 
concern in CIC’s PSR Quality Assurance Evaluation, which found inadequacies in both note-
taking and decision letter drafting. It found for example that only 52% of case notes in refused 
applications were “complete and supported.” The study also reports that “in 70% of refusal 
letters, the reasons presented to support the decision provided a substantive explanation as to 
why the application was refused.”60 A review conducted by the Canadian Council for Refugees 
of a sample of 11 decisions from the Damascus visa officer also reported exceedingly short 
decision letters: 
The letters are all under 2 pages in length. Most of each letter is taken up with 
explaining the relevant sections of the Act and Regulations. In 10 out of 11 
letters, the part of the letter addressing the applicants’ fear of persecution and the 
reasons for the refusal consists of a single paragraph. In the 11th case, there were 
two paragraphs on these issues. 
 
Given the short space allotted to addressing the application, it is clear that none 
of the letters provides much detail on the reason for the refusal. Many of the 




In this section, I present the results of my analysis of the content of visa officer decisions, 
focusing on reasons that are not reasons, boilerplate reasons, and inadequate decision letters. 
 
i) Reasons that are not reasons 
For lawyers or researchers familiar with Canada’s inland refugee determination system, 
practices around reason-giving and case documentation in the resettlement system will appear 
rather astounding.  There were a fair number of cases in the dataset where the case notes were so 
                                                   
59 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 27.2. 
60 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 11 at para 5.2. 
61 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Analysis of a Small Number of Iraqi Private Sponsorship Applications 




short or devoid of meaningful reasoning that they could hardly be considered “reasons.” For 
example, in IMM-71-11, the entirety of the visa officer notes consisted of the following 72-word 
conclusion, without any reference to responses or statements made by the applicant or any 
documentary evidence: 
PA departed Eritrea in 2008 because husband (an Ethiopian) was arrested and 
imprisoned. She had lost husband and all family support (she was shunned for 
having married an Ethiopian). So came to Sudan. 
Appears to have left simply because she and her children were all alone and 
seemingly had no future in Eritrea. No evidence of any sort of persecution on 
file. 
Does not meet definition of refugee. Case to be refused. 
 
The decision letter contains the same information but worded differently. Surprisingly, this case 
was denied leave at the Federal Court, and denied leave a second time following an application 
reconsideration. 
 
IMM-6481-14 is a more concerning case in that the visa officer’s reasons consist of only a bare 
conclusion, without even a reference to the factors that weighed in the assessment. This case 
concerns an Afghan family of Hazara ethnicity that claimed that they were persecuted by the 
Taliban. The visa officer case notes contain no information regarding the interview, but only the 
following conclusion: 
After a full review of the application, including PA’s explanations and responses, 
I am not satisfied that PAs reside in Pakistan as stated and find it more likely that 
they have repatriated or otherwise reside in Afghanistan, their country of 
nationality. As a result, they do not meet the criteria set out at section 96 of the 
Act or section 147 of the Regulations. Consequently, with reference to section 
139(1)(e) of the Regulations and section 11 of the Act, the application is refused. 
 
The notes in this case contain no information whatsoever regarding why the visa officer 
considered it more likely than not that the applicant had repatriated. On judicial review, the 
applicant stated in his affidavit that he had asked the visa officer for the opportunity to submit 
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further documents related to his residence in Pakistan, a request that does not appear in the case 
notes. The judicial review application went unopposed and was settled between the parties 
before leave was decided. 
 
In many other cases, the case notes report the responses of the applicant to various questions, 
followed by a “conclusion” devoid of any assessment. In IMM-4010-15, for example, a female 
Afghan Hazara applicant was interviewed at the Islamabad visa office. The case notes indicate 
that the visa officer questioned the applicant regarding the events that caused her to leave 
Afghanistan. She told the visa officer that her brother had been killed in front of her, and that 
her father and another sibling were killed in a rocket attack. The case notes indicate that the visa 
officer also questioned the applicant about her life in Pakistan. These exchanges are followed in 
the notes by this bare assessment: 
After a careful review of the information on file, I am not satisfied the applicants 
are Convention refugees or member of the Country of Asylum class, as they do 
not have a well-founded fear of persecution on any of the Convention grounds. 
Although they left Afghanistan after a traumatic event, I am not satisfied that 
they would continue to be seriously and personally affected by the civil war or 
armed conflict or massive violations of human rights in Afghanistan. Application 
Refused. 
 
From the above assessment, even though the case notes include some responses provided by the 
applicant, it is impossible to determine why the case was rejected. On judicial review, leave was 
granted unopposed and the application was settled between the parties. 
 
In IMM-6393-14, a Somali refugee was interviewed at the Pretoria visa office. He stated at the 
interview that he had left Somalia because of the war, and that he had been attacked many times 
in South Africa. The visa officer noted in the record the responses of the applicant to questions 
about his reason for fleeing and his situation in South Africa. This is followed in the notes by 
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this “conclusion” devoid of any substantive assessment:  
CONCLUSION: 
PA HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR INFO TO ADD BEFORE DECISION IS 
TAKEN? None. 
APPLICATION SIGNED? Yes. 
EXPLAINED THAT PA WOULD BE CONTACTED IN WRITING WITHIN 
THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WITH MY DECISION AND/OR ANY OTHER 
REQUIRED STEPS. 
COUNSELLED ABOUT IMM500 LOAN & REPAYMENT. LOAN 
APPLICATION SIGNED. END OF INTERVIEW. 
 
The decision letter provides only a few additional details on the reasoning of the visa officer: 
You currently reside in a country that is a signatory to the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, South Africa. You have been able to benefit from the protection of 
South Africa and have been able to obtain asylum. 
You have been unable to satisfy me that you do not have a durable solution in 
South Africa and therefore, you do not meet the provisions of this paragraph. 
 
On judicial review, the applicant also brought to the attention of the court that the officer notes 
provided were incomplete on their face, as the entry did not end with information typically 
found in notes (date, visa officer code, file number). The judicial review application was 
unopposed and discontinued. 
 
ii) Boilerplate notes 
It was striking to find a large number of cases where the visa officer notes were almost identical 
to each other. This was especially prevalent for notes concerning Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 
many of whom were refused for the same reason, almost verbatim, by different visa officers. In 
the dataset, there were 102 cases involving Afghan applicants seeking refuge in Pakistan. Forty-
five of these were refused because the visa officer believed the applicant was “residing” in 
Afghanistan. I will explain in Chapter 6 why incorporating in the refugee resettlement eligibility 
criteria a ‘residence’ requirement is an error of law on which the Federal Court finally ruled in 
2015. Out of the 45 cases refused on the basis of residence, 23 included an identical or nearly 
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identical version of this paragraph, including the confusion between “reparation” and 
“repatriation”:  
There is a high incidence of fraud in this office and a high number of applicants 
who incorrectly claim residence in Pakistan in order to pursue refugee 
applications with this office. Since 2002, more than 4.7 million Afghans have 
returned from Pakistan under the biggest facilitated voluntary return programme 
conducted by the UNHCR. This is in addition to the hundreds of thousands of 
Afghans that have returned outside the voluntary reparation [SIC] program. 
UNHCR estimates that a further 900,000 Afghans returned without assistance. 
Reports from the UNHCR indicate that returnees from a quarter of the current 
total population of Afghanistan, while as many as 1.6 registered Afghans remain 
in Pakistan. Application refused. I am not satisfied that the applicants reside in 
Pakistan as well as the documentation provided and explanation when asked to 
clarify is also not plausible. I have serious concerns about the applicants’ 
continued residence in Pakistan. This leads me to believe it is more likely that 
they have repatriated or otherwise reside in Afghanistan, their country of 
nationality. I have reviewed the application in full, and have considered all of 
their explanations and responses, but find that they do not ally my concerns. As a 
result they do not meet the criteria set out per section 96 of the Act or section 147 
of the Regulations. 
 
 
I recognize that similarities in reasons are not necessarily objectionable, especially if they 
describe country conditions through objective country evidence. In some instances, however, the 
resemblance between decisions is so striking that it puts into question whether the visa officer 
adequately put their mind to the personal circumstances of each applicant.  
 
I also found there to be a high prevalence of boilerplate decision-making in cases decided at the 
Pretoria visa office. In 32 of the 37 refusals from Pretoria, the visa officer found that the 
applicant had a durable solution through local integration in South Africa. In 21 of these cases, 
the visa officer notes included a relatively short series of question and answers, followed by a 
780-word boilerplate text on policy and legislative measures dealing with refugees in South 
Africa, and finally the sentence: “Subjects therefore have a durable solution in South Africa and 
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are ineligible for selection as refugees to Canada” or an almost identical phrase. In addition, 26 
decision letters provided the following reasoning or a nearly identical one: 
After carefully assessing your application I have determined that you do not meet 
these requirements. You have been accepted as a Convention refugee in the 
Republic of South Africa. You have been given the right to work and study in 
South Africa and are able to avail yourself of the protection of government 
agencies. You have mobility rights and the same rights as a South Africa citizen 
with the exception of voting rights. 
   
 
These decisions present a number of problems with regard to assessing durable solutions, 
country condition documents, and personal evidence, each of which will be explored later in this 
chapter. It is clear that the overreliance on template decision-making has led visa officers to 
overlook the personal situations of applicants. These applicants were all considered to have 
similar access to durable solutions. But their experience in South Africa varied widely. Many 
told the visa officer that they had been the victim of xenophobic attacks in South Africa and had 
received little help from the police, which is inconsistent with the boilerplate decision they were 
issued. Applicants reported, for example, being the victim of racially motivated robberies,62 
having their house burned by local residents,63 and being stabbed or shot.64 Others told the visa 
officer that they had in fact been denied refugee status or permanent stay in South Africa.65 In 
numerous cases, the visa officer seems to have disregarded these claims entirely in favour of the 
boilerplate analysis. 
 
As it turns out, the two lawyers who litigated the largest number of cases in this dataset brought 
the problem of boilerplate decision-making in Pretoria to the attention of the Federal Court in a 
                                                   
62 Files IMM-4927-15 & IMM-3722-15. 
63 File IMM-3139-13. 
64 Files IMM-3456-15, IMM-7347-13, IMM-1095-15, IMM-3933-15, IMM-6393-13 & IMM-3962-15. 
65 File IMM-7812-12. 
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few cases. Evidently, through litigating dozens of resettlement cases every year, they had come 
to notice nearly identical decisions from the Pretoria visa office in particular. In one judicial 
review application, the visa officer had decided that the applicant had a durable solution in 
South Africa, despite the fact that the applicant stated that he had been the subject of numerous 
xenophobic attacks, including being robbed, shot and stabbed. He told the visa officer that the 
authorities were unable to protect him against racially motivated attacks. On judicial review, the 
applicant’s lawyer expressed his frustration over the visa officer’s reasoning in these terms: 
At some point, the endless boiler plate statements in Canadian visa office refusals 
that the Government of South Africa is hoping and trying to make things better 
have to be taken for what they are - Pollyanna, pie in the sky. When year after 
year, refugees are beaten, robbed and killed, at some point it becomes 
unreasonable to continue to rely only on Government promises that things will 
get better. The period of time one has to wait for the situation to improve ceases 
to be reasonable.66 
 
Justice Elliott rejected the argument: 
While use of boilerplate text in some cases provides sufficient grounds to believe 
the decision was not personalized, it is acceptable when the boilerplate used 
addresses historic documents and actions taken by a country provided that it is 
clear the decision-maker put their mind to the actual issues and made an 
independent decision based on the evidence…67 
 
 
In another case,68 the applicant told the visa officer that he operated a shop in South Africa, and 
had been the target of racially motivated robberies. He also stated that the police sometimes 
extracted bribes from him and sometimes “take the part of the criminal.” The lawyer for the 
applicant noticed that the decision he was litigating was practically identical to three other 
decisions he had litigated in the past. He argued that the visa officer had merely copied his own 
reasons in other cases, without individual or independent analysis. That case was denied leave. 
                                                   
66 File IMM-3456-15. The same argument was made in file IMM-3458-15. 
67 Abdi v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1050 at para 26. 
68 File IMM-6788-13. 
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One wonders what the Federal Court would make of the same argument if presented with 
dozens of nearly identical unrelated decisions. 
 
iii) Decision letters 
IRCC’s processing manual provides that refusal letters should include the following 
elements: 
Refusals on admissibility 
The refusal letter must give clear and detailed reasons why the applicant does not 
have the potential to resettle successfully in Canada. … 
 
Refusing on eligibility 
A refusal letter: 
• must explain why the officer does not think an applicant is a: 
o Convention refugee abroad; or 
o a member of one of the humanitarian-protected persons abroad 
classes; and 
• should refer to evidence provided by the applicant, and how and why this 
evidence does not meet the requirements for recognition as a: 
o Convention refugee abroad; or 
o a member of the country of asylum class; or 
o a member of the source country class.69 
 
 
The manual also contains a template refusal letter. The template directs visa officers to explain 
the legal criteria of resettlement and then explain the decision following this format: 
After carefully assessing all factors relative to your application, I am not satisfied 
that you are a member of any of the classes prescribed because (specify reasons; 
if the application is refused without an interview, also specify reasons that an 




In the dataset, the decision letters were generally two pages long. However, many of the 
                                                   
69 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 27.2. 
70 Ibid, Appendix E. 
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decision letters reviewed contained no information specific to the applicant’s case. 7.71% of 
refusal letters contained no information specific to the applicant. A further 11.41% contained 
only one to five lines of text, hardly enough to adequately explain the visa officer’s reasoning. It 
was interesting to note that almost all boilerplate decision letters were issued to Afghan refugees 
in Pakistan and Sri Lankan refugees in India. Overall, Afghan applicants received boilerplate 
decisions in 12.80% of cases, and Sri Lankan refugees in 19.57% of cases. Interestingly, there 
was also an instance of a significant error in the boilerplate text of the decision letter in IMM-
6792-11. In that case, the decision letter included in its description of the criteria of the 
Convention refugee definition the criteria for the “Source Country class.” 
 
5.4.1.5 Reason-giving in administrative law 
The above assessment of reasons and documenting decisions brings us into the evolving debate 
in administrative law around reason-giving. Despite the strong theoretical rationale in favour of 
reasons, the common law has only rather recently imposed a general duty to give reasons on 
administrative decision-makers.71 In Canada, a duty to give reasons was first recognized by the 
Supreme Court in Baker.72 At issue in Baker was a decision made by immigration officer Caden 
refusing to grant Mavis Baker permanent resident status within Canada on “humanitarian and 
compassionate” grounds. The decision letter received by Ms. Baker only indicated that there 
were insufficient humanitarian and compassionate grounds to grant the application. No reasons 
were initially disclosed for the refusal. Through her counsel, the applicant was later able to 
obtain the notes of a second immigration officer - officer Lorenz - on which the deciding officer 
had relied. The notes of the recommending officer included the following conclusion: 
                                                   
71 See David Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 306-13. 
72 Baker, supra note 47. 
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The PC is a paranoid schizophrenic and on welfare. She has no qualifications 
other than as a domestic. She has FOUR CHILDREN IN JAMAICA AND 
ANOTHER FOUR BORN HERE.  She will, of course, be a tremendous strain on 
our social welfare systems for (probably) the rest of her life. There are no H&C 
factors other than her FOUR CANADIAN-BORN CHILDREN. Do we let her 
stay because of that? I am of the opinion that Canada can no longer afford this 
type of generosity. However, because of the circumstances involved, there is a 
potential for adverse publicity. I recommend refusal but you may wish to clear 
this with someone at Region. 
This case is a catastrophy [sic].  It is also an indictment of our “system” that the 
client came as a visitor in Aug. ’81, was not ordered deported until Dec. ’92 and 
in APRIL ’94 IS STILL HERE!73 
 
 
The visa officer’s decision was challenged on Charter and administrative law grounds. 
Ultimately, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé found that the case notes gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé took particular issue with the implied link 
between Ms. Baker’s mental illness, her work experience as a domestic worker and her several 
children, and the conclusion that she would be a strain on public services.74 Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé also found that the exercise of discretion was substantively unreasonable in that the 
immigration officer failed to give substantial weight to the applicant’s children’s best interests.75  
 
The issue that concerns us here, however, is Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s pronouncement on 
whether there exists an obligation to provide reasons and whether that obligation had been met. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé explained that the content of procedural obligations on administrative 
decision-makers varies depending on the context. She proposed a non-exhaustive list of five 
factors that influence the degree of procedural fairness owed in particular cases, including (1) 
the nature of the decision being made and process followed in making it; (2) the nature of the 
                                                   
73 Ibid at para 5. 
74 Ibid at para 48. 
75 Ibid at para 75. 
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statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the 
importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected; (4) the legitimate 
expectations of the person challenging the decision; (5) the choices of procedure made by the 
agency itself.76 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé determined that procedural fairness can include the 
duty to provide reasons. In the case at bar, she found that, considering the importance of the 
decision on the applicant, the level of procedural fairness was relatively high and included the 
right to receive reasons: 
In my opinion, it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, 
the duty of procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation 
for a decision. … The profound importance of an H & C decision to those 
affected, as with those at issue in Orlowski, Cunningham, and Doody, militates in 
favour of a requirement that reasons be provided. It would be unfair for a person 
subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical to their future not to be 
told why the result was reached.77 
 
 
In Baker, the notes of recommending officer Lorenz, which were not disclosed 
contemporaneously to the applicant, were considered adequate to fulfill the duty to give reasons. 
L’Heureux-Dubé explained that courts must be flexible in assessing the duty to give reasons.78 
This flexibility is what reconciles the right to procedural fairness with the needs of 
administrative agencies.79 She writes that courts must recognize 
                                                   
76 Ibid at paras 23-28. 
77 Baker at para 43. 
78 Ibid at para 40. 
79 See Mullan, supra note 71 at 310-311: 
In response to the standard contrary arguments that to impose a reasons requirement would 
impede efficient administration, creating delays and imposing extra costs burdens, and also 
lead to a lack of candour in the sense of formulaic, boilerplate sets of reasons having as their 
principal aim the avoidance of judicial review or reversal on appeal, L’Heureux-Dubé J. 
countered that at least the first of these concerns could be met in large measure by judicial 
flexibility as to the form of the reasons that would be acceptable. This, in the particular case, 
the Court held that the obligation had been met by the notes of the front line immigration 




the day-to-day realities of administrative agencies and the many ways in which 
the values underlying the principles of procedural fairness can be assured. It 
upholds the principle that individuals are entitled to fair procedures and open 
decision-making, but recognizes that in the administrative context, this 
transparency may take place in various ways.80 
 
The Baker decision left a number of questions unanswered, including the issue of what can 
count as reasons, and the relationship between the assessment of the procedural adequacy of 
reasons, and the substantive assessment of the reasonableness of reasons.81 Scholars also pointed 
to a potential perverse effect of Baker: that decision-makers could become concerned with 
crafting reasons that are only sufficient to pass the Baker test, but devoid of meaningful 
analysis. Sossin writes that, because the Supreme Court offers no standard against which to 
evaluate reasons, we will see the proliferation of boilerplate reasons that serve only to satisfy the 
formal reasons requirement: 
Given the result in Baker (i.e. the quashing of the decision and the remitting of 
the application back to a different immigration officer for a redetermination 
consistent with the reasons of the Court) we are unlikely to see such candor in 
administrative reasons in the future. Indeed, Baker may well serve as an incentive 
to give as few and as unspecific reasons as permitted by law. … 
 
… In this sense, the reasons provided in Baker are preferable to “boiler-plate” 
reasons that offer the affected party no insight into the individual values or 
systemic assumptions of decision-makers. This is especially important when the 
power being exercised is of a subjective and discretionary nature.82 
 
 
Indeed, given that the court in Baker did not impose a requirement that reasons be of a certain 
quality, or a requirement that reasons be immediately disclosed to applicants, it is questionable 
whether the duty to provide reasons provides any meaningful benefit to individuals. In 
                                                   
80 Baker at para 44. 
81 See Lorne Neudorf, “Inadequate Reasons: The Need for Tribunal Participation in Judicial Review 
Litigation” (2016) 54:1 Alta L Rev 219.  
82 Lorne Sossin, “An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in Administrative Law” 
(2002) 27:2 Queen's LJ 809 at 836-838. 
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Newfoundland and Labrador Nurse’s Union, Justice Abella confirmed that the duty to give 
reasons is a binary analysis: either reasons are provided, or they are not. 83  There is no 
requirement - under procedural fairness, that is - that reasons be of a certain standard. The 
adequacy of reasons is not “a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a 
reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses - one for the reasons and a separate one for the 
result.”84  
 
That being said, reviewing courts do examine the substantive content of decisions in the context 
of the reasonableness analysis. 85 Paul Daly writes that the history of administrative law is one of 
the “inexorable rise” of the “culture of justification.” 86  Indeed, in the Baker case, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé insisted that decision-makers must be “alert, alive and sensitive” to the 
considerations of the individual. 87  Drawing from the Baker case, Mary Liston describes a 
general “ethos of justification” in public law.88 In the 2008 Dunsmuir case, the Supreme Court 
further developed the reasonableness analysis, describing it as being concerned with 
“justification, transparency and intelligibility”, and with whether the decision falls within a 
range of “possible, acceptable outcomes.”89 Paul Daly writes that the Dunsmuir decision was 
                                                   
83 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 
62, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union]. 
84 Ibid at para 14. 
85 Ibid at paras 20-22. 
86 Paul Daly, “Vavilov and the Culture of Justification in Contemporary Administrative Law” (2020) Ottawa 
Faculty of Law Working Paper No 2020-18, online: SSRN 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3618743#> [“Vavilov and the Culture of 
Justification”]. 
87 Baker, supra note 47 at para 75. 
88 See Mary Liston, “‘Alert, Alive and Sensitive’: Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons, and the Ethos of 
Justification in Canadian Public Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004) 113. See also Daly, “Vavilov and the Culture of Justification”, supra note 86. 
89 Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47. 
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only a hesitant step towards the culture of justification.90 The Dunsmuir framework instructed 
reviewing courts to begin their analysis by looking at the outcome, and then proceed to 
scrutinizing the reasons. In addition, the approach to deference in Dunsmuir was justified by the 
presumption that all administrative decision-makers have relevant expertise. Paul Daly writes 
that, in any event, any movement towards a culture of justification that stemmed from the 
Dunsmuir language was essentially abandoned in subsequent Supreme Court decisions and 
replaced by a “culture of authority.” 91  In Agraira, the Supreme Court retreated from the 
“justification, transparency and intelligibility” criteria and required only that the reasoning 
process be “comprehensible.”92 In Newfoundland Nurses, Justice Abella stated that reviewing 
courts should seek to supplement incomplete or unclear reasons. Justice Abella cited with 
approval the following passage from David Dyzenhaus: 
“Reasonable” means here that the reasons do in fact or in principle support the 
conclusion reached. That is, even if the reasons in fact given do not seem wholly 
adequate to support the decision, the court must first seek to supplement them 
before it seeks to subvert them. For if it is right that among the reasons for 
deference are the appointment of the tribunal and not the court as the front line 
adjudicator, the tribunal’s proximity to the dispute, its expertise, etc, then it is 
also the case that its decision should be presumed to be correct even if its reasons 
are in some respects defective. 93 
 
 
Neudorf writes that the Canadian law on the review of administrative reasons in the 
Dunsmiur/Baker era failed to deliver on the very principles that justified the imposition of the 
duty in the first place: 
                                                   
90 Paul Daly, “Vavilov and the Culture of Justification”, supra note 86. 
91 Ibid at 22. 
92 Agraira v Canada (MPSEP), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 SCR 559. 
93 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union, supra note 83 at para 12, citing David Dyzenhaus, “The 
Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed, The Province of 
Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 279 at 304. 
	223	
	
Administrative decision makers are therefore free to pay little attention to the 
quality of their reasoning as there is little risk that a decision will be quashed on 
this basis under procedural fairness. And on substantive review, when applying a 
reasonableness standard, courts will go to great lengths to supplement inadequate 
reasons or even invent reasons they think the decision maker could have given. 
 
What incentive is there to produce well-written, quality reasons? Why do the 
hard work of writing clear, comprehensive, and logical reasons when the court 
will simply do the work for you? Baker struck a balance in favour of an increased 
scope of the duty to provide reasons at the cost of quality control. If anything 
counts as reasons, can it be claimed that reasons are truly providing the benefits 
expected of them? Canadian law on reasons is certainly problematic to the extent 
that individuals are required to challenge an administrative decision in court to 
properly understand why the original decision was made.94 
 
 
The cases in the dataset discussed in the previous section illustrate the pitfalls of the 
Baker/Dunsmuir framework. Decision letters often contained no meaningful information. Case 
notes were generally, but not consistently, more detailed, and many made use of boilerplate text. 
Moreover, these notes were never disclosed to the applicant unless judicial review was initiated 
or an access to information request was submitted. I want to reiterate that requiring visa officers 
to provide more fulsome decision letters would procure many benefits. It would have a 
disciplining effect in terms of improving decision-making and provide more opportunity for 
oversight. More fulsome reasons are also required so that applicants can ascertain why their case 
was rejected and make informed decisions about whether to seek judicial review. As access to 
information requests take some time to process, applicants contemplating judicial review often 
have no choice but to initiate judicial review before receiving the notes. Requiring more fulsome 
refusal letters would reduce the number of “place-holder applications” and free up Federal Court 
resources. I note that CIC’s 2011 PSR Quality Assurance evaluation recommended that further 
                                                   
94 Neudorf, supra note 81 at 229-30. 
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decision letter templates be developed, as well as standard country of origin packages. 95 It is 
important that the use of such decision-making tools not come at the expense of individualized 
assessment.  
 
I want to address two additional points in this section, beginning with the recent Vavilov 
decision.96 The Vavilov decision was not applicable during the time of this study’s dataset, but it 
is nonetheless worth looking at how the Vavilonian approach may (or may not) influence how 
visa officers make overseas refugee decisions. The Vavilov decision established a strong 
presumption in favour of the reasonableness standard of review, but reoriented the 
reasonableness review towards a more robust scrutiny of justification. Under the Vavilov 
framework, administrative decision-maker expertise is no longer presumed, it must be 
demonstrated through the decision.97 Reviewing courts are instructed to begin their assessment 
not with the outcome of the decision, but to concentrate first and foremost on the reasons 
provided, and to assess if they justify the outcome. The court notes that “the exercise of public 
power must be justified, intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but to the individuals 
                                                   
95 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 11 para 4.7, 5.3. 
96 Canada (MCI) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 79-81 [Vavilov]. 
97 Vavilov, ibid at para 93. The presumption of expertise of administrative decision-makers under the 
Dunsmuir framework was heavily criticized by administrative law scholars. David Mullan described the 
presumption as a “tautology”, and explained: 
What remains puzzling in all of this is why, even absent any statutory requirements for legal 
qualifications, a presumption of expertise exists … It certainly cannot be based on empirical 
data nor do I suspect on informed intuition. Rather, it tends to be an add-on or make-weight 
reason deployed in support of other and more substantial justifications for differentiating 
between adjudicative tribunals and Ministers (David Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on 
Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review of Administrative Action – The Top 
Fifteen” (2013) 42:1&2 Adv Q 1 at 9).  
See also Lorne Sossin & Colleen Flood, “The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci’s Legacy and the Standard 
of Review in Administrative Law” (2007) 11:54 UTLJ 581 at 591; Lorne Sossin, “Empty Ritual, 
Mechanical Exercise or the Discipline of Deference? Revisiting the Standard of Review in 
Administrative Law” (2003) 27 Adv Q 478 at 492. 
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subject to it”,98 and that decision must be “justified in relation to the constellation of law and 
facts that are relevant to the decision.”99 The Court expressly recognizes that the process of 
drafting reasons “necessarily encourages administrative decision makers to more carefully 
examine their own thinking and to better articulate their analysis in the process.”100 The court 
also explains that the expected level of responsiveness to an individual’s concerns rises with the 
importance of the decision.101 Importantly, the Vavilov majority steers away from the position in 
Newfoundland Nurses’ Union that reviewing courts must be ready to bolster inadequate or 
incomplete reasons: 
Where, even if the reasons given by an administrative decision maker for a 
decision are read with sensitivity to the institutional setting and in light of the 
record, they contain a fundamental gap or reveal that the decision is based on an 
unreasonable chain of analysis, it is not ordinarily appropriate for the reviewing 
court to fashion its own reasons in order to buttress the administrative decision. 
… To allow a reviewing court to do so would be to allow an administrative 
decision maker to abdicate its responsibility to justify to the affected party, in a 
manner that is transparent and intelligible, the basis on which it arrived at a 
particular conclusion. … To the extent that cases such as Newfoundland Nurses 




Unfortunately, the Vavilov decision leaves unchanged the principle that reasons - where reasons 
are required - need not be disclosed as a matter of course. The vast majority of rejected refugee 
resettlement applicants will therefore continue to be left in the dark as to why their application 
was rejected unless they initiate judicial review or make an access to information request.  
 
Vavilov remains solidly anchored in the principle of deference. It has however, “set a slightly 
                                                   
98 Vavilov, ibid at para 95. 
99 Vavilov, ibid at para 105. See also Paul Daly, “Vavilov and the Culture of Justification”, supra note 86 at 6. 
100 Vavilov, ibid at para 80. 
101 Vavilov, ibid at para 135. 
102 Vavilov, ibid at para 96. 
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higher bar” for decision-makers in terms of justification, demonstrated expertise, responsiveness 
and contemporaneity.103 It is too early to assess with clarity the impact Vavilov will have on 
courts reviewing immigration decisions. Daly’s review of recent Federal Court decisions shows 
that the Federal Court has indeed strengthened its scrutiny of reasons in immigration matters: 
…in Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Diner J noted that Vavilov 
requires “basic responsiveness” to the evidence presented (and found it lacking 
here); in Samra v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Favel J found a 
decision unreasonable because it “lacked analysis”: “the officer’s decision is 
merely a recitation of the evidence before him followed by a conclusion”; in Li v 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), Fuhrer J struck down a sparsely reasoned 
study permit decision issued by a line officer who failed to “engage” with the 
applicant’s evidence; in Slemko v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness), Walker J held that brief reasons for refusing a humanitarian and 
compassionate application were unreasonable as they failed to consider and 
weigh all of the applicant’s submissions; and in Albrifcani v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), Strickland J noted that key findings were not justified by 





This leads Daly to conclude that “boilerplate statements are now treated with suspicion by the 
courts”, even in cases decided by “line decision-makers.”105 Also of significance for refugee 
matters is the renewed emphasis in Vavilov on the consequences of the decision on the affected 
individual.106 There is strong evidence that courts are effectively now engaging in a more robust 
reasonableness review of refugee and immigration decisions. For our purposes, however, the 
more important question is to what extent will the new doctrinal environment have an impact on 
how visa officers decide refugee cases? Daly recognizes that the new criteria will pose a 
challenge for high-volume areas of decision-making, such as immigration: 
                                                   
103 Paul Daly, “One Year of Vavilov” (Paper delivered at the CLEBC Annual Administrative Law Conference, 
20 November 2020) at 6, online: SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3722312>. 
104 Ibid at 8. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Jamie Chai Yun Liew, “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: A Preliminary Assessment of Whether the 
Vavilov Framework Adequately Addresses Concerns of Marginalized Communities in the Immigration Law 
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Whilst most respectable administrative tribunals, those engaged in issue-driven 
analysis, point-first writing and active adjudication, are likely to continue to scale 
this bar with ease, other bodies might find it more imposing. Those operating in 
high-volume areas of decision-making (such as immigration) and those used to 
receiving a high degree of deference on the basis of their expertise (such as 
labour arbitrators) or electoral legitimacy (such as ministers) are, in my view, 
going to need to learn to jump higher than they have in the past. 
 
 
This brings me to my second point, which is that the significance of judicial review doctrinal 
principles is probably exaggerated in the case of decisions that rarely get judicially reviewed, 
such as overseas refugee decisions. In that sense, administrative law scholarship’s focus on 
judicial review at the expense of other modes of legality is perhaps misplaced. It is worth 
considering whether fairer procedures and outcomes could be better achieved not through 
judicial review, but through non-judicial interventions in administrative processes. In making 
this argument, I rely on Jennifer Raso’s thesis that the gulf between public law doctrine and 
administrative practice is growing, leaving lawyers and scholars “ill-equipped to conceptualize 
and tackle the changing structure of public administration and the evolving relationships 
between courts, legislatures, and administrators.”107 Raso explains: 
Because many legal scholars use appellate court decisions as a central source of 
evidence to conceptualize how administrative governance, or the rule of law, 
functions or ought to function, they scope their inquiry at the spatiotemporal 
scale of the judicially reviewable (and actually reviewed) administrative decision. 
Relying largely on judicial decisions as the raw material for public law theories, 
this vein of legal scholarship takes administrative decision making as it is 




Raso’s study looks at social assistance decisions by Ontario Works as a type of administrative 
                                                   
107 Jennifer Raso, “Unity in the eye of the beholder? Reasons for decision in theory and practice in the Ontario 
Works program” (2020) 70:1 UTLJ 1. 
108 Ibid at 7. 
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decision that operates on a different “spaciotemporal scale” than judicial review. Granted, 
overseas refugee decisions are not as diffuse and are more identifiable than social assistance 
decisions. Nevertheless, they are judicially reviewed relatively rarely. Decisions in the GAR 
stream, in particular, almost never get judicially reviewed. As Raso writes, where there is no 
threat of judicial review, “administrative decision makers are less likely to provide richly 
articulated reasons.”109 It is worth noting that even in the rare cases where judicial review is 
initiated, cases are often settled, thus bypassing judicial scrutiny. As the previous section 
illustrates, the most egregious decisions in the dataset were never scrutinized by the Federal 
Court.  
 
In closing this section, I should state my skepticism that visa officers engage meaningfully with 
judicial development. To make a definitive statement on the matter, however, would require 
carefully studying the “judicial-executive dialogue” through more informal, organic conduits for 
the dissemination of judicial developments. 110  Such, an inquiry is beyond the scope and 
methodology of this dissertation but holds promise for future research. 
 
5.4.1.6 Delay in assessing cases 
The average processing time of applications in the dataset was almost three years, with the 
longest case taking over nine years to process.111 As reviewed in section 3.9, the problem of 
excessively long processing times in the PSR program has been a central issue taken up by the 
                                                   
109 Ibid at 13. 
110 See Lorne Sossin, “The Rule of Policy: Baker and the Impact of Judicial Review on Administrative 
Discretion” in David Dyzehaus, ed, The Unity of Public Law (London, Hart, 2004) 87 at 90. See also Lorne 
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sponsorship community’s advocacy campaigns. 112  The length of time required to process 
applications obviously causes extreme hardship to refugee applicants who remain in limbo in 
precarious refugee situations. Delays also cause challenges for sponsors groups in Canada who 
may struggle to maintain cohesiveness and integrity over a number of years.113 Beyond this, 
delays in processing and changing country conditions also severely affect substantive outcomes 
and make any assessment of refugee status conducted by sponsors extremely difficult. This 
concern has been voiced by the Canadian Council for Refugees on many occasions.114 
 
Many applicants in the dataset would have qualified for refugee resettlement when the 
application was submitted, but no longer qualified when the application was assessed because of 
changes in country conditions. This was especially prevalent for Sri Lankan applicants. In the 
dataset, there were 47 Sri Lankan applicants, all of whom were Tamil with claims of persecution 
related to the Sri Lankan civil war. The vast majority of these applicants applied before the 
                                                   
112 See Canadian Council for Refugees, “The Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program: Current Challenges 
and Opportunities” (2006) at 5, online (pdf): <https://ccrweb.ca/files/psrpbriefing.pdf> [“The Private 
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113 See Thomas R Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship in Manitoba” (2003) 4:2 J Int Migr & 
Integration 257 at 267; Ashley Chapman, “Private Sponsorship and Public Policy: Political Barriers to 
Church-Connected Refugee Resettlement in Canada” (Citizens for Public Justice, 2014) at 5, online 
<https://www.cpj.ca/private-sponsorship-and-public-policy>. 
114 See for example Canadian Council for Refugees, “The Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program”, supra 
note 112 at 5: 
Because of the long processing delays, there are changes in circumstances that mean that, by 
the time of the decision, the applicant is no longer a refugee (for example, there has been a 
change of government in the home country) or the applicant has found another solution (for 
example, been resettled to another country). 
… due to the delays in processing, the cases being finalized now were submitted before 
detailed information and training were offered in recent years. Similarly, the long processing 
delays mean that feedback from visa offices, for example, that a certain category of persons 
generally does not meet the definition, doesn’t reach sponsoring groups for years, by which 
time many hundreds of such cases may have been submitted, based on the information 
available at the time. 
	230	
	
official end of hostilities (18 May 2009), but were processed after it.115 In 43 of these 47 cases, 
the visa officer concluded that since the war had ended, the applicant could repatriate to Sri 
Lanka. For example, in IMM-2010-11, a Tamil Sri Lankan family told the visa officer that they 
left because LTTE forces were forcing the eldest son to join them. They left Sri Lanka in 2007 
and were sponsored in 2008. Their application was only assessed in 2011. The visa officer 
wrote: 
I do not find reasonable founds to believe that you have a well-founded fear of 
persecution because of the following concerns. You described incidents and 
threats that occurred during a period of protracted armed conflict which has since 
ended. You stated a general fear if you return, but I did not find reasonable 




IMM-7211-11 illustrates how processing delays can put applicants at risk of deportation and 
                                                   
115 I am not suggesting here that I agree with the determination that all Sri Lankan Tamils refugees can 
necessarily repatriate to Sri Lankan because of the mere fact that the civil war has ended. The UNHCR 
reported in 2012 that LTTE members and supporters suffered violent reprisals at the hands of Sri Lankan 
authorities. The UNHCR also identifies numerous at-risk groups in post-war Sri Lanka, including opposition 
and human rights activists, journalists, witnesses of human rights abuse, and LGBTQ persons. See UNHCR, 
“Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka” 
(21 December 2012), online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/50d1a08e2.html>. 
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review because the visa officer had not considered the application of section 108(4) of the IRPA, which 
concerns refugee applicants whose reasons for seeking protection has ceased to exist: 
108. (1) A claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a 
Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in any of the following 
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... 
(e) the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist. 
... 
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compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or 
punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which 
they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, 
torture, treatment or punishment. 
At issue in this decision was whether the harm suffered by the applicant was severe enough to trigger the 
application of section 108(4). Justice Hughes certified the following question: 
Is an Officer obliged to consider section 108(4) of IRPA only in truly exceptional cases 
rising to the level of appalling or atrocious? 
The case never proceeded to the Federal Court of Appeal. The argument that the visa officer had failed to 
consider section 108(4) was made in another four cases in the dataset, none of which were successful. 
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persecution. The applicant in this case was an Arabic-speaking Ahwazi Iranian claiming 
persecution for his political opinion and cultural activities in Iran. He fled to Syria in 2006, 
where he was accepted as a refugee by the UNHCR, and his file was referred to CIC for 
resettlement as a GAR. He attended two interviews with CIC, and was told that his application 
had been accepted. He was given medical forms and underwent a medical exam in November 
2009. CIC failed to follow-up with the applicant. When he contacted CIC, he received an 
automated message saying that medical examinations can take up to six months to process and 
that they would not examine communications when the medical examination occurred less than 
six months prior. The applicant contacted the visa office again in October 2010, after twelve 
months had elapsed, and again received no reply. The situation in Syria at the time was 
becoming increasingly dangerous, and Ahwazi people were at risk of being forcibly deported to 
Iran. The applicant received a phone call from a Farsi-speaking man who claimed to be a 
UNHCR interpreter and asked him for a meeting at an unofficial location. The applicant decided 
then to flee to Turkey. In Turkey, he was informed that his visa was ready in Damascus. The 
applicant returned to Syria, but subsequently failed to obtain any response from the Canadian 
visa office in Damascus. The Syrian civil war was developing at the time, and the applicant was 
forced to flee to Lebanon. In Lebanon, he was informed by a Canadian official that an exit 
permit would be difficult to obtain from Lebanon and that his chances of receiving one would be 
better in Turkey. The applicant then made his way to Turkey. In Turkey, he was informed by 
Canadian officials that his medical certificate had expired and that he needed to undergo another 
examination, which the applicant did. The second medical report was submitted, but the 
applicant never heard back from the visa office. Two months later, a mandamus application was 




5.4.2 Substantive matters 
5.4.2.1 Gender-based claims 
Although the Refugee Convention does not explicitly offer protection to victims of gender-
based persecution, modern interpretations of the Convention hold that gender constitutes a 
“particular social group”: 
It is surely axiomatic that a gender-based group is defined by an innate, 
immutable characteristic and hence within the ejusdem generis approach to social 
group. Indeed, acknowledgment that gender-based groups are clear examples of 
social subsets defined by an innate and immutable characteristic and are properly 
within the ambit of the social group category is now decades old. … 
Widespread state practice – across both common law and civil law states – no 
reflects the notion that women, sex, or gender may constitute a particular social 
group for the purpose of refugee law.117 
 
 
The UNHCR Resettlement Handbook states that gender-related persecution can include “acts of 
sexual violence, family/domestic violence, coerced family planning, female genital mutilation 
and other harmful traditional practices, punishment for transgression of social mores, and 
discrimination against homosexuals.”118 In Canadian law, the Supreme Court in the watershed 
1993 Ward case determined that a “particular social group” under the Convention included three 
possible categories: 
(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic; 
(2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to 
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and 
(3) groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its 
historical permanence.119 
 
Justice Laforest explicitly recognized that gender should be considered a particular social group 
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under the first category: 
The first category would embrace individuals fearing persecution on such bases 
as gender, linguistic background and sexual orientation, while the second would 
encompass, for example, human rights activists. The third branch is included 
more because of historical intentions, although it is also relevant to the anti-
discrimination influences, in that one's past is an immutable part of the person.120 
 
 
Canadian decision-makers have been slow in embracing Laforest’s reasoning to its full extent, 
often requiring in cases of gender-based persecution the formulation of unnecessarily complex 
social groups, instead of simply “women.” 121  The Federal Court has now recognized that 
gender-based persecution can be involved in “domestic violence, rape, detention or 
confinement, beating, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, forced abortion, force 
sterilization, persecution from being a victim of rape or bearing illegitimate children, and harm 
due to marrying against family wishes.”122 
 
IRCC’s processing manual expressly recognizes that gender constitutes a particular social group 
under the Convention.123 The manual also contains a “Declaration on refugee protection for 
women”, which highlights the importance of sensitivity in assessing gender-based claims: 
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Gender sensitivity in Canada 
The ability to question with sensitivity, awareness of the signs of gender-related 
persecution, and knowledge of conditions affecting women in source countries, 
are required of those who deal with refugee women. Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada is committed to the development of training and direction for all officers 
in Canada and abroad, for other staff, and for interpreters, to promote this 
sensitivity, awareness and knowledge. 
 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada is also committed to achieving an equitable 
gender balance in the selection of staff throughout the organization. Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada recognizes that refugee claims by women may be 
jeopardized because they do not tell of experiences of sexual violence, they may 
be unwilling to speak of such experiences in front of their husbands, or they may 
be intimidated by the presence of male officials or interpreters. 
Wherever operationally feasible, Citizenship and Immigration Canada will 
ensure that women making refugee claims have the option of being interviewed 
by female officers, with the assistance of trained female interpreters.124 
 
The manual also directs visa officers to consult IRB’s Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.125  
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the principal applicant was female in 158 cases in the dataset 
                                                   
124 Ibid, Appendix B. 
125 Immigration and Refugee Board, Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution (13 November 1996), online: <https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-
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Canada’s approach is undeniably avant-garde: the Guidelines were the first of their kind in 
the world and are now being used as a model elsewhere, including the United States, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom (LaViolette, supra note 121 at 178). 
Nevertheless, the guidelines, updated for the last time in 1996, have been criticized as an imperfect framework 
to address gender-based refugee claims and a document in dire need of revision. In LaViolette’s assessment: 
Guidelines that are truly responsive to gender-related persecution must clearly reflect all the 
ways in which the gendered social hierarchies injure women and men. The concept of 
gender-related persecution, as it is currently defined in the Guidelines, must be revised in 
favour of the adoption of a more clearly social constructionist interpretation of the notion of 
“gender” (201). 
In the same vein, Macintosh writes: 
…the Gender Guidelines themselves require considerable revision if they are to serve as an 
effective tool for assisting adjudicators. Pivotally, revisions are required to bring them in line 
with contemporary human rights instruments, and to provide better and more fulsome 
direction on a number of issues, such as how adjudicators are to use social and economic 
norms in their assessments of state protection. This indicates the pressing need for the 
Guidelines to not merely be revised on an issue-by issue basis, but to be put through a 
general review process (MacIntosh, supra note 121 at 163). 
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(33.26%). Unfortunately, the gender of the visa officer was not always apparent on the record. 
The gender of the interpreter was not once indicated. There were 58 cases where the refugee 
claim pertained to gender-based persecution. In these cases, the victim of gender-based violence 
was not always the principal applicant. In 19 cases, gender-based persecution was the only risk 
raised. As I explain in this section, there were many cases where the claim of gender-based 
persecution was either considered by the visa officer as irrelevant to refugee protection or was 
altogether ignored. There were also troubling instances of visa-officers displaying insensitive 
and offensive views towards the reality experienced by the women concerned. Furthermore, not 
a single reference to the IRB’s Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-
Related Persecution was made.126 
 
i) Insensitive assessments 
IMM-6792-11 is a case of an Afghan family interviewed at the Islamabad visa office. They told 
the visa officer, Philippe de Varennes, that a mujahideen commander demanded that the 
principal applicant’s two elder daughters, who were 16 and 14 years old at the time, be married 
to his sons. The commander told the principal applicant that, should he refuse, his daughters 
would be kidnapped and he would be killed. The principal applicant told the visa officer that the 
commander sent gifts to the family in order to convince them to go ahead with the marriage, and 
that eventually his daughters fled to Pakistan and married other men. Upon learning of this, the 
commander demanded that the principal applicant’s youngest daughter - then 12 years old – 
marry his son. After the applicant refused this marriage, there was a failed kidnapping attempt 
on his youngest daughter, shortly after which the entire family fled to Pakistan. The visa 
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officer’s assessment of the case is the following: 
Story does not make sense. Traditionally, marriage are being arranged when both 
Parties reached an agreement. In this case an agreement was reached but PA says 
he was forced to. He nevertheless benefited of it in accepting the gift and 
advantages offered by the other party. Because of war, PA felt he could marry his 
daughters elsewhere since there was no news from other party. This is fair and 
this seems to have been accepted by the other party. Upon return, other party 
wants to have younger daughter. It is up to PA to reach an agreement [emphasis 
mine]. 
 
The visa officer never interviewed the youngest daughter, who was present at the visa office, 
and who was at the centre of the claim. Not only was the visa officer seemingly unconcerned 
with the possibility of forced marriage as gender-based persecution, he suggested that the 
commander had secured some kind of contractual right to marry the applicant’s daughters to his 
son. On judicial review, this application was granted leave (opposed) and then settled between 
the parties. 
 
The same officer made a similar decision in IMM-5962-11, another case of an Afghan family 
that fled to Pakistan because a daughter was being forced into marriage. Here, the male principal 
applicant told the visa officer that his father had promised in marriage his one-year-old daughter 
to his uncle, a local powerful warlord. Years later, the principal applicant and his daughter 
refused to honour the marriage. The applicant’s uncle threatened to kill the principal applicant 
and force the daughter into marriage. He took the applicant’s land and began threatening other 
children of the applicant. The daughter attempted to commit suicide by ingesting poison. The 
applicant told the visa officer that he sought the help of local police, who were unwilling to act 
against his uncle. In rejecting the case, visa officer Philippe de Varennes wrote: 
Story does not make a lot of sense. Normally, father arranges marriage. Not 
grandfather. It is also considered an honor to marry within the family. If a 





Here again, the visa officer not only fails to properly address gender persecution through the 
accepted legal framework, he makes light of forced marriage within the family, describing it as 
“an honor.” At the Federal Court, leave was granted (opposed) and judicial review was granted 
on the merits.127 Justice Heneghan determined that the visa officer applied the wrong legal test in 
assessing whether the applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution – he stated that he was 
“not convinced” and “not satisfied” that the applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution, 
instead of determining whether there was a “reasonable chance” that persecution would take 
place. Surprisingly, Justice Heneghan did not fault the visa officer’s assessment of the claim of 
gender-based persecution, beyond finding that his understanding around the “honor to marry 
with the family” was not based on the evidence: 
In this case, I am of the view that the Officer identified implausibilities that were 
not supported by the evidence, for example his finding that it “is also considered 
an honor to marry within the family”. The Officer gave no explanation for the 
source of this information. His manner of relying upon implausibilities, without 
identifying the evidentiary foundation, undermines his credibility findings. In 
these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Officer’s ultimate conclusion 




ii) Failure to consider gender-based violence as a Convention ground 
In another group of cases, visa officers failed to properly consider gender-based violence as a 
ground on which to recognize refugee status. In IMM-4126-12, for instance, a young Afghan 
woman who fled to Tajikistan told the visa officer that she fled Afghanistan to escape a cousin 
who wanted to force her into marriage. After her immediate family had opposed the union, her 
cousin killed her father and threatened to kill her entire immediate family if the marriage did not 
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go forward. When other family members continued to oppose the marriage, the cousin murdered 
the applicant’s sister and assaulted other family members. The visa officer who rejected the 
claim determined that the applicant’s situation did not amount to persecution on a Convention 
ground: 
I am not satisfied that this family situation amounts to the persecution of any or 
all of applicants as this appears to be more of a criminal issue within the family. 
The cousin may be a threat to the family; however in my opinion this is not 
persecution. This could happen anywhere in the world. Including Canada. 
 
It is also worth noting that, in this case, the visa officer’s assessment of the availability of state 
protection analysis is problematic in that it fails to consider whether the state efforts resulted in 
effective protection. 129 The visa officer added:  
In addition, even if I were to consider that Marina and family have a well-
founded fear of persecution. I am not satisfied that they have availed themselves 
to the protection of their country. When their cousin killed their father, he was 
arrested and put in jail. It appears that he served his time and was released. 
Justice was served in this case which demonstrates that the justice system in 
Kabul performed as it should. at least with respect to the crime of murder. When 
their sister was killed, the police arrived and were investigating their sister’s 
death; however the family decided to leave before the investigation was 
concluded. 
 
On judicial review, leave was granted unopposed and the application was settled parties. 
 
IMM-2248-12 is the case of an Eritrean woman who fled to Egypt. She told the visa officer that 
she left Eritrea because of domestic violence at the hands of her husband. She also stated that in 
Eritrea she had been detained by authorities after having been captured during a Pentecostal 
religious gathering. Her application was refused for the first time in 2010. The first visa officer 
did not accept that the applicant was a Pentecostal believer, and did not mention in her reasons 
the incidents of domestic violence. This refusal was judicially reviewed along with 40 other 
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similar refusals from the Cairo office and ultimately settled after the Federal Court issued its 
decisions in the four lead cases.130 The applicant was then interviewed by a different visa officer, 
at which point she submitted a letter from her local Pentecostal church. The second visa 
officer’s refusal notes state: 
States she left because of disagreement over religion in which children should be 
raised. Stated was beaten by husband, who was often drunk. Left husband in 
2007. Children stayed with her until 2009, when she flew to Egypt. Kids stayed 
with sister in Eritrea. Stated she left Eritrea because husband constantly 
threatening her. He wanted her to come back to him to serve him. 
Based on interview, am not convinced that PA qualifies as a refugee. Essentially, 
she left Eritrea over an ongoing domestic dispute. There was no well-founded 
fear of persecution. 
 
On judicial review, this case was granted leave unopposed and granted on consent. This is a 
troubling instance of an applicant finding herself trapped in a loop of refusal-JR settlement. The 
record does not show how the case was handled for the third determination. 
 
In IMM-3454-15, a Somali woman in her early twenties was interviewed in Ethiopia. She told 
the visa officer that a member of Al-Shabaab came to her shop and asked that she marry him, 
which she refused. This man then broke into her house, killed her brother, and assaulted her 
father. The applicant said that she escaped through a window and left the country shortly 
thereafter with the help of a neighbour. Despite the very specific claim presented by the 
applicant, the visa officer concluded that the applicant had failed to demonstrate how she was 
“personally affected.” The visa officer further noted that her experience with the member of Al 
Shabab was a “love-personal affair”: 
General statements — failed to demonstrate how you are personally affected, 
Also, is not one of the convention grounds, but more a love/personal affair and 
situation. 
 
                                                   
130 See section 5.4.7. 
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On judicial review, leave was granted opposed and the application discontinued. 
 
IMM-2368-12 is the case of an Afghan family that owned a gold shop. The principal applicant 
told the visa officer that his twin brother was kidnapped by a group of men who mistook him for 
the applicant. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of 200,000USD for the release of the brother. 
The applicant could only make a partial payment. The kidnappers agreed to release his brother 
after they were promised the balance of the ransom. After the release, the kidnappers threatened 
to kill the principal applicant if he did not pay them. Eventually, the kidnappers demanded that 
the principal applicant’s daughter be given in marriage in lieu of payment. The visa officer did 
not assess the threat of forced marriage, nor did he interview the daughter. Ultimately, he 
considered that the problems the applicants faced in Afghanistan were “criminal in nature”: 
I have reviewed file again and reviewed my notes. Description of brother’s 
kidnapping and subsequent request for ransom payment which lead PA and 
family to leave Afghanistan were criminal in nature. 
 
The judicial review application in this case was granted leave (unopposed) and discontinued by 
the applicant. It is likely that case was settled between the parties. 
 
IMM-5343-15 is a case that presents a multiplicity of shortcomings in decision-making, coupled 
with an extremely compelling case of gender-based violence. It is worth here providing fuller 
details about the case. The applicant was a Nepalese woman in her twenties. She wrote in her 
application that, when she was ten years old, a war broke out between the Royal Nepalese army 
and Maoist rebels. The applicant’s father had been a soldier in the Indian army and was 
perceived by the Maoists as an opponent of the movement. Throughout her teens, Maoist 
guerrillas demanded, amid both threats and violence, that the applicant join their movement. To 
escape the threats, the applicant’s mother brought the applicant to a nearby village to be married 
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to a man she had never met. Two months later, the applicant accompanied her new husband on a 
“business trip” to Mumbai, India. Her husband brought her to what she believed was a hotel. He 
left her there, and she realized that she had been sold into prostitution at a brothel. She was held 
captive and forced into sexual acts for twenty months, before finally escaping. She managed to 
find police officers, who forced her to perform sexual acts. After two days of captivity and 
sexual slavery, the police officers gave her a train ticket to the Nepalese border. The applicant 
managed to return to her home village. The Maoists, who had solidified their control of the 
territory, accused her of having left to avoid joining the movement and threatened her. The 
applicant was also threatened by fellow villagers who came to know that she had been the 
victim of sex trafficking in India and called her a “dirty girl.” Once again, the applicant left her 
village for the nearby town. A woman agreed to take the applicant to Thailand and help her find 
work. This woman was however arrested on drug charges in Thailand and the applicant was left 
alone. Contrary to IRCC practice, the applicant was interviewed by a male visa officer instead 
of a female visa officer. Oddly, the visa officer made his final assessment of the case more than 
two years after the interview took place. His assessment shows a troubling lack of sensitivity to 
gender-based violence and sex trafficking. The visa officer found that the applicant’s story of 
sex trafficking was “not credible” for the following reasons: 
… suddenly one evening after 15 months of forced prostitution, she opened the 
window and escaped. Just like that. … She injured herself during the escape and 
did not go to the hospital as she feared that the staff would notify the brothel. 
Instead, she went straight to the police to seek assistance. I do not find it credible 
that she escaped from the location where she was confined and ran straight to the 
police. She stated that she did not seek protection from the police in her own 
country so I do not find it credible that the first thing she did after escaping was 
to seek protection from the police in a foreign country. She also stated she feared 
that the hospital staff would notify the brothel yet she did not fear that the police 
would do the same. I also do not find this credible. Moreover, there would have 
been a language barrier with the police officers. I also do not find it credible that 
the police would have decided to abuse her for 2 days and then be so be so 
generous to provide her with a train ticket and money. 
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Again, the above assessment of the case was conducted more than two years after the interview, 
and the officer’s credibility concerns were not put to the applicant. The visa officer did not refer 
to any objective country documentation in discounting the applicant’s claim of sex trafficking as 
“not credible.” His assessment that the claim of the applicant is implausible relies solely on his 
own intuition of how a young Nepalese woman victim of sex trafficking would behave. It is 
apparent that the visa officer made no attempt to understand the dangers of women and girls 
sold into sex trafficking. On judicial review, the applicant’s counsel submitted to the court ten 
objective reports that confirm that trafficking of Nepalese women and girls is a significant 
problem, and that anti-trafficking policies are lacking. Leave was granted unopposed and 
judicial review was granted on consent. 
 
iii) Gender-based risk ignored 
There were many other cases in the dataset where a fear of gender-based persecution was 
asserted at the interview or in the written application and simply ignored by the visa officer. For 
instance, in IMM-4503-12, an Afghan family was interviewed at the Islamabad visa office. The 
male head of the family told the visa officer that members of the Taliban beat him after they 
discovered that he operated a video rental shop. He also told the visa officer that the family left 
Afghanistan in order to protect his daughters: 
ALSO MY DAUGHTERS WERE THERE. BECAUSE OF MY DAUGHTERS I 
LEFT. THEY WERE TAKING THE GIRLS. SO I CAME HERE. 
 
Following this exchange, the visa officer inquired into the principal applicant’s work 
experience, military experience, and education, but never asked what had happened to his 
daughters in Afghanistan, or what would happen to them if they returned. His assessment of the 
claim makes no mention of the risk faced by the applicant’s daughters: 
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HIS DEPARTURE FROM AFGHANISTAN, A RESULT OF THE INCIDENTS 
OF HARASSMENT THAT HE MENTIONED, CAME NEAR THE END OF 
THE TALIBAN REGIME. WHILE HIS SECOND INCIDENT WITH THE 
TALIBAN WAS VIOLENT, AND HE WAS INJURED, THERE WAS NO 
PERSISTENT MISTREATMENT. 
 
At the Federal Court, this case was perfected and discontinued before leave was decided.  
 
In IMM-2821-14, an Afghan woman was interviewed in Kyrgyzstan along with her Kyrgyz 
husband, her son and her daughter. The female principal applicant stated at the interview that 
she left Afghanistan with her family at the age of eleven because of the civil war. She married 
her husband, a Kyrgyz national, in Tajikistan, and later left for Kyrgyzstan. She told the visa 
officer that the family could not stay in Kyrgyzstan, because her husband was being threatened 
by men who killed his brother-in-law. In addition, she said that in order to obtain Kyrgyz 
citizenship through her husband, she would need to return to Afghanistan to get a document 
attesting that she had not been married before. She further mentioned at the interview that she 
had experienced discrimination because of her gender in Afghanistan, was prevented from 
attending school, and was forced to wear a hijab. She also expressed concerns about her children 
– including her daughter – not being able to attend school. The visa officer made a cursory 
reference to the risk the applicant and her daughter would face in Afghanistan because of their 
gender: 
I have considered that the applicant is of the female gender, has a school-aged 
daughter, and has been outside of Afghanistan for over 10 years. 
 
Ultimately, the visa officer determined that that the female applicant had not demonstrated a 
well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground, and further determined that the 
applicant could obtain citizenship in Kyrgyzstan. At the Federal Court, leave was granted 
(opposed), and judicial review was granted after a hearing. Justice McVeigh found that the visa 
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officer’s assessment of gender-based persecution was unreasonable: 
There were gender and education concerns regarding her children that were 
raised by the Applicant but the Officer did not deal with them. These areas are 
important to the claim and yet the Officer did not analyse these risks or address 
these additional grounds. 
 
I find fault with the Officer’s decision with regards to the human rights and 
conflict situation in Afghanistan without using a gender lens. The Applicant 
spoke to the system of education for girls in Afghanistan but the Officer appears 
to have avoided answering the question of whether the Applicant is at risk in 
Afghanistan by finding a durable solution in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
In addition the Board’s analysis on Afghanistan is incomplete and unreasonable. 
The Applicant stated that she did not want her children, one of whom is a girl, to 
have to study in Afghanistan. Which in my view is a valid inquiry to undertake 
and which brings the Applicant within the scope of section 147, as it suggests she 
may continue to be seriously and personally affected by human rights abuses.131 
 
 
In IMM-4049-14, a single Tamil female from Sri Lanka in her mid 30’s was interviewed 
through videoconference. In her written form, she wrote that Sri Lankan soldiers and Tamil 
paramilitaries had on numerous occasions taken her from her home and sexually assaulted her. 
At the interview, the visa officer did not refer to these assertions, and concluded that the risk 
was not personalized: 
The applicant was provided several opportunities at the interview to express why 
she faced a personalized subjective or objective fear of persecution if returned to 
Sri Lanka. PA was unable to provide specific details or examples of why she 
feared returning to Sri Lanka. 
 
As reviewed previously in section 5.4.1.2, a report was submitted on judicial review attesting to 
the fact that the applicant suffers from a cognitive deficit and had the mental capacity of a young 
child, which could have explained her difficulty in providing details of her experience. Given 
the claim of gender-based violence, and because of her obvious cognitive disability, the visa 
officer could have, at the very least, referred to the assertions made in the written application. At 
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the Federal Court, leave was granted leave (opposed) and the application was settled between 
the parties. 
 
In IMM-3211-15, IMM-3212-15, and IMM-3213-15, a 20-year-old Eritrean woman presented 
for an interview in Abu Dhabi, along with her adult brother and her parents. Her mother told the 
visa officer that she feared that both her son and her daughter would be forced into military 
service in Eritrea. The following exchange took place: 
Q: What do you believe would happen if you returned to Eritrea? 
We can return but our children will be put into military service forever. Your son 
or all or your children? Even daughters will be put into military service.  
Q: Your overage sons in the military - have they encountered any specific 
problems in Eritrean from the military authorities?  
They keep them forever. They don't even get pay.  
Q: Any other problems you would lace it you returned to Eritrea?  
The military service for my children is the only reason. 
 
The visa officer interviewed every member of the family, except the daughter. The notes 
indicate the following assessment with regards to the children’s application: 
In the case of children’s’ files, they have separate files but no further 
interviewing is required. Schedule 2 for all children are similar and state they 
face problems with limited education opportunities in KSA and that they cannot 
return to Eritrea due to mandatory military service. … While unfortunate 
compulsory military service itself does not make the children meet either s. 96 or 
R147. 
 
On judicial review, the applicant’s counsel submitted several reports on the atrocious treatment 
of women in the Eritrean national service, including this excerpt from UNHCR’s Eligibility 
Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Eritrea: 
Sexual violence against female conscripts within the military is being reported by 
human rights monitors. Some female conscripts are reportedly subject to sexual 
harassment and violence, including rape, by their supervisors. It is reported that 
female conscripts are coerced into having sex with commanders, including 
through threats of heavy military duties, harsh postings, and denial of home 
leave. Refusal to submit to sexual exploitation and abuse is allegedly punished by 
detention, torture and ill-treatment, including exposure to extreme heat and 
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limitation of food rations. No effective mechanism for redress and protection 
exists within or outside the military, and perpetrators generally go unpunished. 
 
All three linked applications were discontinued after having been perfected. 
 
In IMM-2274-11, two unmarried Somali sisters in their early twenties were interviewed in 
Kenya along with their uncle. All three told the visa officer that they left Somalia because of the 
civil war. Their uncle stated that the family home was attacked during a fight between Islamic 
courts and militias. The two sisters also told the visa officer that they feared being raped: 
WHY DID YOU LEAVE YOUR COUNTRY? THERE WAS BAD FIGHTING 
WITH KILLING, LOOTING AND RAPING. … 
ANY SOMALIS IS AT RISK, SO WHY ARE YOU MORE AT RISK THAN 
ANYBODY ELSE? I AM A LADY I AM AFRAID OF RAPE AND MY 
FRIENDS WERE KILLED. … 
CAN YOU RETURN TO SOMALIA? NO. WHY NOT? I WILL BE RAPED 
AND KILLED AND I DON'T KNOW WHERE MY PARENTS ARE. WHY 
WOULD YOU BE RAPED OR KILLED? MANY PEOPLE ARE KILLING 
YOUNG LADIES AND THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT. 
 
The visa officer rejected this application on credibility grounds. The visa officer also took issue 
with the fact that the sponsorship was initiated shortly after their arrival, suggesting that the 
sponsorship was probably in the works before they left. The visa officer made no effort to assess 
the applicant’s fear of being raped in Somalia, or consult objective documentation on the current 
situation of young single women in Somalia. At the Federal Court, this case was granted leave 
(opposed) and then settled between the parties. 
 
iv) Improving decision-making in gender-based claims 
The fourteen cases discussed in this section show troubling shortcomings in the assessment of 
gender-based claims. Visa officers often made insensitive assessments, showed a poor 
understanding of gender-based risk as a Convention ground, and sometimes altogether ignored 
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written or oral statements related to gender-based risk. As mentioned earlier, in the entirety of 
the dataset, there was not a single reference that the visa officer had consulted or considered the 
IRB’s Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution. Each of 
the reviewed cases had a positive outcome at the Federal Court. However, only two were heard 
on the merits. The other 12 - which include the most egregious cases - were settled and 
presumably sent for redetermination without the court weighing in on how it was decided. This 
is further evidence that judicial review plays a limited role in shaping decision-making practices 
in the overseas refugee system. The small likelihood of judicial review, combined with the 
practice of settling the most meritorious cases, arguably creates an environment where visa 
officers can become unconcerned with judicial oversight. It is crucial, in my assessment, to 
reinforce internal mechanisms of training and review with regard to gender-based claims. The 
2015 visa officer training material reviewed refers to the statement in Ward on gender as a 
particular social group, and also includes two fact patterns dealing with gender-based risk. The 
2020 training material, however, did not contain any reference to gender-based risk. 
 
5.4.3 Assessing testimony, personal documentation and country documentation 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of decision-making was the prevalence of glaring errors in the 
assessment of testimony and personal documentation. Problems were also identified in visa 
officer assessments of objective country documentation assessment. In fact, objective 
documentation was rarely relied on, and when invoked, visa officers often either misinterpreted 
it or appeared to cherry-pick among available documents. 
 
i) Applicant testimony 
Often, an applicant’s testimony is the only source of evidence available to the visa officer. Visa 
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officers note interviewees’ responses and review their notes before making a final decision. In 
more than 20 cases, visa officers made factual and determinative errors on the applicant’s 
testimony that are apparent on the face of case notes. Take for example IMM-3409-15, IMM-
3410-15, and IMM-3412-15, three linked cases concerning a Somali family interviewed in 
Djibouti who told the visa officer that they had fled because of the ongoing armed fighting in 
Somalia. The visa officer refused the case on credibility and identity grounds. The credibility 
finding rested on the applicant’s lack of knowledge of their clan. The visa officer wrote in the 
decision letter: 
I am not satisfied that you are a member of any of the classes prescribed because 
you were not able to provide credible explanation on the fact that you do not 
have knowledge of your clans and your sub clans. I found implausible that your 
father did not transfer this information to you because he was only trying to find 
food for his family. This response is not credible considering that the Somali 
society is organized and based on a clan system [emphasis mine]. 
 
The case notes reveal that the principal applicant – whom the visa officer confused with the 
principal applicant’s father in the decision letter – did, in fact, know their clan and sub-clan, but 
did not know the “sub-sub-clan”: 
VO: Nationality? Father: Somali 
VO: Ethnicity? Father: Rahanwen 
VO: Subclan? Father: Maymaye 
VO: Subsubclan? Does not know the clan. 
 
On judicial review, this case was granted leave unopposed and then discontinued. 
 
IMM-577-12 is the case of an Iranian applicant in Pakistan. The applicant told the visa officer 
that he and his siblings were targeted by Iranian authorities because of their activities as 
democracy and human rights activists. The applicant told the visa officer that he had been 
imprisoned and tortured after he attended a protest and that one of his brothers had been 
imprisoned for five years for organizing a protest. The visa officer found that the applicant was 
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not credible and that he would face no risk if he returned to Iran. The visa officer noted that the 
applicant’s brother and his sisters were living safely in Iran, despite the applicant having said in 
the interview that his two brothers were dead and that one sister was currently imprisoned 
because of her opposition to the Iranian regime. On the issue of credibility, the visa officer 
faulted the applicant for making contradictory statements about his age. Yet, a review of the 
case notes reveals that the applicant was entirely consistent about his age. On judicial review, 
Justice Boivin outlined the visa officer’s error: 
The applicant's year of birth is reported on his forms as being 1990… The 
applicant repeats twice during the interview that he is twenty-one (21) years old, 
which is consistent with a 1990 year of birth because the interview took place in 
2011… He also makes consistent statements about his age by stating he was 
seventeen (17) when his brother died in 2007 (again, consistent with a 1990 year 
of birth …) and turning eighteen (18) “this month” … (also consistent with a 
1990 year of birth …). 
 
In the CAIPS notes, the Officer states that the applicant said he was fourteen (14) 
when he came to Pakistan… In fact, the applicant stated he was 14 or 16… The 
age of sixteen (16) is in fact consistent with a year of birth of 1990 since he 
crossed the border in May 2006, as shown on the UNCHR papers. The only 
contradictory statement made by the applicant is an answer given using the 
Persian calendar where he stated year 1368 as his year of birth, and the officer 
added in parentheses “(1989) (22 YRS OLD)”… and while it is true that the 
NARA card provided by the applicant appears to contain errors, the applicant 
said “give it to me and I will explain”… but he was not offered an opportunity to 
provide his explanation to the Officer.132 
 
 
IMM-330-11 is the case of a Somali national who left Somalia as a child with his family in the 
early 1990s following the collapse of the Somali government. Afterwards, he lived with his 
family in Kenya. He told the visa officer that he returned to Somalia in 2001, and left again in 
2005, this time for Yemen. The visa officer determined that the applicant had no subjective fear, 
and that he left Somalia for economic reasons: 
                                                   
132 Mezbani v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 1115. 
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You stated that you came to Yemen as you were expecting a better life, good jobs 
and good schools. You were unable to explain what events led you to leave 
Somalia other than the fact that you left for reasons of employment. 
 
The interview notes show that, in fact, the applicant consistently stated that he left Somalia 
because of the civil war: 
Why couldn't you have gone straight from Kenya to Yemen? … 
I did not have enough money to go directly from Kenya to Yemen. I wanted to 
live here as a refugee. Why? It is because in Somalia there is a civil war. 
But you went back to Somalia, that doesn't explain why you wanted to come to 
Yemen? My main destination was Yemen. … 
Go back to Somalia? There is a civil war. You went there once to Bossaso? 
Even in Bossaso the situation is not good. I heard on ratio/tv some people being 
killed. … 
Expressed my concerns to PA that he came to Yemen looking for better 
economic opportunities and not fleeing from persecution 
I left from Somalia, main reason was civil war and was expecting to find 
something better but was the same [emphasis mine]. 
 
At the Federal Court, leave was granted (opposed) and judicial review was granted on consent. 
 
ii) Personal documentation and other personal evidence 
Flawed analyses of personal documentation were also quite common in the dataset. IMM-5655-
15 involves an Afghan family in Pakistan whose application was rejected because the visa 
officer did not believe the applicants “resided” in Pakistan and concluded that they were not 
credible. The officer’s conclusion with respect to the applicant’s residence was based on a 
number of factors, including the fact that the applicants had no “Tazkira cards”, and the fact that 
the utility bill submitted by the applicant was in a different name than the name of their 
landlord. The officer’s credibility concerns rested on the fact that the applicant’s allegation 





No POR cards, or Tazkiras. 
RESIDENCY: Where are you living? Karum Colony #5. How long have you 
lived there? Six years. Who is your landlord? [redacted by author]. 
How much do you pay for you gas/electric? Some time more some time less. 
How much do you pay? Whatever it is. The bills are in a different name than 
what you stated can you explain? Those are the papers we are given. … 
Why did you leave? Because my wife’s brothers were taken by the Taliban. … 
Narrative in schedule two does not mention any of this.  
 
As it turns out, each finding was erroneous. The applicants had submitted to the visa officer 
Tazkira cards. They had even used their Tazkira cards to enter the embassy premises. The name 
on the utility bills, too, matched that of the applicant’s landlord, as stated at the interview. The 
applicant’s Schedule 2 form provided details of the female applicant’s brothers being captured 
by the Taliban. It is also worth mentioning that many other documents establishing residence 
were submitted, and went unaddressed by the visa officer, including birth certificates, school 
transcripts, and tuition fee sheets. The judicial review application was settled after having been 
perfected. 
 
IMM-2890-14 is a case of an Afghan family applying in Russia. The visa officer determined 
that the family could locally integrate in Russia. This assessment rested on the fact that the 
applicants had been issued “Russian passports”: 
I have reviewed your response to the procedural fairness letter which outlined the 
concern that you may have a durable solution in Russia. You have provided 
copies of Russian passports for yourself and your dependents. I am therefore 
satisfied that you have a durable solution in Russia and your file is refused 
pursuant to section 139 of the Regulations. 
 
In fact, what the applicants had submitted were not “Russian passports”, but temporary travel 
documents. Judicial review was granted on the merits for that reason.133 
 
                                                   
133 Rahim v Canada (MCI) (2 July 2015), IMM-2890-14 (FC). 
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In IMM-5349-49, Afghan applicants were denied the opportunity to resettle because the visa 
officer believed they did not reside in Pakistan but had repatriated to Afghanistan. The 
applicants submitted several documents establishing residence, including utility bills, affidavits 
from past and present landlords, school transcripts, confirmation of student status, confirmation 
of transcripts, employer performance reports, and a death certificate. The bulk of the documents 
were simply ignored by the visa officer. With regard to the death certificate, one of the few 
submitted documents mentioned by the visa officer, the notes indicate: 
Where did your husband pass away? At home. (death certificate no date provided 
on document). 
 
On judicial review, the applicants noted that the death certificate in fact did include a 
registration date. The judicial review application was settled before leave was decided. 
 
In IMM-3630-11, an Ethiopian couple told the visa officer that they had been displaced by the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea War. The female applicant had been detained by Ethiopian authorities on the 
suspicion of supporting the opposition. The visa officer was not satisfied that the applicants 
were credible or that they had established their identity. The decision letter reads: 
I have determined that you are not a member of any at the classes prescribed 
because I did not find you credible on several material aspects of your 
application for permanent residence and refugee claim. As you have not provided 
any identification for yourself, I am not satisfied of your Identity. Therefore, you 
do not meet the requirements of this paragraph [emphasis mine]. 
 
Not only did the visa officer fail to bring up the issue of identity at the interview, it was 
established on judicial review that the applicants had submitted to the visa officer various 
identity documents, including a UNHCR registration document. Judicial review was granted on 




IMM-5360-15 is the case of a Somali man who left Somalia because he was being forced to join 
Al Shabaab during the civil war. The visa officer in Pretoria reasoned that, since the applicant 
had obtained refugee status in South Africa, he could locally integrate. The document provided 
by the applicant was, however, not a proof of refugee status, but an asylum seeker temporary 
permit, a permit that protects a refugee claimant from removal until their asylum claim is heard. 
At the Federal Court, the judicial review application was perfected and then discontinued before 
leave was decided. 
 
IMM-8604-11 is another case where the visa officer wrongly understood an applicant’s status 
documents in South Africa. The visa officer wrote in the CAIPS notes that he believed the male 
applicant would be granted refugee status because his spouse had been “conditionally approved” 
for refugee status: 
Spouse has been conditionally approved by the Refugee Board in South Africa; 
as a result it is reasonable to believe that her spouse will also be granted refugee 
status as a result of their relationship. 
 
In this case, there was no evidentiary basis for the visa officer’s conclusion that the male 
applicant would be granted refugee status through his spouse. More importantly, the documents 
provided to the visa officer showed not only that the principal applicant’s refugee claim had 
been rejected in 2008, but that his spouse’s refugee claim had also been rejected, and that she 
was awaiting an appeal. The judicial review application was perfected and discontinued. 
 
IMM-3413-12 is one of the rare cases in the dataset where the refusal was based on the 
successful establishment criteria. The case involves Somali adult siblings who were interviewed 
by a visa officer in Ethiopia. They told the visa officer that they were from a minority clan 
targeted in Ethiopia. The visa officer was concerned with the applicant’s establishment potential 
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in Canada since they would be relying on support from a brother. The visa officer determined 
that the brother was without status in Canada, and that applicants wrongly believed him to be 
their sponsor: 
Pa & all x-ref's believe that this brother is their sponsor, to the point where they 
confirmed that their brother completed the forms and that he would support them 
upon their arrival in CDA. However, his name does not appear anywhere on the 
forms (not listed under siblings on SCHED 2 which he reportedly completed) or 
on sponsorship applications. I have strong concerns regarding why he is 
concealing his identity, and whether or not he has legal status in CDA. I therefore 
have concerns regarding their ability to adapt, and the reliance of these 5 persons 
… on someone in CDA without legal status who could possibly be removed from 
CDA at any time. 
 
It was made clear on judicial review that the applicants’ statements were correct: their brother in 
Canada was their co-sponsor, and his name was indicated on the form, which had been approved 
by CIC. He therefore had at least permanent resident status in Canada, as only permanent 
residents and citizens are allowed to sponsor refugees. The judicial review application was 
discontinued after having been granted leave unopposed. 
 
The last case reviewed in this section is IMM-2805-15. This is a case of an Afghan family of 
Hazara ethnicity interviewed at the Islamabad visa office. At the interview, the visa officer had 
some concerns over the authenticity of the submitted school records. The principal applicant 
stated in his affidavit submitted on judicial review that the visa officer said that he would verify 
the authenticity of the document with the issuing school, and that if the school did not confirm 
the authenticity of the documents, the applicants would be called in for a second interview. The 
possibility of a second interview is not noted in the case notes. What the case notes do indicate 
is that following the interview, the visa officer contacted the school principal, who confirmed 
that the documents were not authentic. The applicants were never called in for a second 
interview. The applicants submitted on judicial review a letter from the same school principal 
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denying having ever told the visa officer that the documents were fraudulent. The judicial 
review application was settled after having been perfected. 
 
iii) Objective country documentation 
CIC’s 2011 evaluation of decision-making in the PSR program concluded that visa officers were 
not relying on objective country documentation sufficiently: 
Knowledge of conditions in the applicant’s country of origin is an important 
element in assessing a protection claim. The results show that the record clearly 
cited sources of COI to support the decision in 8 percent of cases. An additional 5 
percent of cases noted COI in the decision, but did not provide a reference to its 
source. In the remaining 87 percent of files, no direct reference was made to 
sources of COI. For refused cases, 16 percent of records had direct or indirect 
citations for COI.134 
 
 
The use of country documentation seems to have slightly improved, at least in quantitative 
terms. Country documents were cited by visa officers in 22.55% in this study’s dataset. 
However, a closer look at these decisions reveals that in many cases (over 30) the assessment of 
country documentation was problematic. In addition, in a further 36 cases, the visa officer 
mentioned that they had relied on “country documents” or “reports” without citing which 
documents were used. In the cases where documents were cited, visa officers often relied on 
reports that supported their conclusion, while discounting without explanation other 
contradictory publicly available documents. In some cases, the visa officer’s interpretation of a 
section of a report was contradicted by other sections of the same report. Refugee lawyers refer 
to this practice as “cherry-picking.” Cherry-picking was especially prevalent in the case of 
Afghan refugees, where visa officers frequently relied on boilerplate text. It seems that in many 
Afghan cases, visa officers are not fully aware of the content of the reports they routinely cite in 
                                                   
134 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 11 at para 4.4. 
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their notes. The same is true of the reports cited in cases decided in South Africa, reviewed in 
section 5.4.1.4. Four cases are reviewed in this section to illustrate the kind of shortcomings 
identified in visa officers’ assessment of country conditions documents. 
 
IMM-3595-15 is a case of an Afghan Hazara Ismaili family that feared persecution at the hands 
of mujahideen because of their ethnicity and religion. The visa officer determined that the 
applicants could safely repatriate to Afghanistan. In her notes, the visa officer cited a number of 
reports indicating that the situation for Hazaras has improved since the end of the Taliban 
regime, that Hazaras are now safe at least in some parts of Afghanistan, and that millions of 
Afghans have repatriated from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Justice Southcott allowed the judicial 
review on the ground that the visa officer had not properly assessed country conditions 
documents. Justice Southcott found that not only were the documents cited not fully supportive 
of the visa officer’s conclusion, there were also outdated, and contradicted by several more 
recent documents provided by the applicant: 
The difficulty is that, as emphasized by the Applicant, the reference in the UK 
COI Report is to an article from the National Geographic magazine that appears 
to be significantly outdated. The UK COI Report, while itself dating to February 
2013, refers to this National Geographic article as being an undated article that 
was accessed on October 1, 2012. However, the Applicant points out that the 
paragraphs quoted from the article indicate it to date to a period six years after 
the Taliban fell, which the parties agree was in 2001. As such, the Applicant 
correctly characterizes this as an article appearing to date back to 2007.135 
 
 
Hazara Shiite Afghan applicants in Pakistan were handed a similar decision in IMM-3215-15. 
The visa officer in that case cited a few documents as supporting the position that Hazara 
refugees can now live safely in Afghanistan. On judicial review, Justice LeBlanc took issue with 
                                                   
135 Haidari v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 263 at paras 27-28. 
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the visa officer’s reliance on outdated reports. Justice LeBlanc also found that the visa officer 
had not addressed contradictory information included in the cited documents: 
…the Officer’s GCMS ignores more recent reports of targeted attacks against 
Hazaras in Kabul. … 
 
While the Officer recognizes that the security situation in many parts of 
Afghanistan is still difficult, the Officer does not explain why she disregarded 
evidence contradicting her finding that the Applicant and his family will not 
suffer a reasonable chance of persecution due to their Hazara ethnicity if they 
were to return to Kabul nor does she refer to evidence directly contradicting her 
finding on this issue.136 
 
 
IMM-6254-14 is another case involving Hazara Afghan applicants in Pakistan. In that case, the 
visa officer determined that the applicants were not residing in Pakistan and had in fact 
repatriated to Afghanistan. The visa officer relied on reports indicating that millions of Afghans 
had repatriated from Pakistan. The officer also relied on the fact that the applicant had no POR 
card. The following boilerplate text which appears in numerous decisions on Afghan refugees 
appears in the case notes, followed by a short conclusion: 
According to reports from the UNHCR, from 2005 to late 2006, the Government 
of Pakistan with assistance from the UNHCR began and completed a registration 
process of all Afghans living in the country, with a reported registration of 2.15 
million persons. During the process nearly the entire Afghan community was 
registered. … Since 2002, more than 4.7 million Afghans have returned from 
Pakistan under the biggest facilitated voluntary return programme conducted by 
the UNHRC. … Reports from the UNHRC indicate that returnees form a quarter 
of the current total population of Afghanistan, while as many as 1.6 million 
registered Afghans remain in exile in Pakistan. I am not satisfied that PA’s reside 
in Pakistan as stated and find it more likely that they have repatriated or 
otherwise reside in Afghanistan, their country of nationality. … 
 
Judicial review was granted by Justice Barnes. She found that the visa officer’s assessment of 
the registration process was incomplete, and also unverifiable because it is not cited: 
                                                   
136 Qurban Ali Barat v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 443 at paras 12, 14-15. 
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Mr. Rahimi told the Officer during his interview that he was not required, and 
had no need, to register. He also stated, “a lot of Afghans are living without these 
cards”. … they were not given an opportunity to produce corroborative evidence 
about the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan who were unregistered. This 
type of information should have been readily available and may well have been 
reported by the UNHCR. But because the Officer neglected to note the source of 
the UNHCR data he relied on and failed to include that reference material in the 
Certified Tribunal Record (CTR), it is impossible to put the cited registration 
data into its proper context. …137 
 
 
In IMM-1566-11, a Rwandan man and his family were assessed at the Nairobi visa office. The 
principal applicant told the visa officer that he was a local organizer for an opposition party in 
Rwanda, the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), which had been ordered to dissolve in 
2003. He told the visa officer that he was targeted by authorities because of his involvement in 
the party. He was arrested and imprisoned three times, was beaten, and his wife and daughter 
were also attacked. The applicants submitted in their application several publicly accessible 
documents reporting harms suffered by former supporters of the MDR party. The visa officer 
determined that neither the applicant nor his family would not be at risk in Rwanda: 
I have reviewed country of origin information (COI), including reports 
referenced in submissions from PA’s legal counsel in Canada (attached to file). It 
is well documented that supporters and members of MDR were detained during 
the 2003 election. However, I have not found evidence that former members or 
supporters of MDR of comparable rank to PA (or their family members) have 
faced persecution following the 2003 elections. 
 
On judicial review, Justice Beaudry noted that, in fact, the reports listed by the visa officer 
presented evidence that members of opposition parties or former political parties are currently at 
risk of persecution. 
 
                                                   
137 Rahimi v Canada (MCI) (Sept 15, 2021), IMM-6254-14 (FC) at para 4. 
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The cases reviewed in this section show that visa officers sometimes fail to consider the specific 
circumstances of a claim. Many of the shortcomings identified in this section, I believe, can be 
attributed to processing pressures and the fact that visa officers have a limited amount of time 
for each application. Significant and persistent processing pressures have been reported as 
hindering visa officers’ ability to conduct thorough evaluations in other contexts.138 Had the visa 
officers been able to devote more time to the review notes and personal documents, or had they 
been able to access an audio recording of the interview, one can hypothesize that these types of 
errors would be less common. The issue of cherry-picking country documents is a more difficult 
one, one related only partially to processing pressures. As discussed in section 5.4.1.4, it appears 
visa officers cite country condition documents without having fully reviewed them. CIC’s 2011 
evaluation had recommended the development of country information packages similar to those 
by the IRB.139 It is unclear whether such a tool has been developed. There was no reference to 
such a document package in any of the decisions reviewed or in the training material disclosed. 
 
5.4.4 Assessing local integration as a durable solution 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, refugee resettlement is considered one of three “durable solutions” 
for refugees, the other two being local integration and voluntary repatriation. Chapter 2 also 
provided an overview of the problematic relationship between durable solutions and norms of 
international refugee law, as well as an overview of historical shifts in the international refugee 
regime’s conceptualization of durable solutions. The three durable solutions are not defined in 
international refugee law. Over time, however, a relative international consensus has emerged 
around definitions proposed by the UNHCR. In Canadian refuge law, the term “durable 
                                                   
138 See Vic Satzewich, Points of Entry: How Canada’s Immigration Officers Decide Who Gets In (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2015) at 105. 
139 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 11 at para 4.7. 
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solutions” appears in the IRPR, but is not defined. Section 139(1)(d) provides that resettlement 
is only available to refugees who do not have a durable solution within a reasonable period: 
139 (1) A permanent resident visa shall be issued to a foreign national in need of 
refugee protection, and their accompanying family members, if following an 
examination it is established that … 
… 
(d) the foreign national is a person in respect of whom there is no reasonable 
prospect, within a reasonable period, of a durable solution in a country other than 
Canada, namely 
(i) voluntary repatriation or resettlement in their country of nationality or 
habitual residence, or 
(ii) resettlement or an offer of resettlement in another country… 
 
 
Interestingly, local integration is not mentioned specifically in this provision, and the term 
“namely” would suggest that the list introduced is exhaustive. Nevertheless, all actors in the 
refugee resettlement programs operate under the assumption that the term “durable solution” in 
section 139 includes local integration. It is also worth mentioning that the concept of durable 
solutions, being unique to the resettlement context, is rather underdeveloped in Canadian law. In 
this section, I investigate how visa officers and IRCC interpret and apply local integration as a 
durable solution, and assess to what extent the concept of local integration in Canadian law 
conforms with principles developed in the international refugee regime. 
 
The most authoritative statement on local integration is found in UNHCR’s Resettlement 
Handbook. Local integration is therein defined as 
… a legal, economic and socio-cultural process aiming at providing the refugee 
with the permanent right to stay in the country of asylum, including, in some 
situations, as a naturalized citizen. Local integration follows the formal granting 
of refugee status, whether on an individual or prima facie basis, and assistance to 
settle in order for the refugee to live independently within the community.140 
… 
                                                   
140 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 118 at para 1.3.4. 
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If local integration is to be a viable solution, it requires (i) agreement by the host 
country concerned; and (ii) an enabling environment that builds on the resources 
refugees bring with them, both of which implicitly contribute to the prevention of 
further displacement. Local integration should be seen as a gradual process that 
takes place through three interrelated dimensions: 
 
• legal: refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights (similar 
to those enjoyed by citizens) leading eventually to permanent residency 
and, in some situations, to naturalization; 
• economic: refugees gradually become less dependent on aid from the 
country of asylum or on humanitarian assistance and become increasingly 
self-reliant to support themselves and contribute to the local economy; 
• social and cultural: the interaction between refugees and the local 
community allows refugees to participate in the social life of their new 
country without fear of discrimination or hostility while not obliged to 
abandon their own culture. 
… 
There are serious constraints to local integration. Some asylum countries are not 
signatories to universal or regional instruments concerning refugees and/or do not 
apply practices akin to the rights enumerated under the 1951 Convention. 
General socio-economic conditions, the desire to protect scarce resources, the 
risk of security problems, concerns about migration, and potential antagonism 
towards refugees or migrants in general often prevent the local integration of 
refugees. Obstacles to local integration grow when stagnated local economies 
increase competition in the labour market, exacerbate the struggle over already 
limited resources, and trigger xenophobia [emphases mine].141 
 
 
Local integration, following this definition, is far more than the granting of refugee status and 
the protection against refoulement. In other words, protection alone is not solution, although 
there is no doubt that there can be no solution without protection. Solution in the country of 
asylum also requires integration. The UNHCR expressly recognizes that socioeconomic 
conditions, security problems, and xenophobia can be barriers to local integration. UNHCR’s 
Resettlement Handbook, a piece of international soft law, is not binding in Canadian law. The 
Supreme Court has however acknowledged in Ward that the handbook has acquired a de facto 
authority in national courts: 
                                                   
141 Ibid at 1.3.4. 
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While not formally binding on signatory states, the Handbook has been endorsed 
by the states which are members of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, 
including Canada, and has been relied upon by the courts of signatory states.142 
 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, James Hathaway points out that local integration is, at minimum, the 
enjoyment of full refugee rights, not only the protection against refoulement. Full refugee rights 
include religious rights, property and intellectual property rights, the right of association, access 
to courts, employment rights, housing rights, education rights, the right to freedom of 
movement, the right to identity documents, the right to travel documents, the right to fair fiscal 
treatment, and the right to transfer one’s assets. 143  Hathaway also points out that only 
naturalization can formally put an end to a person’s refugee status and thus truly be considered a 
‘solution’ to the person’s refugee status. 
 
Already, the conceptualization of local integration under the IRPR is at odds with the concept as 
defined by the UNHCR, insofar as applicants are disqualified from resettlement not only if they 
have locally integrated, but if it is deemed that they can locally integrate within a reasonable 
period, the length of which is unspecified.144 The prospective nature of the local integration 
analysis under the IRPR does not fit easily with the highly contextualized and personalized 
analysis proposed by the UNHCR. In addition, the definition of local integration in IRCC 
guidelines only partly mirrors that of the UNHCR. 
                                                   
142 Canada (AG) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689 at para 27. See also Elyasi v Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 419 at para 
28; Al-Anbagi v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 273 at para 22. 
143 James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 979 [The Rights of Refugees]. 
144 According to IRCC’s processing guidelines, what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” is a question of 
fact to be determined by the visa officer and can vary depending on the circumstances: 
If the civil and human rights of the applicant are respected in the country where they are 
currently living, a reasonable period of time may be longer than that for an individual who is 
not permitted to work, for example (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas 
Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 13.2). 
	263	
	
Local integration is a long-lasting solution to a refugee’s situation. It is more than 
the granting of safe conditions of asylum, which is a key obligation of signatories 
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Local integration is an 
enhanced status that signatories are encouraged, though not required, to offer to 
refugees who have sought asylum within their borders. Local integration allows 
refugees to participate broadly in the host society. In reality, relatively few major 
countries of first asylum provide refugees with opportunities for local integration. 
 
Local integration allows the refugee to live permanently in safety and dignity in 
the country of refuge and partake of its enduring legal, economic and social 
benefits. While ideally sanctioned by law, CIC recognizes that even where 
benefits are not legally conferred, in some cases the refugee may be de facto 
locally integrated as a result of actual enduring conditions. Conversely, where 
benefits are legally extended to refugees but factors such as widespread 
discrimination by the host society prevent real access to those benefits, then local 
integration has not occurred [emphases mine].145 
 
In fact, the guidelines explicitly recognize that there is no binding definition of local integration 
and that the departmental definition may diverge from the UNHCR’s: 
Although the UNHCR uses its own definition, there is no binding legal definition 
of the concept of “local integration”. As a result, Departmental guidelines may 
not mirror the UNHCR definition in every respect. … 
… 
Determining whether or not local integration can or has occurred requires careful 
analysis by the visa officer of both country conditions, the applicant’s individual 
circumstances and a comparison of these circumstances to the Department’s 
guidelines described here [emphases mine].146 
 
 
The notion of de facto integration outside national legal frameworks is not one that is 
contemplated in the UNHCR’s conceptualization of local integration. Further, what is lacking 
from this definition is the notion that general social, economic, and security conditions may pose 
a barrier to local integration. While it does not necessarily follow that those considerations are 
irrelevant, cases from the dataset reveal that visa officers are indeed not concerned with “general 
conditions” in their assessment of local integration. Moreover, the view that general conditions 
                                                   




are irrelevant to local integration seems to have led to a conceptual slippage where visa officers 
replace the local integration assessment with the Convention refugee definition. Indeed, in the 
dataset, visa officers frequently considered that a refugee has locally integrated if he or she 
would not be able to claim refugee status against the host state. Again, local integration and 
refugee status are distinct concepts with different foundations in international refugee law. In 
addition, many visa officer decisions in the dataset showed a troubling disregard both for actual 
legal status, and for incidents of xenophobia and discrimination.  
 
In the following analysis, the case of South Africa figures prominently. The bulk of cases 
rejected on local integration involved applicants in South Africa, a signatory state to the 
Refugee Convention. A 2015 survey conducted by the Canadian Council for Refugees shows 
that sponsors are particularly concerned with such refusals, with one sponsor noting: 
South Africa illustrates that visa officers have the freedom to decide one way or 
the other. About two-thirds of my RSA cases were refused for the durable 
solution reason; the rest got here. The de facto situation on the ground should be 
given more weight than the de jure override…147 
 
 
i) Local integration and generalized risk: conceptual confusion? 
The refusal of visa officers to consider ‘generalized risk’ as an impediment to local integration 
was frequent in cases decided in South Africa. In these cases, the local integration analysis often 
overlapped with the heavy reliance on the boilerplate country document analysis reviewed in 
section 5.4.1.4. In IMM-96-13, for example, a visa officer found that a Somali man who had 
refugee status in South Africa had locally integrated, despite the fact that the applicant stated 
that Somalis were routinely victims of xenophobic attacks in South Africa. In the visa officer’s 
                                                   
147 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Survey of Refusals of Privately Sponsored Refugees - Summary of 
Results” (2015) [“Survey of Refusals”]. 
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assessment, since crime is widespread in South Africa, it cannot be an impediment to local 
integration: 
Applicants have not been subjected to xenophobic violence. They fear crime but 
South Africa is a violent place with lots of crime. In this they are no different 
than any other resident or citizen of South Africa. 
 
 
A similar conclusion was reached in IMM-4927-15. In this case, the applicant reported being the 
victim of ethnically motivated robberies, and that the police would not provide effective 
protection. The visa officer concluded: 
While the PA and spouse have been victims of robberies, so has almost the entire 
South African population – citizens, PRs, foreign nationals and diplomats alike. 




Another Somali applicant was found to have a durable solution in South Africa in IMM-3456-
15. In that case, the applicant reported having been attacked, shot and left for dead. He told the 
visa officer that he sought the protection of the police on several occasions but the authorities 
were unable to protect him. The visa officer reasoned: 
The PA has been a victim of crime in RSA. The shop he worked in was robbed 
and he was injured in the robbery. The police however were contacted and a case 
opened and the applicant received a case number. Applicant provided no 
evidence that he was the victim of xenophobic violence rather a victim of the 
level of crime that exists in RSA. 
 
 
There was similar reasoning in IMM-3722-15, the case of a female Eritrean national with 6 
children in South Africa. She told the visa officer that she was robbed in South Africa, and that 
officials had demanded bribes to extend her refugee status. The visa officer noted the following: 
PA indicates that she has been robbed many times, that she used to call the police 
but got discouraged as the crimes went unsolved. It is noted that there is a high 
	266	
	
incidence of crime in RSA which is something that has an impact on everyone 
living in RSA. … 
While it is regrettable that the applicant has been a victim of crime in RSA, 
applicant did not provide any evidence that she has been a victim of xenophobic 
violence, rather a victim of the level of crime that exists in RSA for everyone. 
 
 
IMM-3962-15 concerns a family from the Democratic Republic of Congo who told the visa 
officer that they felt that the local population was hostile to their presence and that their 
daughter was afraid of walking to school. The principal applicant also told the visa officer that 
he had been the victim of a robbery during which his friend was stabbed. The following 
exchange took place: 
Unfortunately robberies happen in any country and unfortunately bad things 
happen. When this happened what did you do? A: Well we called the police. Q: 
And? A: And they came and investigated Q: So the police responded the same 
way they would for a South African citizen? A: I'm not sure how they respond to 
South African citizens. 
 
 
In IMM-3933-15, a case concerning a Rwandan woman seeking refuge in South Africa, the 
applicant told the visa officer that she feared xenophobic attacks and that she had been attacked 
and stabbed on her way home from school. The visa officer considered that the fact that she was 
able to obtain medical treatment after the attack was an indication that she had locally integrated 
in South Africa: 
Q: Did you go to the hospital? A: Yes. Q: Was it a government hospital? A: Yes. 
Q: So the RSA government provided you medical care? Yes. Q: How much did 
you pay? A: Nothing.  
Q: So you receive free medical care? A: Yes.  
Q: That’s better than in some first world countries where they don't have free 
medical aid. A: I guess. … 
Based on the evidence before me. I am satisfied that the PA has a durable 
solution in RSA. She has the same rights as a RSA citizen and a clear pathway to 
citizenship. She has the ability to avail herself of the protection of the police 
should she be the victim of crime and this is the same situation he [SIC] would 
himself [SIC] in Europe, Canada or elsewhere. Application refused. 
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The finding of a durable solution in the context of widespread criminality is not unique to South 
Africa. In IMM-12748-12, a visa officer found that an Eritrean family had a durable solution in 
Sudan. The visa officer considered that police extortion could not be an impediment to local 
integration as it is commonplace in the region: 
Only problem in Sudan was police attempt to extort money (pulled over while 
driving). Very common all over this region. 
 
 
This approach to generalized crime is certainly inconsistent with the principles established by 
the UNHCR, and also, perhaps, inconsistent with IRCC’s own criteria, which refers to “safety.” 
Nevertheless, the approach has been endorsed by the Federal Court.148 In my view, the definition 
of local integration adopted by the Federal Court departs from the UNHCR’s definition in many 
respects. In Barud, for example, the Federal Court suggested that the local integration 
assessment is less stringent than the test for state protection: 
The standard for a durable solution differs from the test for state protection. In 
the latter case, the question is whether the claimant will face a well-founded fear 
of persecution on return to his or her country of origin, given the state’s resources 
and willingness to protect the person. In the case of a “durable solution”, the 
state’s plans and intentions, as compared to its existing capacity and desire, is far 
more relevant.149 
 
A similar conclusion was reached in Abdi: 
                                                   
148 In Muled Ismail Shiek Mahamed v Canada (MCI) (17 December 2015), IMM-2646-15 (FC), 
Justice Gascon wrote at para 11: 
The finding of a durable solution is a forward-looking exercise, where the focus is on the 
state’s plans and intentions. … A durable solution analysis does not have to feature a 
consideration of the ability of the state to protect. Neither is the high risk of crime faced by 
the general population a deterrent to a finding of a durable solution. … [I]n a durable 
solution analysis, the state’s plans and intentions, as compared to its existing capacity and 
desire, are far more relevant [sources omitted]. 
In that case, the Federal Court refused to certify a question to that effect for the purposes of appeal. Similar 
questions for certifications were refused in Barud v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1152, Ahmed Sheik Hussein v 
Canada (MCI) (25 November 2015), IMM-1097-15 (FC) and Abdi v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1050. 
149 Barud, ibid at para 16. 
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…a durable solution analysis does not require a finding that there is an existing 
ability of the state to protect. What was relevant and to be considered were the 




Granted, these passages are not entirely clear. Insofar as the Federal Court would allow a 
finding of local integration where a state is unable to protect a person from the harms identified 
in the Refugee Convention or section 97 of the IRPA, this interpretation is extremely 
problematic and inconsistent with the core principles of the international refugee regime. Still, 
even the consideration that a person’s actual integration is much less relevant than a host state’s 
apparent plans to integrate refugees opens the door to perpetual findings that a durable solution 
is “forthcoming.” 
 
ii) Xenophobia and local integration 
UNHCR’s Resettlement Handbook refers to “xenophobia” and “antagonism towards refugees or 
migrants” as potential obstacles to local integration. IRCC’s processing guidelines state that 
“widespread discrimination” can prevent access to local integration. In a few cases decided in 
South Africa, when claimants asserted that they feared xenophobic attacks, visa officers found 
that because they had not yet been personally targeted, they could therefore locally integrate. 
For example, in IMM-992-11, a young Rwandan man seeking refuge in South Africa told the 
visa officer that he feared xenophobic attacks, and that he had stayed home for two months 
during a documented wave of attacks. The visa officer noted that xenophobic attacks are 
widespread in South Africa, and wrote the following: 
The applicant did not indicate that he has ever suffered any xenophobic attacks in 
South Africa in the past 5 years he has been here. … Even if the applicant were 
                                                   
150 Abdi v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1050 at para 25. 
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to meet either of the criteria I note that the applicant appears to have a 
satisfactory durable solution in South Africa. 
 
 
If we accept that the local integration analysis is to be strictly forward-looking, the absence of 
the materialization of the risk in the past should not so easily lead to a conclusion of local 
integration. What is more, even when applicants declared having been victims of discrimination 
or xenophobic violence in South Africa, visa officers in many cases considered that those 
attacks did not result from discrimination or xenophobia, but from general criminality. In other 
cases, a claim of xenophobic attacks was simply ignored. In IMM-96-13, IMM-3456-15, and 
IMM-4927-15, cited in the previous section, the applicants had experienced personal incidents 
of violence or discrimination which they attributed to xenophobia. A specific claim of 
xenophobic violence was made and discounted in another eight cases processed in South Africa. 
For example, in IMM-9101-11, the following exchange took place between a Somali applicant 
and the visa officer: 
Q: Why do you feel that you do not have a durable solution in RSA? 
A: It is not safe for foreigners. I have been very robbed and beaten on two 
occasions. 
 
The visa officer concluded: 
Although he has been the victim of two robberies and a violent attack in South 
Africa, all three were motivated by money. Although the CDT believes that they 
may also have been racially motivated, on all occasions, the police were called 
and investigations were opened. The CDT was extended the help of the local 
authorities as well as offered medical assistance. 
 
 
In IMM-6393-14, a Somali applicant told the visa officer about two extremely violent attacks he 




WHY CAN’T YOU STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
… Many times they are attacking. South African people hate us. I have a knife 
scar on my left arm. In 2012 … they attacked us. We were sleeping. They broke 
down the door and entered the shop. … They opened fire. … One was killed. 
Did you call the police? No because they took our phones. 
Why did they target your place? Not only us – all foreigners. … 
 
They stabbed me and tied me and asked me for money. The second time in 2014 
– I was with my uncle. They stopped us at a checkpoint – South African people – 
they covered their faces – they opened fire because we were moving. My uncle 
was shot and passed away. They opened the car door and pulled him outside. … 
They hit me and asked where the money was.  
 
The officer’s notes contain no assessment of the problems faced by the applicant in South 
Africa. The decision letter contains only the following boilerplate conclusion: 
You currently reside in a country that is a signatory to the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, South Africa. You have been able to benefit from the protection of 
South Africa and have been able to obtain asylum. 
You have been able to benefit from the protection of South Africa and have been 
able to obtain asylum. 
 
 
The lack of any meaningful assessment of these claims of xenophobic attacks is all the more 
troubling given that most visa officer reasons cited above contain a standard text recognizing the 
existence of xenophobic violence in South Africa. 
 
iii) Access to status, temporariness and backward-looking analysis 
UNHCR’s conception of local integration includes the notion of permanent resident status: local 
integration is “a legal, economic and socio-cultural process aiming at providing the refugee with 
the permanent right to stay in the country of asylum.”151 The Refugee Convention itself contains 
a loose obligation on signatory states to promote the naturalization of refugees: 
 
                                                   
151 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 118 at 1.3.4. 
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The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs 
of such proceedings.152 
 
 
IRCC’s processing guidelines also emphasize the importance of a permanent right to stay: 
“[l]ocal integration allows the refugee to live permanently in safety and dignity in the country of 
refuge and partake of its enduring legal, economic and social benefits.”153 The IRPR, however, 
frames local integration in a problematic way insofar as it is concerned with integration 
occurring “within a reasonable period.”154 In addition, in many cases in the dataset, the visa 
officer considered that temporary status, or even the possibility of obtaining refugee status in a 
country that is signatory to the Refugee Convention, was sufficient to ground a finding of local 
integration. However, the mere fact that a country is a signatory to the Refugee Convention does 
not mean that the state’s asylum procedures are fair, accessible, or that the state upholds the 
rights of refugees as stipulated in the Refugee Convention. Some states have extremely low 
asylum seeker approval rates. The following statement made by a sponsor surveyed by the 
Canadian Council for Refugees is consistent with the findings of the cases reviewed: 
It is cruel to leave refugees in deplorable conditions, with little or no hope, with 
Canada hiding behind a “durable solution” facade that is more legal fiction than a 
practical, human reality.155 
 
 
In IMM-5557-15, an Eritrean couple had been in Israel for 18 years and had had two Israeli-
born children. They had both fled mistreatment in the national service in Eritrea. In Israel, they 
                                                   
152 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954), art 
34. 
153 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 13.2. 
154 IRPR, s 139(1)(d). 
155 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Survey of refusals”, supra note 147 at 4. 
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were only able to secure temporary group protection, which needed to be renewed every one to 
six months. The applicants presented to the visa officer a letter from an employee of the 
Jerusalem African Community Center showing that only 0.2% of asylum seekers in Israel obtain 
permanent refugee status. The letter also indicated that the applicants face delays in their visa 
renewal during which they are unemployed, considered undocumented, and at risk of 
deportation. Nevertheless, the visa officer found that they had locally integrated, despite their 
inability to secure permanent status for 18 years: 
You currently reside in a country that is signatory to the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, Israel, where you have effectively secured a durable solution. You 
have resided for 18 years in Israel. During this time, you have been permitted to 
work unrestrictedly by the Israeli authorities. Your authorization to remain and 
work in Israel has been renewed semi-annually for the past 18 years and there is 
every indication that this will continue indefinitely. Both your children were born 
in Israel and were issued regulation government birth certificates, which are only 
issued to citizens and permanent residents. Both attend a normal Israel school.  
 
At the Federal Court, leave was granted unopposed and the application was settled between the 
parties. 
 
IMM-6100-14 presents a similar situation, but in this case the applicant was formally denied 
refugee status by the country of refuge. This is the case of an Iranian couple who fled to Japan in 
1991 because of problems resulting from the Iran-Iraq war. In Japan, the couple had two 
children and converted to Christianity. The applicants made an asylum claim in Japan, which 
was refused. At the time of their interview, they had been in Japan for 23 years on a temporary 
visa that required renewal every one to three years. They were never able to obtain a travel 
document from Japan, and since their asylum claim was rejected, were permanently at risk of 
being deported to Iran. The visa officer nevertheless concluded that the applicants had a durable 
solution in Japan: 
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You currently reside in a country that is a signatory to the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, Japan, where you have a reasonable possibility, within a reasonable 
period of time, of a durable solution. You are currently lawfully employed, your 
children have access to education. You have access to government subsidized 
healthcare. You have a longterm migratory status in Japan. Your children will 
eventually be eligible to become citizens of Japan and it appears that you may be 
eligible to apply for permanent residence in Japan. Therefore, you do not meet 
the provisions of this paragraph. 
 
 
It is problematic that the visa officer would rely in his analysis on the fact that Japan is a 
signatory to the Refugee Convention, since the applicants had already been refused refugee 
status and were at risk of deportation. In addition, the fact that the applicant had been in Japan 
without permanent status or protection for 23 years raises an important question: what is a 
‘reasonable period of time’ a refugee can be expected to wait for a durable solution? Yet, this 
case was denied leave by Justice McVeigh. 
 
Many of the applicants found to have locally integrated in South Africa also lacked a permanent 
status. IMM-7812-12 is the case of a Rwandan couple who fled in the mid-1990s at the time of 
the Rwandan genocide. At the time of the interview, they had been in South Africa for 16 years. 
The applicants had obtained a renewable temporary refugee permit, but had been formally 
denied permanent refugee status by the South African Standing Committee. The following 
exchange took place at the interview: 
Q - You have refugee status in South Africa. Why should you be allowed to go to 
Canada? 
A - Have been in South Africa for 16 years; have been refused permanent 
residence. Because of the xenophobic mindset of the locals, it is not easy to get a 
job. … 
 
Despite evidence that the applicants had been refused permanent refugee status, the visa officer 
found that they had locally integrated: 
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You have been accepted as a Convention Refugee in the Republic of South 
Africa. You have been given the right to work and study in South Africa and are 
able to avail yourself of the protection of government agencies. You have the 
mobility rights and the same rights as a South African citizen with the exception 




Following the refusal, the applicant’s sponsor submitted to the visa officer the letter from the 
South African Standing Committee refusing the applicant’s refugee application. In the letter, the 
Standing Committee indicated that it believed that conditions in Rwanda had changed and that 
there was no evidence that the applicants would now face persecution in their country of 
nationality. The Standing Committee also stated that it intended to cancel the applicant’s 
temporary refugee status in South Africa. The visa officer reviewed these documents but 
maintained his decision. At the Federal Court, leave was granted (opposed) and judicial review 
was granted on the merits. Justice Gagné wrote in the order: 
[T]he Court agrees with [the applicant] that the panel committed a reviewable 
error by failing to analyze all of the evidence filed, particularly Exhibit “C”, in 
which the RSA’s Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs strips him of his 
refugee status in the RSA…156 
 
 
The cases IMM-1221-15, IMM-1222-15, and IMM-1223-15 are linked cases of one Iraqi 
family. In the early 2000s, the principal applicant had worked in Iraq as an engineer for the 
United States Army. He told the visa officer that, because of his involvement with the American 
forces, his name was put on an Al-Qaeda assassination list. The family fled to Jordan in 2004 
following assassination attempts on the principal applicant and his brothers. Jordan is not a state 
signatory to the Refugee Convention and is not bound the international norm of non-
refoulement. In Jordan, the family members obtained temporary residence permits which they 
                                                   
156 Robert Senyoni v Canada (MCI) (16 May 2013), IMM-7812-12 (FC) at 3. 
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renewed every year. During the interview, the principal applicant explained that their temporary 
permit was precarious and dependent on his ability to remain employed. The principal applicant 
also told the visa officer that not all family members were allowed to work in Jordan. In 
determining that the applicants had a durable solution in Jordan, the visa officer focused heavily 
on the fact that the applicants were fairly wealthy: 
… they are effectively settled and well-established in Jordan. HOF runs a 
successful medical supplies business with office in Jordan and business ties in 
Iraq. Reasonable to assume he can go on doing this and supporting his family. He 
is able to fund costly univ education for all his children, as well as international 
travel. … They have successfully obtained legal Jordanian annual residency 
every year since 2005. … It is reasonable to assume that they can go on obtaining 
it. 
 
On judicial review, Justice LeBlanc determined that the visa officer had erred in concluding that 
the applicants could have a durable solution in a country that is not a signatory to the Refugee 
Convention and where they have only temporary status: 
Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (the 
Convention). It is, as a result, under no legal obligation to offer the Applicants 
long-term residence. In fact, the Applicants do not have legal status in Jordan as 
long-term residents. As a result, if and when Jordan decides not to renew the 
Applicants’ temporary 1-year residency permit, the Applicants will not be 
protected from refoulement to Iraq. … In addition, in determining that the 
Applicants would have no difficulty in satisfying the residency requirements in 
Jordan in the future, the Officer failed to consider that the family’s ability to 
retain residency status in Jordan is highly contingent on the Principal Applicant's 
ability to maintain a successful business.157 
 
 
A visa officer made a similar decision in IMM-2249-15, another case that involves Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan. The principal applicant in this case was an architect who had been targeted 
in Iraq because of his work with American forces. Like the applicants in the case above, the 
applicants in IMM-2249-15 had only a temporary residence permit that needed to be renewed 
                                                   
157 Al-Anbagi v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 273 at para 26. 
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every year. The principal applicant in this case, however, stated that he had not been able to find 
work in the last six months and that the family was at risk of losing their temporary status. 
Nevertheless, the visa officer concluded that the applicants could locally integrate, stating that it 
was reasonable to expect that the applicants could continue to renew their status in the future. 
The visa officer also stated that the applicant was “able to avail [him]self of the protection in 
Jordan”, despite the fact that Jordan is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention. At the Federal 
Court, this case was denied leave by Justice Diner.  
 
The last case to be reviewed in this section is IMM-7760-14. Here, the visa officer focused not 
on a possibility of a future durable solution, but on a past (and now unobtainable) possibility. 
The case involved a single male applicant who was born in Eritrea when the territory was still 
part of Ethiopia. He then moved to Ethiopia proper and became stranded there with his family 
when the civil war began. In Ethiopia, he was suspected to be an Eritrean spy and was at risk of 
deportation to Eritrea, where he would also be in danger. His entire family was arrested by 
Ethiopian authorities and never heard from again. He fled Ethiopia and sought refuge in Sudan. 
The visa officer determined that he had a durable solution in Ethiopia because he could have 
obtained Ethiopian citizenship: 
I realise that you were born in what is now Eritrea and that you moved to Addis 
Ababa with your family at a relatively young age. You indicated that … you 
were unable to regularise your status. … 
It appears to me that … it might have been possible for you to acquire Ethiopian 
nationality and thus to remain legally in Ethiopia. While I appreciate that the 
level of tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea was high at that time and that you 
might have felt you would not receive fair treatment at the hands of the 
Ethiopians, I am not satisfied that you made every reasonable effort to resolve 
your situation before leaving Ethiopia for Sudan [emphasis mine]. 
 
On judicial review, Justice McDonald ruled that the visa officer had erred in conducting a 
backward-looking durable solutions analysis. Justice McDonald also faulted the visa officer for 
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relying on a report concerning the acquisition of Ethiopian nationality that was over a decade 
old.158 
 
Local integration was the third most frequent ground of refusal in the dataset. The above 
analysis shows that visa officers assessed local integration in a way that is out-of-step with 
UNHCR guidelines. Findings of local integration were made in cases where applicants lived in 
countries that were not signatories to the Refugee Convention, cases where the applicant had 
been refused refugee status, cases where the applicant only had temporary status, and cases 
where the applicant could not economically integrate and was facing widespread xenophobia.  
 
5.4.5 Assessing successful establishment 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, the IRPR provide that establishment potential is to be assessed taking 
into consideration the applicant’s resourcefulness, the presence of relatives or sponsors in 
Canada, their employment prospects given their education, work experience and skills, and their 
ability to learn English or French.159 IRCC’s processing guidelines specify that visa officers are 
to consider a pre-establishment period of 3-5 years. 160  Casasola has criticized successful 
establishment criteria as leading to inconsistent decision-making between visa posts and 
preventing Canada from providing protection to vulnerable refugees.161 In the dataset, successful 
establishment was cited as a refusal ground in only seven cases. Successful establishment was 
the sole ground of refusal in only one case. The relatively low frequency of refusals based on the 
successful establishment criteria is consistent with government statements on the reorientation 
                                                   
158 Seifu Belay Zgta v Canada (MCI) (12 January 2016), IMM-7760-14 (FC). 
159 IRPR, s 139(1)(g). 
160 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 16.1. 
161 Michael Casasola, “Legislative Review, New Directions and Refugee Resettlement” (1999) 18:1 Refuge 
18 at 19 [“Legislative Review”]. 
	278	
	
of the resettlement program towards protection with the introduction of the IRPA in 2001.162 
This approach is reflected in visa office training material disclosed by IRCC: 
Protection is the overriding goal of Canada’s resettlement program; while the 
ability to settle is important, protection is the priority.163 
 
 
The shift towards protection and away from establishment potential also brings Canada’s 
resettlement program more in line with UNHCR’s position that establishment potential should 
never be considered in resettlement decisions: 
The notion of integration potential should not negatively influence the selection 
and promotion of resettlement cases. For example, educational level or other 
factors considered to be enhancing the prospects for integration are not 
determining factors when submitting cases for resettlement.164 
 
 
The review of the seven cases in the dataset confirms that the assessment of establishment 
potential is an exceptionally subjective and discretionary exercise. IMM-5046-14 was the only 
case where successful establishment was the sole refusal ground. This was the case of an 
Eritrean family who had fled to Sudan. The male principal applicant had fled to Sudan for the 
first time in 1983 after the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) came to his village and 
rounded up men and women. He had repatriated to Eritrea with his first wife in 2001 with the 
assistance of the UNHCR. He was later arrested in Eritrea for allegedly hosting people with 
anti-government views in his shop. He was detained and tortured for four months by Eritrean 
authorities, and managed to escape to Sudan once again. His first wife and six children stayed 
behind. In Sudan, he married his second wife. Together they had 5 children. The visa officer 
                                                   
162 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Evaluation of Government Assisted Refugees (GAR) and 
Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP)” (March 2011) at vii. 
163 Access to Information Request # A-2015-09399 (29 June 2015) at 23, on file with author. 
164 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 118 at para 6.1. 
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concluded that given the applicant’s age, education, work experience, and large family, he 
would not be able to become financially independent in Canada: 
PA is 53 years old which is already a very advanced age to enter the labour 
market. He has very limited work experience with any application to the 
Canadian economy. He has worked as a subsistence farmer and daily labourer. 
He has been able to provide for daily needs of the family through low-skilled 
work in Eritrea and Sudan. … PA’s experience in Sudan and Eritrea is not easily 
transferable. PA has 6 years of elementary school and no English or French 
language ability. No secondary. His wife declares no education at all. Her only 
work experience is as a maid for a Sudanese family… Unlikely that she would be 
able to work full-time as a cleaner at this time as she has very young children. PA 
has 5 accompanying deps and 6 non-accompanying deps. There are very limited 
possibilities for anyone in this family to earn sufficient income in Canada to 
support this very large family. 
 
The visa officer also concluded that the applicant’s family in Canada had only a limited capacity 
to contribute financially to his settlement and took the unusual step of conducting an 
independent Google search to determine their level of income, based on where they lived: 
I googled the address PA’s sister and her live at … in London, Ontario. This is 
non-profit social housing which normally is only available to people with low 
income. I am not satisfied that the support that could be provided by PA’s 
relatives in Canada would be sufficient to overcome the challenges he has to 
becoming established Canada… 
 
On judicial review, the applicant noted that it had been established at the interview that his six 
children in Eritrea would not be coming to Canada. The applicant also noted that the same visa 
officer had approved for resettlement one adult son, yet had failed to consider his potential 
financial contribution to the family’s establishment.165 Leave was denied by Justice Mason.  
                                                   
165 The visa officer also determined that the applicant’s second wife could not qualify as a spouse. She made 
the following Kafkaesque assessment of the relationship, which overlooks the fact that the principal applicant 
had been separated from his first wife: 
PA’s wife is not a spouse according to the regs & OP 2. PA was married to his first wife 
when he married his current wife and as such the marriage is not legally valid even though 
he subsequently divorced his first wife. Nor can such a relationship (polygamous second 
marriage) be converted to a monogamous relationship) common law) as per guidance in 
OP2. To make his marriage to his second wife legally valid, PA must re-marry his second 
wife. But to re0marry her, he must divorce her and, according to PA, under Islamic law, she 




In another case, IMM-9101-11, the visa officer found that a single male Somali applicant would 
not successfully integrate in Canada because he had not sought to learn the local language while 
in South Africa for seven years: 
I AM NOT SATISIFIED THAT THE CDT WOULD BE ABLE TO BECOME 
ECONOMICALLY ESTABLISHED IN CANADA. 
- THE CDT HAS ONE COUSIN IN CANADA WITH WHOM HE HASN’T 
SPOKEN SINCE MARCH. 
- THE CDT HAS BEEN IN RSA FOR 7 YEARS AND HAS NOT LEARNT 
ANY OF THE 11 OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF SOUTH AFRICA. 
- THE CDT HAS CHOSEN NOT TO TAKE UP STUDIES IN RSA (HE CAME 
HERE AS A YOUNG MAN) AND HAS NO FORMAL EDUCATION FROM 
RSA. 
- THE CDT DID ONE YEAR AT A LANGUAGE SCHOOL IN SOMALIA 
FROM 97-98 BUT DROPPED OUT OF HIS PROGRAM. 
- THE CDT SPEAKS NO ENGLISH OR FRENCH EVEN THOUGH HE HAS 
BEEN IN A PREDOMINANTLY ENGLISH SPEAKING COUNTRY FOR 7 
YEARS. HE ALSO SPEAKS NO AFRIKANS OR XSOSA OR ANY OTHER 
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF RSA. 
 
The officer here notes only the more negative aspects of the applicant’s integration in South 
Africa. Strangely, the visa officer also rejected the case because the applicant had successfully 
integrated in South Africa, a conclusion that is, in many respects, incompatible with a finding of 
a lack of establishment potential in Canada. In coming to the conclusion that the applicant had 
locally integrated in South Africa, the visa officer noted that that the applicant had been 
employed since his arrival. The applicant’s financial independence in South Africa, however, 
did not factor in the officer’s determination that the applicant would not successfully establish 
                                                                                                                                                                   
CIC’s family class processing manual clearly states that a married person can form a common law 
relationship with a second person partner if one has separated from the first spouse: 
The notion of conjugality has within it the requirement of monogamy; therefore, it is only 
possible in law to establish a new common-law relationship after a person is either divorced 
or separated from the spouse or common-law partner and where they have convincingly 
formed the intention not to continue with that previous relationship (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, OP 2 Processing Members of the Family Class (2006) at para 13.2, 




themselves in Canada. Judicial review in this case was granted on consent. 
 
IMM-3863-13 is another case where the visa officer failed to consider the factors enumerated in 
the IRPR. This is the case of a 27-year-old Eritrean man in South Africa who claimed to have 
fled religious persecution as a Pentecostal believer. The visa officer found that the applicant was 
not credible and that he was “reticent and did not provide any details even when asked.” As 
reviewed in section 5.4.3, the applicant’s difficulty in answering the visa officer was likely 
compounded by the fact that no interpreter was provided and the interview was conducted in 
English, a language that the applicant did not understand well. The applicant’s difficulty at the 
interview also led the visa officer to conclude that he would not successfully establish in 
Canada: 
It was very difficult to extract information - failing to satisfy me that he would 
have sufficient initiative to establish himself in Canada. … Finally, I believe that 
his general lack of initiative would render resettlement in Canada difficulty. 
 
The applicant told the visa officer during the interview that he had family members in Canada, 
that he had a high school education, that he could do construction, cleaning, cooking, and 
service work. It was also clear that the applicant understood some English. The visa officer 
never considered these facts or any of the factors listed in section 139 of the IRPR in coming to 
his decision. Rather, he relied on the vague notion of “lack of initiative.” On judicial review, this 
application was settled between the parties. 
 
The last case to be reviewed in this section is IMM-3752-14. This is the case of a Haitian widow 
in the Dominican Republic with three children who claimed that she and her daughters were 
assaulted by men from the Lavallas organization after they demanded they join the organization. 
The visa officer’s problematic assessment of the gender-based claim was reviewed in section 
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5.4.2.1. Regarding establishment potential, the applicant demonstrated that she could speak 
French fluently, and she stated that the family had not worked in the Dominican Republic 
because they did not have a work permit, and that doing so would be illegal and put them at risk 
of deportation to Haiti. The visa officer nevertheless determined that the applicant had poor 
establishment potential because she had not worked or studied while in the Dominican 
Republic: 
Potentiel de ré-établissement très faible. Pas d’études complétées au-delà du 
secondaire, pas d’expérience de travail. Ils considèrent qu’ils pourront apporter 
leur contribution au développement socio-économique du Canada mais n’ont pas 
d’expérience ont démontré jusqu’à présent un manque total d’initiative. Ils 
auraient pu travailler des petits boulots en attendant, surtout au travers de leur 
église, ou étudier en ligne. N’ont rien fait, même pas de bénévolat. … Le fils … a 
dit que la différence entre les milliers d’Haïtiens travaillant au noir en RD et eux 
était que leur but était d’aller au Canada et qu’en conséquence, ça ne valait pas la 
peine de travailler.  
 
At the Federal Court, the application was granted leave (opposed) and dismissed on the merits 
by Justice Locke.166 
 
While successful establishment was the sole ground of refusal in only one case, the cases 
reviewed above confirm that it remains a highly subjective and discretionary assessment. The 
four cases reviewed in this section presented no worse settlement potential than a large number 
of other applicants in the dataset who were much older, more vulnerable, and had more limited 
work experience, education, and language skills. In addition, in the seven cases where 
settlement potential was an issue, visa officers seldom took into consideration the full list of 
factors listed in the IRPR. In only one case did the visa officer considered whether extending the 
                                                   
166 Janvier v Canada (MCI), 2015 FC 278. 
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sponsorship period to 36 months would mitigate concerns of successful establishment, as 
prescribed by IRCC guidelines.167  
 
The existence of the requirement, however infrequently invoked as a refusal ground, remains at 
odds with UNHCR guidelines and the principle of refugee protection. It also opens the door to 
inconsistent practices among visa offices and visa officers. Abandoning the requirement 
altogether would eliminate these potential inconsistencies, and remove a barrier to the 
resettlement of the most vulnerable. 
 
5.4.6 Inadmissibility 
A total of 15 applications were rejected because of ‘true’ inadmissibility concerns. I use the 
terms ‘true’ inadmissibility because another 15 applications were rejected because the visa 
officer was not satisfied that the applicant was not inadmissible. In this group of cases, no 
positive finding of inadmissibility was made. Such a determination was frequent in cases where 
the applicant failed to complete procedural steps, such as submitting updated forms, attending 
the interview, or responding to a procedural fairness letter. However, this also occurred in cases 
where the visa officer had general credibility concerns, and in one case where the applicant was 
found to have submitted a fraudulent police report A finding that an applicant is ‘not not 
inadmissible’ is a problematic one, as noted by Justice Kane in IMM-3561-12. In that case, the 
principal applicant told the visa officer that his family originally fled Afghanistan because of the 
                                                   
167 Section 154(3) of the IRPR expressly provides that the sponsorship period can be extended to up 36 
months because of successful establishment concerns. Similarly, IRCC’s processing manual states: 
Officers may consider an extended private sponsorship when they believe that an applicant 
will require a longer period of assistance, even if they are not a special-needs refugee. In 
such cases, the sponsorship may be extended for up to 36 months provided the applicant is 
otherwise eligible under the Regulations (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas 
Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 13.14.). 
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war and that now they could not return because his daughters would risk being kidnapped or 
forced into marriage. The applicant told the visa officer that he had never performed military 
service and had never been recruited by the mujahedeen. The visa officer did not find the 
applicant credible in relation to his military service, and concluded: 
Upon removing from the assessment of your file those elements for which I have 
credibility concerns, I find that I am not satisfied, given all the available evidence 
that remains, that you are not inadmissible to Canada. 
 
Justice Kane remarked that the use of inadmissibility language was improper in the 
circumstances: 
I cannot help but comment that immigration decision-makers often use double 
negatives and, although such findings may be an attempt to follow the wording of 
the Act, such wording is awkward and difficult to interpret. In this case, the 
officer did not articulate why the applicant is inadmissible. The mere double 
negative statement which conveys that the applicant is not admissible is 
insufficient as it does not explain why the applicant is not admissible. … 
… 
In the present case, it cannot be said that the officer’s inadmissibility finding and 
the reasons underlying this finding were “established with the utmost clarity”. 
The officer fails to articulate - let alone explain - the basis on which the applicant 
was found to be inadmissible.168 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that in the above case, there was at least a loose connection to a ground of 
inadmissibility (the applicant’s potential military service in Afghanistan). In 10 of the 15 cases, 
however, the finding that the applicant was “not not inadmissible” was not even remotely linked 
to a ground of inadmissibility, but instead resulted from general credibility concerns or the 
failure of the applicant to attend the interview. 
 
The 15 cases rejected for “true” inadmissibility break down as follows: 
                                                   
168 Fairozi, Karimdad v Canada (MCI) (12 December 2012), IMM-3561-12 at 9-10 (FC). 
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• 7 case of security inadmissibility through membership under section 34(1)f) of the 
IRPA169 
• 3 cases of inadmissibility for human or international rights violation under section 35170 
• 3 cases of inadmissibility for serious criminality under section 36171 
• 1 case of inadmissibility for non-compliance with the IRPA under section 41(a)172 
• 1 case of inadmissibility of a family member under section 42173 
 
It is noteworthy that none of the security inadmissibility findings involved direct participation in 
the prohibited acts listed in section 34. Each security inadmissibility determination relied on the 
membership clause in section 34(1)(f). This finding is consistent with empirical studies in the 
inland context that have shown that the vast majority of security inadmissibility determinations 
made by the IRB rely on the membership clause, and very few on direct involvement.174 The 
organizations considered to have committed the prohibited acts were the Kurdish Democratic 
Party of Iran (KDPI - 2 cases), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Ethiopian Democratic Union 
(EDU), and the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). It is noteworthy that these cases 
had a high success rate on judicial review. Aside from one case that was not perfected, all but 
three judicial review applications were either granted on their merits or settled (a positive 
outcome rate of 78.57%). It was also interesting to note that the single case refused under 
section 41 for non-compliance with the act involved an applicant who had failed to attend his 
interview. There were many other cases in the dataset where an interview was missed, but this is 
the only case where a missed interview led to a finding of inadmissibility under section 41. 
                                                   
169 Files IMM-274-12, IMM-5532-13, IMM-5233-14, IMM-2531-15, IMM-3210-15, IMM-5121-11 & IMM-
12434-12. 
170 Files IMM-309-15, IMM-2158-15 & IMM-4297-15. 
171 Files IMM-226-15, IMM-3043-15 & IMM-5810-15. 
172 File IMM-6290-12. 
173 File IMM-909-15. The underlying inadmissibility was security inadmissibility. 
174 See Angus Grant, Confronting (In)Security: Forging Legitimate Approaches to Security and Exclusion in 
Migration Law (PhD thesis, York University Osgoode Hall Law School, 2016). 
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5.4.7 Assessing credibility and plausibility 
The assessment of credibility is at the core of the refugee status determination.175 A finding that 
an applicant is not credible can defeat their entire claim.176 Studies in Canada’s inland refugee 
system have reported that the majority of rejected cases are rejected on the basis of credibility.177 
In this study’s dataset, 198 cases (50.38% of decided cases) were decided on credibility 
grounds. In 69 cases (17.56%), credibility was the sole ground of refusal. 
 
In CIC’s PSR QA Evaluation, some of the most concerning findings related to credibility 
assessments. The report found that in 25% of the cases rejected on credibility grounds, the 
applicant was not or was only partially confronted with the officer’s concerns over credibility.178 
Moreover, in 63% of cases, the record did not clearly indicate how the credibility issue related 
to material aspects of the claim.179 In the previous sections, I have reviewed over 20 cases where 
inadequate interpretation, translator error, mental health problems, misconstruction of 
testimony, and misconstruction of personal documents appear to have led to problematic 
credibility determinations. In those cases, the credibility concerns may have been put to the 
applicant, and may have related to central elements of the claim, but the credibility 
determinations were nevertheless deemed problematic for other reasons. In the paragraphs that 
follow, I address more substantive issues that were not covered in CIC’s evaluation. 
                                                   
175 See Smith-Khan, supra note 14 at 391; Michael Kagan, “Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective 
Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status Determination” (2002) 17 Geo Immigr LJ 367 at 367. 
176 See Salim v Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 1592 at para 31; Cienfuegos v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 1262 at para 
25; Ventura v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 10 at para 60; Nanton v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 266 at para 13. A 
negative credibility finding is however not necessarily determinative “if the subjective and objective 
components of the test for refugee status have been met” (Yener v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 372 at para 31). 
177 See for example Audrey Macklin, “Truth and Consequences: Credibility Determination in the Refugee 
Context” in The Realities of Refugee Determination on the Eve of a New Millennium: The Role of the 
Judiciary (Haarlem: International Association of Refugee Law Judges, 1999) 134 at 158. 




It is worth beginning this analysis by reviewing some general principles of credibility 
assessments in refugee claims as formulated by Canadian courts. The case law highlights the 
need for visa officers to avoid engaging in a “microscopic examination” of an applicant’s 
testimony, especially if the applicant is testifying through an interpreter.180 “Minute” or “trivial” 
contradictions should not lead to a negative credibility finding, nor should a decision-maker turn 
the claim into a “memory test.”181 Decision-makers are not to conduct a “line-by-line treasure 
hunt for errors”182 or a “too granular or overzealous analysis.”183 Nor should they be “reaching 
for inconsistencies” to support a negative credibility finding.184 Moreover, credibility findings 
should not be based on matters “irrelevant to the case or peripheral to the claim.”185 Courts have 
also stated that findings of implausibility should only be made in the “clearest of cases” where 
the facts are “inherently implausible.”186  The Federal Court has ruled that decision-makers 
should be particularly cautious in making determinations of implausibility because “refugee 
claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible from Canadian 
                                                   
180 Attakora v Canada (MEI), [1989] FCJ No 444, 99 NR 168 (CA) at 198. See also Hashi v Canada (MCI), 
2020 FC 309 at para 24; Haramichael v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1197 at para 15; Lubana v Canada 
(MCI), 2003 FCT 116 at paras 10-11; Tang v Canada (MCI), 2019 FC 1478 at para 27; Abou Loh v Canada 
(MCI), 2019 FC 1084 at para 36; Pooya v Canada (MCI), 2018 FC 1019 at para 21; Hos v Canada (MCI), 
2015 FC 791 at para 29; Arslan v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 252 at para 36. 
181 Yahaya v Canada (MCI), 2019 FC 1570 at para 12. 
182 Yan v Canada (MCI), 2017 FC 146 at para 19. 
183 Lawani v Canada (MCI), 2018 FC 924 at para 23. See also Zirou v Canada (MCI), 2003 FCT 617 at para 
66; Hohol v Canada (MCI), 2017 FC 870 at para 20; RKL v Canada (MCI), 2003 FCT 116 at para 25; 
Balyokwabwe v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 623 at para 44. 
184 Owusu-Ansah v Canada (MEI), [1989] FCJ No 442, 98 NR 312 (CA). See also Acikgoz v Canada (MCI), 
2018 FC 149 at para 37; Yener v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 372 at para 31; Tanase v Canada (MCI), [2000] 
FCJ No 32, 181 FTR 111 at para 20. 
185 Lawani v Canada (MCI), 2018 FC 924 at para 23. See also Bueno v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 228, [2020] 
ACF no 230 at 22; Farah v Canada (MCI), 2019 FC 27 at para 24; Warnakulasuriya v Canada (MCI), 2008 
FC 885 at para 7; Towolawi v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 245 at para 29. 
186 Sherlock Albertson Hardware v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 338 at para 29. See also Fok v Canada (MCI), 
[1993] FCJ No 800 (FCA) at para 1; Valtchev v Canada (MCI), 2001 FCT 776 at para 7; Callender v Canada 
(MCI), 2020 FC 515 at para 48; AB v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 498 at para 111. 
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standards may be plausible when considered from the claimant’s milieu.” 187  Directions 
contained in IRCC’s processing manual reflects these principles, and warn against microscopic 
and overly vigilant evaluations: 
Given the nature of the refugee experience, it is hardly possible for a refugee to 
“prove” every part of their story. Therefore, it is frequently necessary to give the 
applicant the benefit of the doubt.  
… 
Officers should not be over-vigilant by microscopically examining the applicant. 
This is especially so where an interpreter is being used. Officers must not search 
through the evidence looking for inconsistencies or for evidence that lacks 
credibility thereby “building a case” against the applicant’s credibility.188 
 
 
There were many cases in the dataset where the visa officer’s credibility assessment appeared to 
be out of step with these principles. I recognize that my analysis of credibility assessments, 
perhaps more than other analyses in this dissertation, draws from my subjective assessment of 
the claim. Though I cite Federal Court cases to define the parameters of credibility assessments, 
I want to stress that my claim in this chapter is not that the problems I have identified are ones 
that would necessarily warrant granting judicial review. Rather, I am identifying problematic 
trends and opportunities for improvement.  
 
i) Credibility of Eritrean Pentecostal believers  
I reviewed in chapter 3 problems associated with visa officer Ann Marie MacNeil at the Cairo 
office who in 2009 rejected a large number of Eritrean applicants claiming to be followers of the 
Pentecostal faith, a religion outlawed in Eritrea. The Canadian Council for Refugees published 
                                                   
187 Low v Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 256 at para 18. See also Ortiz v Canada (MCI), 2004 FC 690 at para 6; 
Chikadze v Canada MCI), 2020 FC 306 at para 24; Manan v Canada (MCI), 2020 FC 150 at para 46; Jamil v 
Canada (MCI), 2006 FC 792 at para 25.  
188 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Overseas Selection and Processing”, supra note 16 at para 13.1. 
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in January 2010 a 36-page review of 17 applications rejected by the visa officer.189 The findings 
of the report are troubling. The report shows that that the visa officer lacked basic knowledge of 
realities in Eritrea, and that she made arbitrary assumptions about the knowledge of Pentecostal 
followers. According to the report, the visa officer frequently asked applicants to name the 
“seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit” or answer specific questions of religious doctrine. If applicants 
could not answer correctly, they were considered not to be believers: 
She tested membership in a faith community (Pentecostal Christianity) through 
questions focused on religious doctrine, an approach that is flawed because 
adherents are not necessarily knowledgeable about their faith. The approach was 
particularly problematic in these cases, as the visa officer lacked knowledge of 




There were also concerns that the visa officer may be biased against Pentecostal believers, as 
she frequently mentioned that she was Catholic and challenged the applicants on why they 
decided to convert. The report states that the visa officer frequently assumed, without 
justification, that it was “unreasonable” for an applicant to voluntarily decide to follow a banned 
religion. Applications for judicial review were launched in over 40 cases. Judicial review was 
granted in four lead cases by Justice Snider.191 The remainder were settled, with a commitment 
from the government that the particular visa officer would no longer decide refugee cases. These 
judicial review applications were all submitted before 2011 and therefore were not included in 
my dataset. It is nonetheless useful to review the cases decided on their merits because of 
evident similarities with certain cases included in the dataset. In Ghirmatsion, the visa officer 
                                                   
189 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Concerns with Refugee Decision-making at Cairo” (January 2010), 
online (pdf): <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/cairoconcerns_1.pdf> [“Decision-making at Cairo”]. See 
also Canadian Council for Refugees, “Disturbing upsurge in rejections of Eritrean refugees in Cairo by 
Canada” (30 November 2009), online: <https://ccrweb.ca/en/bulletin/09/11/30>. 
190 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Decision-making at Cairo”, ibid at 2. 
191 Ghirmatsion v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 519; Kidane v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 520; Weldesilassie v 
Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 521; Woldesellasie v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 522. 
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had determined that the applicant was not a Pentecostal follower because he could not provide 
“sufficient information about the religion”: 
I am not satisfied that you are indeed a true convert to Pentecostal faith. Your 
knowledge of the faith [was] not up to the level one would expect from a person 
who has been practicing and reading the bible for 12 years. You were not able to 
provide sufficient information about the religion to satisfy me that you are in fact 
a follower of the Pentecostal faith.192 
 
The case notes showed that the visa officer had asked only three questions, which the applicant 
answered: 
Describe to me how do you pray?  
LEADER TELLS US WHAT TO DO, AND WE DO IT. 
What are the days that Pente followers celebrate?  
EASTER, CHRISTMAS, AND PENTECOST 
Why did you convert?  
NO MENTORS, AND BELIEVE IN JESUS CHRIST.193 
 
Justice Snider determined that it was unreasonable for the visa officer to conclude that the 
applicant was not a Pentecostal believer based on three simple questions to which the applicant 
gave three simple answers. 
 
In both Kidane and Weldesilassie, the visa officer asked the applicant to name the “seven gifts 
of the Holy Spirit.” On judicial review, an expert witness testified that the expression “seven 
gifts of the Spirit” is “absolutely foreign to a Pentecostal.” The visa officer, on cross-
examination of her affidavit, stated that she was not familiar with Pentecostalism as practiced in 
Eritrea, but only generally. As to the issue of the “seven” gifts of the Holy Spirit, she stated that 
she was aware that there was no specific number mentioned in the Bible: “I just chose a number. 
I could have asked for three or four. I chose seven.” Justice Snider determined that the visa 
officer had engaged in an arbitrary assessment of the applicant’s belief: 
                                                   
192 Ghirmatsion, ibid at para 35. 
193 Ibid at para 39. 
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In my opinion, the faith-based questions posed by the Officer were without 
factual foundation. It is an important function for a visa officer to decipher the 
sincerity of an applicant's religious belief. In order to do this, the visa officer 
must be informed regarding the relevant religious beliefs and practices. This 
cannot be done by arbitrarily applying a test that would confuse an applicant. 
This was the case with the line of questioning posed by the Officer. The Officer 
did not assess the sincerity of the Applicant's Pentecostal religious beliefs. 
Instead, the Officer asked questions designed to test the Applicant’s knowledge 
of “the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit”. Moreover, the Officer’s admission that she 
knew little of the Pentecostal faith in Eritrea taints all of the questions that she 
asked and the inferences that she drew from the Applicant’s responses.194 
 
 
In the dataset, sixteen cases were identified as presenting problematic credibility assessments of 
Eritrean nationals who claimed to be followers of the Pentecostal faith. Fourteen were decided 
at the Cairo office, at least three of which were decided by visa officer Ann Marie MacNeil. All 
of these refusals showed a striking resemblance to the cases assessed by the Canadian Council 
for Refugees and the four lead cases reviewed by the Federal Court. It is disappointing to see 
that the visa officer was not removed from refugee decision-making immediately after the 
Canadian Council for Refugees report was published or after the launch of over 40 judicial 
review applications. It is also curious that all three were denied leave. 
 
In IMM-5097-12, visa officer Ann Marie MacNeil asked numerous and detailed questions to the 
applicant, and concluded: 
I am not satisfied that you were indeed a follower of the Pentecostal faith. You 
were unable to provide specific details concerning the Pentecostal religion. 
 
It is not entirely clear what “specific details” the visa officer was expecting. In the interview, the 
applicant explained in some detail the conversion process that led to his baptism: 
What did you do in order to become baptized? Attended salvation classes. 
How long? One month. … 
                                                   
194 Kidane, supra note 191 at para 46. 
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What is the meaning of baptized? It means you are creating your union with 
[unreadable] that means you are dying with J.C. 
How long are salvation classes normally?  
In Sudan it takes some long months, but in Eritrea it is done in a hidden day… In 
Sudan it depends on the church and on the person. It depends how long you 
attend, how many weeks, how many hours  
Are you tested on your knowledge? The follow up on how you are doing classes. 
They give you exam. 
… explain about the salvation classes. … When you finish your salvation 
courses, they give you an exam, to understand how much your knowledge. 
Only give you one exam at the end of the course? Yes, they ask you daily if your 
life has changed. If your life is not changed, they may extend the class. 
 
The visa officer’s conclusion that the applicant lacked knowledge about his religion seems to 
have been based on the applicant’s inability to cite the specific book of the Corinthians where 
the “Gifts of the Holy Spirit” are mentioned and his inability to cite an unknown number of such 
gifts (the applicant was “Only able to list 6”). Leave was denied by Justice Barnes. 
 
IMM-4948-13 is another case decided by the same visa officer. In this case, visa officer 
MacNeil asked several doctrinal questions about Pentecostalism such as “Where is the word 
Pentecostal in the Bible?”, “Significance of the Lord’s last supper?”, and “What is the meaning 
of baptism?” In most instances, she failed to record the applicant’s answer, simply writing 
“incorrect” after the question. The visa officer seemed to be prepared to accept only one answer: 
WHERE IS THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT LOCATED IN THE BIBLE? 




In IMM-6201-12, visa officer MacNeil asked the applicant what led to his conversion. The 
applicant explained that his cousin had told him about Jesus Christ being the true saviour, and 
that he had been baptized. The visa officer concluded: “…I find it unreasonable that you would 




Another nine cases in the dataset, despite not being decided by Ann Marie MacNeil, presented 
striking similarities. In addition, six of these were decided after Justice Snider’s decision in 
Ghirmatsion. IMM-1788-13, for example, was decided at the Cairo office in October 2012. 
Officer “FA” asked the following questions to the PA:  
Q. What is the meaning of the Pentecost? A. T is the feast of the 50 days after JC 
had risen when the Holy Spirit (HS) came down to the Apostles and filled them. 
They started to speak in tongues. 
Q. Do you know any specific gifts given to Peter and Paul? A. They are speaking 
in tongues. When they pray in tongues the others accepted the Lord and 
converted. 
Q. How many are the gifts of the HS? A. They are five, I cannot remember them 
now but it is like a gift to heal people. 
Q. Do you know where they are found in the Bible? A. Corinthians. 
Q. Chapter? Verse? A. It is hard for me to memorise since I am not educated, I 
only studied only for 5 years. … 
Q. What are the days of observance to the Pente? A. Christmas and Easter. 
 
The visa officer concluded the following: 
PA has provided minimal or incorrect information about the Pentecostal faith 
that, a religion she claims to be a member of for 23 years. A follower of this faith 
would be expected to have more knowledge and commitment of the faith than 
PA has demonstrated. 
 
It is unclear which of the information provided by the applicant during the interview was found 
to be incorrect. At the Federal Court, leave was denied by Justice Gagné. 
 
IMM-404-13 was decided by visa officer “KG”, also from the Cairo office, and also after the 
Federal Court decided Ghirmatsion. The visa officer asked seventeen doctrinal questions at the 
interview. The applicant provided an answer to each: 
Q. Tell me passages in Bible that are significant. A. Psalm 23. 
Q. Tell me those sig to Pente religion. A. 1 John 3 about baptism, there was a 
man who asked Christ about baptism, that’s it. Told to be re-born again. 
Q. Old/New? A. New. 
Q. Sig of Pentecost? A. That he is the only way. 
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Q. Tell me what Pente/Pentecost means? (starts fidgeting) A. A feast where the 
holy spirit comes down. 
Q. Sig of 50 days? A. Apostles were gathered holy spirit comes upon them. 
Q. When does this take place or celebrated? A. When he raised form dead… 50 
days after. 
Q. After what? A. 50 days after he rose up from the dead, they were gathered and 
he came upon them. … 
 
The visa officer never indicates what responses he or she was expecting from the applicant. 
Nevertheless, the visa officer concluded: “I do not find the PA sufficiently knowledgeable about 
the religion that could be expected of a committed member of the faith.” This case was denied 
leave. Officer ‘KG’ came to a similar conclusion following a similar line of questions in IMM-
349-12 and IMM-8602-11, both decided after Ghirmatsion and denied leave at the Federal 
Court.  
 
The problems identified in the Canadian Council for Refugees report therefore appear not to be 
limited to a single visa officer. It is also evident that the Federal Court’s 2011 decision in 
Ghirmatsion was not immediately brought to the attention of visa officers. These cases highlight 
the need for increased internal review of refusals and the importance of communicating to visa 
officers developments in Federal Court case law. 
 
ii) Other problematic plausibility findings 
In this section, I review five cases from other visa offices where the visa officer made 
problematic plausibility findings. IMM-5801-12 is a case of an Afghan family who fled to 
Pakistan. The principal applicant claimed that he feared returning to Afghanistan because 
warlords would demand his daughters in marriage. The visa officer rejected the application 
because of concerns over the “credibility of the information you gave me regarding warlords 
imposing forced marriage proposals on you for your daughters.” The visa officer made a 
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bewildering plausibility finding with regard to the applicant’s daughter’s schooling and her 
ability to do “calculations”: 
HOW OLD WERE YOU WHEN YOU CAME TO PAK? I was 15. 
HOW OLD ARE YOU KNOW? 21. I was born in 1991. 
HAVE YOU BEEN TO SCHOOL? Yes in Afghanistan. 
HOW FAR IN SCHOOL? I studied for 3 years - primary. 
YOU CAN DO MATH PRETTY WELL FOR SOMEONE WHO ONLY 
STUDIED 3 YEARS. What do you mean? 
I MEAN YOU DID ALL THE CALCULATIONS TO FIGURE OUT HOW 
OLD YOU WERE WHEN YOU CAME HERE - SOMEONE WHO HAS 
STUDIED 3 YEARS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO THAT. I studied at 
home [emphasis mine]. 
 
The visa officer’s assumption that people who studied only three years would not be able to 
“calculate” how old they were when they moved to another country was not based on any 
evidence. Neither does it relate to a central element of the claim. At the Federal Court, this case 
was denied leave. 
 
A problematic finding of implausibility was also made in IMM-1439-12, which involved a 
female Eritrean applicant who claimed that she had escaped national service and had been 
detained thereafter. She told the visa officer that she became sick while in detention, was 
transferred to a hospital, and managed to escape while the person guarding her was sleeping. 
The visa officer found it implausible that the applicant would manage to escape at 5pm: 
WHILE I WAS IN THE HOSPITAL, I WAS THINKING HOW I WOULD 
LEAVE, WHEN I FOUND A SUITABLE SITUATION AND TIME I 
ESCAPED FROM HOSPITAL. … THE GUARD WAS CARELESS BECAUSE 
HE WAS SLEEPING, AND I WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE FROM THE 
HOSPITAL. … 
PEOPLE WOULD HAVE SEEN YOU LEAVE THE HOSPITAL AND 
KNOWN? AT THE TIME I LEFT THERE WAS NO ONE. I CHOSE A 
SUITABLE TIME. … 
WHAT WAS THE TIME OF DAY? AROUND 5 OR 6 PM, THE HOSPITAL 
WAS QUIET, NO PEOPLE AROUND. … 
PA CLAIMS TO HAVE WALKED OUT OF THE HOSTPITAL WHILE THE 
GUARD WAS SLEEPING (AROUND 5 OR 6 PM AT HIGHT). WOULD 
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THINK THT THERE WOULD BE LOTS OF ACTIVITY DURING THE 
SUPPER HOURS. 
 
The visa officer never questioned the applicant about where the applicant’s room was located in 
the hospital, or how many other patients and staff there were in her section of the hospital. 
Leave in this case was also denied. 
 
IMM-2211-11 is a case where the Federal Court did intervene. That case involved a Tamil Sri 
Lankan family who fled to India because the principal applicant was targeted by Sri Lankan 
authorities. The principal applicant told the visa officer that he had been forced to work for the 
LTTE for three days and had later been imprisoned by the Sri Lankan army on suspicion of 
supporting the LTTE. He was able to escape detention after his father paid a bribe. After his 
release, Sri Lankan authorities continued to look for him and, in a case of mistaken identity, 
killed his brother. The visa officer’s decision includes the following determinations of 
implausibility (which are misidentified as “credibility concerns”): 
It is not credible that the army would detain you for eight months and then 
release you upon payment of a bribe if you were considered a member of the 
LTTE. Nor is it credible that the army or related groups would then return to your 
home to kill you one month after your release from detention, or that these 
assailants would leave after killing your brother without further pursuing you. 
 
The visa officer did not refer to any objective evidence in support of his findings regarding how 
the Sri Lankan army operated in the context of the civil war. On judicial review, Justice Barnes 
faulted the visa officer for assuming that Sri Lankan authorities would behave in a rational way: 
The essential problem with this finding is that this part of Mr. Jeevaratnam’s 
story was entirely plausible, at least insofar as he had recounted it. … At the time 
of these events, when unlawful detentions and extra-judicial killings were 
frequent, there is nothing implausible about a prisoner gaining release on 
payment of a bribe and then being targeted for execution. Indeed, an expectation 
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of rational behaviour on the part of state agents allegedly involved in bribery and 
murder should not form the basis of a plausibility finding of this sort.195 
 
 
The Federal Court also intervened in IMM-5094-12. This was the case of a young married 
Ethiopian couple. They told the visa officer that Ethiopian authorities had arrested the male 
applicant and detained him for two months because he had refused to support the governing 
party in the election. The male applicant escaped prison after the payment of a bribe, and both 
applicants fled to Djibouti, where they were married one year later. The visa officer found it 
implausible that the applicants would reside together before getting married, as that is 
inconsistent with cultural norms. Justice O’Keefe granted judicial review and determined that 
the applicants “could have decided to live together before marriage (as they stated) despite the 
customs of their country.”196 Indeed the notes indicate that the applicants provided at least a 
plausible explanation for diverging from cultural norms: 
I ALSO DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY IF SHE CAME TO YOU IN DJIBOUTI 
SINCE 2006, WHY YOU WERE LIVING TOGETHER FOR MORE THAN A 
YEAR WITHOUT MARRYING. We married in that year, and we have lived 
together since 2006, and we married each other in 2007. But I entered 2006. 
THAT IS WHY I AM ASKING - IS IT NOT INAPPROPRIATE IN YOUR 
CULTURE FOR A WOMAN AND MAN TO LIVE TOGETHER IN ONE 
ROOM WITHOUT BEING MARRIED? If we lived alone, there was some 
people who would abuse her. 
SO WHY DIDN'T YOU JUST MARRY AS SOON AS YOU WERE 
TOGETHER? At that time, we had no income. We had no money at that point. It 
is impossible to pay for rent. 
 
 
The last case reviewed in this section, IMM-4855-12, is a case of a young Ethiopian woman 
who claimed that she was imprisoned and raped because of her involvement with the All 
Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO). Her father was also a member of AAPO and had been 
                                                   
195 Jeevaratnam v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 1371 at para 13. 
196 Abdulahi v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 868 at para 43. 
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detained before the applicant herself became a member. She told the visa officer that she was 
aware of the risks of joining the AAPO, and had done so because she was “struggling for the 
rights of (her) ppl”, and because she was “trying to look for (her) father” who was arrested 
because of his activities with the AAPO. The visa officer rejected the case because he found it 
“unreasonable” that the applicant would have joined the AAPO and remained a member: 
I find it unreasonable that you joined AAPO after your father has been detained 
for his involvement with same party. It is also unreasonable that you would 
resume your activities with the army after you have been arrested and detained 
for 45 days. 
 
Judicial Review was granted in this case, but on other grounds. The Refugee Convention exists 
precisely to protect persons who “decide” put themselves at risk because of their political 
opinion or religious views. It is baffling that the visa officer would consider that choosing belief 




5.5 Improving decision-making 
Throughout this chapter, I have identified various data-informed measures that would lead to 
improved decision-making within IRCC. In this section, I reiterate these recommendations and 
provide additional guidance on how I believe the problems identified can be addressed. The 
recommendations I make are rather minor and easily achievable. More systemic change has 
been suggested elsewhere. Notably, the Legislative Review Advisory Group recommended in 
1998 that both inland and overseas systems be administered by a single independent agency.197 
There is no doubt that such a structural change would help address many of the issues I have 
                                                   
197 Canada, Legislative Review Advisory Group, Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future 
Immigration – Executive Summary, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
1997) at 25. See Casasola, “Legislative Review”, supra note 161. 
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identified in the case review and reduce the gap in decision-making between the inland and 
overseas refugee systems. That being said, the recommendation I offer are all achievable within 
existing administrative structures. 
 
5.5.1 Administrative changes 
5.5.1.1 More robust training 
This issue of inadequate training has been mentioned by various scholars, advocacy 
organizations, and government evaluators. IRCC’s 2016 Evaluation of the Resettlement 
Programs (GAR, PSR, BVOR, RAP) reports the views of visa officer’s themselves on existing 
training programs: 
Several issues with the training opportunities, both internationally and 
domestically, were reported. 
- On-the-job training for officers varied between CVOA, depending on the 
provider, available material, and region-specific information and needs. 
Variances in on-the-job training by CVOA resulted in inconsistencies in applied 
practices.  
- Refugee-specific training for CVOA staff was reportedly oversubscribed; thus, 
not all officers had access to training. Furthermore, the formal training did not 
always match how processing was completed in the offices due to a lack of time 
and operational demands.  
- During the international case studies, CVOA officers noted that training on 
GCMS, particularly its advanced reporting and management functions, was not 
provided [emphasis mine].198 
 
 
The data reviewed in this chapter is strong evidence that training should be strengthened. That 
some visa officers make refugee decisions without having complete core training in refugee 
processing is concerning. Improving training is a cross-cutting measure that would lead to 
improvements in almost every procedural and substantive area reviewed in this chapter. 
                                                   
198 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs – Extended 
Report” (Spring 2016) at 5.2.3. 
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Training programs on refugee decision-making should be consistent across all regions. Visa 
officers should not be assigned to refugee cases before completing the core training program. 
Training should also be ongoing and training material should be frequently updated. There 
should also be region-specific training modules that address region-specific issues, such as local 
integration. The design and delivery of the training program could benefit from a partnership 
with the Immigration and Refugee Board. The data reviewed in this study indicates that 
increased training is especially needed in the areas of case documentation, gender-based claims, 
vulnerable applicants, language barriers, inadmissibility findings, and making use of country 
documentation. 
 
i) Documenting cases (notes and decision letters) 
The notes entered by visa officers should be clear, substantive, and complete. The case notes 
should be complete. They should reflect the questions posed and the answers provided, and also 
reflect why the case was decided in that particular way. Decision letters should also provide a 
substantive statement of why the visa officer arrived at that particular decision. Boilerplate 
decisions should be avoided. Clear benchmarks should be developed and applied by supervisors. 
 
ii) Gender-based claims 
Visa officer training with respect to gender-based claims should be strengthened. This training 
should put serious emphasis on principles elaborated by the Federal Court, the IRB, and the 
UNHCR on gender as a “particular social group”, and should emphasize the need to 




iii) Vulnerable and applicants and language matters 
Visa officers should receive training on how to identify applicants who have mental disabilities 
and procedures should be developed on how to adapt interviews with such applicants. Training 
should for example address the issue of adapting visa officers’ expectations, and the increased 
need to review objective country condition documents. Visa officers should also receive training 
on how to better identify language barriers between interpreters and applicants and how to adapt 
the interview in light of those barriers. 
 
iv) Properly indicating inadmissibility findings 
As stated by the Federal Court,199 it is inappropriate for visa officers to conclude that they are 
not satisfied that an application is not inadmissible. The language of inadmissibility should be 
employed only in cases where a positive finding of inadmissibility is made. 
 
v) Making proper use of objective country documentation 
Visa officers relied on objective country documents only in a small minority of cases. Often, the 
title of the document was omitted. There were also many cases where the analysis of 
documentation was problematic. In some cases, visa officers misquoted documentation.  Visa 
officers would benefit from more developed country documentation tools, in conjunction with 
training on how to use these tools. 
 
5.5.1.2 Lighter workload 
The pervasiveness of factual mistakes, lack of country conditions research, and inadequate 
documenting of decisions, suggest that visa officers are unable to allocate sufficient time to each 
                                                   
199 See section 5.4.6. 
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case. IRCC’s 2016 Evaluation, quoted earlier in this section, reports that visa officers are unable 
to apply the best practices discussed during training because of a lack of time. IRCC should 
consider measures to ensure that visa officers can devote the time required to process refugee 
applications. This should be guided by the principle that refugee applications are more complex 
than other immigration matters and require a different approach in terms of human resources 
allocation. This could include increasing the overall number of visa officers or allocating cases 
differently within a visa office based on the nature of the application. 
 
5.5.1.3 Recording interviews 
Creating a system for recording interviews would relieve visa officers from the time-consuming 
task of transcribing the questions posed and responses provided during the interview. A greater 
proportion of the interview could be devoted to substantive inquiry. Visa officers would also 
benefit from such a recording of the interview when they review and assess the case. Such a 
system for recording interviews would require only minor additional resources. Applicants 
would also benefit from audio recordings, especially those who proceed to judicial review. 
Because the visa officer notes - often incomplete - are the only reliable record of the interview, 
it can be arduous for the Federal Court to reconstruct what transpired at the interview. For 
instance, it is difficult for an applicant to establish that the translation was inadequate, that they 
made a particular statement, or that they were impeded by a cognitive impairment. Similarly, 
allegations of improper interview conduct are difficult to verify. This is the rationale that led the 
CCR to recommend instituting audio recording of interviews.200 Conversely, some decisions are 
quashed by the Federal Court for the reason that the court cannot identify on the written record 
the basis of the visa officer’s credibility concerns. Visa officer decisions would be less 
                                                   
200 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Decision-Making at Cairo”, supra note 189 at 28, 34. 
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vulnerable to judicial review if the reviewing court could access a recording of the interview. I 
note that in the inland system, all refugee hearings at the RPD are recorded, and the recording is 
disclosed when judicial review is initiated. When leave is granted, a transcript of the hearing is 
produced. 
 
5.5.1.4 Automatic review of refusals 
Returning to the former practice of having a senior official review every rejected refugee would 
create an important safeguard against poor-quality decision-making and also provide ongoing 
learning opportunities for visa officers. Such a change was recommended in CIC’s PSR QA 
Assessment, where it was noted that automatic internal review would be consistent with other 
jurisdictions, including the United States.201 
 
5.5.1.5 Reconsider position on local integration 
It should be of concern to policy-makers that Canada’s definition and application of local 
integration as a durable solution is out-of-step with criteria developed by the UNHCR. In the 
dataset, local integration was found to have occurred in cases where applicants lived in countries 
that were not signatories to the Refugee Convention, cases where the applicant had been refused 
refugee status, cases where the applicant only had temporary status, and cases where the 
applicant could not economically integrate and was facing widespread xenophobia. 
 
                                                   
201 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “PSR QA Project”, supra note 11 at 8. 
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5.5.2 Regulatory changes 
5.5.2.1 Eliminate the successful establishment criteria 
In the reviewed dataset, very few applicants were rejected on the basis of the successful 
establishment criteria. The existence of the requirement remains however at odds with UNHCR 
guidelines and the very principle of refugee protection. The criteria also enables inconsistent 
uses of discretion. Processing directives state that protection concerns should be at the centre of 
the assessment, yet the successful establishment criteria remains a tool that visa officers can 
invoke to reject applications. The applicants in the dataset that were rejected on the basis of 
establishment potential had no worse establishment potential than other applicants. The criteria 
should be eliminated from the regulations. 
 
5.5.2.2 Eliminate the UNHCR/state refugee documentation requirement 
As reviewed in Chapter 3, refugees have differential access to refugee status determination 
based on their nationality and country of asylum. Canada’s refugee resettlement system should 
be equally accessible to all refugees regardless of nationality. IRCC should consider other 




Already in 1984, only six years after the formalization of refugee policy in Canada, Gerald 
Dirks wrote that the newly adopted act was a “significant breakthrough” which put an end to 
earlier ad hoc refugee policies that relied on unclear criteria.202  Dirks noted, however, that 
                                                   
202 Gerald E Dirks, “A Policy within a Policy: The Identification and Admission of Refugees to Canada” 
(1984) 17 Can J Pol Sci 279 at 299. 
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Canada’s overseas refugee system suffered from shortcoming as a result of administrative 
practices:  
… legislation which appears to be liberal and humane may be modified by 
administrative convenience, or the perceptions of elected and career policy-
makers.203 
 
In Dirk’s assessment, the faulty administrative practices include, for instance, shortfalls in staff 
numbers, failures in assessing the link between refugee emergencies and living conditions in the 
country of first asylum, budgetary considerations, and policy priorities dictated by cabinet. 
Dirks also noted that, because refugee policy is implemented within the broader context of 
immigration policy, refugee admissions are determined, formally or informally, on the basis of 
evaluation criteria developed for regular migrants.204 
 
My analysis of the 403 cases reviewed in this chapter indicates that, 35 years later, there is still 
room improvement in terms of institutional design. This chapter has identified and documented 
important procedural and substantive shortcomings in decision-making. These findings confirm 
many of the concerns expressed over the years by refugee organizations. Major improvements 
could be achieved with relatively minor changes in the way the overseas refugee program 
operates. In closing this chapter, I would like to reiterate that this study does not suggest that 
improving decision-making is the only or the best avenue to optimize Canada’s contribution to 
refugee protection. Short of a wholesale reform of the international refugee regime, refugee law 
researchers must face the fact that resettlement admissions to Canada are limited. If one refugee 
applicant with a real protection need is wrongly denied entry to Canada, another one will replace 
her. In other words, top-quality decision-making will not increase the total sum of protection 
                                                   
203 Ibid at 299-300. 
204 Ibid at 309. 
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Canada offers. Some may add that the number of resettlement places offered by Canada is a 
drop in the bucket considering global resettlement needs. Yet, it is clear that deficiencies in 
decision-making and processing cause immense hardship to individual refugee applicants in 
need of a durable solution who often wait for years in limbo before receiving a decision from 
IRCC. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, deficiencies in decision-making also impact sponsors, 
and lead to increases in cost. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The impact of judicial review for refugees is salient in the context of inland asylum seekers, for 
whom a negative judicial review can lead directly to removal: 
Refugee determinations are among the most important decisions Canadian 
administrative tribunals and courts are called upon to make. If errors in first-
instance refugee determinations at the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) are 
not caught and corrected through judicial review, refugees may be deported to 
countries where they face persecution, torture or death.1 
 
Effective and fair judicial review also forms part of a state’s implementation of its obligations 
under international refugee law: 
The way that the rule of law operates at the national level in relation to refugees 
and asylum seekers determines the extent to which their rights in international 




For failed resettlement applicants, too, judicial review is a high-stakes affair. It is their only 
recourse to challenge a visa officer’s negative decision. It can mean the difference between 
protection and a durable solution in Canada, on the one hand, and life in limbo and potential 
refoulement on the other. A judicial review framework that is fair and accessible will have a 
major impact in correcting individual failings and shaping decision-making practices. 
Conversely, a judicial review framework that is inaccessible will fail to correct objectionable 
decision-making practices and to have a meaningful impact. 
 
                                                   
1 Sean Rehaag, Rehaag, Sean, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 
38 Queen’s LJ 1 at 2 [Luck of the Draw]. 
2 Susan Kneebone, “Introduction: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the International Context – Rights and 
Realities”, in Susan Kneebone, ed, Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 1 at 30. 
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The goal of this chapter is to assess, using quantitative and qualitative methodologies, how 
judicial review operates in the context of refugee resettlement, and to discuss the overall impact 
of judicial review on the resettlement program.3 The first section of this chapter will discuss 
how my analysis is situated within the literature on judicial review. The second section will 
present a quantitative overview of the outcomes of the 403 cases in the dataset. This will be 
followed by more detailed quantitative analyses, beginning with various applicant-focused 
factors that are correlated to variations in judicial review outcomes, including sponsor, city of 
filing, country of origin and country of asylum, and quality of counsel. In the following section, 
I address three extralegal, ‘judge-focused’ factors, that have been found to have an impact on 
grant rates in other contexts, including individual variation, gender variation, and variation 
based on the political party of appointment. Federal judges’ reason-giving practices will also be 
analyzed and discussed. The following section will shift the analysis from the quantitative to the 
qualitative, as I review the Federal Court’s approach to procedural fairness and deference, 
practices in case settlement, as well as strong cases that were denied leave. In the following 
sections, I discuss the role of judicial review as individual redress and as a structural component 
of the resettlement system. In the concluding section, I present recommendations in light of my 
findings aimed at improving access to review. 
 
6.2 Researching judicial review 
Refugee law scholars are particularly interested in judicial review as it is often the ultimate 
recourse for individuals undergoing refugee status determination. Doctrinal approaches have 
                                                   
3 Many of the quantitative results and recommendations in this chapter were previously reported in Pierre-
André Thériault, “Judicial Review in Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program”, in Shauna Labman & 
Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 227. 
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traditionally dominated in legal research around judicial review in the refugee context. There is 
however a growing body of literature in legal scholarship that approaches decision-making in 
judicial review proceedings in refugee matters through empirical methodologies. The overall 
finding of many of these studies is concerning: judicial review of refugee matters often depends 
extralegal factors, such as the identity, gender and the ideology of the judge, with devastating 
impact for refugee claimants who are entitled to a ruling on the merit of their case.4 No study 
has yet inquired into how judicial review operates in the overseas refugee context and how it 
may differ from the inland refugee context. 
 
I also want to address here a related emerging body of literature in the social sciences termed 
‘judicial impact studies’, an approach concerned with the broader impacts of judicial review on 
government bureaucracies. The judicial impact approach seeks to go beyond the traditional 
doctrinal concerns of legal scholarship and addresses some of the more informal aspects of the 
interaction between courts and bureaucracies: 
[t]he most profound and enduring influences of judicial review are not to be 
found by examining the statute book, or by seeking formalized and public shifts 
in policy in response to litigation. Rather they are to be found in the effects of 
litigation on the less accessible aspects of government: the internal and informal 




The judicial impact approach is an empirically grounded one that privileges interviews and 
observation with decision-makers. Judicial impact scholars have looked, for example, into 
                                                   
4 See for example Jon B Gould, Colleen Sheppard & Johannes Wheeldon, “A Refugee from Justice? 
Disparate Treatment in the Federal Court of Canada” (2010) 32:4 JL & Pol’y 454. 
5 Maurice Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on Government 
Bureaucracies”, in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: 
International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 43 at 63. 
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decision-makers’ perceptions and reactions to doctrinal changes,6 mechanisms of dissemination 
of judicial decision,7  the use of soft-law by agencies to implement judicial decisions, and 
practices around case settlement.8 In this chapter, the discussion around case settlement, changes 
in decision-making practices following judicial pronouncements, and the structural impact of 
judicial review on the resettlement program are indeed topics of concern of the judicial impact 
approach. That being said, as my methodology is grounded in the legal approach and case 
analysis, I engage only peripherally with the judicial impact literature.  
 
6.3 Overview of judicial review outcomes and rate of seeking judicial review 
My review of the cases shows that 320 JR applications were ‘perfected’ (i.e. all required court 
documents were filed), while seven applications were granted on consent before having been 
perfected. Twenty-two cases were discontinued by the applicant before being perfected – two of 
which contained evidence of a settlement. Fifty-four cases were not perfected and were denied 
leave for that reason. It should be noted that the relatively high number of ‘not perfected’ cases 
is likely driven by the rules of disclosure in immigration matters. Reasons are not disclosed to 
applicants as a matter of course, and can only be obtained through a formal access to 
information request. However, delays in obtaining a reply to an access to information request 
can bring applicants outside the judicial review time limit, which is 60 days in the case of 
refugee resettlement applicants. As a result, a common practice is for lawyers to file a judicial 
review application as soon as judicial review is contemplated and review disclosure provided 
                                                   
6 Bradley C Canon, “Studying Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in The United States: 
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches” in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and 
Bureaucratic Impact: International an Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 76. 
7 Robin Creyke & John McMillan, “Executive Perceptions of Administrative Law - An Empirical Study” 
(2002) 9 Austl J Admin L 163. 
8 Sunkin, supra note 5. 
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through the judicial review process. Only at that point do applicants and their lawyer assess 
whether continuing with the judicial review is warranted. 
TABLE 6.1 - SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OUTCOMES 
 
Pre-leave stage (403 cases) 
 
• 76 cases not perfected or discontinued before being perfected 
o 54 not perfected and denied leave 
o 22 discontinued before being perfected 
• 7 cases granted on consent or settled before being perfected 
• 320 perfected cases, including: 
o 7 cases granted on consent or before leave decision 
o 45 cases discontinued after being perfected (13 with evidence of 
settlement, 11 where leave was not opposed) 
o 268 cases proceeded to leave determination 
 
Leave stage (268 cases) 
 
• 268 leave determinations, including: 
o 172 leave granted cases (22 leave not opposed; 150 leave opposed) 





Post-leave stage (172 cases where leave was granted) 
 
• 38 cases discontinued after leave granted (14 with evidence of settlement) 
• 134 cases proceeded to a hearing, including 
o 78 cases granted (56 on their merits, 22 on consent) 




Out of the 320 perfected cases, 7 were granted on consent before leave was decided, 45 were 
discontinued before leave was decided (13 containing evidence of a settlement, and another 11 
cases where leave was not opposed), and 268 proceeded to a leave determination. 
 
Leave was opposed by the government in 245 of the 270 perfected cases that proceeded to a 
leave determination. Leave was granted in 150 of those 245 cases, for a leave grant rate of 
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61.22% for “opposed and perfected” cases. Leave was also granted in all but one of the 23 
unopposed leave applications. Overall, leave was granted in 172 of all perfected cases 
(63.70%).9 The leave grant rate varied between a low of 42.86% in 2013 to 80.00% in 2015. No 
clear trend emerges from fluctuations in grant rates over the study period.10 
TABLE 6.2 - LEAVE GRANT RATES (2011-2015) 
 
 
Rehaag observed that the Federal Court’s average leave grant rate in applications for judicial 
review of negative inland refugee determination is lower than what the leave’s permissive legal 
test should permit. As reviewed in chapter 3, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court directs 
judges to grant leave if “a fairly arguable case is disclosed”11 or “if there appears to be any 
possibility of applicant succeeding at the hearing.”12 Rehaag writes, 
given the low leave grant rate (14.44%), the success rate at the merits stage in 
cases where leave is granted (43.98%) is surprisingly high. … If only 
applications that clearly cannot succeed on the merits fail at the leave stage, and 
if the vast majority of applications do not pass that stage, one might expect 
success rates on the merits to be lower in cases where leave is granted. The 
combination of low leave-granting rates and high success rates once leave is 
                                                   
9 In 6 cases, a motion to reconsider leave was filed by the applicant after leave was denied. Leave was granted 
in 4 of the 6 motion to reconsider. For the purpose of case statistics, only the outcome of the reconsideration 
was included. 
10 In contrast, leave grant rates have steadily increased for refugee cases stemming from the inland system. 
See Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations (II): Revisiting the Luck of 
the Draw” (2019) 45:1 Queen's LJ 1 at 17 [Revisiting The Luck of the Draw]. 
11 Bains v Canada (MEI) (1990), 47 Admin LR 317 at paras 1, 3 (FCA). 
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granted may lead one to wonder whether leave is too often being withheld in 
cases where there is some modest prospect of success.13 
 
It seems that, in the case of resettlement applications, the imbalance observed by Rehaag is 
largely rectified, with a leave grant rate (61.22%) that is over 4 times what it was in the inland 
asylum system. 
 
Of the 172 cases that were granted leave, 38 were discontinued after receiving a positive leave 
determination, 14 with evidence of a settlement. It is likely, however, that many more (if not all 
38) were in fact settled, considering that not all lawyers follow the practice of placing settlement 
letters in the court record. Of the 134 remaining cases, 56 were granted on their merits, 22 were 
granted with the consent of the government, and 56 were dismissed on their merits, for a success 
rate at the hearing stage of 58.21% (78/134). 
 
A “serious question of general importance”, which opens the door for an appeal to the Federal 
Court of Appeal, was submitted for certification in 36 cases by the applicant, and in one case by 
the government. All but one of the questions for certification submitted by the applicant were 
refused, while the sole question submitted by the government was accepted for certification. 
Neither case actually proceeded to an appeal.  
 
Overall, as many as 154 cases (38.21% of all cases) had a positive outcome, taking into account 
explicitly settled cases, cases granted on consent, perfected cases discontinued following a 
notice that leave was not opposed, cases discontinued following a positive leave determination, 
and cases granted on their merits. It is also likely that the other 21 cases discontinued after being 
                                                   
13 Sean Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 23-24. 
	314	
	
perfected were in fact settled, with no evidence of settlement entered into the record. 
 
It is also noteworthy that a large proportion of cases were settled by the government: 63 cases 
were granted on consent or explicitly settled at various stages of the process, another 24 cases 
were discontinued after a positive leave determination, and 11 cases were discontinued after 
leave was not opposed by the government. In total, 98 cases (24.32%) were settled, in addition 
to the 21 perfected and discontinued cases mentioned in the above paragraph. 
 
The dataset’s 403 judicial review applications reviewed account for 494 separate ‘principal 
applicants’ (480 principal applicants in the PSR stream and 14 principal applicants in the GAR 
stream). Taking into account individual principal applicants is relevant to calculating the rate of 
seeking judicial review in the overall rejected resettlement applicant population. It is also 
important to pay attention to the fact that mandamus applications concern refugee applications 
that have not been determined yet. Taking into consideration these variables, 8.47% of rejected 
principal applicants in the PSR stream sought judicial review during the study period, while 
rejected refugee applicants in the GAR stream sought judicial review in 0.25% of rejected 
cases.14 
 
                                                   
14 This method of calculating the rate of seeking judicial review has one limitation. Under the IRPA, judicial 
review applications can be filed up to 60 days after they receive their decision (IRPA, s 72(2)b)). Therefore, it 
was expected that some judicial review applications in the dataset would concern a decision made in the last 
60 days of 2010, or even earlier if the decision was not received immediately when it was issued. In total, 23 
cases, all filed in 2011, concerned a decision issued in 2010. Similarly, the methodology may not have 
captured all visa officer decisions made in the last 60 days of 2015 in respect of which a judicial review was 
sought. To ensure a more accurate analysis, I considered looking at judicial review applications filed in the 
first 60 days of 2016, and eliminating all 2011 judicial review applications that involved a visa officer 
decision from before 2011. I decided against this method because, as it turns out, a large number of judicial 
review applications are filed outside the 60 days window. In the end, I believe the number of judicial review 
applications that concern pre-2011 visa officer decision roughly cancels out the number of 2015 visa officer 
decisions that were judicially reviewed in 2016 or later. 
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TABLE 6.3 - RATE OF SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW (2011-2015) 
PSR GAR 




JR applications as a % 
of all rejected cases* 




JR applications as a % 
of all rejected cases* 
393 475 1 8.47% (474/5597) 10 17 9 0.25%  
(8/3203) 
†Principal applicants equivalent 
*Principal applicants excluding mandamus applications 
 
6.4 A quantitative assessment of the judicial review process  
6.4.1 Type of sponsor and sponsor impact 
As reviewed in the methodology section, the 393 privately sponsored cases in the dataset 
included 224 cases sponsored by a SAH (57.00%); 138 cases sponsored by a Group of Five 
(34.11%); and only one case sponsored by a Community Sponsor (0.25%). In 30 cases, it was 
impossible to determine the type of sponsor. I initially hypothesized that, as “repeat players”,15 
SAHs would have more favourable outcomes than other types of sponsors in judicial review. 
The data does not entirely support this hypothesis. While SAH cases had a significantly higher 
leave grant rate in perfected and opposed cases, as compared to Groups of Five and Community 
Sponsors (67.61% compared to 51.76%), SAHs actually had a slightly lower rate of positive 
outcome (44.32% compared to 48.65%).16 I also hypothesized that SAH-sponsored cases would 
be overrepresented in the dataset because SAHs are more experienced with review procedures 
and thus more likely to initiate a judicial review to challenge a visa officer decision. CIC’s 2016 
Evaluation of the PSR program reports that, between 2010 and 2014, SAHs submitted 66% of 
all sponsorship applications, while Groups of Five submitted 31%, and Community Sponsors 
submitted 3%.17 Relying on those numbers, SAH-sponsored cases actually appear to be slightly 
                                                   
15 See Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” 
(1974) 9 L & Soc Rev 95. 
16 Ultimate positive outcome here includes cases settled, granted on consent, discontinued after a declaration 
that leave was not opposed, and cases discontinued after being granted leave. 
17 Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs (GAR, BVOR, 
PSR and RAP)” (July 2016) at para 5.4.1. 
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underrepresented in the dataset and Groups of Five slightly overrepresented. A potential 
explanation is that SAHs are not true repeat players because a large proportion of their cases are 
submitted with one-time co-sponsors. That being said, it is worth noting that such a calculation 
relies on the assumption that approval rates are consistent across sponsor categories, which may 
not be the case.18 Unfortunately, there is no available data on approval rates broken down by 
sponsor category. What remains clear is that extremely few cases sponsored by a Community 
Sponsor were judicially reviewed (0.25% of reviewed cases), as compared to the overall number 
of submitted Community Sponsor cases (3% of all sponsored applications). 
 
6.4.2 City of filing 
In 82.52% of cases where the city of destination was apparent on the record, the city of 
destination matched the province where the judicial review was filed.19 Table 6.4 shows in 
which Federal Court office processed each of the 403 cases.  
TABLE 6.4 – CITY OF FILING 
Federal Court 
office 
Number of cases % of cases 
Toronto 203 50.37% 
Winnipeg 99 24.57% 
Montreal 40 9.93% 
Vancouver 24 5.96% 
Ottawa 19 4.71% 
Calgary 10 2.48% 
Edmonton 6 1.49% 
Saskatoon 1 0.25% 
Saint John 1 0.25% 
All cities 403 100.00% 
 
That Toronto would be the top city of filing is to be expected considering that Toronto is the city 
                                                   
18 For example, SAHs, being more experienced in preparing refugee applications, may have higher approval 
rates that other sponsors. 
19 The city of destination was apparent in 286 cases. 
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which received the largest number of resettled refugees during the study period.20 It is surprising 
that the volume of cases filed in Winnipeg is equivalent to that of Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa, 
Calgary, and Edmonton combined. To those familiar with Winnipeg’s strong history of refugee 
resettlement, however, this should not come as a surprise. Tom Denton explains: 
Winnipeg per-capita brought in more privately sponsored refugees [in 2001] than 
any other Canadian city, and in absolute numbers was exceeded only by Toronto. 
More refugees arrived in Winnipeg than in all other Prairie cities combined. The 
city's closest rival was Montreal, with fewer than half Winnipeg’s numbers.21 
 
That being said, the proportion of judicial review applications being filed in Winnipeg (24.57%) 
remains much higher than the proportion of refugees resettled in the province in recent years of 
Manitoba (14.57% of all PSRs in 2011-2015).22 This suggests that long-standing community 
organization around refugee sponsorship in Manitoba has led to an increased capacity for 
sponsors to conduct judicial review. 
 
In Rehaag’s 2012 dataset, there was some variation in success rates between cities where the 
application is filed. Notably, Rehaag found that applications filed in Montreal were less likely to 
be granted leave and less likely to be granted on the merits than applications filed in other cities. 
Conversely, applications filed in Toronto were found to have higher than average success 
                                                   
20 Ontario is the top province of destination for resettled refugees and Toronto is the top city of destination in 
Canada: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Canada - Admissions of Resettled Refugees by 
Province/Territory and Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Intended Destination and Immigration 
Category”, online: <https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/4a1b260a-7ac4-4985-80a0-603bfe4aec11>. 
21 Thomas R Denton, “Understanding Private Refugee Sponsorship in Manitoba” (2003) 4:2 J Int Migration & 
Integration 257 at 262. Labman writes that the private sponsorship of refugees is encouraged as a “population-
building strategy” in Winnipeg, with a city-funded “assurance fund” available to sponsors who cannot meet 
the financial needs of the newcomers. See Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: Canada’s Refugee 
Resettlement Program (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) at 100-01. 
22 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Canada - Admissions of Permanent Residents by 
Intended Province/Territory of Destination and Immigration Category, 2000-March 2016”, online: 
<https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/ad975a26-df23-456a-8ada-756191a23695>; Immigration, Refugees 




rates.23 Rehaag’s study did not identify a reason for the disparity. One potential explanation 
could be that the payment structure of the Commission des services juridiques (CSJ) – which 
provides comparatively low-paying legal aid certificates – has led to the development of a 
refugee law business model where lawyers do not devote as much time to a case as they would 
otherwise.24 In this study’s dataset, similar trends were observed. Applications filed in Montreal 
had lower than average grant rates. Applications filed in Toronto were 1.7 times as likely to 
have a positive outcome than applications filed in Montreal. The fact that legal aid is not 
available in resettlement cases casts serious doubt on the above hypothesis. The disparity in 
success rates is more likely a product of a variety of factors that go beyond the scope of this 
study. I suggest that counsel experience may be a contributing factor. As will be discussed 
further in section 6.4.5, counsel with more experience (i.e. counsel with more cases in the 
dataset) generally obtained better outcomes for their clients, and it just so happens that none of 
the five most experienced lawyers in the dataset (who together have litigated more cases than 
the other 91 lawyers in the dataset) work in Quebec. 
TABLE 6.5 - OUTCOME BY CITY OF FILING 





























                                                   
23 Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 29, 56. 
24 See Justice Canada, “Legal aid in Canada 2016-17”, online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/aid-
aide/p1.html#table17>. 
25 “Successful” cases account for all positive outcomes: cases ultimately granted one the merits, cases granted 
on consent or explicitly settled. It is assumed here that cases discontinued after a positive leave, and all cases 
discontinued after a declaration by the government that leave was not opposed, were in fact settled. Therefore, 
the number of cases with a determined positive outcome exceeds the number of cases in respect of which 




6.4.3 Country of origin and country of asylum 
As expected, there were important variations in judicial review outcomes depending on 
applicants’ country of origin and the country of asylum. The table below shows the judicial 
review outcomes for each country of origin and country of asylum with more than 20 cases. 
TABLE 6.6 - OUTCOMES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 










































TABLE 6.7 - OUTCOMES BY COUNTRY OF ASYLUM 















































Applicants from Somalia were vastly more likely to be granted leave (89.36% compared to an 
average of 64.18%). Eritrean refugee applicants (46.15%) and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lankan 
refugees (50.00%) were less likely to be granted leave. There were outliers as well in terms of 





countries of asylum: applicants seeking refuge in Kenya were granted leave in 86.87% of 
perfected cases, while refugee applicants in Egypt were granted leave in 47.06% of perfected 
cases. Higher leave grant rates generally correlated with higher overall success, with the notable 
exception of Somalia, which had the highest leave grant rate but a relatively low overall success 
rate. As shown in chapter 5, some countries of origin and some countries of asylum are heavily 
associated with particular types of refusals. The fact that South Africa had the lowest overall 
success rate among all countries of asylum with over 20 cases and that Sri Lanka had the second 
lowest overall success rate among countries of origin with over 20 cases suggests that refusals 
based on the availability of an alternative durable solution are difficult to challenge on judicial 
review. 
 
6.4.4 Variation among judges: individual, gender, and party of appointment 
In legal theory, legal realism holds that judicial decision-making is an inherently subjective 
exercise.29 Under a strong legal realist view of decision-making, judicial decision-making is 
primarily influenced by extralegal factors, and there is no expectation of consistency among 
decision-makers. The legal realist view does not sit well with the principle of the rule of law, 
which relies on predictability and impartiality. The opposing view, legal formalism, describes 
legal decision-making as a purely objective, rational exercise, and allows for divergent 
judgements only when the law itself can lead to two plausible outcomes.30 Just as the legal 
realist position is objectionable on normative grounds, the formalist position is objectionable on 
empirical grounds: the data shows that judicial decision-making is relatively inconsistent, and 
that subjectivity cannot be completely eliminated in any human activity. The better view of 
                                                   
29 See Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
30 Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Butterworths, 1985) at 221. 
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decision-making is that, in reality, decision-making combines elements of both realism and 
formalism: it is neither fully objective, nor fully subjective. Tamahana terms this conception 
decision-making “balanced realism.”31 
 
Greene and Shaffer write that, in the refugee context, “(a) uniform and just application of the 
law is particularly important … because of the severe human consequences which may result if 
the law is misapplied.”32 Several studies have focused on leave grant rates and judicial review 
grant rates among Federal Court judges in refugee and other immigration matters. These studies 
have consistently found that judicial review outcomes at the Federal Court in refugee cases are 
correlated to extralegal factors, including the identity of the judge, the judge’s party of 
appointment and the judge’s gender. In the following pages, I will discuss these studies and 
explore whether similar trends can be found in my dataset. 
 
Soon after the leave requirement was adopted for inland refugee cases in 1989, Greene and 
Schaffer conducted an analysis of outcomes in a random sample of 611 judicial review 
applications of inland refugee decisions. 33  The authors found a statistically significant 
association between individual judges and the rate of success of leave applicants, even when 
taking into variations in country origin. Greene, Baar, McCormick, Szablowski, and Thomas 
later conducted a more comprehensive study of all 2,081 leave applications filed in 1990, which 
                                                   
31 Brian Z Tamanaha, “Balanced Realism on Judging” (2010) 44:4 Val U L Rev 1243. 
32 Ian Greene & Paul Shaffer, “Leave to Appeal and Leave to Commence Judicial Review in Canada’s 
Refugee-Determination System: Is the Process Fair?” (1992) 4:1 Intl J Refugee L 71 at 75, cited in Rehaag, 
“Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 15. 
33 Greene & Shaffer, ibid. Under the 1976 Immigration Act (in force at the time of that study), leave 
determinations and hearings on the merits were conducted by the Federal Court of Appeal. 
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confirmed the previous study’s findings.34 In addition, they found that cases decided by judges 
with low leave grant rates were not more likely to succeed on the merits than cases granted 
leave by judges with high grant rates.35 
 
A 2010 study by Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon looked at a random sample of refugee and 
non-refugee leave applications decided by the Federal Court.36 The authors found that a number 
of factors were significantly correlated to leave outcomes, including the gender of the judge, the 
judge’s ideology, the language of the judge, and whether or not the applicant was represented by 
experienced counsel. More recent and comprehensive research has been conducted by Sean 
Rehaag. Rehaag’s 2012 study analyzed the entirety of Federal Court leave determinations in 
inland refugee cases between 2005 and 2010.37 Rehaag found wide discrepancies in leave grants 
rates, ranging from 77.97% (Justice Campbell) to 1.36% (Justice Crampton). Rehaag also found 
wide discrepancies in terms of judicial review grant rates, ranging from 92.31% (Justice 
Campbell) to 7.89% (Justice Boivin). Rehaag’s analysis also identified variations in terms of 
city of filing, party of appointment, gender, and experience of counsel. In an updated study, 
Rehaag looked at leave determinations made between 2008 and 2016.38 He found that, while 
discrepancies between judges had decreased, there remained important variations in both leave 
grant rates and judicial review grant rates. Between 2013 and 2016, leave grant rates ranged 
from 49.2% (Justice Heneghan) to 5.3% (Justice Snider). Judicial review grant rates ranged 
from 66.2% (Justice MacTavish) to 17.9% (Justice Boivin).  
                                                   
34 Ian Greene et al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: James Lorimer & 
Company, 1998) at 20-21. For example, Justice Pratt granted leave in 14% of cases, while Justice Desjardins 
was 3.43 times more likely to grant leave with a grant rate of 48% of cases. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 4. 
37 Sean Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1. 




In this study’s dataset, a total of 45 judges made leave determinations in perfected and opposed 
cases. The number of cases decided ranged from 19 (Shore) to one (Southcott, Louis, Pinard, 
and Mandamin). Because of the low number of leave cases decided by individual judges, it is 
difficult to draw reliable conclusions in terms of consistency across the bench. I will focus here 
only on the eight judges who decided at least ten leave applications. As the table below shows, 
there appears to be some significant disparities in leave grant rates between judges. Justices 
Gagné and Mosley granted leave in 100% of cases, while Justice Snider granted leave in 10% of 
cases. While the caseload is excessively small, it is interesting to note that the leave grant rates 
in this group of cases follows, to a certain extent, the trends identified in Rehaag (2012) and 
Rehaag (2019). This suggests that in this group of cases as well, outcomes may depend on judge 
assignment. 
TABLE 6.8 - LEAVE DETERMINATIONS FOR JUDGES WITH 10+ CASES39 
Name of 
judge 














Mosley 10 10 0 100.00% +38.78 -1 N/A 
Gagné 10 8 2 80.00% +18.78 N/A N/A 
Shore 19 14 5 73.68% +12.56 +18.33 -3.5 
Russell 10 7 3 70.00% +8.78 +7.84 +19.8 
Mactavish 13 9 4 69.23% +5.01 +8.84 -4.1 
Kelen 14 9 5 64.29% +3.07 -4.32 N/A 
Bédard 11 5 6 45.45% -15.77 -0.23 -7.9 
Snider 10 1 9 10.00% -51.22 -7.47 -16.9 
All judges 245 150 95 61.22% 0 0 0 
 
A total of 40 judges decided applications on their merits. The number of applications decided by 
individual judges ranged from 15 (Justice O’Reilly) to one (Justices Locke, Roy, Near, 
McVeigh, Manson, De Montigny, Martineau, Strickland, Strickland, Gagné, Camp, Simpson, 
Southcott, and Gleeson). The table below shows the grant rates for the four most prolific judges. 
                                                   
39 Perfected and opposed cases only. 
40 The leave grant rates in this column are for the years 2005-2010. 
41 The leave grant rates in this column are for the years 2013-2016. 
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Here the number of cases per judge is certainly too low to reliably ascertain consistency 
between judges. It is interesting to note, however, that the low grant rates of Justice Boivin seem 
consistent across this study and both Rehaag’s 2012 and 2019 studies. 
TABLE 6.9 - HEARING OUTCOME BY JUDGE (TOP 4 JUDGES) 
Name of 
judge 














LeBlanc 7 4 3 57.14% +7.14 N/A -6.2 
Heneghan 7 3 4 42.86% -7.14 +5.46 -10.6 
O’Reilly 15 3 12 20% -30% +8.77 +8.5 
Boivin 6 1 5 16.67% -33.33 -31.65 -26.8 
All judges 112 56 56 50% 0 0 0 
 
The nature of the dataset was better suited for analyses based on the gender of the judge and the 
party of appointment. An important study in the US context found that female judges had much 
higher grant rates than male judges in refugee proceedings, a finding that led researchers to 
hypothesize that female adjudicators were more sympathetic than male adjudicators to refugee 
applicants.44 Studies in the Canadian context have not supported this hypothesis. In Gould’s 
study, male judges were found to be more likely to grant leave than female judges to a 
significant degree.45 Rehaag’s study of gender impact at the IRB has shown that the difference 
between male and female grant rates is much narrower than in the US context, and that male 
adjudicators were 6% more likely to grant refugee status than female adjudicators.46 Rehaag’s 
2012 study of judicial review proceedings at the Federal Court also found that male judges were 
more likely to grant leave than female judges, but were less likely to grant judicial review on the 
                                                   
42 The leave grant rates in this column are for the years 2005-2010. 
43 The leave grant rates in this column are for the years 2013-2016. 
44 Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 4 at 465. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I Schoenholtz & 
Phillip G Schrag, “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication” (2007) 60:2 Stan L Rev at 295 at 
339-49. 
45 In that study, male judges granted leave in 58% of cases, and female judges in 46% of cases (Gould, 
Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 4 at 469). 
46 Sean Rehaag, “Do Women Refugee Judges Really Make a Difference? An Empirical Analysis of Gender 
and Outcomes in Canadian Refugee Determinations” (2011) 23 CJWL 627 at 648 [“Gender and Outcomes”]. 
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merits, and the differences were rather small.47 
 
In this study’s dataset, male judges were more likely to grant leave than female judges (64.74% 
for male judges; 55.06% for female judges). However, male judges were slightly less likely to 
grant judicial review on the merits than female judges (48.85% for male judges; 53.85% for 
female judges). From this data alone, it is very difficult to explain how, if at all, the gender of 
the judge influences judicial review outcomes. This study does confirm Rehaag’s finding that 
variations based on gender are much less pronounced in Canada than in the US context, and 
supports his call for caution in generalizing differences in how men and women decide cases 
based on studies from specific adjudicative settings.48 
TABLE 6.10 LEAVE OUTCOMES BY JUDGE GENDER (PERFECTED AND OPPOSED CASES) 








Female 89 49 40 55.06%  
Male 156 101 55 64.74%  
All judges 245 150 95 61.22% 
 
TABLE 6.11 - JR OUTCOMES BY JUDGE GENDER (CASES DECIDED ON THE MERITS) 
Gender JR decided JR granted JR dismissed JR grant rate 
Female 26 14 12 53.85% 
Male 86 42 44 48.84%  
All judges 112 56 56 50.00% 
 
Political party of appointment is another factor that has been posited as influencing judicial 
outcomes generally and in the refugee context in particular. 49 The variation in refugee grant 
rates based on political party of appointment is especially large in the US context.50 In the 
dataset analyzed in Rehaag’s 2012 study, Federal Court judges appointed by a Liberal Prime 
                                                   
47 At the leave stage, Rehaag found that the grant rate was 16.52% for male judges and 15.85% for female 
judges. At the JR stage, the grant rate was 38.78% for male judges and 42.88% for female judges. See 
Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 28, 56. 
48 Rehaag, “Gender and Outcomes”, supra note 46 at 648; Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 32. 
49 See Rehaag, “Luck of the draw”, supra note 1 at 13. 
50 See Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 44. 
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Minister were much more likely to grant leave and grant judicial review than judges appointed 
by a Conservative (or Progressive Conservative) Prime Minister: Liberal appointees granted 
leave in 17.64% of cases, and granted judicial review in 42.69% of cases; Conservative 
appointees granted leave in 11.00% of cases, and granted the judicial review in 29.14% of 
cases. 51  According to Rehaag, the finding is unsurprising given that the Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper indicated a desire for greater deference to IRB members in 
judicial review and would seek to appoint judges who share their judicial policy.52 
 
The results in this study’s dataset are not entirely straightforward. The judges’ political party of 
appointment was correlated to a slight variation in leave grant rates. Judges appointed by the 
Liberal Party granted leave in 63.95% of cases, compared to 57.14% for judges appointed by the 
Conservative Party and the Progressive Conservative Party, which amounts to a variation of 
11.92%. This is a much smaller variation than that reported in Rehaag’s study. More 
importantly, at the hearing stage, there was practically no difference, with (Progressive) 
Conservative appointees being 3.64% more likely to grant judicial review. It may be that 
ideological differences between judges are less salient in the case of overseas refugee applicants, 
who have been addressed much differently in political discourse. 
TABLE 6.12 - LEAVE OUTCOMES BY POLITICAL PARTY OF APPOINTMENT 
(PERFECTED AND OPPOSED CASES) 
Party Leave decided Leave granted Leave denied Leave grant rate 
Liberal 147 94 53 63.95% 
(Progressive) 
Conservative 
98 56 42 57.14%  





                                                   
51 Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1 at 56. 
52 Ibid at 32. 
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TABLE 6.13 - JR OUTCOMES BY POLITICAL PARTY OF APPOINTMENT  
(CASES DECIDED ON THE MERITS) 
Party JR decided JR granted JR dismissed JR grant rate 
Liberal 57 28 29 49.12%  
(Progressive) 
Conservative 
55 28 27 50.91% 
 
All judges 112 56 56 50.00% 
 
6.4.5 Impact of counsel 
There is a growing literature on the impact of counsel and representation more generally in both 
administrative and judicial proceedings. These studies tend to show two things. First, 
individuals with counsel tend to attain more favourable outcomes than self-represented 
individuals or individuals represented by someone other than a lawyer. Second, lawyers obtain 
better results for their clients than other types of representatives, and certain categories of 
lawyers, including lawyers with more experience, tend to obtain more favourable results than 
other lawyers. For instance, in the American context, Anderson and Heaton have demonstrated 
that public defenders reduce their client’s murder conviction by 19%, and their likelihood of 
obtaining a life sentence by 62% compared to appointed counsel.53 Thornton and Gwin show 
that providing parents with quality representation in child welfare cases leads to faster and more 
successful family reunification. 54  Carpentar, Mark and Shanahan’s study demonstrates that 
represented parties in employment proceedings fare better than unrepresented parties, and that 
lawyers are better equipped than non-lawyers to deal with contested procedural and substantive 
issues and advance novel legal argument. 55  Poppe and Rachlinski reviewed the existing 
empirical literature on the impact of legal representation in a variety of administrative and 
                                                   
53 James M Anderson & Paul Heaton, “How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make: The Effect of Defense 
Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes” (2012) 122:1 Yale LJ 154. 
54 Elizabeth Thornton & Betsy Gwin, “High-Quality Legal Representation for Parents in Child Welfare Cases 
Results in Improved Outcomes for Families and Potential Cost Savings” (2012) 46:1 Fam LQ 139. 
55 Anna E Carpenter, Alyx Mark, and Colleen F Shanahan, “Trial and Error: Lawyers and Nonlawyer 
Advocates” (2017) 42:4 L & Soc Inquiry 1023; Colleen F Shanahan, Anna E Carpenter & Alyx Mark, 
“Lawyers, Power, and Strategic Expertise” (2016) 93:2 Denver L Rev 469. 
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judicial proceedings, including juvenile cases, housing, administrative hearings on government 
benefits, employment proceedings, family proceedings, small claims proceedings, tax 
proceedings, bankruptcy proceedings and torts claims. They found that legal representation was 
associated with better outcomes across all areas with the exception of juvenile court, where the 
evidence is unclear.56 
 
Empirical studies in the American context have shown that legal representation matters in 
immigration and refugee proceedings. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz and Schrag conducted a 
large-scale study of more than 400,000 refugee proceedings before various administrative 
tribunals and courts. They found that representation was the most important factor affecting 
outcomes. Refugee claimants that went unrepresented had a success rate of 16.3%, compared to 
45.6% for represented claimants.57 In addition, certain categories of lawyers - lawyer from large 
law firms working pro bono and lawyers from university legal clinics - had a much higher 
success rate of 96% and 89% respectively.58 Miller, Keith and Holmes looked at all American 
asylum decisions between 1990 and 2010, finding that quality of counsel did impact outcomes, 
and that “low quality representation actually makes an applicant worse off than if they precede 
pro se.”59 A 2006 study by Kagan has shown that legal assistance is also a strong predictor of 
claim success in UNHCR refugee status determination procedures, both at first instance and at 
the appeal level.60 
 
                                                   
56 Emily S Taylor Poppe & Jeffrey J Rachlinski, “Do Lawyers Matter? The Effect of Legal Representation in 
Civil Disputes” (2016) 43 Pepp L Rev 881. 
57 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 44 at 340. 
58 Ibid at 340-41. 
59 Banks Miller, Linda Camp Keith & Jennifer S Holmes, “Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal 
Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability” (2015) 49:1 L Soc’y Rev 209 at 232. 
60 Michael Kagan, “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt” (2006) 
19:1 J Refugee Stud 45. 
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Now turning to the Canadian context, Gould, Sheppard and Wheeldon, cited in the previous 
section, found that applicants (both refugee and immigrant) represented by a lawyer were 32 
times more likely to be granted leave by the Federal Court than applicants representing 
themselves or represented by a consultant.61 In addition, lawyers from experienced law firms 
had more success at the leave stage.62 The presence and experience of counsel have also been 
shown to strongly influence outcomes in first instance refugee cases at the IRB. Rehaag’s study 
of IRB refugee cases decided between 2005 and 2009 showed that those represented by a 
consultant or without representation were ten times more likely to have their claim denied.63 In 
addition, there was a strong correlation between a lawyer’s experience and their success rate.64 
Ethnographic studies have also shown that lawyers at the IRB have a major impact on 
outcomes.65 
 
In this study’s dataset, 395 applicants were represented by a lawyer on judicial review (98.01%), 
while 8 applicants (1.99%) were either self-represented or represented by a non-lawyer. Not a 
single applicant proceeding without a lawyer was granted leave. A total of 96 lawyers were 
represented in the dataset. Forty-four were counsel in one case each, 41 were counsel in 2-5 
cases, 8 were counsel in 6-18 cases, and three lawyers were counsel in over 18 cases (31, 54, 
and 85 cases respectively). It is clear from the dataset that a handful of lawyers specialize in 
overseas refugee judicial reviews. The top three lawyers litigated together 170 cases (42.18% of 
                                                   
61 Gould, Sheppard & Wheeldon, supra note 4 at 475-76. 
62 Ibid at 468. 
63 Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical 
Assessment” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 90. 
64 Ibid at 89. 
65 Sule Tomkinson, “The impact of procedural capital and quality counsel in the Canadian refugee 
determination process” (2014) 1:3 Int J Migr & Border Stud 276; Sule Tomkinson, “Who are you Afraid of 
and why? Inside the Black Box of Refugee Tribunals” (2018) 61:2 Can Pub Admin 18; Sule Tomkinson, 




the total caseload). The top 5 lawyers litigated more cases than the bottom 91 lawyers. The table 
below shows a breakdown of leave grant rates and overall success rates by each lawyer 
category. 
TABLE 6.14 - JR OUTCOMES BY LAWYER EXPERIENCE 




Leave grant rate (all 
perfected cases) 
Overall success rate  
(all perfected cases)66 
Lawyers w/ 19-85 cases (n=3) 170 42.18% 73.95% (88/119) 52.14% (73/140) 
Lawyers w/ 6-18 cases (n=8) 73 18.11% 48.78% (20/41) 53.06% (26/49) 
Lawyers w/ 2-5 cases (n=41) 108 26.80% 63.38% (45/71) 52.56% (42/78) 
Lawyers w/1 one case (n=44) 44 10.92% 59.37% (19/32) 41.18% (14/34) 
No lawyer (n=8) 8 1.99% 0% (0/5) 0% (0/5) 
All cases 403 100% 64.18% 172/268 50.33% (154/306) 
 
Judicial review is a complicated, technical process, one that is difficult to navigate without 
counsel even for the most sophisticated of individuals. Judicial processes are not designed with 
self-represented litigants in mind.67 The disastrous showing of self-represented litigants in the 
dataset confirms that legal representation matters in judicial review. The data also confirms, but 
only to a certain extent, that more experienced counsel obtain better results for their client. 
Lawyers who had litigated only one case in the study period obtained lower than average 
outcomes both in terms of leave outcome and ultimate success. It was surprising to find that, in 
terms of ultimate outcome, the overall success rate was relatively constant across all lawyer 
categories with at least 2 cases. That being said, because of the small number of lawyers 
litigating 20+ cases (3 lawyers), it is difficult to reliably determine the impact of experience at 
the higher end.68 
                                                   
66 See note 25, supra. 
67 See Trevor CW Farrow et al, “Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice 
System”, Commissioned Reports, Studies and Public Policy Documents Paper 38 (Toronto and Edmonton: 
2012), online: <https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/reports/38/>; Michelle Flaherty, “Self-Represented 
Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 
119. 
68 Idiosyncratic factors also may play a role in the success rate of the three lawyers with a high volume of 
cases, such as a focus with particular refugee populations, and a relationship with particular SAHs that see 
particular types of refusals. 
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TABLE 6.15 – JR OUTCOMES BY LAWYER EXPERIENCE (GRAPH)
 
 
6.4.6 Reason-giving  
The common law has not traditionally imposed on courts a duty to give reasons, but that 
traditional position has evolved in many jurisdictions, including Canada. In 2002, the Supreme 
Court in Sheppard adopted a functional test to assess whether a trial judge in the criminal 
context had provided adequate reasons. While refusing to recognize an absolute stand-alone 
duty to give reasons, the court ruled that reasons will be considered adequate if, considering the 
entirety of the court record, they fulfil their purpose, defined as being “reasonably intelligible to 
the parties and provid[ing] the basis for meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the 
trial judge’s decision.”69 
 
Judicial reason-giving is a defining characteristic of legal regimes. A variety of rationales are 
considered to support a strong commitment to judicial reason-giving. Reasons promote the 
principle that individuals should be treated not as mere objects of the law, but as agents entitled 
                                                   
69 R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para 55. See also R v Y (CL), 2008 SCC 2; R c Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24; R v 
Walker, 2008 SCC 34; R v M (RE), 2008 SCC 51; R v B (HS), 2008 SCC 52; Hamish Stewart, “The Trial 
























to participate in the making of law. Reasons encourage the acceptance of decisions and reinforce 
confidence in the judicial system. The act of writing reasons helps to ensure that decisions are 
arrived at rationally and imposes on judges a form of self-discipline. Reasons allow parties to 
understand why a case was decided a certain way. Reasons allow appeal judges to assess the 
merits of decisions under review. Reasons are also necessary for the proper development of the 
common law through the principle of stare decisis, and serve an educational purpose by 
informing both the legal community and those outside it of the content and evolution of legal 
rules.70  
 
In the case of the Federal Court, regulations seem to indicate that the decision to issue reasons or 
not is left to the discretion of the judge. Rule 392 of the Federal Courts Rules provides that 
“The Court may dispose of any matter that is the subject-matter of a hearing signing an order.”71 
Rule 393 provides directions for how a judge may deliver reasons for judgement. In practice, 
Federal Court judges do issue reasons in the vast majority (if not the entirety) of final judicial 
review cases decided on the merits. However, in order for judicial reasons to serve their full 
purpose, they must not only be given to the parties, they also must be published and made 
available to the public. 72  Those familiar with the Federal Court practices in refugee and 
immigration cases know that it is not uncommon for the court to issue unpublished orders. 
Research conducted by Rehaag and Thériault has mapped trends in issuing unpublished 
                                                   
70 See Mathilde Cohen, “When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach” 
(2015) 72:2 Wash & Lee L Rev 483 at 514-513; Jason Bosland & Jonathan Gill, “The Principle of Open 
Justice and the Judicial Duty to Give Public Reasons” (2014) 38:2 Melbourne U L Rev 482 at 488-90. 
71 Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106. 
72 See JJ Spigelman, “The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective” (2006) 29:2 UNSWLJ 147; 
Bosland & Gill, supra note 70. 
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decisions in inland refugee cases between 2006 and 2018.73 They report that the Federal Court’s 
practice has varied greatly over time. The rate of issuing unpublished decisions peaked in 2014-
15, where the rate of issuing an unpublished decision ranged between 36.9% (2014) and 48.6% 
(2015). Rehaag and Thériault show that the rise in unpublished decisions increased in the years 
preceding a 2015 notice to the profession in which the Chief Justice of the Federal Court 
announced that only decisions deemed by the deciding judge to have “precedential value” would 
be accompanied by reasons and be published, while decisions “considered by the presiding 
judicial officer to not have precedential value” would be issued in the form of a “Judgment” 
without detailed reasons.74 Following the 2015 notice, the court faced significant pressure from 
the immigration and refugee bar through its Bench & Bar Liaison Committee, and formally 
ended the practice of issuing unpublished decisions on the merits in 2018. 
 
In this study’s dataset, the overall proportion of unpublished final decisions was 27.68%, with 
positive decisions being slightly more likely to be published compared to negative decisions 
(30.36% vs 25.00%). This rate of unpublished decisions is close to the 33.37% rate reported 
with respect of inland refugee judicial reviews by Rehaag and Thériault for 2011-2015. The data 
also shows that the rate of unpublished decisions peaked in 2015, before falling drastically in 
2016. It appears that Federal Court judges followed the same practice in overseas refugee cases 
as they did in inland refugee cases. 
 
                                                   
73 Sean Rehaag & Pierre-André Thériault, “Judgments v Reasons in Federal Court Refugee Claim Judicial 
Reviews: A Bad Precedent?” (Paper delivered at the Canadian Law & Society Association Conference, UBC, 
3 June 2019). 
74 Federal Court, “Notice to the Parties and the Profession – Publication of Decisions of Precedential Value” 
(19 June 2015). 
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TABLE 6.16 - UNPUBLISHED FINAL DECISIONS (2011-2015)75 
Year Final 
decisions 
% of unpublished 
positive decisions 
% of unpublished 
negative decisions 
% of unpublished decisions  
(all decisions) 
2011 4 0% (0/2) 50% (1/2) 25% (1/4) 
2012 35 26.67% (4/15) 5% (1/20) 14.29% (5/35) 
2013 11 25% (2/8) 33.33% (1/3) 27.27% (3/11) 
2014 13 50% (2/4) 22.22% (2/9) 30.77% (4/13) 
2015 29 61.64% (8/13) 50% 8/16 55.17% (16/29) 
2016 20 7.14% (1/14) 16.67% (1/6) 10% (2/20) 
All years 112 30.36% (17/56) 25% (14/56) 27.68% (31/112) 
 
6.5 A qualitative look at Federal Court decisions 
6.5.1 Deference and procedural fairness 
As I reviewed in Chapter 3, the Federal Court in Jallow reasonned that visa officer decisions are 
“purely administrative”,76  and that visa officers are entitled to “extensive discretion.”77 The 
Jallow case should be contrasted with the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Ha. In Ha, the 
court, in discussing the application of the Baker principles, determined that “[t]he fact that the 
appellants are applying for permanent resident status as Convention refugees suggests that this 
decision is potentially of great importance in their lives.”78 The court in Ha determined that the 
visa officer had breached procedural fairness by denying the applicant the right to have a lawyer 
present at the interview. In the overwhelming majority of cases in the present dataset, the 
Federal Court, at least explicitly, approached matters of procedural fairness and deference in 
general terms. There were relatively few cases where the court described visa officer refugee 
decisions as a distinct type of administrative decision requiring a distinct level of procedural 
                                                   
75 The classification of cases as published and unpublished proved problematic in four cases. In three cases 
(IMM-5962-11/2012 FC 800; IMM-3396-15/2016 FC 298; IMM-3721-15/2016 FC 399), the judge issued 
reasons, a neutral citation is associated with the decision, but the decision does not appear on the Federal 
Court website or any other online platform. Those cases were considered “published” in order to reflect the 
judge’s intention. Conversely, the court’s decision in IMM-3566-11 was issued as a judgment, without a 
neutral citation, yet the decision is reported in online platforms. This may be due to the fact that a question for 
appeal was certified in that case. This case was considered unpublished in order to reflect the judge’s intention 
as well. 
76 Jallow v Canada (MCI), [1996] FCJ No 1452 at para 18. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ha v Canada (MCI), 2004 FCA 49 at para 61. 
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fairness and deference.  
 
A higher degree of deference was articulated in two cases. In IMM-7718-14, Justice St-Louis 
determined that the visa officer had not breached procedural fairness by failing to specifically 
state in a procedural fairness letter that the applicant could submit a further police report. In 
coming to that decision, Justice St-Louis stated that refugee applicants - like other visa 
applicants - are owed minimal procedural fairness: 
Moreover, the content of the duty of fairness owed to visa applicants is at the low 
end of the fairness spectrum. In fact, minimal fairness is owed to persons outside 
of Canada, seeking admission to Canada, given that there is no individual right at 
stake for an unqualified applicant to enter Canada and given the highly 
discretionary context of visa applications. 79 
 
 
A similar conclusion was reached in IMM-3505-12. In that case, the applicant on judicial review 
argued that the visa officer had breached procedural fairness by not directly putting to him their 
concerns regarding omissions in the written application. In determining that the visa officer had 
not breached procedural fairness, Justice Manson adopted the reasoning in Oraha: 
The duty of fairness owed to refugee claimants applying from within Canada is 
different than the duty owed to applicants outside of Canada. The Supreme Court 
in Singh did not comment adversely on the process used for the determination of 
refugee claims by persons outside of Canada (Oraha, above, at paras 8-11).80 
 
 
In other decisions, however, the judge, while recognizing that overseas refugee applicants are 
not entitled to the same level of procedural fairness as inland refugee claim, stressed that 
overseas refugee decisions are nonetheless extremely important to the applicant and warrant a 
                                                   
79 Khuda Bakhsh et al v Canada (MCI) (25 June 2015), IMM-7718-14 (FC) at paras 6-7. 
80 Ismailzada v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 67 at para 21 (IMM-3505-12). The judicial review in this case was 
granted on other grounds. 
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level of procedural fairness that is not at the lowest end of the spectrum. In IMM-634-13, the 
applicant filed a motion for the appointment of a special advocate to appear at an in camera 
hearing, on a motion by the respondent for non-disclosure of confidential information. Justice 
MacTavish recognized that the importance of the decision militates in favour of a higher level of 
procedural fairness, but concluded nonetheless that the duty of fairness did not require the 
appointment of a special advocate: 
I accept that this matter is undoubtedly of great importance to both the applicant 
and his family. However, unlike the situation in Security Certificate proceedings, 
there are no section 7 Charter rights at stake in this case. … 
 
As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Baker v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, the content of the duty of 
fairness is variable, and how much fairness is owed in a given case depends on 
the context of the specific case at issue. 
 
As was noted earlier, I recognize that the decision in issue in this case was of 
considerable importance to Mr. Kandiah and his family, a factor that militates in 
favour of a somewhat higher level of procedural fairness being owed to him. So 
too does the fact that no appeal is provided for by IRPA with respect to the 
decision under review. Insofar as this latter consideration is concerned, Mr. 
Kandiah is limited to his application for judicial review, and then only with leave 
of the Court. 
 
That said, there are other factors that limit the content of the duty of fairness 
owed to visa applicants such as Mr. Kandiah [cases omitted]. In particular, the 
visa officer’s decision in this case did not deprive Mr. Kandiah or any legal 
rights. As a foreign national, he had no right to enter Canada [cases omitted]. 
This reduces the level of procedural fairness required [cases omitted].81 
 
 
In another case, IMM-4297-15, Justice Zinn distinguished overseas refugee application from 
other types of visa officer decisions, before concluding that the visa officer had breached 
procedural fairness by not disclosing that he had relied on American “joker cards” to determine 
Iraqi army rank: 
                                                   
81 Premachandran Kandiah v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 302 at paras 10, 14-16. The underlying application was 
dismissed in Premachandran Kandiah v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 509. 
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The parties disagree on the level of procedural protection owed. While the 
respondent refers to jurisprudence finding that visa officers should only be 
required to provide a low level of procedural protection, the applicant points out 
that this is not a typical visa case. Rather, the applicant is applying to come to 
Canada as a refugee and claims to fear persecution, and even death, if he is 
forced to return to Iraq. 
 
I accept that the officer's decision in this case was more important to the 
applicant than an officer's decision would normally be in a non-refugee case and 
I therefore accept that, according to the contextual analysis set out by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, [1999] SCJ No. 39, a somewhat higher level of 
procedural fairness was owed.82 
 
 
There is clearly a disagreement on the Federal Court in how to approach overseas refugee 
decisions. The fact that the Federal Court of Appeal rarely reviews such decisions certainly 
serves to perpetuate doctrinal divergences. At the same time, important doctrinal divergences 
also exist regarding inland refugee decisions, which both the Federal Court and the Federal 
Court of Appeal hear much more regularly.83 I want to state that, at minimum, the lumping 
together of overseas refugee applicants with other visa applicants certainly is problematic in that 
it fails to recognize the important interests at stake - literally life or death. Persons seeking to 
come study, work or visit Canada are not in the same position as refugees escaping persecution 
and seeking a durable solution. Analyses that fail to take this into consideration are out of step 
with the dicta in Baker. 
 
6.5.2 Case settlement and residence 
As previously stated, the rate of case settlement was surprisingly high in this dataset (24.32%). 
                                                   
82 Krikor v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 458 at paras 12-13. 
83 For example, Evans Cameron describes in her book opposing and consequential approaches at the Federal 
Court in terms of “error preference” in the inland refugee context (Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Law’s 
Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong Mistake (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
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A case settlement is generally a favourable outcome for an applicant, but that is not always the 
case. The dataset revealed at least three cases where a redetermination was settled following a 
first judicial review settlement, suggesting that some applicants find themselves going back and 
forth from refusal to settlement without having the court weigh in on their case. This datapoint 
proved difficult to code, however, as the existence of a previous judicial review is not always 
apparent on the record. It is likely that more cases in the dataset were being judicially reviewed 
for a second time following a settlement. 
 
Sunkin describes the practice of settling public law cases as being driven not only by resource 
concerns, but also a concern to maintain policy status quo: 
The ability to settle is, for example, an ability to keep controversial public 
interest issues or sensitive issues of policy out of court. This may be extremely 
valuable for public authorities and especially for those that are regularly 
challenged by judicial review proceedings. … Apart from saving resources, one 
of the most common reasons for settling a public law case is assumed to be the 
ability to resolve a specific problem without risking the integrity of the system or 




Case settlement is indeed a convenient mechanism at the disposal of the government to avoid 
restrictive precedents and, moreover, to avoid the disclosure of material that may reveal 
objectionable practices. In my dataset, the issue of ‘residence’ illustrates this practice well. Both 
the Convention Refugee class and the Country of Asylum class require that the refugee be 
outside their country of nationality or habitual residence. This would seem a rather 
uncontroversial requirement, as all refugee resettlement applicants are effectively outside their 
country of nationality or habitual residence when they attend their interview with a visa officer. 
                                                   
84 Maurice Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on Government 
Bureaucracies”, in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: 
International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 43 at 50-51. 
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However, as reviewed in Chapter 5, in a large number of cases, visa officers read into the 
refugee definition a residence requirement.85 In refugee law, a finding that an applicant has 
travelled back and forth between their country of origin and their country of asylum can lead to 
the conclusion the applicant lacks subjective fear or that the fear is not well-founded. However, 
visa officers err when they reject applicants for not having established their residence through 
utility bills, school records, employment records, etc.  
 
A total of 46 cases were refused because, inter alia, the visa officer believed the applicant was 
not “residing” in the country of asylum where the interview took place. In 19 of these cases, 
residence was the only ground for refusal. All of these cases involved Afghan applicants in 
Pakistan, save one.86 Finally, in February 2016, the Federal Court in Ameni clarified, in no 
uncertain terms, that there is in fact no residence requirement: 
In my view, in terms of establishing the quality of connection to a country other 
than that of their nationality, persons claiming Convention refugee or country of 
asylum class protection outside Canada need only establish what the statute 
requires, namely that one “is outside” their country of nationality, i.e., that they 
be outside such other country. Officers lack the legal authority to require 
applicants to meet any higher requirement. In my view they also act 
unreasonably and without statutory authority to the extent they impose, as I find 
they did in this case, a requirement that such claimants reside or live outside the 




There is reason to believe that the Department of Justice was aware that IRCC was routinely 
issuing questionable refusals on the basis of residence. Prior to the Ameni decision, the residence 
                                                   
85 In refugee law, a finding that an applicant has travelled back and forth between their country of origin and 
their country of asylum can lead to the conclusion the applicant lacks subjective fear, or that the fear is not 
well-founded. However, visa officers err when they reject applicants for not having established their residence 
through utility bills, school records, etc. 
86 The other case concerned a Syrian applicant in Lebanon. 
87 Ameni v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 164 at para 28. See also Amani et al v Canada (MCI), 2016 FC 1215. 
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rationale was directly challenged as an error of law in two cases.88 Both cases were granted 
leave by the Federal Court and both were settled. One wonders how many such settlements 
occurred before 2011. 
 
6.5.3 Strong cases denied leave and similar cases treated differently 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a statistical study of leave grant rates in the inland refugee 
cases, conducted by Rehaag, suggested that fewer cases are being granted leave than the leave 
test should allow, given the very permissive nature of the leave test.89 A qualitative analysis of 
inland refugee leave application conducted by Liew et al has shown that a large proportion of 
apparently meritorious leave applications are being denied leave by Federal Court judges.90 In 
this study’s dataset, the leave grant rate is much higher than it is in inland refugee claim judicial 
reviews. Nonetheless, my review revealed numerous cases where leave was denied despite a 
significant error apparent on the record. My claim is not that these cases should necessarily have 
succeeded on the merits, but that the record disclosed, in my opinion, at least a “fairly arguable 
case”, which should have been heard on the merits. A few illustrations are provided below. 
 
Many strong cases denied leave involved questionable assessments of the evidence. One such 
case involved a Tamil Sri Lankan applicant who fled to Malaysia after being kidnapped by the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE).91 The visa officer rejected the application because the applicant had failed 
to establish his identity. This visa officer rejected the entirety of the applicant’s identity 
documents because some contained minor discrepancies in terms of the exact date of birth of the 
                                                   
88 Files IMM-5500-14 & IMM-4782-15. 
89 Rehaag, “The Luck of the Draw”, supra note 1. 
90 Jamie Chai Yun Liew et al, “Not just the luck of the draw: Explaining Leave Grant Rates at the Federal 
Court” (2021) 37:1 Refuge 61. 
91 File IMM-3322-11, leave denied by Justice Harrington. 
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applicant’s parents.  
 
Leave was also denied in the case of a man from Iran who fled to Turkey after a video of him 
engaging in sexual intercourse with another man was disclosed to the Iranian authorities, 
triggering an investigation.92 The visa officer rejected the case on the basis that she did not 
believe that the Iranian authorities were aware of the video, despite the fact that the applicant 
had disclosed to the officer an Iranian court summons which indicated that the applicant is 
charged with sodomy, a crime punishable by death in Iran. The visa officer also determined that 
the applicant was not credible because he identified as heterosexual, despite having had sex with 
a man. The denial of leave in this case is all the more troubling given that the respondent 
provided no substantive response to the applicant’s argument. 
 
In IMM-6788-13, 93  an Eritrean man was detained and tortured by Eritrean authorities for 
practicing his Pentecostal faith. He fled to South Africa, where he obtained refugee status. The 
visa officer determined that the applicant was a refugee, but rejected the application because he 
now had a durable solution in South Africa. The visa officer concluded that he had in South 
Africa a status “analogous to permanent residence in Canada”, despite the fact that the very 
documents cited by the visa officer indicated that the majority of permanent residence 
applications by refugees in South Africa are rejected. The visa officer also cited a document 
from “CORSMA” to establish that the applicant’s status was legally equivalent to permanent 
status, while the document said no such thing. 
 
                                                   
92 File IMM-1957-12, leave denied by Justice Near. 
93 Leave denied by Justice Simpson. 
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In IMM-3315-11,94 a young woman from Sierra Leone had been detained by a local group. This 
group was intent on forcing her to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM) and join their pro-
FGM organization. She fled, along with her family, to Guinea. The visa officer determined that 
she was not a Convention refugee, because there was objective country information to the effect 
that FGM originates from within families, not from outside groups, and that forced membership 
in the group in question usually resulted if a woman criticized the group in particular, not FGM 
in general. However, the cited report indicated that there were numerous circumstances where 
FGM originates outside any family context. It had also been the applicant’s testimony that she 
had openly criticized the group, not only FGM generally. 
 
There were also cases with near-identical fact-patterns that received different leave decisions. 
Take for example IMM-1221-15 and IMM-2249-15, discussed in Chapter 5. Both involved Iraqi 
applicants in Jordan, a country that is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention. Both 
applicants had the same temporary status in Jordan, which required periodic renewal and was 
dependent on employment. In both cases, the visa officer determined that the applicant had 
locally integrated in Jordan. IMM-2249-15 was denied leave by Justice Diner. In IMM-1221-15, 
not only was leave granted, but the judicial review was granted on the merits. 
 
6.6 Judicial review as individual redress 
The data presented in the previous section is strong evidence that judicial review is not an 
effective legal recourse for failed resettlement applicants. It is true that leave grant rates are 
higher for rejected refugee resettlement applicants relative to inland rejected refugee claimants. 
Yet, it remains a fact that the leave requirement bars access to the courts for a significant 
                                                   
94 File IMM-3315-11, leave denied by Chief Justice Crampton. 
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number of applicants. Over a third of perfected cases in the present dataset were denied leave 
(98 cases), and in many of them a significant error was apparent on the record. The negative 
impact of the leave requirement on judicial review applications originating from the refugee 
resettlement system should not be minimized. However, the most significant obstacle to redress 
through judicial review for rejected resettlement applicants appears to be a more practical one: 
conducting litigation in Canadian courts is simply unachievable for the vast majority of 
displaced persons abroad. Overall, 5.38% of rejected PSR and GAR applicants sought a judicial 
review between 2011 and 2015. In comparison, the proportion of failed inland refugee claimants 
seeking judicial review before the RAD was implemented was over five times greater.95 
 
The primary factor at play is no doubt the financial cost of judicial review. As it was noted in 
Chapter 3, contrary to inland rejected refugee claimants, rejected resettlement applicants do not 
have access to financial support from state-funded legal aid agencies. I do not want to endorse 
the myth that all refugees abroad are destitute. Without a doubt, the refugee condition is not 
reserved for the poor, and people with means are not insulated from the conditions that create 
refugee flows. It remains the case, however, that the vast majority of refugee resettlement 
applicants, especially those in the GAR stream, are in a precarious financial situation and are not 
sufficiently economically integrated into their country of asylum to earn a substantial income. 
The overwhelming majority of them cannot afford the $3,000-$5,000 fee associated with hiring 
a lawyer to conduct judicial review.96 Recently, under an initiative of the Refugee Sponsorship 
                                                   
95 The proportion of failed inland refugee claimants who sought judicial review in 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 
was 30.01%. This data was compiled relying on online Federal Court Statistics and IRB Departmental 
Performance Reports. See also Justice Canada, “Immigration and Refugee Legal Aid Cost Drivers”, (2002) at 
para 6.2, online (pdf): <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/ir/rr03_la17-rr03_aj17/rr03_la17.pdf>. 
96 See Canadian Council for Refugees, “Concerns with Refugee Decision-making at Cairo” (January 2010) at 
4, online (pdf): <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/cairoconcerns_1.pdf>: 
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Support Program, some lawyers have been offering ‘low bono’ services to refugee resettlement 
applicants.97 However, even a low bono fee can be prohibitive for destitute refugees. In the 
Federal Court’s 2011 decision in Ghirmatsion, Justice Snider took the exceptional step of 
awarding costs to the applicants on the following rationale: 
The four representative Applicants and all of the remaining applicants are 
refugees in a dangerous foreign country without the resources to finance the 
judicial review of their claims in Canada.98 
 
 
Only 8 applicants in the dataset (1.99%) were able to proceed to judicial review without a 
lawyer. None of the cases without counsel were granted leave: one was discontinued before 
being perfected, two were not perfected and denied leave for that reason, and 5 were perfected 
and denied leave. It is clear that the challenge facing self-represented refugee resettlement 
applicants in judicial review is especially insurmountable for those who have no contact in 
Canada whatsoever. In one case of a self-represented litigant - a GAR applicant - an application 
for extension of time was sought on the grounds of “Difficulty of getting who to represent me in 
Canada due to lack of financial support [sic]” and “late reception of how and where to follow up 
information [sic].”99 One wonders who would have appeared in court on behalf of the applicant 
had leave been granted. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
For refugee applicants in Canada, access to the Federal Court may be difficult, but they can 
at least speak directly to a lawyer who can advise them and they may be eligible for legal 
aid, or be able to earn Canadian wages to cover the legal costs. Refugee applicants overseas 
are unlikely to be able to apply to the Federal Court unless they have family in Canada or a 
private sponsor who can afford to hire a lawyer on their behalf. The UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), which refers many of the refugees assessed by the visa officers, 
does not assist those rejected to apply to the Federal Court. 
97 See Kelsey Lange, “Mobilization of the Legal Community to Support PSR Applications through the 
Refugee Sponsorship Support Program”, in Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to 
Neighbours: Private Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2020) 212. 
98 Ghirmatsion v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 773 at para 6. See Labman, Crossing Law’s Border, supra note 21 
at 74-75. 
99 File IMM-1513-13. 
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It is clear that private sponsors play a major role in funding and coordinating judicial review 
proceedings. Privately sponsored applicants also often have family or other personal contacts in 
Canada who can assist in the judicial review process. Even for sponsors and family members in 
Canada, however, the legal steps involved in challenging a refusal are costly and difficult to 
navigate.100 It is also clear that for GAR applicants, hiring a lawyer and initiating litigation in 
Canada is virtually impossible. The rate of seeking judicial review is relatively low (8.47%) for 
PSR applicants, but that rate is almost 34 times higher than the rate for GAR applicants (0.25%). 
Generally speaking, GARs have fewer support networks in Canada and tend to be in more 
vulnerable situations than PSRs.101  The fact that even a handful of GAR applicants sought 
judicial review may be surprising to some. That the majority of those GAR applicants who 
sought judicial review were not typical GAR cases. The background of the applicant was 
discussed in nine of the ten GAR cases in the dataset. These include four cases with immediate 
family in Canada, one case of a former UNHCR lawyer, one case of an applicant who had 
previously lived in Canada, and one case of a fairly well-off businessman. In only two cases did 
the applicant appear to have no connections to Canada, have minimal knowledge of the 
Canadian legal system, and be of modest means.  
 
We can hypothesize with some confidence that resettlement applicants - especially GAR 
applicants - also lack informational resources necessary to pursue a judicial review application. 
                                                   
100 See Canadian Council for Refugees, “Survey of refusals of Privately Sponsored Refugees conducted 
Spring 2015 - Summary of results” (2015). In this survey, one SAH participant declared that “our sponsors 
simply do not have the resources to retain a lawyer.” Another sponsor stated that “[t]he cost is very difficult 
for families when they are deciding to appeal. Also, it was challenging to get the case notes from the visa 
office.it was challenging to get the case notes from the visa office.” 
101 See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, Evaluation Division, “Rapid Impact Evaluation of the 
Syrian Refugee Initiative” (December 2016) at para 1.3. See also Sabine Lehr & Brian Dyck, “‘Naming’ 
Refugees in the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program: Diverse Intentions and Consequences”, 
in Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbours: Refugee Sponsorship in Context 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020) 42 at 53-54. 
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Many are probably not aware of the workings of Canadian administrative law. Judicial review is 
not mentioned during the interview and is not mentioned in refusal letters. 
 
6.7 The structural role of judicial review 
Before addressing the structural role of judicial review in the resettlement system, it is 
informative to note that Canadian courts have had a major influence on the evolution of the 
inland refugee system, both at the procedural and substantive levels. The IRB was created in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Singh, where it was recognized that inland refugee 
claimants are protected by the Charter and have the right to an oral hearing if credibility is at 
stake.102 There is a vast body of Federal Court case law dealing with both procedural and 
substantive issues in the inland refugee system. In fact, in the years preceding the 
implementation of the Refugee Appeal Division at the IRB in 2012, judicial review of inland 
refugee matters made up around half of the Federal Court’s caseload.103 The IRB maintains an 
online legal resource with extensive references to Federal Court cases.104 This is not the case 
with the overseas refugee system. While the case law pertaining to the interpretation of the 
Convention Refugee definition developed in the inland context applies in the overseas context, 
the usefulness of inland refugee case law ends there. Even the annotated IRPA and IRPR 
published by major Canadian legal publishers contain scant references to refugee resettlement 
                                                   
102 Singh v Canada (MEI), [1985] 1 SCR 177. 
103 Federal Court, Statistics, online: <http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc_cf_en/Statistics.html>. See also  
Audrey Macklin, “Asylum and the Rule of Law in Canada: Hearing the Other (Side)” in Susan Kneebone, ed, 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 78 at 104. 




cases.105 That is because little case law exists on key substantive legal issues specific to the 
overseas refugee system, such as the Country of Asylum class, durable solutions, and the 
successful establishment criteria. The same can be said about the procedural aspects of refugee 
resettlement decision-making. The case law is thin and has had little impact on the development 
of decision-making procedures. 
 
The limited role of courts in refugee resettlement can be explained by process-oriented and 
doctrinal factors. At the process level, three issues are worth noting. First, a remarkably low 
number of rejected cases are judicially reviewed. Only about 22 rejected PSR cases are 
reviewed each year on their merits by the Federal Court. Over the five-year period of study, only 
2 GAR cases were reviewed on their merits. It is somewhat troubling from a structural 
perspective that a surprisingly high proportion of cases where leave is granted are ultimately 
settled out of court or granted on consent (as much as 29.57% of perfected cases). As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, this practice raises concerns around IRCC’s potential use of case 
settlement as a method to insulate objectionable practices from judicial and public scrutiny. 
Further qualitative research should be pursued to identify trends in case settlement, and 
determine if this practice leads to the repetition of particular failures in decision-making. Second 
is the fact that a significant portion of Federal Court decisions go unreported. These orders are 
compiled by the Department of Justice, which thus builds a significant body of law unavailable 
to refugee applicants. Thirdly, limitations on appeal, much like the leave requirement, hinder the 
development of a comprehensive body of case law. A “question of general importance for the 
legal system as a whole” was certified on only two occasions, despite such questions having 
                                                   
105 See Henry M Goslett & Barbara Jo Caruso, The 2020 Annotated Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2019); Lorne Waldman, Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law Practice, 
2020 ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2019). 
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being submitted in 36 cases. It appears that the last resettlement case decided by the Federal 
Court of Appeal dates back to 2004.106 No refugee resettlement case has ever been heard by the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
The exceptionally deferential position adopted by the Federal Court, and the court’s sharp 
distinction between inland refugee decisions and overseas refugee decisions, also contribute to 
limiting the procedural and substantive impact of judicial review on the resettlement system as a 
whole.107 That said, there is reason to question whether formal statements of deference in the 
Federal Court jurisprudence translate to actual deference in how judges decide cases. The leave 
grant rate and overall success on the merits is much higher in resettlement cases as compared to 
inland cases, where deference is in theory much lower. However, those numbers alone do not 
tell the entire story. The quality of cases being reviewed by the Federal Court is certainly quite 
low as compared to inland cases. This alone could account for the relatively higher grant rates. 
Visa officers are not well-trained in refugee law and there exist systemic concerns about the 
quality of decision-making in the resettlement system. Chapter 5 has revealed persistent 
shortcomings in visa officer decisions in this dataset. It can also be hypothesized with some 
confidence that the possibility of success at the Federal Court is a decisive factor for 
resettlement applicants contemplating judicial review, much more than for inland refugee 
                                                   
106 Ha v Canada (MCI), 2004 FCA 49, 236 DLR (4th) 485. 
107 Beyond the distinction between inland and overseas refugee decisions, scholars have noted that judicial 
review in the immigration context in general is exceptionally deferential as compared to other areas of law: 
Immigration law, like the law surrounding parole and prison discipline, has had a reputation 
among people interested in administrative law as a sort of wasteland in which judges have 
been loath to apply the legal principles we normally associate with a sense of justice in 
Canadian public administration (Philip L Bryden, “Fundamental Justice and Family Class 
Immigration: The Example of Pangli v. Minister of Employment and Immigration” (1991) 
41:4 UTLJ 484 at 484).  
See also Anna Pratt, Securing Canada’s Borders: Detention and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: 
UBC Press: 2005) at 60-61. 
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claimants who may have access to legal aid. 
 
Getting a fuller picture of the role of courts in overseas refugee matters would require an 
analysis of how legal developments percolate to decision-makers on the ground. What is clear 
however is that the factors reviewed above contribute to minimizing judicial impact on refugee 
decision-making. It is noteworthy that, out of the hundreds of visa officer decisions reviewed, 
merely two cited case law. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented a wide-ranging quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 
judicial review process in the refugee resettlement context. I have sought to draw some 
comparisons with existing studies on the operation of the judicial review process in the inland 
refugee system, as well as studies in other jurisdictions. My overall analysis suggests that 
judicial review in the context of refugee resettlement is largely inaccessible for legal and 
practical reasons, and that judicial review plays a minimal role at the individual and structural 
levels. My analysis has also shown that extralegal factors, such as the identity of the judge and 
the party of appointment of the judge, influence judicial decision-making, although the results 
are not always straightforward. 
 
Effective judicial review is essential to uphold the rights of refugees and, more generally, to 
uphold the rule of law. Legal barriers to judicial review, such as the leave requirement in 
immigration and refugee matters, are difficult to reconcile with the rule of law. Audrey Macklin, 
writing on the inland refugee system, offers the following: 
	350	
	
One of the foundational tenets of the rule of law is the guarantee of access to an 
independent and impartial court … to challenge the legality of a decision 
affecting fundamental rights … The use of a leave requirement to constrict that 
access, however compelling the administrative exigencies animating it, directly 
and incontrovertibly breaches that fundamental principle. … 
 
The leave requirement has never been justified on a principled basis. More 
specifically, it would be untenable to contend that the rule of law does not apply 
to asylum seekers, or that anything about the current system provides a 




Macklin’s statements certainly apply in the case of overseas refugees, especially considering 
existing concerns over the quality of visa officer decision-making, training, and caseloads. With 
that in mind, I would like to present rather modest recommendations that would facilitate access 
to judicial review for overseas refugee resettlement applicants. There is little doubt that 
abolishing the leave requirement would lead to better access to justice for both overseas and 
inland refugee claimants. The call to abolish the leave requirement for all refugee applicants has 
been voiced by others.109 Abolishing the leave requirement would require a significant increase 
in judicial appointments, but little else. As noted earlier in this chapter, before the coming into 
force of the 2001 IRPA, all visa officer decisions were exempted from the leave requirement. An 
exemption to the leave requirement specifically for overseas refugee claimants would have 
minimal administrative impact. When the federal government moved to implement the leave 
requirement for visa officer decisions, the Canadian Bar Association commented: 
…the Section strongly opposes the imposition of a leave requirement on judicial 
reviews of refugee cases refused by visa officers. The proportion of successful 
judicial reviews of visa officer decisions does not justify a leave requirement. If 
refugees are to be encouraged to apply from abroad, their relatively fewer due 
process rights cannot be eroded. Decisions on refugee cases are decisions on 
protection: ensuring they are made correctly and that, if not, they are corrected is 
                                                   
108 Macklin, supra note 103 at 104-05. 
109 See Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw” supra note 1 at 34–⁠39. 
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the absolute minimum required by fairness. If a leave requirement is imposed, 




Short of abolishing the leave requirement, or exempting overseas refugees from its application, 
it could be reformed and relaxed, or at least be better defined by the Federal Court of Appeal.111 
More importantly, in the case of resettlement applicants, it is clear that measures must be 
adopted to ensure that, at a minimum, rejected applicants understand that judicial review is an 
option open to then. It is clear that many rejected applicants are unaware that they can seek 
judicial review at all. In a survey conducted by the Canadian Council for Refugees among 
Group of Five and Community Sponsors, 46.67% of the respondents indicated that they lacked 
either information or support in terms of what steps to take in the event of a case rejection.112 
Judicial review is not mentioned during interviews and is never mentioned in refusal letters. 
Clearly, in the case of GARs, such support is critically needed. 
                                                   
110 Canadian Bar Association, National Citizenship and Immigration Law Section, Response to Building on a 
Strong Foundation for the 21st Century: White Paper for Immigration and Refugee Policy and Legislation 
 at 23 (March 1999), online: <https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=97021bf5-c0d2-477d-ad41-
e40dadd0b396>. 
111 See Rehaag, “Luck of the Draw” supra note 1 at 40-42. 
112 Canadian Council for Refugees, “Survey about Group of Five Sponsors and Community Sponsors: 
Detailed Results” (2020), online (pdf): <https://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/g5-survey-report-
detailed.pdf>. This was the respondents’ most frequently cited concern. 
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CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSION 
 
The relationship between refugee resettlement and the other durable solutions in the 
international refugee regime is a complicated and evolving one. My historical review has shown 
that refugee resettlement has played an important role in the international response to refugees 
since the Second World War. However, as a discretionary act, resettlement is deeply intertwined 
with international geopolitics and shifting state perspectives towards international solidarity. 
During the decades of the Cold War, the resettlement of refugees fleeing communist regimes 
was deployed as a political tool by Western states. Until the 1980s, resettlement was the most 
favoured durable solution and was offered to a relatively large proportion of the global refugee 
population. Today, refugee resettlement is offered to an increasingly small proportion of the 
refugee population. Following a clear turn towards repatriation in the 1990s, initiatives are now 
being deployed to reinvigorate resettlement. States and the UNHCR have stressed the 
importance of refugee resettlement, both in terms of refugee protection and burden-sharing. 
However, in the much-anticipated Global Compact on Refugees, which seeks to push forward 
the pursuit of equitable global burden-sharing, the emphasis is not on third-country resettlement, 
but on support for asylum in regions of origin. 
 
The potential pitfalls of an increased focus on refugee resettlement have been an important 
theme of this dissertation. States have at times resorted to resettlement to justify measures that 
limit their obligations to refugees. Some states have also decreased their financial contribution 
to the UNHCR as a result of increased resettlement admissions. 1  In Canada, financial 
                                                   
1 Megan Bradley & Cate Duin, “A Port in the Storm: Resettlement and Private Sponsorship in the Broader 
Context of the Refugee Regime”, in Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: 
Refugee Sponsorship in Context (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020) 74 at 81-8. 
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contributions have not been linked to admission numbers. However, successive governments 
have leveraged increases in resettlement to justify restrictions to the asylum system. Throughout 
these initiatives, refugees awaiting resettlement were repeatedly portrayed as “legitimate”, while 
asylum seekers were portrayed as “bogus” or “dangerous.” 
 
I have sought in this dissertation to understand how refugee resettlement operates within 
Canada’s legal system, and to explore what can be law’s role in strengthening refugee 
resettlement. I have also sought to analyze how refugee resettlement - including the private 
sponsorship of refugees - is situated within Canadian refugee policy. My inquiry has led to 
empirically-grounded findings that should be of interest to Canadian policy-makers, as well as 
policy-makers in those jurisdictions considering the implementation of a sponsorship of 
refugees program. 
 
Looking at refugee resettlement through a legal lens has been at the core of this project. This is a 
relatively new approach in Canadian legal scholarship. As explained in the introduction of this 
dissertation, the bulk of scholarship on refugee resettlement has focused on policy and 
integration. Few researchers, until recent years, have considered refugee resettlement applicants 
as bearers of legal rights in Canadian law. Shauna Labman’s recent work2 has been foundational 
in revealing law’s complex role in the discretionary act of resettlement and has provided an 
important theoretical and historical basis on which I have developed this research. My hope is 
                                                   
2 Shauna Labman & Geoffrey Cameron, eds, Strangers to Neighbors: Refugee Sponsorship in Context 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2020); Shauna Labman, Crossing Law’s Border: 
Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019); Shauna Labman & Madison 
Perlman, “Blending, Bargaining, and Burden-Sharing: Canada’s Resettlement Programs” J Int Migr & 
Integration 339; Shauna Labman, “Private Sponsorship: Complementary or Conflicting Interests?” (2016) 
32:2 Refuge 67; Shauna Labman, “Queue the Rhetoric: Refugees, Resettlement and Reform” (2011) 62 
UNBLJ 55 at 57. 
	354	
	
that by applying an empirical methodology to the study of resettlement decisions in Canada, and 
by analyzing the role of administrative law in the resettlement framework, I have provided a 
convincing account of how law operates not at the periphery of refugee resettlement, but at its 
core. 
 
My empirical assessment of the legal framework of refugee resettlement has focused on first 
instance decision-making in visa offices abroad, and on judicial review at the Federal Court. My 
conclusions are concerning. They lend evidence to various claims made by advocacy groups 
over the decades: procedural rights are few, appeal mechanisms are inexistent or inaccessible, 
and decision-makers are both poorly trained in refugee law and often make poor quality 
decisions. The data on visa officer decision-making shows persistent shortcomings in various 
areas of decision-making, including documenting decisions, credibility assessments, assessment 
of objective evidence, and assessment of gender-based claims. The data also shows that 
language barriers and mental health issues can significantly hinder communication between 
applicants and visa officers, with potentially devastating consequences for applicants. Another 
important trend addressed relates to the problematic interpretations and applications of various 
regulatory and legislative criteria, including local integration, successful establishment, and 
inadmissibility. The readers of this dissertation who are familiar with refugee determination 
practices and procedures at the Immigration and Refugee Board may be surprised by the chasm 
that separates the inland and the overseas refugee determination systems. I want to reiterate here 
that I recognize that refugee determination is an extremely difficult task even in the best of 
circumstances, and that visa officers are under enormous organizational pressure to process 
cases quickly. In my view, the better way of understanding the findings of this research is in 
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terms of systemic problems that can be addressed through systemic changes, as opposed to 
individual visa officer failures. 
 
My analysis of judicial review of resettlement decisions was anchored in the literature and 
methodology of administrative law and law & society. First, I conducted quantitative analyses 
examining various non-legal factors that potentially impact outcomes. Many of the analyses 
were inconclusive. However, the data does suggest that lawyer experience and city of filing are 
correlated to important variations in outcomes. The wide variation in grant rates among 
individual judges observed in the inland refugee context was also partly reflected in this dataset. 
The second component of my analysis consisted of a general assessment of the role of judicial 
review in refugee resettlement. While Federal Court leave and hearing grant rates were found to 
be much higher in the resettlement context than in the inland context, my analysis has shown 
that judicial review in the refugee resettlement context plays a limited role. This, I argued, can 
be explained by several doctrinal and practical factors. First, few failed refugee resettlement 
applicants (and practically no applicants in the GAR program) have the financial or 
informational resources to pursue judicial review. In the dataset, only 8.47% of all rejected PSR 
applicants, and only 0.25% of rejected GAR applicants, sought judicial review. It is clear that 
judicial review is an inaccessible avenue of redress for the vast majority of refugee applicants 
abroad. Second, the leave requirement contributes to limiting access to review. Despite the 
relatively high leave grant rate, it remains the fact that a significant portion of judicial review 
applicants do not get their day in court. The restriction on appeals to the Federal Court of 
Appeal further contributes to limiting access to review and the development of case law. Third, I 
have found that a large proportion of the few judicial review applications launched by overseas 
refugee applicants - including the most problematic ones - are ultimately settled out of court by 
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the Department of Justice. I have argued that this practice impedes the development of a 
comprehensive body of case law and potentially allows the immigration bureaucracy to avoid 
the proliferation of restrictive precedents. The issue of residence is a good example of this 
dynamic. The residence criteria was wrongly applied by visa officers for years, leading to 
flawed refusals. The issue was raised in a number of judicial review applications between 2011 
and 2015, which were routinely settled out of court by Justice Canada, thereby permitting the 
repetition of the mistake, until finally one case was heard by the Federal Court in 2016. Fourth, I 
have found that the Federal Court has adopted an exceptionally deferential approach in its 
review of visa officer decisions, deemed “discretionary” and “purely administrative.” The actual 
impact of this doctrinal environment is unclear, however, as leave and hearing grant rates are 
much higher in the overseas context compared to the inland context. 
 
Evidently, refugee resettlement operates in a zone where the rule of law is thin. Legal scholars 
such as Catherine Dauvergne have maintained that a weak rule of law is a common feature of 
immigration systems. 3  I have not waded into the immigration/rule of law debate in this 
dissertation, but I would like to caution against the view that an exceptionally weak rule of law 
is an inherent and necessary feature of immigration systems. Significant improvements to the 
Canadian inland refugee system have been achieved in the past thirty years through legal 
advocacy. The overseas refugee system is lagging behind, in my assessment, largely because it 
is allowed to unfold away from public and judicial scrutiny. In the final analysis, my dissertation 
calls for a strengthening of the rule of law in refugee resettlement decision-making, both to 
                                                   
3 See, for example, Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration 
and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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ensure fairness and accuracy for refugee applicants and to ensure the long-term support of the 
sponsorship community.  
 
This dissertation has offered several recommendations aimed at improving decision-making and 
access to review in the resettlement system. Since the Canadian legal system itself is not easily 
accessible by displaced persons abroad, the bulk of my recommendations have been aimed not 
at judicial review, but at first instance decision-making. I have suggested that visa officer 
training should be strengthened in many areas, including drafting reasons, dealing with 
vulnerable applicants, dealing with gender-based claims, and making credibility and 
inadmissibility determinations. I have also recommended that resources be increased to allow 
visa officers to devote more time to each refugee case, that reasons be disclosed as a matter of 
course, that all refusals be reviewed by a senior officer, and that audio recording of interviews 
be instituted. I have recommended three minor regulatory and regulatory interpretation changes. 
First, I have recommended abandoning the requirement of a UNHCR/state refugee recognition 
requirement for those refugees sponsored by Groups of Five and Community Sponsors. As I 
have explained, access to a UNHCR or state refugee status determination varies depending on a 
refugee’s country of origin and country of asylum. Many Palestinian refugees, for instance, are 
excluded from the mandate of the UNHCR. Insofar as limiting the backlog of Group of Five and 
Community Sponsors cases is a concern of the government, it would be preferable to limit 
intake through front end mechanisms that do not disproportionately impact particular refugee 
populations. Second, I have argued that the successful establishment criteria should be 
abandoned. As a humanitarian program, refugee resettlement should focus exclusively on 
protection needs. Steps have been undertaken to reduce the focus on establishment potential 
with the adoption of the IRPA, but the new orientation shows signs of ambivalence. The data in 
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this study indicates that successful establishment is now rarely invoked as a ground for refusal, 
but its application is exceptionally unpredictable. Third, I have recommended that IRCC 
reconsider its interpretation of local integration as a durable solution. Findings of local 
integration were common in the dataset in cases where refugees faced xenophobic attacks, were 
denied refugee status, and were denied basic rights. This interpretation is inconsistent with 
international norms, which require at minimum protection from refoulement, the possibility of 
economic integration, and the provision of basic rights. 
 
With regard to the judicial review process, I have suggested that abandoning the leave 
requirement for overseas refugee cases - as was the case prior to the 2001 IRPA - would lead to 
better access to justice for rejected resettlement applicants. Abandoning the leave requirement 
would not lead to “unnecessary litigation.” It would provide those rare applicants who manage 
to reach the Federal Court the right to be heard on the merits. In turn, this would lead to the 
development of a larger body of case law on insufficiently scrutinized legal issues specific to the 
resettlement context, such as durable solutions, successful establishment and the country of 
asylum class. I have also suggested that more needs to be done through the resettlement 
application process to inform applicants about the steps they can take to seek judicial review. 
 
In conducting this research and developing recommendations, I was mindful of the potential 
unintended consequences legal changes could engender in the resettlement program. The PSR 
program operates largely through the work of SAH employees and volunteers, as well as Group 
of Five and Community Sponsor members, often with the assistance of the Refugee Sponsorship 
Training Program (RSTP). While the Refugee Sponsorship Support Program (RSSP) is now 
providing legal support to some sponsors, the vast majority of the actors in the PSR sector are 
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not legally trained and have limited resources. There is a legitimate concern that further 
“juridification” of the resettlement system could lead to unmanageable increases in cost and 
complexity for the largely volunteer-based sponsorship community. 4  Similarly, adding 
complexity to the GAR process could increase the burden put on the UNHCR, which is already 
under-funded. I acknowledge that it would not be helpful to mirror the complexity of the inland 
refugee system in the overseas resettlement system. I am also mindful of the fact that increases 
administration costs could, in the long run, diminish political and public support for the 
program. That being said, I do not believe that the changes I propose in this dissertation would 
lead to such challenges. My recommendations are primarily aimed at improving first instance 
decision-making through relatively modest administrative and policy changes. None of these, I 
believe, would significantly increase the burden already placed on the volunteer ecosystem of 
private sponsorship. Adopting interview recording, and mandating the disclosure of reasons to 
applicants without requiring them to submit an access to information request, would, to the 
contrary, decrease the challenges applicants and sponsors face in navigating the resettlement 
system. As I have noted throughout this dissertation, the sponsorship community itself has 
repeatedly called for such changes. The automatic disclosure of reasons would also decrease the 
number of placeholder applications for judicial review at the Federal Court and free up court 
resources. 
 
                                                   
4 Colin Scott defines juridification as the “process by which relations hitherto governed by other values and 
expectations come to be subjected to legal values and rules” (Colin Scott, “The Juridification of Regulatory 
Relations in the UK Utilities Sector”, in Julia Black, Peter Muchlinski & Peter Walker, eds, Commercial 
Regulation and Judicial Review (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 19 at 19). See also Genevra Richardson, 
Impact studies in the United Kingdom in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and 
Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 103 at 122. 
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This dissertation has addressed a variety of themes, but has left many important questions 
unanswered. I have relied exclusively on documentary analysis to study the work of visa 
officers. It would be instructive to conduct interviews or observations in visa offices. Such a 
methodology could shed light on informal information-sharing practices, for example. Have 
practices organically developed where visa officers discuss and learn about legal developments 
in the area of refugee resettlement? Are informal decision-making tools utilized in particular 
visa offices? How are caseloads managed? What measures are in place to inform visa officers of 
changes in country conditions? Questions surrounding GARs remain in a blind spot, as almost 
no GARs seek judicial review. An interesting avenue of research would be to study the UNHCR 
resettlement referral framework and assess how the Canadian resettlement criteria interact with 
UNHCR criteria. How does the UNHCR for example incorporate the Canadian approach to 
durable solutions or the successful establishment criteria within its referral infrastructure? How 
does the Canadian GAR assessment process compare with that of other countries? In terms of 
the judicial review process, my research has shown interesting patterns around case settlement. 
Further research could be undertaken to understand Department of Justice strategies around case 
settlement and specifically the question of “settlement loops.” Such an inquiry would benefit 
from collaborations with lawyers. 
 
As I have alluded to earlier in this dissertation, another important avenue of research still 
unexplored relates to the experience of refugees who go through the overseas refugee system. 
The experiences and agency of refugees are too often overlooked in refugee legal scholarship. 
How do resettlement applicants learn about the Canadian resettlement requirements? How do 
they understand the criteria? How do they experience the application and interview process? 
Has their “local integration” materialized? Further research could seek partnerships with 
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sponsor organizations to identify and interview refugee applicants who have been denied 
admission and remain abroad. 
 
Perhaps the most important question left unanswered by this dissertation is what can be 
domestic law’s role in resolving the international refugee crisis? The limits of law in the current 
refugee regime are glaring. As observed in Chapter 2, the legal structures for assessing refugee 
status in countries of the Global North are extremely costly and do little to provide either 
protection or a durable solution to the vast majority of refugees, who remain in countries of the 
Global South. Lawyers and legal advocates are often blamed for this state of affairs. James 
Hathaway, the world’s most recognized expert in refugee law, has suggested that, just as 
national governments consistently mischaracterize their obligations under refugee law, refugee 
legal advocacy has been characterized as “absolutist” and as contributing to making the debate 
around reinvigorating refugee law “sterile.”5 Without endorsing such a view, I acknowledge that 
the preeminent question concerning the future of refugee protection is ultimately a political one, 
not a legal one. 
 
Finally, this dissertation has left largely open the question of what should be the role of 
resettlement in the future of the international refugee regime. Increasingly, international actors 
insist that resettlement should remain the smallest piece of the puzzle, and that asylum in 
regional countries and eventual repatriation is preferable. Reform proposals that endorse this 
approach have been favourably received. Scholars critical of this “new” inclination contend that 
such a strategy is merely one of containment that allows countries of the Global North to offload 
its responsibilities onto countries of the Global South. This dissertation has not proposed an 
                                                   
5 James Hathaway, “Why Refugee Law Still Matters” (2007) 8:1 Melb J Intl L 89 at 90-97. 
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alternative system of refugee protection, I do not claim to have such a solution. In closing, 
however, I would like to point out that, in light of the critiques of the status quo and of the 
containment inclination of the Global Compact, the potential for refugee resettlement to play an 
important role in the international refugee regime is clear: it is a mechanism that guarantees both 
refugee protection and a durable solution to refugees, and one that incorporates an ethical 
conception of burden-sharing. It is also perhaps the only obtainable solution for the growing 






APPENDIX A - Index of Cases 
 




DATE OF JR 
APPLICATION 
1. IMM-71-11 ERITREA SUDAN 2011-01-05 
2. IMM-329-11 SOMALIA YEMEN 2011-01-18 
3. IMM-330-11 SOMALIA YEMEN 2011-01-18 
4. IMM-528-11 ETHIOPIA EGYPT 2011-01-27 
5. IMM-529-11 ETHIOPIA EGYPT 2011-01-27 
6. IMM-597-11 LIBERIA GHANA 2011-01-28 
7. IMM-694-11 ETHIOPIA SOUTH AFRICA 2011-02-03 
8. IMM-916-11 SIERRA LEONE LIBERIA 2011-02-11 
9. IMM-966-11 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2011-02-14 
10. IMM-992-11 RWANDA SOUTH AFRICA 2011-02-15 
11. IMM-1316-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-02-28 
12. IMM-1319-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-02-28 
13. IMM-1343-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-01 
14. IMM-1485-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-07 
15. IMM-1566-11 RWANDA KENYA 2011-03-09 
16. IMM-1593-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-10 
17. IMM-1594-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-10 
18. IMM-1590-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-03-10 
19. IMM-1767-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-17 
20. IMM-2010-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-25 
21. IMM-2029-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-03-28 
22. IMM-2776-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-02 
23. IMM-2211-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-04 
24. IMM-2239-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-04 
25. IMM-2241-11 IRAQ SYRIA 2011-04-04 
26. IMM-2274-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-04-05 
27. IMM-2589-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-18 
28. IMM-2590-11 IRAQ SYRIA 2011-04-18 
29. IMM-2805-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-27 
30. IMM-2854-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-04-29 
31. IMM-3043-11 ERITREA SUDAN 2011-05-09 
32. IMM-3314-11 SIERRA LEONE GUINEA 2011-05-19 
33. IMM-3315-11 SIERRA LEONE GUINEA 2011-05-19 
34. IMM-3317-11 SIERRA LEONE GUINEA 2011-05-19 
35. IMM-3322-11 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2011-05-19 
36. IMM-3333-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-05-20 
37. IMM-3447-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-05-25 
38. IMM-3448-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-05-25 
39. IMM-3544-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-05-27 
40. IMM-3566-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-05-30 
41. IMM-3630-11 ETHIOPIA KENYA 2011-05-31 
42. IMM-3922-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-06-13 
43. IMM-3931-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-06-13 
44. IMM-3959-11 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2011-06-14 
45. IMM-4276-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-06-29 
46. IMM-4303-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-06-30 
47. IMM-4343-11  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-07-07 
48. IMM-4378-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-07-11 
49. IMM-4467-11 SOMALIA YEMEN 2011-07-15 
50. IMM-4531-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-07-19 
51. IMM-4702-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-07-22 
52. IMM-4744-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-07-25 
53. IMM-4740-11  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-07-25 
54. IMM-4753-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-07-25 
55. IMM-4754-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-07-25 
56. IMM-4927-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-07-29 
57. IMM-5121-11 ETHIOPIA SUDAN 2011-08-04 
58. IMM-5158-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-08-05 
59. IMM-5159-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-08-05 
60. IMM-5160-11 SRI LANKA INDIA 2011-08-05 
61. IMM-5365-11  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-08-11 
62. IMM-5650-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-08-22 
63. IMM-5652-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-08-22 
64. IMM-5752-11 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2011-08-24 
65. IMM-5754-11 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2011-08-24 
66. IMM-5755-11 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2011-08-24 
67. IMM-5757-11 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2011-08-24 
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68. IMM-5758-11 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2011-08-24 
69. IMM-5759-11 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2011-08-24 
70. IMM-5859-11 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2011-08-26 
71. IMM-5861-11 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2011-08-26 
72. IMM-5962-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-08-26 
73. IMM-6200-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-09-09 
74. IMM-6245-11 ERITREA SUDAN 2011-09-12 
75. IMM-6461-11 ERITREA SUDAN 2011-09-20 
76. IMM-6742-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-09-30 
77. IMM-6792-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-10-03 
78. IMM-6857-11 SOMALIA UGANDA 2011-10-05 
79. IMM-6858-11 SOMALIA UGANDA 2011-10-05 
80. IMM-6861-11 SOMALIA UGANDA 2011-10-05 
81. IMM-6862-11 SOMALIA UGANDA 2011-10-05 
82. IMM-6975-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-10-11 
83. IMM-7029-11 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-10-12 
84. IMM-7211-11 IRAN TURKEY 2011-10-18 
85. IMM-7833-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-11-02 
86. IMM-7835-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-11-02 
87. IMM-7959-11 SOMALIA KENYA 2011-11-07 
88. IMM-8270-11  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2011-11-14 
89. IMM-8604-11 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2011-11-25 
90. IMM-8602-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-11-25 
91. IMM-8719-11 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2011-11-30 
92. IMM-8801-11 AFGHANISTAN KYRGYSTAN 2011-12-01 
93. IMM-9101-11 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2011-12-08 
94. IMM-9531-11 ERITREA EGYPT 2011-12-20 
95. IMM-274-12 IRAN TURKEY 2012-01-06 
96. IMM-1439-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-01-10 
97. IMM-577-12  IRAN PAKISTAN 2012-01-20 
98. IMM-610-12  LIBYA MALTA 2012-01-20 
99. IMM-596-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-01-20 
100. IMM-633-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-01-23 
101. IMM-928-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-01-31 
102. IMM-1446-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-02-10 
103. IMM-1437-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-02-10 
104. IMM-1654-12 ETHIOPIA KENYA 2012-02-16 
105. IMM-1775-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-02-20 
106. IMM-1852-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-02-22 
107. IMM-1854-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-02-22 
108. IMM-1904-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-02-23 
109. IMM-1955-12 IRAN TURKEY 2012-02-24 
110. IMM-1957-12 IRAN TURKEY 2012-02-24 
111. IMM-2050-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-02-28 
112. IMM-1026-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-03-02 
113. IMM-2248-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-03-06 
114. IMM-2368-12 AFGANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2012-03-08 
115. IMM-2423-12 AFGANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2012-03-12 
116. IMM-2842-12 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2012-03-23 
117. IMM-2921-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-03-26 
118. IMM-3413-12 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2012-04-10 
119. IMM-3505-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-04-13 
120. IMM-3518-12 AFGANISTAN INDIA 2012-04-13 
121. IMM-3561-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-04-16 
122. IMM-3729-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-04-19 
123. IMM-3877-12 AFGANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2012-04-24 
124. IMM-3988-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-04-27 
125. IMM-4052-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-04-30 
126. IMM-4126-12 AFGANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2012-05-02 
127. IMM-4253-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-05-07 
128. IMM-4254-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-05-07 
129. IMM-4450-12 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2012-05-10 
130. IMM-4503-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-05-11 
131. IMM-4545-12 SUDAN EGYPT 2012-05-14 
132. IMM-4840-12 AFGANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-05-18 
133. IMM-4855-12 ETHIOPIA EGYPT 2012-05-18 
134. IMM-5094-12 ETHIOPIA DJIBOUTI 2012-05-28 
135. IMM-5097-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-05-28 
136. IMM-5158-12 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2012-05-29 
137. IMM-5725-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-06-11 
138. IMM-5721-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-06-11 
139. IMM-5801-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-06-12 
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140. IMM-6115-12 ETHIOPIA DJIBOUTI 2012-06-19 
141. IMM-6164-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-06-20 
142. IMM-6201-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-06-21 
143. IMM-6290-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-06-25 
144. IMM-6292-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-06-25 
145. IMM-6323-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-06-26 
146. IMM-6400-12 DRC RWANDA 2012-06-27 
147. IMM-6401-12 DRC RWANDA 2012-06-27 
148. IMM-7521-12 ETHIOPIA KENYA 2012-07-26 
149. IMM-7509-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-07-26 
150. IMM-7641-12 ERITREA UGANDA 2012-07-30 
151. IMM-7812-12 RWANDA SOUTH AFRICA 2012-08-02 
152. IMM-7931-12 ERITREA UGANDA 2012-08-07 
153. IMM-7933-12 ERITREA UGANDA 2012-08-07 
154. IMM-8540-12 ETHIOPIA EGYPT 2012-08-24 
155. IMM-8615-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-08-27 
156. IMM-9092-12 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2012-09-05 
157. IMM-9176-12 ERITREA UGANDA 2012-09-07 
158. IMM-9177-12 ERITREA UGANDA 2012-09-07 
159. IMM-9239-12 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2012-09-10 
160. IMM-9481-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-09-12 
161. IMM-9484-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-09-12 
162. IMM-9652-12 N/A EGYPT 2012-09-18 
163. IMM-10409-12 SRI LANKA INDIA 2012-10-09 
164. IMM-10471-12  AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-10-11 
165. IMM-10509-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-10-11 
166. IMM-10748-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-10-19 
167. IMM-11415-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-11-07 
168. IMM-11416-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-11-07 
169. IMM-11480-12 RWANDA CAMEROON 2012-11-09 
170. IMM-349-12 ERITREA EGYPT 2012-11-29 
171. IMM-12346-12 SOMALIA KENYA 2012-11-30 
172. IMM-12434-12 COLUMBIA EQUADOR 2012-12-03 
173. IMM-12623-12 LIBERIA GHANA 2012-12-10 
174. IMM-12748-12 ERITREA SUDAN 2012-12-13 
175. IMM-12441-12 N/A SYRIA 2012-12-14 
176. IMM-12975-12 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2012-12-19 
177. IMM-96-13  SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-01-04 
178. IMM-122-13 SOMALIA KENYA 2013-01-07 
179. IMM-404-13 ERITREA EGYPT 2013-01-11 
180. IMM-463-13 DRC DRC 2013-01-15 
181. IMM-617-13 SRI LANKA INDIA 2013-01-23 
182. IMM-631-13 DRC RWANDA 2013-01-23 
183. IMM-634-13 N/A SRI LANKA 2013-01-23 
184. IMM-677-13 SRI LANKA INDIA 2013-01-24 
185. IMM-675-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-01-24 
186. IMM-966-13 IRAQ SYRIA 2013-02-06 
187. IMM-1426-13 ERITREA SUDAN 2013-02-22 
188. IMM-1513-13 CAMEROON TUNISIA 2013-02-26 
189. IMM-1568-13 SRI LANKA INDIA 2013-02-28 
190. IMM-1671-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-03-04 
191. IMM-1792-13 IRAQ SYRIA 2013-03-07 
192. IMM-1788-13 ERITREA EGYPT 2013-03-07 
193. IMM-1926-13 IRAN SOUTH KOREA 2013-03-13 
194. IMM-1928-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-03-13 
195. IMM-1986-13 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2013-03-14 
196. IMM-1984-13 ETHIOPIA UGANDA 2013-03-14 
197. IMM-2183-13 IRAQ LEBANON 2013-03-22 
198. IMM-2716-13 SOMALIA SAUDI ARABIA 2013-04-10 
199. IMM-2718-13 SOMALIA SAUDI ARABIA 2013-04-10 
200. IMM-2719-13 SOMALIA SAUDI ARABIA 2013-04-10 
201. IMM-2722-13 SOMALIA SAUDI ARABIA 2013-04-10 
202. IMM-2777-13 N/A N/A 2013-04-12 
203. IMM-3139-13 DRC SOUTH AFRICA 2013-04-30 
204. IMM-3698-13 ERITREA SUDAN 2013-05-27 
205. IMM-3863-13 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-06-04 
206. IMM-3934-13 DRC SOUTH AFRICA 2013-06-07 
207. IMM-4307-13 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2013-06-25 
208. IMM-4305-13 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2013-06-25 
209. IMM-4378-13 SOMALIA KENYA 2013-06-28 
210. IMM-4714-13 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2013-07-15 
211. IMM-4948-13 ERITREA SUDAN 2013-07-25 
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212. IMM-5027-13 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2013-07-29 
213. IMM-5077-13 SRI LANKA INDIA 2013-07-31 
214. IMM-5233-13 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2013-08-07 
215. IMM-5263-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-08-08 
216. IMM-5302-13 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2013-08-12 
217. IMM-5175-13 SRI LANKA MALAISIA 2013-08-16 
218. IMM-5532-13 ETHIOPIA ERITREA 2013-08-21 
219. IMM-6046-13 N/A INDIA 2013-09-19 
220. IMM-6276-13 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2013-09-30 
221. IMM-6528-13 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2013-10-09 
222. IMM-6740-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-10-18 
223. IMM-6788-13 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-10-21 
224. IMM-6879-13 SRI LANKA INDIA 2013-10-24 
225. IMM-6909-13 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-10-25 
226. IMM-6910-13 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-10-25 
227. IMM-7161-13 ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-11-07 
228. IMM-7347-13 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-11-18 
229. IMM-7348-13 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-11-18 
230. IMM-7349-13 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-11-18 
231. IMM-7350-13 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2013-11-18 
232. IMM-7941-13 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2013-12-12 
233. IMM-8072-13 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2013-12-18 
234. IMM-8135-13 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2013-12-19 
235. IMM-8245-13 ERITREA SUDAN 2013-12-24 
236. IMM-60-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-01-06 
237. IMM-228-14 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2014-01-13 
238. IMM-246-14 AFGHANISTAN KYGYZSTAN 2014-01-13 
239. IMM-269-14 SRI LANKA INDONESIA 2014-01-15 
240. IMM-740-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-02-06 
241. IMM-783-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-02-10 
242. IMM-912-14 AFGHANISTAN BELARUS 2014-02-14 
243. IMM-1307-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-03-03 
244. IMM-1455-14 AFGHANISTAN TURKEY 2014-03-10 
245. IMM-1542-14 N/A PAKISTAN 2014-03-12 
246. IMM-1634-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-03-17 
247. IMM-2110-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-03-31 
248. IMM-2821-14 AFGHANISTAN KYGYZSTAN 2014-04-15 
249. IMM-2820-14 N/A PAKISTAN 2014-04-15 
250. IMM-2890-14 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2014-04-17 
251. IMM-2895-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-04-17 
252. IMM-3752-14 HAITI DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 2014-05-07 
253. IMM-3906-14 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2014-05-13 
254. IMM-3935-14 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2014-05-15 
255. IMM-4049-14 SRI LANKA INDIA 2014-05-21 
256. IMM-4250-14 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2014-05-29 
257. IMM-4747-14 RWANDA KENYA 2014-06-10 
258. IMM-5046-14 ERITREA SUDAN 2014-06-25 
259. IMM-5100-14 SRI LANKA MALAYSIA 2014-06-27 
260. IMM-5233-14 IRAN TURKEY 2014-07-04 
261. IMM-5500-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-07-16 
262. IMM-5595-14 N/A PAKISTAN 2014-07-18 
263. IMM-5614-14 SRI LANKA INDONESIA 2014-07-18 
264. IMM-5722-14 N/A N/A 2014-07-24 
265. IMM-5765-14 SOMALIA EGYPT 2014-07-25 
266. IMM-5839-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-07-31 
267. IMM-5900-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-08-01 
268. IMM-5902-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-08-01 
269. IMM-5903-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-08-01 
270. IMM-6075-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-08-12 
271. IMM-6100-14 IRAN JAPAN 2014-08-13 
272. IMM-6254-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-08-22 
273. IMM-6393-14 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2014-09-02 
274. IMM-6481-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-09-05 
275. IMM-6623-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-09-12 
276. IMM-6624-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-09-12 
277. IMM-6677-14 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2014-09-16 
278. IMM-6678-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-09-16 
279. IMM-6802-14 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2014-09-23 
280. IMM-6803-14 N/A N/A 2014-09-23 
281. IMM-6917-14 ERITREA SUDAN 2014-09-30 
282. IMM-7467-14 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2014-10-31 
283. IMM-7501-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-11-03 
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284. IMM-7502-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-11-04 
285. IMM-7655-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-11-12 
286. IMM-7718-14 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2014-11-17 
287. IMM-7734-14 SOMALIA MALTA 2014-11-17 
288. IMM-7735-14 ERITREA MALTA 2014-11-17 
289. IMM-7738-14 ERITREA MALTA 2014-11-17 
290. IMM-7744-14 N/A N/A 2014-11-17 
291. IMM-7745-14 AFGHANISTAN TADJIKISTAN 2014-11-17 
292. IMM-7739-14 ERITREA MALTA 2014-11-17 
293. IMM-7760-14 ERITREA SUDAN 2014-11-18 
294. IMM-7828-14 ERITREA ETHIOPIA 2014-11-20 
295. IMM-8297-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-12-19 
296. IMM-8333-14 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2014-12-19 
297. IMM-8334-14 ETHIOPIA KENYA 2014-12-19 
298. IMM-226-15 RWANDA KENYA 2015-01-15 
299. IMM-263-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-01-20 
300. IMM-275-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-01-20 
301. IMM-309-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-01-22 
302. IMM-909-15 IRAQ TURKEY 2015-02-24 
303. IMM-1095-15 ETHIOPIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-03-05 
304. IMM-1097-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-03-05 
305. IMM-1096-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-03-05 
306. IMM-1118-15 SOMALIA KENYA 2015-03-06 
307. IMM-1126-15 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2015-03-06 
308. IMM-1124-15 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2015-03-06 
309. IMM-1201-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-03-11 
310. IMM-1221-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-03-12 
311. IMM-1222-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-03-12 
312. IMM-1213-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-03-12 
313. IMM-1223-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-03-12 
314. IMM-1265-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-03-16 
315. IMM-1264-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-03-16 
316. IMM-1476-15 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2015-03-26 
317. IMM-1557-15 SOMALIA KENYA 2015-03-31 
318. IMM-1671-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-04-09 
319. IMM-1866-15 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2015-04-22 
320. IMM-1955-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-04-27 
321. IMM-2013-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-04-30 
322. IMM-2066-15 ETHIOPIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-05-04 
323. IMM-2119-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-05-06 
324. IMM-2136-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-05-07 
325. IMM-2158-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-05-08 
326. IMM-2188-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-05-11 
327. IMM-2249-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-05-14 
328. IMM-2266-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-05-15 
329. IMM-2342-15 ETHIOPIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-05-20 
330. IMM-2402-15 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2015-05-22 
331. IMM-2531-15 ERITREA ISRAEL 2015-05-29 
332. IMM-2614-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-04 
333. IMM-2611-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-04 
334. IMM-2613-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-04 
335. IMM-2612-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-04 
336. IMM-2646-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-06-05 
337. IMM-2807-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-16 
338. IMM-2805-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-16 
339. IMM-2799-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-06-16 
340. IMM-2893-15 SOMALIA MALAYSIA 2015-06-19 
341. IMM-3043-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-06-30 
342. IMM-3212-15 ERITREA SAUDI ARABIA 2015-07-13 
343. IMM-3211-15 ERITREA SAUDI ARABIA 2015-07-13 
344. IMM-3213-15 ERITREA SAUDI ARABIA 2015-07-13 
345. IMM-3215-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-07-13 
346. IMM-3210-15 ERITREA SUDAN 2015-07-13 
347. IMM-3272-15 ERITREA ISRAEL 2015-07-16 
348. IMM-3315-15 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2015-07-20 
349. IMM-3314-15 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2015-07-20 
350. IMM-3370-15 IRAQ CYPRUS 2015-07-22 
351. IMM-3406-15 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2015-07-24 
352. IMM-3409-15 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2015-07-24 
353. IMM-3410-15 SOMALIA DJIBOUTI 2015-07-24 
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355. IMM-3407-15 SOMALIA ETHIOPIA 2015-07-24 
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363. IMM-3458-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-07-28 
364. IMM-3456-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-07-28 
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369. IMM-3756-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-08-17 
370. IMM-3762-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-08-17 
371. IMM-3924-15 SYRIA LEBANON 2015-08-27 
372. IMM-3933-15 RWANDA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-08-27 
373. IMM-3934-15 RWANDA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-08-27 
374. IMM-3964-15 RWANDA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-08-31 
375. IMM-3963-15 DRC SOUTH AFRICA 2015-08-31 
376. IMM-3972-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-08-31 
377. IMM-3962-15 DRC SOUTH AFRICA 2015-08-31 
378. IMM-4010-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-09-02 
379. IMM-4154-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-09-14 
380. IMM-4297-15 IRAQ JORDAN 2015-09-21 
381. IMM-4354-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-09-24 
382. IMM-4400-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-09-29 
383. IMM-4782-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-10-26 
384. IMM-4804-15 SOMALIA SAUDI ARABIA 2015-10-27 
385. IMM-4881-15 SOMALIA GHANA 2015-10-30 
386. IMM-4927-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-11-03 
387. IMM-4953-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-11-05 
388. IMM-5037-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-11-10 
389. IMM-5108-15 SOMALIA GHANA 2015-11-13 
390. IMM-5107-15 SOMALIA GHANA 2015-11-13 
391. IMM-5087-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-11-23 
392. IMM-5248-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-11-23 
393. IMM-5343-15 NEPAL THAILAND 2015-11-27 
394. IMM-5360-15 SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA 2015-11-30 
395. IMM-5349-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-11-30 
396. IMM-5468-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-12-07 
397. IMM-5557-15 ERITREA ISRAEL 2015-12-11 
398. IMM-5655-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-12-17 
399. IMM-5656-15 AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA 2015-12-17 
400. IMM-5732-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-12-21 
401. IMM-5794-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-12-23 
402. IMM-5820-15 AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN 2015-12-23 
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